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Background to the Inquiry 
On 20 November 2013, the Treasurer, the Hon. Joe Hockey MP, released a draft terms 
of reference for the Financial System Inquiry (the Inquiry) for consultation with 
interested stakeholders. 
After completing this consultation process on 20 December 2013, the Treasurer 
released the final terms of reference and appointed a Committee, independent of 
Government, to undertake this task. The members of the Committee are listed on the 
following pages. 
The Committee was charged with examining how the financial system could be 
positioned to best meet Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic 
growth. 
On 24 March 2014, the Treasurer appointed an International Advisory Panel 
(the Panel) to the Inquiry. The Panel’s role was to provide the Inquiry with an expert 
perspective on aspects of the terms of reference, including technological change, 
Australia’s global competitiveness and offshore regulatory frameworks. The members 
of the Panel are also on the following pages. 
Financial System Inquiry Terms of Reference 
Objectives 
The Inquiry is charged with examining how the financial system could be positioned 
to best meet Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic growth. 
Recommendations will be made that foster an efficient, competitive and flexible 
financial system, consistent with financial stability, prudence, public confidence and 
capacity to meet the needs of users. 
Terms of reference 
1. The Inquiry will report on the consequences of developments in the Australian 
financial system since the 1997 Financial System Inquiry and the global financial 
crisis, including implications for: 
1. how Australia funds its growth; 
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Financial System Inquiry Terms of Reference (cont.) 
2. domestic competition and international competitiveness; and 
3. the current cost, quality, safety and availability of financial services, 
products and capital for users. 
2. The Inquiry will refresh the philosophy, principles and objectives underpinning 
the development of a well-functioning financial system, including: 
1. balancing competition, innovation, efficiency, stability and consumer 
protection;  
2. how financial risk is allocated and systemic risk is managed; 
3. assessing the effectiveness and need for financial regulation, including its 
impact on costs, flexibility, innovation, industry and among users; 
4. the role of Government; and 
5. the role, objectives, funding and performance of financial regulators 
including an international comparison. 
3. The Inquiry will identify and consider the emerging opportunities and 
challenges that are likely to drive further change in the global and domestic 
financial system, including:  
1. the role and impact of new technologies, market innovations and changing 
consumer preferences and demography; 
2.  international integration, including international financial regulation; 
3. changes in the way Australia sources and distributes capital, including the 
intermediation of savings through banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
insurance companies, superannuation funds and capital markets; 
4. changing organisational structures in the financial sector; 
5. corporate governance structures across the financial system and how they 
affect stakeholder interests; and 
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4. The Inquiry will recommend policy options that: 
1. promote a competitive and stable financial system that contributes to 
Australia’s productivity growth; 
2. promote the efficient allocation of capital and cost efficient access and 
services for users; 
3. meet the needs of users with appropriate financial products and services; 
4. create an environment conducive to dynamic and innovative financial 
service providers; and 
5. relate to other matters that fall within this terms of reference. 
5. The Inquiry will take account of the regulation of the general operation of 
companies and trusts to the extent this impinges on the efficiency and effective 
allocation of capital within the financial system. 
6. The Inquiry will examine the taxation of financial arrangements, products or 
institutions to the extent these impinge on the efficient and effective allocation of 
capital by the financial system, and provide observations that could inform the 
Tax White Paper. 
7. In reaching its conclusions, the Inquiry will take account of, but not make 
recommendations on the objectives and procedures of the Reserve Bank in its 
conduct of monetary policy. 
8. The Inquiry may invite submissions and seek information from any persons or 
bodies. 
The Inquiry will consult extensively both domestically and globally. It will publish 
an interim report in mid-2014 setting out initial findings and seek public feedback. 
A final report is to be provided to the Treasurer by November 2014. 
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Executive summary 
This report responds to the objective in the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference to best 
position Australia’s financial system to meet Australia’s evolving needs and support 
economic growth. It offers a blueprint for an efficient and resilient financial system 
over the next 10 to 20 years, characterised by the fair treatment of users. 
The Inquiry has made 44 recommendations relating to the Australian financial system. 
These recommendations reflect the Inquiry’s judgement and are based on evidence 
received by the Inquiry. The Inquiry’s test has been one of public interest: the interests 
of individuals, businesses, the economy, taxpayers and Government. 
Australia’s financial system has performed well since the Wallis Inquiry and has many 
strong characteristics. It also has a number of weaknesses: taxation and regulatory 
settings distort the flow of funding to the real economy; it remains susceptible to 
financial shocks; superannuation is not delivering retirement incomes efficiently; 
unfair consumer outcomes remain prevalent; and policy settings do not focus on the 
benefits of competition and innovation. As a result, the system is prone to calls for 
more regulation. 
To put these issues in context, the Overview first deals with the characteristics of 
Australia’s economy. It then describes the characteristics of and prerequisites for a 
well-functioning financial system and the Inquiry’s philosophy of financial regulation. 
The Inquiry focuses on seven themes in this report (summarised in Guide to the 
Financial System Inquiry Final Report). The Overview deals with the general themes of 
funding the Australian economy and competition. 
The Inquiry has also made recommendations on five specific themes, which comprise 
the next chapters of this report: 
• Strengthen the economy by making the financial system more resilient. 
• Lift the value of the superannuation system and retirement incomes. 
• Drive economic growth and productivity through settings that promote innovation. 
• Enhance confidence and trust by creating an environment in which financial firms 
treat customers fairly. 
• Enhance regulator independence and accountability, and minimise the need for 
future regulation. 
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These recommendations seek to improve efficiency, resilience and fair treatment in the 
Australian financial system, allowing it to achieve its potential in supporting economic 
growth and enhancing standards of living for current and future generations. 
Guide to the Financial System Inquiry Final Report 
 
Overview and general themes 
The Inquiry has taken into account important features of Australia’s economy. 
Australia has an open, market-based economy and is a net importer of capital. The 
Australian economy faces a considerable productivity challenge, and the Australian 
population, like many around the world, is ageing. Finally, Australia is in the midst of 




Characteristics of an effective financial system 
The financial sector plays a vital role in supporting a vibrant, growing economy that 
improves the standard of living for all Australians. The system’s ultimate purpose is to 
facilitate sustainable growth in the economy by meeting the financial needs of its users. 
The Inquiry believes the financial system will achieve this goal if it operates in a 
manner that is: 
• Efficient: An efficient system allocates Australia’s scarce financial and other 
resources for the greatest possible benefit to our economy, supporting growth, 
productivity and prosperity. 
• Resilient: The financial system should adjust to changing circumstances while 
continuing to provide its core economic functions, even during severe shocks. 
Institutions in distress should be resolvable with minimal costs to depositors, policy 
holders, taxpayers and the real economy. 
• Fair: Fair treatment occurs where participants act with integrity, honesty, 
transparency and non-discrimination. A market economy operates more effectively 
where participants enter into transactions with confidence they will be treated 
fairly. 
Confidence and trust in the system are essential ingredients in building an efficient, 
resilient and fair financial system that facilitates economic growth and meets the 
financial needs of Australians. The Inquiry considers that all financial system 
participants have roles and responsibilities in engendering that confidence and trust. 
The Inquiry’s approach to financial system regulation 
Central to the Inquiry’s philosophy is the principle that the financial system should be 
subject and responsive to market forces, including competition.  
However, competitive markets need to operate within a strong and effective legal and 
policy framework provided by Government. This includes predictable rule of law with 
strong property rights; a freely convertible floating currency and free flow of trade, 
investment and capital across borders; a strong fiscal position; a sound and 
independent monetary policy framework; and an effective, accountable and 
transparent government. 
The Inquiry’s approach to policy intervention is guided by the public interest. Given 
the inevitable trade-offs involved, deciding how and when policy makers should 
intervene in the financial system requires considerable judgement. Intervention should 
seek to balance efficiency, resilience and fairness in a way that builds participants’ 
confidence and trust. Intervention should only occur where its benefits to the economy 
as a whole outweigh its costs, and should always seek to be proportionate and cost 
sensitive. 
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General themes 
The Inquiry identified two general themes where there is significant scope to improve 
the functioning of the financial system: 
1. Funding the Australian economy. 
2. Competition. 
Funding the Australian economy 
The core function of the Australian financial system is to facilitate the funding of 
sustainable economic growth and enhance productivity in the Australian economy. 
The Inquiry believes Government’s role in funding markets should generally be 
neutral regarding the channel, direction, source and size of the flow of funds. 
The Inquiry identified a number of distortions that impede the efficient market 
allocation of financial resources, including taxation, information imbalances and 
unnecessary regulation. Reducing the distortionary effects of taxation should lead the 
system to allocate savings (including foreign savings) more efficiently and price risk 
more accurately. The Inquiry has referred the identified tax issues for consideration in 
the Tax White Paper. 
A number of the Inquiry’s recommendations aim to assist small and medium-sized 
enterprises in obtaining better access to funding. To strengthen Australia’s ability to 
continue to access funding, both domestically and from offshore sources, 
recommendations have been made to improve the resilience of the Australian financial 
system. More broadly, given that Australia’s growing superannuation system will 
have an increasing influence on future funding flows, the Inquiry believes that the 
recommendations it has made to improve the efficiency of the superannuation system 
would also enhance financial system funding efficiency. 
Competition 
Competition and competitive markets are at the heart of the Inquiry’s philosophy for 
the financial system. The Inquiry sees them as the primary means of supporting the 
system’s efficiency. Although the Inquiry considers competition is generally adequate, 
the high concentration and increasing vertical integration in some parts of the 
Australian financial system has the potential to limit the benefits of competition in the 
future and should be proactively monitored over time. 
The Inquiry’s approach to encouraging competition is to seek to remove impediments 
to its development. The Inquiry has made recommendations to amend the regulatory 
system, including: narrowing the differences in risk weights in mortgage lending; 
considering a competitive mechanism to allocate members to more efficient 
superannuation funds; and ensuring regulators are more sensitive to the effects of their 
decisions on competition, international competitiveness and the free flow of capital. 
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In particular, the state of competition in the financial system should be reviewed every 
three years, including assessing changes in barriers to international competition. 
Recommendations relating to funding and competition are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Funding the Australian economy and competition recommendations 
Funding the Australian economy 
Number Description 
– Tax observations 
18 Crowdfunding 
19 Data access and use 
20 Comprehensive credit reporting 
33 Retail corporate bond market 
Competition 
Number Description 
2 Narrow mortgage risk weight differences 
10 Improving efficiency during accumulation 
14 Collaboration to enable innovation 
15 Digital identity 
16 Clearer graduated payments regulation 
18 Crowdfunding 
19 Data access and use 
20 Comprehensive credit reporting 
27 Regulator accountability 
30 Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial system 
39 Technology neutrality 
42 Managed investment scheme regulation 
Chapter 1: Resilience 
Historically, Australia has maintained a strong and stable financial system supported 
by effective stability settings. However, the Australian financial system has 
characteristics that give rise to particular risks, including its high interconnectivity 
domestically and with the rest of the world, and its dependence on importing capital. 
More can be done to strengthen the resilience of Australia’s financial system to avoid 
or limit the costs of future financial crises, which can deeply damage an economy and 
have lasting effects on people’s lives. 
As the banking sector is at the core of the Australian financial system, its safety is of 
paramount importance. Australia should aim to have financial institutions with the 
strength to not only withstand plausible shocks but to continue to provide critical 
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economic functions, such as credit and payment services, in the face of these shocks. 
Adhering to international regulatory norms will help ensure Australian financial 
institutions and markets are not disadvantaged in raising funds in international 
financial markets. 
The Inquiry’s recommendations to improve resilience aim to: 
• Strengthen policy settings that lower the probability of failure, including setting 
Australian bank capital ratios such that they are unquestionably strong by being in 
the top quartile of internationally active banks. 
• Reduce the costs of failure, including by ensuring authorised deposit-taking 
institutions maintain sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity to allow 
effective resolution with limited risk to taxpayer funds — in line with international 
practice. 
These recommendations seek to ensure that Australia’s financial system remains 
resilient into the future, and that it continues to provide its core economic functions, 
even in times of financial stress. These recommendations should also produce 
efficiency benefits, including through reducing implicit guarantees and volatility in the 
economy and promoting confidence and trust. 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes 
Australia’s superannuation system is large by international standards and has grown 
rapidly since the Wallis Inquiry, primarily as a result of Government policy settings.  
An efficient superannuation system is critical to help Australia meet the economic and 
fiscal challenges of an ageing population. The system has considerable strengths. It 
plays an important role in providing long-term funding for economic activity in 
Australia both directly and indirectly through funding financial institutions, and it 
contributed to the stability of the financial system and the economy during the global 
financial crisis. 
However, the superannuation system is not operationally efficient due to a lack of 
strong price-based competition. Superannuation assets are not being efficiently 
converted into retirement incomes due to a lack of risk pooling and over-reliance on 
individual account-based pensions.  
The Inquiry’s recommendations to strengthen the superannuation system aim to: 
• Set a clear objective for the superannuation system to provide income in retirement. 
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• Improve long-term net returns for members by introducing a formal competitive 
process to allocate new workforce entrants to high-performing superannuation 
funds, unless the Stronger Super reforms prove effective. 
• Meet the needs of retirees better by requiring superannuation trustees to pre-select 
a comprehensive income product in retirement for members to receive their 
benefits, unless members choose to take their benefits in another way. 
These recommendations seek to improve the outcomes for superannuation fund 
members and help Australia to manage the challenges of an ageing population. 
Chapter 3: Innovation 
Technology-driven innovation is transforming the financial system, as evidenced by 
the emergence of new business models and products, and substantial investment in 
areas such as mobile banking, cloud computing and payment services. 
Although innovation has the potential to deliver significant efficiency benefits and 
improve system outcomes, it also brings risks. Consumers, businesses and government 
can be adversely affected by new developments, which may also challenge regulatory 
frameworks and regulators’ ability to respond. 
The Inquiry believes the innovative potential of Australia’s financial system and 
broader economy can be supported by taking action to ensure policy settings facilitate 
future innovation that benefits consumers, businesses and government. 
The Inquiry’s recommendations to facilitate innovation aim to: 
• Encourage industry and government to work together to identify innovation 
opportunities and emerging network benefits where government may need to 
facilitate industry coordination and action. 
• Strengthen Australia’s digital identity framework through the development of a 
national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital identities. 
• Remove unnecessary regulatory impediments to innovation, particularly in the 
payments system and in fundraising for small businesses. 
• Enable the development of data-driven business models through holding a 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into the costs and benefits of increasing access to 
and improving the use of private and public sector data. 
These recommendations will contribute to developing a dynamic, competitive, 
growth-oriented and forward-looking financial system for Australia. 
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Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes 
Fundamental to fair treatment is the concept that financial products and services 
should perform in the way that consumers expect or are led to believe. 
The current framework is not sufficient to deliver fair treatment to consumers. The 
most significant problems relate to shortcomings in disclosure and financial advice, 
which means some consumers are sold financial products that are not suited to their 
needs and circumstances. Although the regime should not be expected to prevent all 
consumer losses, self-regulatory and regulatory changes are needed to strengthen 
financial firms’ accountability. 
The Inquiry’s recommendations to improve consumer outcomes aim to: 
• Improve the design and distribution of financial products through strengthening 
product issuer and distributor accountability, and through implementing a new 
temporary product intervention power for the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC). 
• Further align the interests of firms and consumers, and improve standards of 
financial advice, by lifting competency and increasing transparency regarding 
financial advice. 
• Empower consumers by encouraging industry to harness technology and develop 
more innovative and useful forms of disclosure. 
These recommendations seek to strengthen the current framework to promote 
consumer trust in the system and fair treatment of consumers. 
Chapter 5: Regulatory system 
Australia needs strong, independent and accountable regulators to help maintain 
confidence and trust in the financial system, thereby attracting investment and 
supporting growth. This requires proactive regulators with the right skills, culture, 
powers and funding. 
Australia’s regulatory architecture does not need major change; however, the Inquiry 
has made recommendations to improve the current arrangements. Government 
currently lacks a regular process that allows it to assess the overall performance of 
financial regulators. Regulators’ funding arrangements and enforcement tools have 
some significant weaknesses, particularly in the case of ASIC. In addition, it is not clear 
whether adequate consideration is currently given to competition and efficiency in 
designing and applying regulation.  
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The Inquiry’s recommendations to refine Australia’s regulatory system and keep it 
fit for purpose aim to: 
• Improve the accountability framework governing Australia’s financial sector 
regulators by establishing a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board to review 
their performance annually. 
• Ensure Australia’s regulators have the funding, skills and regulatory tools to 
deliver their mandates effectively. 
• Rebalance the regulatory focus towards competition by including an explicit 
requirement to consider competition in ASIC’s mandate and conduct three-yearly 
external reviews of the state of competition. 
• Improve the process for implementing new financial regulations. 
These recommendations seek to make Australia’s financial regulators more effective, 
adaptable and accountable. 
Appendix 1: Significant matters 
In addition to the recommendations in the above areas, the Inquiry has made 
13 recommendations relating to other significant matters. These are contained in 
Appendix 1: Significant matters. 
Appendix 2: Tax summary 
A number of tax observations are included in Appendix 2: Tax summary for 
consideration by the Tax White Paper. 
Recommendations 
The Inquiry has made 44 recommendations relating to the Australian financial system. 
The nature of some recommendations warrants more in-depth discussion. These 
recommendations are shaded darker in the Summary of recommendations by chapter 
tables on the following pages. The Inquiry considers that the remaining 
recommendations in the body of the report can be made without providing the reader 
with the same depth of explanation. Recommendations contained in Appendix 1: 
Significant matters are only explained briefly. 
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Summary of recommendations by chapter 
Chapter 1: Resilience (pages 33–88) 
Number Description 
1 Capital levels 
Set capital standards such that Australian authorised deposit-taking 
institution capital ratios are unquestionably strong. 
2 Narrow mortgage risk weight differences 
Raise the average internal ratings-based (IRB) mortgage risk weight to 
narrow the difference between average mortgage risk weights for 
authorised deposit-taking institutions using IRB risk-weight models and 
those using standardised risk weights. 
3 Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity 
Implement a framework for minimum loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity in line with emerging international practice, sufficient to facilitate 
the orderly resolution of Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions 
and minimise taxpayer support. 
4 Transparent reporting 
Develop a reporting template for Australian authorised deposit-taking 
institution capital ratios that is transparent against the minimum Basel 
capital framework. 
5 Crisis management toolkit 
Complete the existing processes for strengthening crisis management 
powers that have been on hold pending the outcome of the Inquiry. 
6 Financial Claims Scheme 
Maintain the ex post funding structure of the Financial Claims Scheme for 
authorised deposit-taking institutions. 
7 Leverage ratio 
Introduce a leverage ratio that acts as a backstop to authorised 
deposit-taking institutions’ risk-weighted capital positions. 
8 Direct borrowing by superannuation funds 
Remove the exception to the general prohibition on direct borrowing for 




Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes (pages 89–142) 
Number Description 
9 Objectives of the superannuation system 
Seek broad political agreement for, and enshrine in legislation, the 
objectives of the superannuation system and report publicly on how policy 
proposals are consistent with achieving these objectives over the long 
term. 
10 Improving efficiency during accumulation 
Introduce a formal competitive process to allocate new default fund 
members to MySuper products, unless a review by 2020 concludes that 
the Stronger Super reforms have been effective in significantly improving 
competition and efficiency in the superannuation system. 
11 The retirement phase of superannuation 
Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income 
product for members’ retirement. The product would commence on the 
member’s instruction, or the member may choose to take their benefits in 
another way. Impediments to product development should be removed. 
12 Choice of fund 
Provide all employees with the ability to choose the fund into which their 
Superannuation Guarantee contributions are paid. 
13 Governance of superannuation funds 
Mandate a majority of independent directors on the board of corporate 
trustees of public offer superannuation funds, including an independent 
chair; align the director penalty regime with managed investment schemes; 
and strengthen the conflict of interest requirements. 
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Chapter 3: Innovation (pages 143–192) 
Number Description 
14 Collaboration to enable innovation 
Establish a permanent public–private sector collaborative committee, the 
‘Innovation Collaboration’, to facilitate financial system innovation and 
enable timely and coordinated policy and regulatory responses. 
15 Digital identity 
Develop a national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital 
identities. 
16 Clearer graduated payments regulation 
Enhance graduation of retail payments regulation by clarifying thresholds 
for regulation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Strengthen consumer protection by mandating the ePayments Code. 
Introduce a separate prudential regime with two tiers for purchased 
payment facilities. 
17 Interchange fees and customer surcharging 
Improve interchange fee regulation by clarifying thresholds for when they 
apply, broadening the range of fees and payments they apply to, and 
lowering interchange fees. 
Improve surcharging regulation by expanding its application and ensuring 
customers using lower-cost payment methods cannot be over-surcharged 
by allowing more prescriptive limits on surcharging. 
18 Crowdfunding 
Graduate fundraising regulation to facilitate crowdfunding for both debt and 
equity and, over time, other forms of financing. 
19 Data access and use 
Review the costs and benefits of increasing access to and improving the 
use of data, taking into account community concerns about appropriate 
privacy protections. 
20 Comprehensive credit reporting 
Support industry efforts to expand credit data sharing under the new 
voluntary comprehensive credit reporting regime. If, over time, participation 





Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes (pages 193–232) 
Number Description 
21 Strengthen product issuer and distributor accountability 
Introduce a targeted and principles-based product design and distribution 
obligation. 
22 Introduce product intervention power 
Introduce a proactive product intervention power that would enhance the 
regulatory toolkit available where there is risk of significant consumer 
detriment. 
23 Facilitate innovative disclosure 
Remove regulatory impediments to innovative product disclosure and 
communication with consumers, and improve the way risk and fees are 
communicated to consumers. 
24 Align the interests of financial firms and consumers 
Better align the interests of financial firms with those of consumers by 
raising industry standards, enhancing the power to ban individuals from 
management and ensuring remuneration structures in life insurance and 
stockbroking do not affect the quality of financial advice. 
25 Raise the competency of advisers 
Raise the competency of financial advice providers and introduce an 
enhanced register of advisers. 
26 Improve guidance and disclosure in general insurance 
Improve guidance (including tools and calculators) and disclosure for 
general insurance, especially in relation to home insurance. 
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Chapter 5: Regulatory system (pages 233–260) 
Number Description 
27 Regulator accountability 
Create a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board to advise 
Government annually on how financial regulators have implemented their 
mandates. 
Provide clearer guidance to regulators in Statements of Expectation and 
increase the use of performance indicators for regulator performance. 
28 Execution of mandate 
Provide regulators with more stable funding by adopting a three-year 
funding model based on periodic funding reviews, increase their capacity 
to pay competitive remuneration, boost flexibility in respect of staffing and 
funding, and require them to undertake periodic capability reviews. 
29 Strengthening the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s funding and powers 
Introduce an industry funding model for the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) and provide ASIC with stronger 
regulatory tools. 
30 Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial system 
Review the state of competition in the sector every three years, improve 
reporting of how regulators balance competition against their core 
objectives, identify barriers to cross-border provision of financial services 
and include consideration of competition in the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission’s mandate. 
31 Compliance costs and policy processes 
Increase the time available for industry to implement complex regulatory 
change. 





Appendix 1: Significant matters (pages 261–276) 
Number Description 
32 Impact investment 
Explore ways to facilitate development of the impact investment market 
and encourage innovation in funding social service delivery. 
Provide guidance to superannuation trustees on the appropriateness of 
impact investment. 
Support law reform to classify a private ancillary fund as a ‘sophisticated’ 
or ‘professional’ investor, where the founder of the fund meets those 
definitions. 
33 Retail corporate bond market 
Reduce disclosure requirements for large listed corporates issuing ‘simple’ 
bonds and encourage industry to develop standard terms for ‘simple’ 
bonds. 
34 Unfair contract term provisions 
Support Government’s process to extend unfair contract term protections 
to small businesses. 
Encourage industry to develop standards on the use of non-monetary 
default covenants. 
35 Finance companies 
Clearly differentiate the investment products that finance companies and 
similar entities offer retail consumers from authorised deposit-taking 
institution deposits. 
36 Corporate administration and bankruptcy 
Consult on possible amendments to the external administration regime to 
provide additional flexibility for businesses in financial difficulty. 
37 Superannuation member engagement 
Publish retirement income projections on member statements from defined 
contribution superannuation schemes using Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) regulatory guidance. 
Facilitate access to consolidated superannuation information from the 
Australian Taxation Office to use with ASIC’s and superannuation funds’ 
retirement income projection calculators. 
38 Cyber security 
Update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the threat 
environment, improve cohesion in policy implementation, and progress 
public–private sector and cross-industry collaboration.  
Establish a formal framework for cyber security information sharing and 
response to cyber threats. 
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Appendix 1: Significant matters (pages 261–276) (cont.) 
Number Number 
39 Technology neutrality 
Identify, in consultation with the financial sector, and amend priority 
areas of regulation to be technology neutral. 
Embed consideration of the principle of technology neutrality into 
development processes for future regulation. 
Ensure regulation allows individuals to select alternative methods to 
access services to maintain fair treatment for all consumer segments. 
40 Provision of financial advice and mortgage broking 
Rename ‘general advice’ and require advisers and mortgage brokers to 
disclose ownership structures. 
41 Unclaimed monies 
Define bank accounts and life insurance policies as unclaimed monies 
only if they are inactive for seven years. 
42 Managed investment scheme regulation 
Support Government’s review of the Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee’s recommendations on managed investment 
schemes, giving priority to matters relating to: 
• Consumer detriment, including illiquid schemes and freezing of 
funds. 
• Regulatory architecture impeding cross-border transactions and 
mutual recognition arrangements. 
43 Legacy products 
Introduce a mechanism to facilitate the rationalisation of legacy 
products in the life insurance and managed investments sectors. 
44 Corporations Act 2001 ownership restrictions 
Remove market ownership restrictions from the Corporations Act 2001 
once the current reforms to cross-border regulation of financial market 




This chapter provides an overview of the Financial System Inquiry’s Final Report. It 
sets out the Inquiry’s starting point for considering how the financial system can meet 
Australia’s evolving needs and support sustainable economic growth. This includes 
outlining the Australian context in which the Inquiry has made its recommendations, 
the characteristics of a well-functioning financial system and the Inquiry’s philosophy 
of financial regulation. This chapter discusses the two general themes that permeate 
much of the Inquiry’s thinking: the effectiveness of the financial system in funding the 
economy and the importance of competition in the financial system. It also provides a 
brief summary of the five specific themes detailed in the remaining chapters of this 
report. 
Figure 1: Guide to the Financial System Inquiry Final Report 
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The Australian context 
In assessing priority areas of financial sector reform, the Inquiry has taken into account 
the following characteristics of the Australian economy: 
• Australia is an open market-based economy. The Australian financial system is 
predominantly privately owned and operates according to market principles. 
• Australia is, and is likely to continue to be, a substantial net importer of capital. 
Australia has a relatively small but well-educated and skilled population. It has 
significant endowments of natural resources that cannot be fully utilised without 
foreign investment. Ongoing access to foreign funding has enabled Australia to 
sustain higher growth than it otherwise could. The financial system has an 
important role in facilitating funding from, and investing in, offshore capital 
markets. 
• The structure of the Australian economy will continue to evolve, as seen in the 
shift from mining-led investment to broader activities in non-mining sectors. The 
financial system plays an important role in assisting the economy as it adapts to 
such changes by facilitating the reallocation of financial resources. 
• The Australian population, like many around the world, is ageing. This trend is 
likely to result in a lower proportion of the population being of working age, 
dampening long-term economic growth and placing greater fiscal pressures on 
governments. In this environment, a well-functioning superannuation system will 
be important in alleviating these pressures and ensuring good outcomes for 
retirees. 
• The Australian economy faces a considerable productivity challenge. Compared 
with the last decade, productivity growth will need to be stronger to maintain 
Australia’s living standards, as our terms of trade continue their expected decline 
and the population ages. The financial system plays an important role in facilitating 
productivity growth by funding the economy more efficiently, including funding 
new businesses and using new technology. 
• With the advent of digital technology, Australia is in the midst of one of the most 
ubiquitous, generally applicable technology changes the world has seen. Its effect 
has been, and continues to be, revolutionary as innovative business models insert 
new competitive tensions into a variety of industries. For the financial system, 
technology-driven innovation will continue to change the financial products offered 
to consumers and the very nature of financial intermediation. 
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• Australian financial system assets have grown from the equivalent of around two 
years’ worth of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997 to more than three 
years’ worth of nominal GDP.1 Compared to international peers, Australia has a 
relatively large financial system.2 In particular, superannuation assets are expected 
to continue to grow and increasingly influence funding flows in the economy. 
• Some sectors of the Australian financial system are concentrated. In particular, the 
banking sector is concentrated, with the four major banks being the largest players 
in many aspects of the financial system and having significant market influence. 
Such concentration creates risks to both the stability and degree of competition in 
the Australian financial system. 
Characteristics of a well-functioning financial system 
The financial system plays a vital role in supporting sustainable economic growth and 
meeting the financial needs of Australians. It does this by facilitating funding, liquidity 
and price discovery, while also providing effective risk management, payment and 
some monitoring services. 
The Inquiry believes the financial system achieves this most effectively when it 
operates in an efficient and resilient manner and treats participants fairly. This occurs 
when participants fulfil their roles and responsibilities in a way that engenders 
confidence and trust in the system. 
The financial industry makes a considerable contribution to employment and 
economic output in Australia. However, the Inquiry believes the focus of financial 
system policy should be primarily on the degree of efficiency, resilience and fairness 
the system achieves in facilitating economic activity, rather than on its size or direct 
contribution (such as through wages and profits) to the economy. 
                                                          
1  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 15. 
2  Note: This comparison is based on the share of gross value-added terms. Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 17-18. 
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Efficiency 
An efficient financial system is fundamental to supporting Australia’s growth and 
productivity. An efficient system allocates Australia’s scarce financial and other 
resources for the greatest possible benefit to our economy, promoting a higher and 
more sustainable rate of productivity, and economic growth. The Inquiry is concerned 
with three distinct, but interrelated, forms of efficiency: 
• Operational efficiency — where financial products and services are delivered in a 
way that minimises costs and maximises value. This largely depends on how 
effectively firms deploy labour, capital and technology, and the regulations with 
which firms comply. Strong competition, both from new entrants and incumbents, 
encourages firms to innovate and increase operational efficiency to survive and 
prosper. This can be seen in the ongoing industry focus on deploying new 
technologies in the Australian financial system to improve the quality and reduce 
the cost of products and services. Good policy-making can also assist operational 
efficiency by providing a stable regulatory environment and well-designed 
regulation that takes into account its likely effect on industry. 
• Allocative efficiency — where the financial system allocates financial resources to 
the most productive and valuable use. Central to achieving allocative efficiency is 
the ability of prices to adjust freely to give participants information about the value 
and risk of various financial products and services. Prices help allocate financial 
resources to productive uses. Prices also help allocate risks to those most willing 
and able to bear them, such as through insurance or derivative contracts. For prices 
to play this role, market participants require access to comprehensive information 
about the risks and expected returns of financial products. Allocative efficiency can 
be hampered by ineffective disclosure, government guarantees (explicit or implicit) 
and tax policies that distort price signals. 
• Dynamic efficiency — where the financial system delivers price signals that induce 
the optimal balance between consumption and saving (deferred consumption). At 
times, policy intervention may be required to overcome behavioural biases that 
impede an economy’s ability to allocate resources with dynamic efficiency. For 
example, Australia’s compulsory superannuation system was introduced, in part, 
to overcome the tendency of individuals to underestimate the value of deferred 
consumption for long periods, such as for retirement. 
Resilience 
Resilience refers to the financial system’s capacity to adjust to both the normal business 
cycle and a severe economic shock. A resilient system does not preclude failure, nor 
necessarily imply price stability. Rather, a resilient system can adjust to changing 
circumstances while continuing to provide core economic functions, even during 
severe but plausible shocks. In a resilient system, individual institutions in distress 
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should be resolvable with minimal costs to depositors, policy holders, taxpayers and 
the real economy. 
Occasional episodes of financial instability are inherent in a market economy and are 
typically associated with asset price volatility, high levels of leverage, under-pricing of 
risks and mismatches between assets and liabilities. History suggests that events of 
instability will continue to occur, but their timing, severity and causes cannot be 
reliably predicted. 
Although Australia’s experience of the global financial crisis (GFC) was not as acute as 
that of other countries — in part because of a strong Commonwealth fiscal position, 
effective monetary policy, ongoing demand for commodity exports and a prudent and 
well-managed financial system — Australia has not always been so well placed. Land 
and property speculation in the 1880s and 1890s led to an economy-wide depression, 
with real per capita GDP falling 20 per cent and around half of the Australian trading 
banks closing.3 During the 1930s depression, a number of financial institutions faced 
depositor runs.4 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an unsustainable boom, primarily in 
the commercial property sector, combined with poor lending practices and associated 
loan defaults, resulted in aggregate bank losses equivalent to one-third of 
shareholders’ funds.5 This led to depositor runs on some institutions and was a 
contributing factor in Australia’s recession at that time.  
Severe financial shocks have broad negative consequences, both for individuals and 
for the general economy. Depositors, policy holders, creditors and shareholders of 
affected institutions can lose money. Credit and risk management services may be 
scaled back. In extreme circumstances, payments mechanisms may break down. 
Confidence in the financial system can evaporate, causing contagion to spread from 
distressed institutions to the rest of the system. General economic growth slows, 
unemployment rises and standards of living fall. 
Australia’s use of offshore funding, while beneficial to economic growth, makes the 
country vulnerable to sudden changes in international investor sentiment. Because of 
this, it is critical that the Australian financial system is resilient. As the cost of offshore 
borrowing is linked to the nation’s credit rating, it is also critical that both federal and 
state governments maintain strong fiscal positions.  
                                                          
3  Maddock, R 2014, ‘Capital markets’ in Ville, S and Withers, G (eds), The Cambridge economic 
history of Australia, Cambridge University Press, page 274. 
4  Fisher, C and Kent, C 1999, Two depressions, one banking collapse, Research discussion paper, 
1999-06, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, pages 13–14. 
5  Gizycki, M and Lowe, P 2000, ‘The Australian Financial System in the 1990s’, paper 
presented at The Australian Economy in the 1990s conference held by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Sydney, 24–25 July, page 181. 
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Fair treatment 
Fair treatment occurs where participants act with integrity, honesty, transparency and 
non-discrimination. A market economy operates more effectively where participants 
enter into transactions with confidence that they will be treated fairly. 
Fair treatment does not involve shielding consumers from responsibility for their 
financial decisions, including for losses and gains from market movements. Some 
investor losses are an inevitable feature of a well-functioning market economy, which 
allows risk-taking in search of a return. 
Behavioural biases and information imbalances6 can be detrimental to both financial 
system participants and system efficiency. Participants, including consumers, have a 
responsibility to accept the outcomes of their financial decisions, but financial firms 
should have regard to these information imbalances in treating their customers fairly. 
Financial firms need to place a high degree of importance on treating customers fairly. 
This includes providing consumers with clear information about risks; competent, 
good-quality financial advice that takes account of their circumstances; and access to 
timely and low-cost alternative dispute resolution and an effective judicial system. 
Roles and responsibilities of participants 
Confidence and trust are essential ingredients in building an efficient, resilient and fair 
financial system that facilitates economic growth and meets the financial needs of 
Australians. However, confidence and trust cannot be prescribed in legislation. Rather, 
the Inquiry expects participants to fulfil the following roles and responsibilities in a 
way that engenders confidence and trust: 
• Consumers are generally best placed to make financial decisions that meet their 
financial needs and have a responsibility to accept the outcomes of those decisions 
when they have been treated fairly. 
• Businesses,7 both small and large, should be able to access funding and take 
productive risks to reap commercial rewards. The outcomes from these ventures 
should be shared according to well-defined and enforceable contractual terms. 
Businesses should not be prevented from failing, nor guaranteed access to private 
financial services on non market based terms. 
                                                          
6  In economic terms, ‘information asymmetries’. These occur when two parties entering into a 
transaction do not have the same level of information, placing one at an advantage over the 
other. 
7  This includes financial firms. 
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• Financial firms (banks, insurers, financial advisers, superannuation trustees, 
responsible entities, lenders, brokers etc.) should act in the interests of their legal 
beneficiaries. Financial firms should earn the confidence and trust of customers by 
complying with their legal obligations and considering community expectations, 
thus limiting or avoiding the need for more prescriptive or interventionist 
regulation. 
• Regulators are responsible for discharging their mandate and exercising their 
judgement to the standards of the civil service. To be effective, regulators should be 
independent and accountable, and have access to the appropriate regulatory tools 
and resources. 
• Governments are responsible for setting policy that enables the financial system to 
facilitate sustainable growth and meet the financial needs of Australians, while 
minimising risk to taxpayers’ funds. Governments have an obligation to act in the 
long-term national interest, rather than using the financial system for short-term 
political gain.8 
Culture of financial firms 
Since the GFC, a persistent theme of international political and regulatory discourse 
has been the breakdown in financial firms’ behaviour in failing to balance risk and 
reward appropriately and in treating their customers unfairly. Without a culture 
supporting appropriate risk-taking and the fair treatment of consumers, financial firms 
will continue to fall short of community expectations. This may lead to ongoing 
political pressure for additional financial system regulation and the undermining of 
confidence and trust in the financial system.  
An organisation’s culture reflects its accumulated knowledge, beliefs and values in a 
way that sets norms for the behaviour of its employees and their decision making. 
Organisational objectives, business strategies and systems all influence employees’ 
behaviour, which reflects on an organisation’s culture. Leaders and their governing 
bodies determine organisational culture through their own conduct and design of 
objectives, strategies and systems. This creates competitive advantage. 
The Inquiry considers that industry should raise awareness of the consequences of its 
culture and professional standards, recognising that, responsibility for culture in the 
financial system ultimately rests with individual firms and the industry as a whole. 
Culture is a set of beliefs and values that should not be prescribed in legislation. To 
expect regulators to create the ‘right’ culture within firms by using prescriptive rules is 
likely to lead to over-regulation, unnecessary compliance cost and a lessoning of 
                                                          
8  For a discussion of the potential for financial system policy to be influenced by political 
interests, see, for example, Calomiris, C and Haber, S 2014, Fragile by Design: Political Origins 
of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
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competition. The responsibility for setting organisational culture rightly rests with its 
leadership. 
The Inquiry’s approach to financial system regulation 
The starting point for the Inquiry’s approach to examining the role of Government in 
the financial system is the Wallis Inquiry’s philosophy of regulation.9 Insights 
provided by academic research and practical experience since then have advanced the 
Inquiry’s understanding of the financial system. Critically, this new understanding has 
reduced the Inquiry’s confidence in the inherent efficiency and stability of financial 
markets10 and increased its understanding of the financial system as a complex, 
adaptive network.11 Box 1: Implications of developments since the Wallis Inquiry 
summarises the implications of some developments since the Wallis Inquiry. 
Box 1: Implications of developments since the Wallis Inquiry  
Developments since the Wallis Inquiry Lessons for this Inquiry 
The GFC has again demonstrated that 
financial systems are prone to 
instability and that the resulting 
financial failure can have a significant 
cost to taxpayers, economic output and 
employment. 
Australia remains susceptible to financial 
crises, including from the dislocation of 
international markets. A resilient system 
is required to bolster stability, prevent an 
increase in moral hazard and reduce risk 
to taxpayers. 
The Australian financial system is part 
of a global economy increasingly 
influenced by Asia. It is affected by the 
increasing scope and complexity of 
cross-border financial regulation as well 
as other broader economic changes. 
Policy making should be coordinated, 
more accountable and better 
implemented to deal with changes in 
global regulation and in the financial 
systems of our major trading partners. 
                                                          
9  Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, Canberra, Chapter 5 
— Philosophy of Financial Regulation. 
10  A recent survey of some of this research is provided by Brunnermeier, M, Eisenbach, T and 
Sannikov, Y 2013, ‘Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey’, in Acemoglu, D, 
Arellano, M and Dekel, E (eds.) 2013, Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Tenth World 
Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume II: Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, pages 4–94. See also Allen, F, Babus, A, Carletti, E 2009, ‘Financial Crises: Theory 
and Evidence‘, Annual Review of Financial Economics, volume 1, pages 97–116. 
11  See, for example, Haldane, A 2009 Rethinking the financial network, speech to the Financial 
Student Association Amsterdam, 28 April.  
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Box 1: Implications of developments since the Wallis Inquiry (cont.) 
Developments since the Wallis Inquiry Lessons for this Inquiry 
Behavioural biases undermine the 
assumption that individuals are 
‘rational’. They limit the efficacy of 
disclosure as a regulatory tool and can 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes for 
consumers.12 
Although disclosure remains a valuable 
tool to improve consumer outcomes, it 
should not be relied on in isolation. 
Rapid technological innovation brings 
opportunities to improve user outcomes 
and system efficiency, but also raises 
new risks and challenges. 
Policy settings should facilitate 
innovation and accommodate market 
developments where these improve 
system efficiency and user outcomes. 
General acceptance that, in a severe 
financial crisis, governments (and 
taxpayers) may play a role in protecting 
the real economy. 
To avoid moral hazard, regulatory 
settings should reduce the likelihood of 
Government support being required. 
However, Government should maintain 
a strong fiscal position with the capacity 
to provide this support in extreme 
circumstances. 
The central role of market forces 
Central to the Inquiry’s philosophy is that the financial system should be subject, and 
responsive, to market forces, including competition. This is based on the Inquiry’s 
view that the private sector is best placed to make decisions affecting the efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Competition remains the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system and is 
generally preferred to government intervention.13 Competition drives efficient 
outcomes for price, quality and innovation. However, the Inquiry recognises that 
competition alone does not always deliver the best balance between efficiency, 
resilience and fair treatment. 
                                                          
12  See, for example, Kahneman, D 2011, Thinking Fast and Slow, Penguin Books Ltd, London. 
13  Intervention is defined as including regulation, legislation, guidance, general supervision 
and enforcement. 
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Government prerequisites 
Competitive markets need to operate within a strong and effective legal and policy 
framework provided by government. The characteristics required for the financial 
system to contribute effectively to sustainable economic growth are: 
• Predictable rule of law with strong property rights, providing certainty of contract; 
protection from fraudulent, predatory and anti-competitive behaviour; and access 
to redress. 
• Freely convertible floating currency and general free flow of trade, investment and 
capital across borders. 
• Strong fiscal position. 
• Sound monetary policy framework, including an independent central bank. 
• Effective, accountable and transparent government. 
Although these conditions are regarded as generally being met in Australia, 
Government should not underestimate their importance, and policy should be directed 
at their maintenance. 
Sector-specific regulation in the financial system 
The Inquiry believes the financial system requires sector-specific regulation, in 
addition to the above legal and policy prerequisites, for two reasons: 
1. More so than other sectors, the financial system has the ability to create or 
amplify economic shocks because of its use of leverage, its complexity and its 
interconnectedness with the rest of the economy. 
2. The significant harm to consumers that may result from complex financial 
decisions, or from dishonest and predatory practices, requires specialist 
regulation to promote fair treatment. 
Sector-specific regulation is not unique to the financial system. Characteristics such as 
the high potential for harm and complexity result in specialist regulation in other 
industries, including aviation and pharmaceuticals. However, the Inquiry considers 
the potential effect on living standards or economic growth from mismanaging risk in 
the financial system requires more specialised regulatory oversight than that provided 
under general economy-wide trading rules. 
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Framework for policy intervention 
The Inquiry’s approach to policy intervention is guided by the public interest. Given 
the inevitable trade-offs involved, deciding how and when to intervene in the financial 
system requires considerable judgement by policy makers. 
Intervention should seek to balance efficiency, resilience and fairness in a way that 
builds participants’ confidence and trust. Intervention should only occur where its 
benefits to the economy as a whole outweigh its costs. Intervention should always seek 
to be proportionate and cost sensitive. However, in many cases, the assessment of costs 
and benefits will not be clear-cut and will require policy makers to exercise judgement 
— as has been the case for many matters considered by this Inquiry.14 
Impediments to efficient market operations, such as information imbalances and 
principal agent conflicts, should be minimised.15 The Inquiry expects policy makers to 
set regulatory frameworks that encourage private sector competition and innovation 
by applying regulation on a functional basis, graduating regulatory obligations and 
assisting industry to overcome collective action problems. 16,17 
A resilient financial system allows financial failure but manages it in a way that limits 
the cost to the general economy and taxpayers. The Inquiry believes policy makers 
should seek to minimise the chance of systemic crises, but have the right tools to 
manage such events when they do occur. As a last resort, Government should have the 
fiscal capacity to support the economy if required. 
To encourage the fair treatment of participants in the financial system, policy makers 
should establish frameworks that ensure the orderly conduct of financial markets and 
minimise incidences of consumers buying financial products and services that do not 
meet their needs. 
The Inquiry’s philosophy places great responsibility on policy makers, particularly 
regulators, to make decisions that best balance the desired outcomes of efficiency, 
resilience and fair treatment. Principles-based decisions will often depend on 
regulators’ professional judgement. Central to this approach is the need for 
appropriately skilled, effective regulators that are both independent and highly 
accountable for discharging their mandates. 
                                                          
14  Policy makers should use evidence-based approaches in policy analysis, including trials or 
pilots when feasible. 
15  Principal agent conflicts occur if an agent (for example, a company executive) pursues their 
own self-interest rather than those of the principal (for example, a shareholder) who has 
provided them with resources and delegated responsibility to them for making decisions. 
16  Functional regulation involves regulating similar economic functions in a similar way. 
17  Graduated regulation involves providing lower-intensity regulation for businesses that pose 
lower risks to the system. 
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Box 2: General principles for policy makers 
Determining when to intervene 
• Intervention should be considered where it would improve the efficiency, 
resilience or fairness of the financial system, but only introduced if its benefit is 
judged to outweigh the costs to the economy as a whole. 
• Unless there is a clear public interest, policy makers should give competitive 
markets the opportunity to adjust to market signals and allow established legal 
remedies to be enforced rather than pre-emptively regulating. 
Delivering efficiency 
• Policy makers should seek to remove distortions to the efficient allocation of 
funds and risks in the economy, and reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens. 
• Policy makers should seek to encourage competition by removing unnecessary 
barriers to domestic and international competition. 
• Policy settings should seek to encourage innovation by being technologically and 
competitively neutral in design. 
Delivering resilience 
• Private sector risk-taking should be supported, allowing both success and failure. 
• Policy makers should seek to prevent a build-up of systemic risk. They should 
have systems in place to manage failing financial institutions in an orderly 
manner that protects the financial system’s critical functions and maintains 
financial stability while minimising risk to taxpayers. 
Delivering fair treatment 
• Consumers should generally bear responsibility for their financial decisions, but 
should be able to expect financial products and services to perform in the way 
they are led to believe they will. 
• Policy makers should be aware of, and design regulatory frameworks that take 
into account, behavioural biases. 
Themes of this report 
Australia’s financial system has performed well since the Wallis Inquiry. Australia has 
a competitive financial system with sophisticated capital markets and firms that are 




Although Australia was not immune to the effects of the GFC, the financial system and 
institutional framework held up well compared with many financial systems 
elsewhere in the world. In particular, Australia’s regulatory frameworks proved robust 
during this period. 
However, the Inquiry’s assessment is that Australia’s financial system is at risk of 
falling short of its potential to operate in a manner characterised by efficiency, 
resilience and fair treatment. This assessment led the Inquiry to focus on the seven 
themes in this report (summarised in Figure 1: Guide to the Financial System Inquiry Final 
Report). 
The first general theme, the funding of the Australian economy, refers to the core 
function of the financial system. A number of important opportunities for 
improvement in funding relate to tax. While taxation is outside the terms of reference 
of this Inquiry, a number of observations on tax are summarised in 
Appendix 2: Tax summary.  
The second general theme, competition, underpins a well-functioning financial system 
and is integral to a number of recommendations of this report. 
The Inquiry has also made recommendations within five specific themes, each of 
which is covered in an individual chapter: 
• Strengthen the economy by making the financial system more resilient 
(Chapter 1: Resilience). 
• Lift the value of the superannuation system and retirement incomes 
(Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes). 
• Drive economic growth and productivity through settings that promote innovation 
(Chapter 3: Innovation). 
• Enhance confidence and trust by creating an environment in which financial firms 
treat customers fairly (Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes). 
• Enhance the independence and accountability of regulators and minimise the need 
for future regulatory intervention (Chapter 5: Regulatory system). 
In addition, a number of other recommendations are summarised in 
Appendix 1: Significant matters.  
Funding the Australian economy 
The core function of the Australian financial system is to facilitate the funding of 
sustainable economic growth and enhance productivity in the Australian economy. 
This is the starting point for considering whether Australia’s current financial system 
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is fit for purpose, which greatly influences the Inquiry’s view on specific 
recommendations within this report. 
As outlined in the Interim Report, it is difficult to assess and quantify the most efficient 
allocation of funding for the Australian economy.18 In the view of the Inquiry, the 
framework for the issuance and trading of debt and equity in Australia is operating 
reasonably well. Australia has a well-functioning equity market, a sophisticated 
wholesale financial market, and a privately owned banking and insurance system that 
provides a range of competitive retail products and services. However, some funding 
markets in Australia, including the corporate bond and venture capital markets, 
appear underdeveloped compared with those of some international peers. 
The Inquiry has taken a principles-based approach to funding policy. The Inquiry 
believes government’s role in funding markets should generally be neutral on the 
channel, direction, source and size of the flow of funds. Financial instruments, markets 
and forms of intermediation should develop, evolve and operate in ways that best 
reflect investor and borrower preferences and technological developments. Outside an 
extreme financial shock, there is generally little benefit in policy makers attempting to 
improve efficiency by insulating the economy from market forces. Instead, the 
Inquiry’s approach has been to seek to identify and remove distortions to the 
inefficient allocation of resources.  
The Inquiry has heard four main concerns in relation to the flow of funding in the 
Australian economy. First, that some funding markets, including the corporate bond 
and venture capital markets, are too small. Second, that particular sectors of the 
economy, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or rural businesses, do 
not have sufficient access to funding. Third, that the major banks may face a ‘funding 
gap’ that would restrict economic growth in the future. Finally, stakeholder input and 
Inquiry research indicate significant potential tax distortions. 
Regarding the relative size of various funding markets, the Inquiry’s approach is to 
seek to remove unnecessary regulatory settings that distort the flow of funds favouring 
the use of one market over another. In the case of the domestic corporate bond market, 
these include both tax and regulatory settings such as excessive disclosure 
requirements. The Inquiry does not believe mandating or subsidising a particular 
market in an attempt to increase its size (whether it be corporate bond, securitisation or 
venture capital markets) is an effective strategy in the long term. Instead, the size of a 
funding market should reflect market forces. 
Some submissions also called on Government to influence the allocation of resources 
towards particular sectors of the economy perceived to have insufficient access to 
funding. For example, several submissions call on Government to encourage the 
                                                          
18  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, page 2-44. 
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investment of superannuation assets in infrastructure or to establish a 
Government-owned bank to direct funding to particular causes, such as rural 
businesses. The Inquiry does not support such approaches — to maximise the 
efficiency of the financial system policy makers should not set out to favour one 
particular funding destination over another. 
The Inquiry has noted that SMEs have few options for external financing outside the 
banking system compared with large corporations. In part, this reflects unnecessary 
distortions, such as information imbalances and regulatory barriers to market-based 
funding. Appendix 3: Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) summarises the 
Inquiry’s recommendations relating to SMEs. 
As discussed in the Interim Report, some submissions also argued that the major 
banks face a ‘funding gap’.19 These submissions suggest that in some circumstances 
banks would be unable to fund higher credit growth with new deposits, placing 
economic growth at risk. The Inquiry acknowledges that the ability of Australian 
banks to fund themselves is critical to their stability and is of great importance to the 
broader economy. However, on consideration of the relevant evidence and arguments, 
the Inquiry has concluded that Australia is not at risk from an emerging ‘funding gap’ 
for the following reasons: 
• To the extent that some banks cannot source sufficient funding on commercially 
attractive terms to meet demand, market mechanisms such as the price of credit 
will attract alternative providers of funds, for example superannuation funds and 
other investors lending directly, greater prevalence of market-based financing or 
peer-to-peer lending. 
• Such market mechanisms are also likely to increase the attractiveness of deposits as 
an investment vehicle under a high credit-growth scenario, thus increasing the 
supply of funding available to the banks (as occurred in Australia in the period 
following the GFC).20 
The Inquiry takes a neutral approach to the mechanism through which Australia 
sources its funding, including funding from offshore markets. The flow of funds 
should be subject to market forces and be free to evolve to meet user demands and 
market conditions. 
The funding-related issue that concerns the Inquiry most is that of distortions to the 
market allocation of resources, including through taxation, information imbalances 
                                                          
19  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, page 2-78. 
20  For a description of the interaction between the provision of credit and holding of deposits 
by banks, refer to McLeay M, Radia A and Thomas R, 2014 ‘Money creation in the modern 
economy’ Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Quarter 1, pages 14–27. 
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and unnecessary regulation.21 If unaddressed, such distortions are likely to lead to 
lower productivity and lower longer-term living standards than otherwise would be 
the case. 
A significant number of the distortions identified are tax-related, as summarised in 
Box 3: Major tax distortions. Reducing the distortionary effects of these taxes should lead 
the system to allocate savings (including foreign savings) more efficiently and price 
risk more accurately. This would increase aggregate productivity and limit the 
build-up of systemic vulnerabilities.  
Throughout this report, the Inquiry has made a number of recommendations relating 
to funding: 
• The Tax White Paper should consider the reform of tax settings that distort the flow 
of funds (see Box 3: Major tax distortions). 
• Obstacles to the growth of the corporate bond market should be addressed, 
including regulatory barriers and tax distortions, particularly the non-neutral 
treatment of savings vehicles (see Appendix 2: Tax summary and Recommendation 33: 
Retail corporate bond market). 
• Reforms should be made to remove obstacles to SME financing, including 
facilitating crowdfunding and reducing information imbalances (see Appendix 3: 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)). 
• To strengthen Australia’s ability to continue to access funding, both domestically 
and from offshore sources, recommendations have been made to improve the 
resilience of the Australian financial system (see Chapter 1: Resilience). 
• A more efficient superannuation system should result in more funds for investment 
as well as more effective investment decisions and more efficient allocations of 
funds (see Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes). 
                                                          




Box 3: Major tax distortions 
A more neutral tax treatment of savings vehicles would reduce distortions in the 
composition of household balance sheets and the broader flow of funds in the 
economy. Across savings vehicles, after-tax returns differ markedly. For example, 
interest income is relatively heavily taxed.22 To the extent that distortions direct 
savings to less productive investments, a more neutral treatment would increase 
productivity. 
For assets that generate capital gains, the tax treatment encourages leveraged 
investment, which is a potential source of financial system instability. Investors are 
attracted by the asymmetry in the tax treatment of expenses and capital gains, 
where individuals can deduct the full interest costs of borrowing (and other 
expenses) from taxable income, but only half of their long-term capital gains are 
taxed. The tax treatment of investor housing, in particular, tends to encourage 
leveraged and speculative investment in housing. 
The implications of dividend imputation are less clear. The introduction of 
imputation reduced firms’ cost of equity; however, the effectiveness of imputation 
in lowering the cost of capital arguably has declined as the economy has become 
more open. The tax benefits of imputation may encourage domestic investors to 
invest in domestic firms with domestically-focused investments, which would limit 
opportunities and increase risk from less diversified portfolios. To the extent that 
imputation distorts the allocation of funding, a lower company tax rate would be 
likely to reduce those distortions. A lower company tax rate would also enhance 
Australia’s attractiveness as a place to invest, which would increase Australia’s 
productivity and living standards. 
Reducing the uncertainty and scope of taxes on cross-border flows would improve 
Australian entities’ access to offshore savings. Access to offshore funding markets 
provides Australian entities with cheaper funds than otherwise would be the case. 
Having access to more diverse sources of funding reduces the risk from dislocation 
in one or more funding markets. That said, the complex, ad-hoc tax treatment of 
cross-border transactions reflects, in part, Government’s desire to maintain the 
integrity of the tax base — from profit shifting and other tax avoidance strategies — 
in the face of continued financial innovation and internationalisation. 
                                                          
22  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-49. 
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Box 3: Major tax distortions (cont.) 
For non-residents, repatriated income from Australian investments is subject to a 
regime of withholding taxes. The application and rate of withholding tax varies 
with respect to a host of factors, including the type of funding, the country of the 
foreign entity and the relationship between the domestic and foreign entity. 
Withholding tax increases the required rate of return for non-residents, which 
reduces the attractiveness of Australia as an investment destination. In cases where 
the non-resident can pass on the cost, the cost of funding is raised in Australia. 
Refer to Appendix 2: Tax summary for additional information on the Inquiry’s 
observations related to tax. 
Competition 
The Inquiry believes competition and competitive markets to be at the heart of its 
philosophy and sees them as the primary means of improving the system’s efficiency. 
This section builds on the discussion in the Interim Report of the competitive strength 
in various sectors of the Australian financial system.23 It summarises the Inquiry’s 
recommendations regarding amendments to current competitive regulatory settings 
and strengthening competition in the future. These recommendations are spread 
across a range of chapters in this report. 
Competition in the financial system is generally adequate at present. The Inquiry’s 
approach to encouraging competition is to remove impediments to its development. 
The Inquiry recommends making the following adjustments to current regulatory 
settings: 
• Narrowing the differences in risk weights between authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs) using internal ratings-based models and those using 
standardised models in mortgage lending (see Recommendation 2: Narrow 
mortgage risk weight differences). 
• Introducing a competitive process to allocate new default fund members to 
high-performing superannuation funds, unless the Stronger Super reforms prove 
effective (see Recommendation 10: Improving efficiency during accumulation). 
• Refining the payments regulation framework (see Recommendation 16: 
Clearer graduated payments regulation). 
                                                          




• Supporting innovation and new entrants (see recommendations 14: Collaboration to 
enable innovation, 15: Digital identity, 18: Crowdfunding, 19: Data access and use, 
20: Comprehensive credit reporting, 39: Technology neutrality and 30: Strengthening the 
focus on competition in the financial system). 
In addition, the Inquiry notes that perceptions of implicit guarantees in the banking 
system can distort competition by providing a funding advantage to those banks 
believed to most benefit from such guarantees. Recommendations that increase the 
resilience of the banking sector, especially of the largest banks, will reduce these 
perceptions over time and help contribute to restoring a more competitive 
environment.24 
Notwithstanding the above recommendations to amend current regulatory settings, 
high concentration and trends towards increasing vertical integration in some sectors 
of the financial system have the potential to limit the benefits of competition in the 
future. 
The Inquiry acknowledges that no single solution will guarantee the ‘right’ level of 
competition in the future — competition is a dynamic concept, changing over time. 
Instead, policy makers should be proactive in reviewing levels of competitiveness and 
removing barriers to the emergence of disruptive competitors, including both 
international entrants and domestic innovators.25 In particular, the state of competition 
in the financial system should be reviewed every three years, including assessing 
changes in barriers to international competition (see Recommendation 30: Strengthening 
the focus on competition in the financial system). 
Conduct and prudential regulators have a natural tendency to prioritise fairness or 
stability over competition and long-term efficiency. The long-term benefits of 
competition can be potentially difficult to identify or value, while the short-term costs 
of instability or unfair outcomes are immediately visible to regulators, governments 
and the general public. Therefore, the Inquiry has made a number of recommendations 
to ensure regulators are more sensitive to the effects their decisions have on 
competition: 
• A Financial Regulator Assessment Board should be established to advise 
Government, including on how regulators consider competition issues in designing 
and implementing regulation (see Recommendation 27: Regulator accountability). 
                                                          
24  This approach has been recognised by the Financial Stability Board. See Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) 2014, Adequacy of loss-absorbing capacity of global systemically important banks in 
resolution, Basel, page 6.  
25  The Inquiry supports the approach outlined in the draft report of the Competition Policy 
Review, suggesting a new Australian Council for Competition Policy be empowered to carry 
out market studies of competition in particular sectors. See Commonwealth of Australia 
2014, Competition Policy Review — Draft Report, Canberra, Recommendation 39, page 57. 
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• An explicit requirement to consider competition should be included in the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) mandate 
(see Recommendation 30: Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial system). 
• Regulators should more clearly explain in their annual reports how they have 
considered the effect of their decisions on competition and compliance costs 
(see Recommendation 27: Regulator accountability). 
As discussed in the Interim Report, the Inquiry supports the implementation of the 
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) recommendations on strengthening the financial 
market infrastructure (FMI) framework and Government’s review of the market 
licensing framework.26 This would create a framework under which competition and 
international financial integration in FMI could be increased. 
As outlined in Box 4: International competitiveness, unnecessary barriers to international 
competitiveness and market access into Australia should be front of mind in designing 
and applying Australia’s regulatory frameworks. The free flow of capital in and out of 
Australia significantly benefits competition and those who use Australia’s financial 
system. For example, borrowers can lower their funding costs by directly accessing 
international bond markets, or they can borrow from Australian intermediaries that 
have lowered their funding costs by accessing less expensive foreign sources of capital. 
Box 4: International competitiveness 
Australia has relatively open financial markets: foreign financial services providers 
can generally provide retail services on the same terms as domestic competitors. 
Many wholesale markets are open to foreign providers, such as foreign ADI 
branches, without the need to comply with specific domestic regulatory frameworks 
— strengthening competition. 
But Australia’s financial sector is less open and internationally integrated than it 
could be now — and than it will need to be in the future.27 More needs to be done to 
remove impediments to cross-border competition and other barriers to the free flow 
of capital across borders, such as tax impediments. 
 
                                                          
26  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-37. 
27  For a discussion of international integration of the Australian financial system, refer to 




Box 4: International competitiveness (cont.) 
Developments and opportunities in Asia make change imperative. Financial system 
liberalisation and integration in our region creates an opportunity to mobilise 
surplus savings more efficiently and channel it to investment opportunities, 
supporting economic development and trade. 
Where possible, policy makers should avoid adopting unique Australian 
regulatory approaches that are inconsistent with international practice. They should 
also remove impediments to recognising foreign frameworks for domestic purposes 
(either unilaterally or mutually). The Inquiry recommends: 
• Government and regulators should identify rules and procedures that create 
barriers to competition and consider whether these can be modified or removed. 
(see Recommendation 30: Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial 
system). 
• Government should also consider developing a mechanism to enable Australian 
fund managers to use collective investment vehicles that are more common 
overseas, such as a corporate vehicle (see Recommendation 42: Managed investment 
scheme regulation). 
Government and regulators should develop and implement regulatory frameworks 
in ways that do not impose unnecessary costs on Australian firms operating 
offshore but support improved access to offshore markets.28 
Tax impediments to the free flow of capital add to the cost of doing business in 
Australia. They limit the capacity for Australia’s financial system to exploit new and 
developing product areas, such as those for the Renminbi market, which would 
diversify financial solutions available in Australia. 
Resilience 
Australia weathered the GFC well relative to many international peers. However, it 
would be imprudent to assume the conditions that cushioned Australia during the 
crisis will exist when future shocks occur. Australia should heed the lessons learnt by 
other countries during the GFC. As a capital-importing country exposed to fluctuating 
terms of trade and characterised by a concentrated banking system, Australia needs to 
be better positioned than most. 
                                                          
28  A recent example is the financial services component of the China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014, China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement — Key Outcomes, Canberra, viewed 19 November, 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/chafta/fact-sheets/key-outcomes.html>. 
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Australia will experience future financial crises. However, their timing and sources are 
difficult to predict. As outlined in Box 5: Systemic and housing risk in Australia, in some 
circumstances, the Australian financial system is vulnerable to a number of sources of 
risk that could severely damage both the economy and individuals’ financial 
circumstances. 
Box 5: Systemic and housing risk in Australia 
A number of characteristics of the Australian economy and financial system present 
sources of potential systemic risk:29 
• As a large capital importer, Australia is susceptible to the dislocation of 
international funding markets or a sudden change in international sentiment 
towards Australia, which would reduce access to, and increase the cost of, 
foreign funding. 
• As an open economy, Australia is exposed to shocks in the economies of our 
major trading partners and subject to volatility in commodity prices. 
• Australia’s banking system is highly concentrated, with the four major banks 
using broadly similar business models and having large offshore funding 
exposures.30 This concentration exposes each individual bank to similar risks, 
such that all the major Australian banks may come under financial stress in 
similar economic and financial circumstances. 
• Australia’s banks are heavily exposed to developments in the housing market. 
Since 1997, banks have allocated a greater proportion of their loan books to 
mortgages, and households’ mortgage indebtedness has risen.31 A sharp fall in 
dwelling prices would damage household balance sheets and weigh on 
consumption and broader economic growth. It would also reduce the quality of 
the banking sector’s balance sheets and the capacity of banks to extend new 
credit, which would compromise the speed of a subsequent economic recovery. 
A severe disruption via one of these channels would have broad economic and 
financial consequences for Australia. Indeed, interconnectedness within the 
financial system and the economy would be likely to propagate distress and 
heighten other risks and vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
29  A disruption to the financial system could be considered systemic if it was so widespread or 
severe that it caused material damage to the economy. 
30  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF, 
Washington, page 10. 




Given Australia’s concentrated financial system, high household leverage and 
relatively high house prices, the Inquiry is particularly concerned about the banking 
system’s exposure to housing. Despite housing risk being generally well understood 
by both regulators and the financial industry, the Inquiry has specifically considered 
this risk when making its recommendations. 
More can be done to strengthen the resilience of Australia’s financial system. Although 
no system can ever be ‘bullet proof’, Australia should aim to cultivate financial 
institutions with the strength not only to withstand plausible shocks but to continue to 
provide critical economic functions, such as credit and payment services, in the face of 
these shocks. 
A number of aspects are critical to this strength, including an institution’s capital 
levels, liquidity, asset quality, business model and governance, and Australia’s 
sovereign credit rating. Of these, capital levels are particularly important, as they 
provide a safety buffer to absorb losses regardless of the source. 
The Inquiry proposes a package of recommendations to enhance resilience in 
Australia’s financial system. This package would make institutions less susceptible to 
shocks and the system less prone to crises. It would reduce the costs of crises when 
they do happen and improve the allocative efficiency of the system generally by 
reducing perceptions of an implicit guarantee. The package aims to minimise the cost 
to taxpayers, Government and the broader economy from risks in the financial system. 
In doing so, the package seeks to balance trade-offs between system safety and 
competitiveness where they are in conflict, and aspires to have competitively neutral 
regulatory settings where possible. 
The Inquiry has primarily focused on reforms to two aspects of Australia’s financial 
stability framework: 
• ADI capital levels should be raised to ensure they are unquestionably strong. 
Evidence from banks, regulators and others suggests that Australian banks are not 
in the top quartile of large internationally active banks. Regulatory changes in other 
countries may further weaken the relative position of Australian banks. The Inquiry 
believes that top-quartile positioning is the right setting for Australian ADIs 
(see Recommendation 1: Capital levels).  
• ADIs should maintain sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity to 
allow effective resolution while mitigating the risk to taxpayer funds — in line with 
emerging international practice. Regulators’ toolkits are critical and should be 
enhanced to prevent distress and to resolve failing financial institutions (see 
Recommendation 3: Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity and Recommendation 5: 
Crisis management toolkit). 
In the Inquiry’s view, raising capital requirements for ADIs would provide a net 
benefit to the economy. It would assist to avoid or reduce the severe and prolonged 
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costs of future crises, including high levels of unemployment. The cost of raising 
capital would be reduced by competition in the market, including the effect of the 
recommendations in this report. Drawing on multiple sources of evidence, the Inquiry 
calculates that raising capital ratios by one percentage point would, absent the benefits 
of competition, increase average loan interest rates by less than 10 basis points which 
could reduce GDP by 0.01-0.1 per cent.32 
Making the system more resilient also has efficiency benefits. Large or frequent 
financial crises create volatility and uncertainty that impede the efficient allocation of 
resources and harm dynamic efficiency by discouraging investment. In the resulting 
long periods of high unemployment, productive resources are under-utilised. 
In addition, if implemented, this package of reforms should prevent the need for 
further structural reform in the industry, such as ring-fencing certain operations of the 
major banks. The Inquiry also believes that introducing the proposed reforms would 
reduce the need to pre-fund the Financial Claims Scheme (see Recommendation 6: 
Financial Claims Scheme). 
Although stability settings aim to minimise the economic cost of financial institutions 
failing, it is not possible — or efficient — to eliminate failure altogether. Government 
must ensure its financial position remains sufficient to support the financial system in 
a future crisis. Macro-economic conditions can deteriorate rapidly in a crisis, and 
Government needs to remain alert to this. Maintaining a AAA credit rating would give 
Government the flexibility necessary to support the economy (although not necessarily 
the failed institutions) in such circumstances.  
The GFC highlighted the benefits of Australia’s largely unleveraged superannuation 
sector. The absence of borrowing enabled the superannuation sector to have a 
stabilising influence on the financial system and the economy during the crisis. 
Restricting leverage in the sector will be important for mitigating future risks (see 
Recommendation 8: Direct borrowing by superannuation funds). 
Superannuation and retirement incomes  
Superannuation is now the second largest asset for many Australians. Its growing 
importance underlines the need for a regulatory approach that puts individual 
members at the very centre of the system — benefiting both individual Australians and 
the economy as a whole. 
                                                          
32  For details of this estimate, please see Chapter 1: Resilience. This is a conservative estimate that 
does not account for a number of important benefits, including reducing perceptions of an 
implicit guarantee, or factors that mitigate the cost, such as the effect of competition and 
monetary policy settings. 
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An efficient superannuation system is critical to help Australia meet the economic and 
fiscal challenges of an ageing population. While its importance for retirees and, to a 
lesser extent, taxpayers is self-evident, superannuation efficiency is also vital to 
sustaining long-term economic growth, given the system’s increasing importance in 
funding Australia’s prosperity. 
Australia’s superannuation system has considerable strengths. However, the system 
lacks efficiency in a number of areas. 
The lack of clarity around the ultimate objective of superannuation policy contributes 
to ad hoc short-term policy making, which imposes unnecessary costs on 
superannuation funds and members, reduces long-term confidence in the system and 
impedes efficiency. The Inquiry believes the purpose of the superannuation system is 
to provide an individual with an income in retirement (see Recommendation 9: 
Objectives of the superannuation system). 
At retirement, superannuation assets are not being efficiently converted into 
retirement incomes. This contributes to a significantly lower standard of living for 
some Australians in retirement and during their working life. Efficiency can be 
improved by removing barriers to product development and encouraging the take-up 
of pooled longevity products by requiring superannuation trustees to pre-select a 
comprehensive income product in retirement, while maintaining member choice  
(see Recommendation 11: The retirement phase of superannuation).  
Economic growth will benefit if the growing number of retirees are able to sustain 
higher levels of consumption. The superannuation system is not operationally efficient 
due to a lack of strong price-based competition. As a result, the benefits of scale are not 
being fully realised. Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Stronger 
Super reforms, the Inquiry has some reservations about whether MySuper will be 
effective in driving greater competition in the default superannuation market.  
Unless the Stronger Super reforms prove effective, the Inquiry recommends 
introducing a competitive process to allocate new default fund members to 
high-performing superannuation funds. This would improve the competitive 
dynamics of the sector, reduce costs for funds and reduce compliance costs for 
employers (see Recommendation 10: Improving efficiency during accumulation). 
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The superannuation recommendations in this report have the potential to increase 
retirement incomes for an average male wage earner by around 25 to 40 per cent 
(excluding the Age Pension).33 While these estimates are illustrative and based on 
models that cannot fully reflect the unique circumstances of different individuals, the 
Inquiry is confident that significant increases in retirement incomes can be achieved. 
To protect the best interests of members the Inquiry has also made recommendations 
to improve the governance of superannuation funds (see Recommendation 13: 
Governance of superannuation funds) and remove restrictions on some employees 
choosing the fund that receives their Superannuation Guarantee contributions (see 
Recommendation 12: Choice of fund). 
Innovation 
For the financial system, technology-driven innovation is transformative. 
Opportunities for innovation are abundant as, fundamentally, the system revolves 
around recording, analysing and interpreting transactions, and managing associated 
information flows. With no physical products to manage, these processes readily lend 
themselves to improvements via digital technologies. 
In Australia, the effect has been significant, particularly as Australian consumers are 
fast adopters of technology compared to consumers in many other countries.  
The Inquiry cannot be certain of how future developments in technology will affect the 
financial system. Innovation is by its nature evolving and dynamic, and primarily 
driven by private sector commercial incentives and customer expectations. Instead, the 
Inquiry has focused on ensuring policy settings accommodate technological change to 
facilitate a dynamic, competitive, growth-oriented and forward-looking financial 
system. 
                                                          
33  Estimates prepared by the Australian Government Actuary for the Inquiry, using input from 
Treasury models. Over 10 percentage points of the estimated increase in retirement income 
reflects the benefits of lower superannuation fees and savings from maintaining only a single 
superannuation account over a person’s working life. The remaining portion (and range) 
reflects the use of a comprehensive income product in retirement; in particular, different 
combinations of an account-based pension and either a deferred life annuity or group self 
annuitisation product. The estimates are also sensitive to assumptions regarding the level of 
contributions, time in the workforce and the drawdown rate for the account-based pension. 
The major driver of the increase in retirement income is the benefit of pooling in retirement, 
which comes at a cost of smaller bequests from superannuation and reduced flexibility. For 
further details, see Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes. 
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The Inquiry has focused on reforms to Australia’s innovation architecture. It 
recommends: 
• Government should review the costs and benefits of increasing access to, and 
improving the use of, data. As increasing amounts of data are collected and more 
sophisticated analytical techniques emerge, data can be used to develop alternative 
business models, products and services that improve user outcomes and system 
efficiency (see Recommendation 19: Data access and use). 
• A national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital identities should 
be developed to set a framework and common standards to support the 
development of a competitive market in identity services that enhances consumer 
choice, privacy and security, and balances these objectives with financial system 
efficiency (see Recommendation 15: Digital identity). 
• Government and regulators should remove unnecessary impediments to 
innovation by applying graduated functional frameworks in a range of areas, 
including the payments system. The Inquiry supports simplifying and clarifying 
payments regulation to facilitate innovation; lowering interchange fees to  
reduce costs for merchants and prices for customers; and preventing merchants 
from over-surcharging customers paying with debit and credit cards (see 
Recommendation 16: Clearer graduated payments regulation and Recommendation 17: 
Interchange fees and customer surcharging). 
• Graduating the regulation of market-based financing will increase opportunities for 
small businesses to seek finance from the general public. The Inquiry supports 
facilitating crowdfunding and other innovative sources of finance (see 
Recommendation 18: Crowdfunding). 
The Inquiry’s recommendations seek to provide more facilitative settings that enable 
financial firms to innovate — increasing competitive tension, delivering greater 
efficiency and enhancing user outcomes.  
Consumer outcomes 
To build confidence and trust, and avoid over-regulation, the financial system should 
be characterised by fair treatment. 
In terms of fair treatment for consumers, the current framework is not sufficient. The 
GFC brought to light significant numbers of Australian consumers holding financial 
products that did not suit their needs and circumstances — in some cases resulting in 
severe financial loss. The most significant problems related to shortcomings in 
disclosure and financial advice, and over-reliance on financial literacy. The changes 
introduced under the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms are likely to address 
some of these shortcomings; however, many products are directly distributed, and 
issues of adviser competency remain. 
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Consumers should have the freedom to take financial risks and bear the consequences 
of these risks. However, the Inquiry is concerned that consumers are taking risks they 
might not have taken if they were well informed or better advised.  
The Inquiry deliberated on a spectrum of approaches, from regulating core product 
features to introducing appropriateness and suitability tests for complex products, 
which are features of some international jurisdictions. The Inquiry has developed an 
approach that streamlines and complements the current framework and strengthens 
the accountability of product issuers and distributors. The Inquiry recommends the 
following package of reforms: 
• The design and distribution of products should be strengthened through improved 
product issuer and distributor accountability, and the creation of a new product 
intervention power to allow ASIC to take a more proactive approach in reducing 
the risk of significant detriment to consumers (see Recommendation 21: Strengthen 
product issuer and distributor accountability and Recommendation 22: Introduce product 
intervention power). 
• Standards of financial advice should be improved by lifting adviser competency 
(see Recommendation 25: Raise the competency of advisers), better aligning the interests 
of firms and consumers and enhancing banning powers (see Recommendation 24: 
Align the interests of financial firms and consumers). 
• Regulatory impediments to industry use of technology should be removed (see 
Recommendation 39: Technology neutrality) and more innovative forms of disclosure 
developed (see Recommendation 23: Facilitate innovative disclosure).  
The Inquiry expects these changes will reduce the likelihood of future losses similar to 
those experienced in recent financial investment collapses. Previous collapses 
involving poor advice, information imbalances and exploitation of consumer 
behavioural biases have affected more than 80,000 consumers, with losses totalling 
more than $5 billion, or $4 billion after compensation and liquidator recoveries.34 The 
changes outlined in this report should also significantly improve consumer confidence 
and trust in the financial system. 
The Inquiry considers that the additional regulatory elements of the package will 
rebuild consumer confidence and trust in the financial system in the long term, and 
should help to limit the need for more interventionist regulation in the future. For 
reputable firms with a strong customer focus, the Inquiry expects that costs involved in 
changing practices in response to the recommendations will be low. The Inquiry notes 
                                                          
34  This estimate includes losses involving Storm Financial, Opes Prime, Westpoint, Great 
Southern, Timbercorp and Banksia Securities. 
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that success will require a greater level of regulator judgement, necessitating 
high-quality, accountable regulators with adequate funding. 
The Inquiry also supports continuing industry and government efforts to increase 
financial inclusion and financial literacy to improve customer outcomes. 
Regulatory system 
The roles and performance of financial system regulators have an important effect on 
system efficiency. Strong, independent and accountable regulators assist in 
maintaining confidence and trust in the financial system.  
The Inquiry considers that Australia’s current regulatory architecture does not need 
major change. Although minor refinements are necessary, the roles of the three major 
financial regulators — the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) and ASIC — remain appropriate. 
The Inquiry’s philosophy places a high level of trust in regulators to make judgements 
that balance the efficient, stable and fair operation of the financial system. While 
acknowledging that regulators often have a difficult task, there is room for 
improvement. In particular, the current arrangements lack a systematic mechanism for 
Government to assess regulators’ performance relative to their mandate. Instead, 
scrutiny tends to be episodic and focused on particular issues or decisions. A new 
Financial Regulator Assessment Board should be established to conduct annual 
performance reviews of regulators and provide advice to Government (see 
Recommendation 27: Regulator accountability). 
Regulators also need to have the funding, expertise and regulatory tools to deliver on 
their mandates effectively. APRA and ASIC would benefit from more funding 
certainty, more operational flexibility and a greater ability to compete with industry 
for staff (see Recommendation 28: Execution of mandate). ASIC should be able to recover 
the costs of its regulatory functions from industry, and its powers need strengthening 
in some areas (Recommendation 29: Strengthening Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s funding and powers). 
Regulators should also undertake periodic, forward-looking capability reviews to 
ensure they are fit for purpose and have the capability to address future regulatory 
challenges. 
Levels of financial regulation 
Internationally, the pace of change in financial system regulation has surged since the 
GFC, with some of these regulatory changes yet to be fully agreed and implemented. 
As a capital-importing country, Australia has had little choice but to introduce many of 
these changes. This is on top of a range of fundamental changes in the domestic 
regulatory framework in the last decade, such as the Stronger Super, FOFA and 
national consumer credit reforms. 
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The Inquiry commissioned Ernst & Young (EY) to assess the cost effectiveness of 
certain regulatory changes implemented in the last decade.35 Although the assessment 
highlighted broad agreement with the policy that led to the intervention, it also 
highlighted shortcomings in how policy makers and regulators approach regulatory 
design and implementation. These included gaps in consultation processes and 
optimistic time frames for implementation. 
The Inquiry is very conscious that unnecessary and inappropriate regulation has the 
potential to reduce the financial system’s efficiency. It therefore supports ongoing 
Government efforts to review and remove unnecessary regulation in the financial 
system and has not sought to duplicate this process.36 The Inquiry makes 
recommendations to remove unnecessary regulation or improve regulatory processes 
(see Recommendation 31: Compliance costs and policy processes and Recommendation 39: 
Technology neutrality).  
That said, the Inquiry recognises that many of its recommendations involve new 
regulation or changes to existing regulation. The Inquiry considers that these 
recommendations will both strengthen the financial system now and prevent excessive 
regulatory responses in the longer term. A more competitive and innovative financial 
system with minimal distortions will improve allocative efficiency and drive 
sustainable growth. A more resilient financial system will manage future financial 
shocks at a lower cost to the taxpayer and the real economy. A fairer financial system 
will avoid the need for more interventionist regulation in the future. In particular, the 
Inquiry is seeking to avoid rushed regulatory reactions motivated primarily by the 
political environment. 
Of course, this Inquiry cannot guarantee that there will not be further unnecessary or 
poorly designed regulation in the future. The quality of new regulation will depend on 
the actions of industry, regulators and governments. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes that, if implemented and enforced, the recommendations in this 
report should provide a robust framework to strengthen the financial system, and 
position it to meet Australia’s evolving needs and support sustainable economic 
growth. 
                                                          
35  Refer to Chapter 5: Regulatory system for further information on this research. 
36  The Commonwealth’s whole-of-Government deregulation agenda is outlined in Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014, Whole of Government deregulation agenda, 




The Inquiry recognises it has not addressed all issues put before it by interested 
parties. The Final Report, by necessity, prioritises those issues the Inquiry considers 
most important in setting a blueprint for the Australian financial system. 
The issues examined and recommendations made by the Inquiry involve matters of 
judgement. Importantly, the Inquiry’s test in these judgements has been one of public 
interest: the interests of individuals, businesses, the economy, taxpayers and 
Government. Some recommendations are likely to have a private cost for stakeholders. 
These costs have been explicitly taken into account in the Inquiry’s deliberations. After 
carefully considering the evidence provided, the Inquiry’s judgment is that the benefit 
to the public interest from these recommendations outweighs their associated costs. 
The net result of these recommendations would be to: 
• Encourage an efficient financial system to allocate Australia’s scarce financial and 
other resources for the greatest possible benefit to the economy, promoting higher 
and more sustainable productivity and economic growth. 
• Promote competition in the financial system, both now and into the future. 
• Strengthen the resilience of the financial system, improving its capacity to adjust to 
both the normal business cycle as well as a severe economic shock. 
• Lift the value of Australia’s superannuation system and retirement incomes both 
for individuals and the economy. 
• Drive economic growth and productivity by establishing policy settings that 
promote an innovative and dynamic financial system. 
• Enhance the confidence and trust that users of financial products and services have 
in the financial system by creating a regulatory environment in which financial 
firms treat their customers fairly. 
• Provide financial regulators with the right tools to achieve their mandates, while 
ensuring they are held accountable. 
Such outcomes will improve efficiency, resilience and fair treatment in the Australian 
financial system, allowing it to achieve its potential in supporting economic growth 




Chapter 1: Resilience 
Australia’s financial sector is not invulnerable to risks to stability, and the costs of 
crises can be wide-ranging and severe. Financial crises can deeply damage an economy 
and have a lasting impact on people’s lives. Although Australia was not as acutely 
affected by the global financial crisis (GFC) as some countries, international experience 
suggests the average financial crisis could see 900,000 additional Australians out of 
work as well as substantially reduce the wealth of a generation.1 Financial crises tend 
to be protracted, with unemployment remaining high for years. The average total cost 
of a crisis is around 63 per cent of annual gross domestic product (GDP), and the cost 
of a severe crisis is around 158 per cent of annual GDP ($950 billion to $2.4 trillion in 
2013 terms).2 
More can be done to strengthen Australia’s economy and financial system by 
preventing and mitigating these costs. Although no system can ever be ‘bulletproof’, 
Australia should aim to cultivate financial institutions with the strength to not only 
withstand plausible shocks, but also to continue to provide critical economic functions, 
such as credit and payment services, in the face of these shocks. Australia also needs a 
system that minimises the costs to individuals, the economy and taxpayers when 
financial failure does occur. The world has learnt valuable lessons from the GFC, and 
Australia should look to benefit from this experience. 
A more resilient financial system also has efficiency benefits. Large or frequent 
financial crises create volatility and uncertainty, which impede the efficient allocation 
of resources and harm dynamic efficiency by discouraging investment. In addition, the 
long periods of high unemployment following crises reflect under-utilised resources. 
Government actions required to stabilise financial sectors both overseas and in 
Australia during the GFC reinforced perceptions that some institutions are implicitly 
guaranteed. The private sector accrued gains from financial activities in the run-up to 
the GFC, but losses and risk were shared with taxpayers when failures occurred or 
were threatened. These implicit guarantees create market distortions, altering the 
risk-reward equation and conferring a funding cost advantage on financial institutions 
perceived as guaranteed. 
Removing perceptions of these guarantees will reduce Government’s contingent 
liability and improve the efficiency of the financial system and economy. This chapter 
                                                          
1  Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K 2009, This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, page 224. The authors find that the average financial crisis 
increases unemployment by seven percentage points, which is almost 900,000 people as at 
October 2014. 
2  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010, An assessment of the long-term economic impact 
of stronger capital and liquidity requirements, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, page 10. 
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recommends steps to minimise these perceptions in Australia. These steps will 
strengthen the resilience of banks and enhance resolution arrangements that minimise 
the need for taxpayer support. In the Inquiry’s view, the alternative option of charging 
for such guarantees is not appropriate for Australia as it does not reduce the 
contingent liability of Government. 
Strength in the financial system 
The Australian financial system has characteristics that give rise to particular risks. The 
financial system is complex and highly interconnected with the rest of the world. 
Australia is a capital-importing nation with a significant component of domestic 
investment funded by foreign savings channelled through the banking system. The use 
of foreign investment, which the Inquiry expects to continue, has been advantageous 
for Australia, enabling higher investment and growth than would otherwise have been 
possible. Yet it also brings risks, such as vulnerability to a loss of foreign investor 
confidence, which may lead to increased costs and a sharp contraction in funds 
available for investment. 
As the banking sector is at the core of the Australian financial system, its stability is of 
paramount importance. The sector is responsible for the majority of intermediation 
between savers and investors, and is highly interconnected with the rest of the 
financial system. In addition, the banking sector is concentrated, with the four major 
banks being the largest players in virtually all respects. This concentration, combined 
with the predominance of similar business models focused on housing lending, 
exacerbates the risk that a problem at one institution could cause issues for the sector 
and financial system as a whole. To prevent further concentration, the longstanding 
‘Four Pillars’ policy, which precludes mergers between the four major banks, should 
be preserved as outlined in the Interim Report. 
The importance of the banking sector means that it must be unquestionably strong to 
meet the needs of Australia. A number of aspects are critical to this strength, including 
an institution’s capital levels, liquidity, asset quality, business model and governance, 
and Australia’s sovereign credit rating. Australian authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs) are generally well placed in these respects, with strengthened 
capital and liquidity requirements, low loan losses, a business model focused on 
domestic and commercial banking, sound governance and a AAA-rated Government. 
Of these, capital levels are particularly important, as they provide a safety buffer to 
absorb losses no matter what their source. In the Inquiry’s view, although Australian 
ADIs are generally well capitalised, further strengthening would assist in ensuring 
capital levels are, and are seen to be, unquestionably strong. Liquidity is also very 
important and must be readily available. Given the considerable strengthening of 
regulatory liquidity requirements underway — the effects of which have yet to be seen 
— the Inquiry has not made recommendations in this area. 
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Australia’s stability framework promotes strength in these aspects through:  
1. Active supervision by APRA — a vital component that must remain strong. It 
is particularly useful for assessing the qualitative aspects of an institution’s 
strength, including through the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
(APRA) use of its Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) risk 
assessment model.3 
2. Prudential requirements — providing qualitative and quantitative measures, 
including ensuring adequate minimum capital and liquidity buffers for ADIs. 
3. Systems for dealing with financial institution distress — where the strength 
of an institution proves to be insufficient, a robust framework for effectively 
resolving the failed institution is critical to minimise harm to the economy. 
A robust stability framework provides a stable foundation for the financial system. 
Currently, financial system stability in Australia is underpinned by the continued 
strong financial performance of the banking system.4 Further, many of the reforms 
made to the Australian banking sector following the GFC have now settled. 
Strengthening necessary areas of the financial system at a measured pace now, rather 
than later, will cost less than actions to reinforce the system at a time when it is weak 
or where change must occur quickly. Reforms during good times also dampen 
pro-cyclicality in the financial system. 
Determining the appropriate strength of stability settings is necessarily a matter of 
judgement. The Inquiry’s test has been one of public interest: the interests of 
individuals, businesses, the economy, taxpayers and Government. The Inquiry 
believes that, on the basis of public interest, the benefits of the recommended measures 
outweigh the associated costs. The GFC demonstrated that risks are real and the cost of 
complacency is very high. 
Recommended actions 
The Inquiry’s recommendations are designed to enhance the resilience of the 
Australian financial system, which underpins the strength and efficiency of the 
economy. The recommendations seek to make institutions less susceptible to shocks 
and the system less prone to crises, reducing the costs of crises when they do happen, 
and supporting trust and confidence in the system. They aim to minimise the use of 
taxpayer funds, protect the broader economy from risks in the financial sector and 
minimise perceptions of an implicit guarantee and the associated market distortions. 
                                                          
3  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), APRA Probability and Impact Rating 
System, viewed 11 November 2014, 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/PAIRS-1206-HTML.aspx>. 
4  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Financial Stability Review, September 2014, RBA, 
Sydney, page 1. 
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The recommendations seek to strike a balance between system stability and 
competitiveness, and, where possible, aspire for competitively neutral regulatory 
settings. In many cases there is little trade-off, as greater stability promotes trust and 
confidence in the financial system and enhances resilience and long-term allocative 
and dynamic efficiency. 
This chapter describes eight recommendations to strengthen stability settings, 
applying across a number of sectors. 
Banking: these recommendations broadly have two objectives: 
• Reducing the probability of failure. Evidence from ADIs, regulators and others 
suggests that Australian banks’ capital ratios are not in the top quartile of 
internationally active banks when it comes to capital strength. The Inquiry believes 
it is in Australia’s interest that they are. To this end, ADI capital levels should be 
raised. In achieving this, the transparency of existing capital settings and the 
competitive neutrality of the system for determining risk weights should also be 
improved. The risk-weighted approach to capital requirements should be 
supplemented with a leverage ratio that protects against potential weaknesses in 
the risk-weighting system. 
• Minimising the costs of failure. The toolkits available to regulators to prevent 
distress and resolve failing financial institutions are critical and should be 
enhanced. ADIs should also maintain sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity to allow effective resolution with minimal risk to taxpayer funds, in line 
with emerging international practice. As this area is complex and evolving, 
Australia should take a cautious approach in developing requirements for such 
capacity. 
These recommendations, which reduce the probability of failure and minimise the cost 
of failure when it does occur, are complementary and should not be seen as substitutes 
for each other. Several of the recommendations focus on an ADI’s liability structure: 
the mix of different types of debt and equity instruments used to fund the institution. 
Box 6: ADI liability structures and prudential requirements explains the main categories of 
instruments and the role these play. 
Insurance: Significant reforms took place following the collapse of HIH Insurance 
Limited (HIH) in 2001, with ongoing subsequent improvements, including a 
comprehensive review of capital standards in recent years. The regulatory framework 
continues to change, with health insurers shortly moving to prudential supervision 
under APRA. Some of the proposals in Recommendation 5: Crisis management toolkit 
relate to insurance. Beyond these, the Inquiry has not seen a compelling case for 
further changing stability settings in insurance at this stage. However, as noted in 
Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes, Government is facilitating greater competition in the 
North Queensland market by clarifying restrictions on the use of Unauthorised 
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Financial Insurers (UFIs). Should the use of UFIs became widespread, the stability 
implications should be revisited. 
Superannuation: The GFC highlighted the benefits of Australia’s largely unleveraged 
superannuation sector. The absence of borrowing enabled the superannuation sector to 
have a stabilising influence on the financial system and the economy during the GFC. 
Continuing to restrict leverage in the sector will be important for mitigating future 
risks. The Inquiry recommends limiting borrowing in superannuation funds. 
Financial market infrastructure (FMI): Substantial reforms have taken place since the 
GFC, such as making greater use of FMI for over-the-counter trading derivatives 
transactions. The Inquiry supports reforms to FMI regulation to strengthen the 
resolution framework and preserve critical functions in a crisis. 
Shadow banking: Australia currently has a small shadow banking sector, which is 
reviewed annually by the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR). Although the Inquiry 
is making no direct recommendations to address shadow banking, it is aware that 
measures to enhance resilience in the banking sector could encourage some activities 
to move outside the prudential regulation perimeter. This risk is being actively 
monitored globally.5 In Australia, the CFR should continue to monitor risks in the 
shadow banking sector to enable prompt responses to notable changes. 
More generally, the Inquiry notes that considerable work is continuing in the 
international arena to enhance financial system stability and that, where possible, 
Australia should align itself with international developments. Domestically, the CFR 
agencies continue to work on planning and pre-positioning to ensure they are ready to 
respond to any emerging threats to stability. The Inquiry is supportive of this work.  
Finally, the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) is a fundamental component in protecting 
depositors in the system, providing a guarantee on deposits of up to $250,000 per 
account holder per institution. This is supported by Australia’s system of depositor 
preference, which further protects depositors from loss. The Inquiry recommends 
maintaining the current ex post funding model for the FCS, while noting that the cap 
of $250,000 is relatively high compared to other countries. 
Principles 
In making the recommendations in this chapter, the Inquiry has been guided by the 
following principles:  
• Responsibility for sound governance, robust risk management and adequate 
financial soundness rests primarily with a financial institution’s management and 
                                                          
5  Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2014, Global shadow banking monitoring report 2014, FSB, Basel. 
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its board. Financial institutions have a responsibility to operate with integrity to 
build and protect trust and confidence in the financial system. 
• Instability in the financial system imposes large costs on individuals, the economy, 
Government and taxpayers. Minimising the risk of instability, or its impact where 
unavoidable, is a worthwhile investment. The wellbeing of the Australian 
community depends on the financial system being able to continue to provide its 
core economic functions, even in times of financial stress. 
• Government should not generally guarantee the ongoing solvency and operations 
of individual financial institutions. However, there may be instances — particularly 
where system-wide failure is threatened — where public sector support of the basic 
functions of the financial system is warranted, such as liquidity support by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). In determining whether to intervene in the event 
of a failure, Government should be guided by the anticipated effect of failure on the 
wider economy and seek to minimise taxpayer exposure. 
• System stability should be promoted while giving due regard to the importance of 
balancing potential reductions in competition and efficiency. Where possible, 
regulation should be risk-based, as this helps ensure measures taken to establish 
stability are applied efficiently. Financial regulation should aim to be competitively 
neutral and not favour one type or class of institution over others, unless there is a 
sound public policy reason. An approach that combines strong regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks and market-based disciplines will deliver the best balance 
between financial stability and economic efficiency. 
• In implementing regulation, Australia should build on global frameworks while 
reflecting features of the Australian system. 
• The CFR has a shared responsibility for the stability of the financial system and 
monitoring systemic risks, while the member regulators retain ultimate 
responsibility and accountability for their respective mandates. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes that implementing these recommendations, and continuing to 
develop policy based on these principles, will assist in ensuring Australia’s financial 
system remains strong and stable into the future and continues to provide its core 
economic functions — even in times of financial stress. 
The recommendations increase the system’s resilience to institutional failure and, in 
doing so, reduce the likelihood of future crises. They aim to protect taxpayers and the 
Government balance sheet, help maintain investor confidence and increase efficiency 
in the economy. Where crises are unavoidable, the recommendations are designed to 
lessen their impact, minimising the need for taxpayer funds to be put at risk to support 
the financial sector and reducing the cost of a future crisis to the broader economy. 
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Box 6: ADI liability structures and prudential requirements 
This box outlines the main components of an ADI’s liability structure. It describes 
the relationship of this structure with capital requirements, and loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity. 
Figure 3: ADI liability structure and prudential requirements 
 
RWA: risk-weighted assets. 
D-SIB: domestic systemically important bank. 
CET1: common equity tier 1. 
The liability structure is the mix of debt and equity instruments that the ADI uses to 
fund its activities, shown in the centre of Figure 3. Each category in the liability 
structure represents a layer in the creditor hierarchy. The top layer will be the first to 
absorb a loss. Once a layer has been depleted, further losses are applied to the next 
layer and so on. This means that the liability categories closest to the top of the 
structure are also the riskiest for investors and attract correspondingly higher rates 
of return. The corollary is that these instruments are also the most expensive sources 
of funding for the ADI. 
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Box 6: ADI liability structures and prudential requirements (cont.) 
Historically, prudential requirements have been placed on the top layers of ADIs’ 
liability structures to reduce the probability of failure — shown on the left-hand 
side of Figure 3. This includes capital requirements that mandate a minimum 
portion of the ADI’s funding be in the form of certain regulatory capital. This 
chapter includes recommendations to strengthen these requirements, which include: 
• Buffers: It’s generally expected that an ADI’s capital level will be above the level 
specified by the buffers, but it can fall below this level if necessary. When it falls 
below, restrictions are placed on dividends and bonus payments. 
• Hard minimums: ADI capital levels must be maintained above specified hard 
minimums. An ADI would likely be declared non-viable if capital dropped 
below these levels. 
More recently, international standard-setting bodies have worked on separate 
requirements to minimise the cost of failures. Although no such requirements are 
currently in place in Australia, the right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the capacity for 
different instruments in the liability structure to perform this function. This chapter 
includes a recommendation to introduce a framework for loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity. This aims to ensure that, where an ADI fails, its liability 
structure enhances the ability to feasibly impose losses on creditors and recapitalise 
the institution, minimising the need for taxpayer-funded bail-out.  
Measures to address the goals of reducing the probability of failure and minimising 
the cost of failure when it does occur are complementary, and meeting one objective 
should not be seen as a substitute for meeting the other. 
This chapter makes extensive reference to the different types of regulatory capital 
included in the Basel framework: 
• Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital comprises ‘tangible’ equity such as 
shareholders’ common equity. It is the primary defence against insolvency and 
bank failure.  
• Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital primarily refers to other forms of equity capital, 
such as preference shares, as well as some kinds of debt instruments with similar 
characteristics. Under the Basel framework, AT1 capital must be available to 
absorb the losses of a troubled institution before it becomes non-viable.  
• Tier 2 capital includes subordinated debt that has a ‘bail-in’ clause, meaning it 
can be converted to equity or written off should a set trigger condition be met. 




Set capital standards such that Australian authorised deposit-taking institution capital 
ratios are unquestionably strong. 
Description 
APRA should raise capital requirements for Australian ADIs to make ADI capital 
ratios unquestionably strong. A baseline target in the top quartile of internationally 
active banks is recommended. This principle should apply to all ADIs but is of 
particular importance for ADIs that pose systemic risks or access international funding 
markets. 
The target would be aided by adopting Recommendation 4: Transparent reporting, which 
aims to improve the international comparability of Australian ADI capital ratios. 
The Inquiry’s judgement is that, although Australian ADIs are generally well 
capitalised, further strengthening the banking sector would deliver significant benefits 
to the economy at a small cost. Evidence available to the Inquiry suggests that the 
largest Australian banks are not currently in the top quartile of internationally active 
banks. Australian ADIs should therefore be required to have higher capital levels. 
The quantum of any change should take account of the effect of other 
recommendations, particularly Recommendation 2: Narrow mortgage risk weight 
differences, which aims to improve competitive neutrality of regulatory settings. 
Objectives 
• Make banks less susceptible to extreme but plausible adverse events — such as 
asset price collapses — unexpected loan losses or offshore funding shocks, to 
reduce the likelihood of bank failures and promote trust and confidence in the 
banking sector. 
• Create a financial system that is more resilient to shocks and thus less prone to 
crises, which can have devastating and long-lasting effects on the economy and 
society. 
• Protect the Government balance sheet from risks in the financial system, to 
minimise the burden on taxpayers. 
• Reduce perceptions of an implicit Government guarantee for ADIs and the 
associated economic inefficiency. 
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Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Importance of capital in the banking sector 
Capital, particularly equity capital, is an essential element in both actual and perceived 
financial soundness, acting as a shock absorber for unexpected losses. Once equity has 
been exhausted, a bank is generally non-viable — and could well have been before that 
point. Equity capital is therefore an important determinant of how likely a bank is to 
fail. Capital is also a safety buffer for creditors, as it is typically exhausted before the 
bank defaults on its obligations. By making creditor funds relatively safer, high levels 
of capital assist to maintain confidence in a bank, even in times of market stress. 
Making banks safer and enhancing investor confidence both contribute to reducing the 
likelihood of a financial crisis. Shocks will always buffet the financial system, whether 
they are generated domestically or overseas. Capital is one of the best protections 
against those shocks generating a crisis. 
Although banks choose capital at levels that account for their own specific risks, this 
does not account for the risks the banking system poses to the broader economy. 
Risks and costs of financial crises 
Australia’s financial system is a vital part of the economy, providing avenues for 
saving, investment and funding growth. However, it also poses risks that must be 
managed. This includes minimising the likelihood of future financial crises, which can 
have significant costs for individuals, the economy, Government and taxpayers. 
Australia should not underestimate the risks of financial crises 
Australia’s resilience during the GFC partly reflected the strength of the financial 
sector, the quality of its regulatory framework and supervision, and Government’s 
assistance to the financial sector. However, many other important factors were also at 
play, including macro-economic policy, a strong Government balance sheet and 
Chinese resource demand. Given these supporting factors may not be present in the 
next crisis, Australia should not become complacent about the risks of financial crises 
as a result of its GFC experience. Australia is not immune to financial crises.  
Australia can draw lessons from other countries’ GFC experiences, which highlighted 
that financial systems are vulnerable to low-probability, high-impact ‘tail events’, 
which can be caused by large external shocks or be generated domestically. An asset 
value shock of similar magnitude to those experienced by overseas banks during the 
GFC would cause Australian banks significant distress.  
For example, the major banks currently have a leverage ratio of around 4–4½ per cent 
based on the ratio of Tier 1 capital to exposures, including off-balance sheet. An overall 
asset value shock of this size, which was within the range of shocks experienced 
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overseas during the GFC, would be sufficient to render Australia’s major banks 
insolvent in the absence of further capital raising. In reality, a bank is non-viable well 
before insolvency, so even a smaller shock could pose a significant threat. Following its 
recent stress-test of the industry, APRA concluded, “… there remains more to do to 
confidently deliver strength in adversity”.6 
Financial crises have large costs 
The costs of financial crises are high, and their effects broad-ranging. Financial crises: 
• Significantly constrain households’ and businesses’ access to credit, inhibiting the 
ability to invest, buy a home or grow a business.  
• Potentially affect confidence in banks, which in turn may impact confidence in the 
operation of the payments system. 
• Are historically associated with an average rise in unemployment of seven 
percentage points, which in 2014 would be almost 900,000 additional Australian 
workers.7 Recovery from financial crises can be protracted, with high 
unemployment continuing for a long period. 
• Can result in large contractions in trade credit and make it more difficult for 
businesses, including small businesses, to access financing. 
• Can substantially reduce the wealth and savings of a generation, particularly for 
those with lower initial wealth. This may particularly harm those people who rely 
most on savings, such as those in or close to retirement. 
• Create large falls in GDP. International estimates of the GDP cost of a crisis are  
19–158 per cent of one year’s GDP — which for Australia would have equated to 
$300 billion to $2.4 trillion in 2013 — with a median of around 63 per cent of GDP 
($950 billion).8 
• Erode a government’s fiscal position. The need to directly support the financial 
system, along with the deteriorating budget position due to the associated 
recession, causes a substantial increase in net government debt. According to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, general government net debt between 
2007 and 2013 as a share of 2013 GDP rose by around 40 percentage points in the 
                                                          
6  Byres, W 2014, Seeking strength in adversity: lessons from APRA’s 2014 stress test on Australia’s 
largest banks, AB+F Randstad Leaders Lecture Series, 7 November, Sydney. 
7  Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K 2009, This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, page 224. 
8  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010, An assessment of the long-term economic impact 
of stronger capital and liquidity requirements, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, page 10. 
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United States, 50 percentage points in the United Kingdom, 55 percentage points in 
Portugal and more than 80 percentage points in Ireland.9 
The Australian Federal Government is currently one of the strongest rated sovereigns 
in the world, with a AAA equivalent credit rating from all the major credit rating 
agencies. Significant deterioration in the fiscal position as a result of a financial crisis 
would be expected to threaten this rating. A reduction in Government’s credit rating is 
likely to lead to the banks’ credit ratings being downgraded, increasing funding costs. 
As well as affecting the financial sector directly, a downgrade of the sovereign credit 
rating would raise Government’s borrowing costs and damage Australia’s reputation 
as a safe investment destination, ultimately harming the broader economy — including 
by raising borrowing costs for households and businesses. 
Characteristics of Australia’s banking system create additional systemic risks 
Historically, Australia’s growth has been assisted by the banks’ role as a conduit for 
foreign savings to fund domestic investment — a trend the Inquiry expects to 
continue. However, the benefits of offshore funding come with the risk that foreign 
investors will stop lending to an Australian bank. 
The Inquiry recognises that Australian banks have built a reputation for prudent risk 
management, with low levels of proprietary trading and sound management. 
However, maintaining foreign investor confidence in the strength of the Australian 
banking system is paramount for maintaining the banks’ access to foreign funding. 
This goes beyond the strength of any individual bank, as Australia is a small part of 
the global financial system and investors may view Australian banks as a group. Many 
jurisdictions are still increasing capital levels to implement Basel III, a process largely 
complete in Australia. Over time, the relative strength of Australian ADI capital ratios 
may therefore decline as banks in other jurisdictions continue to increase capital. 
Australia’s highly concentrated banking sector, at the core of its financial system, poses 
a further risk. The majority of Australian banks pursue similar business models, with 
broadly similar balance sheet compositions that can be expected to have a high 
correlation during a crisis. The major banks form part of the largest Australian 
financial groups and are highly interconnected with the financial sector. Hence, 
disruption to the functioning of one major bank could be expected to impose 
significant costs on the economy, particularly if it resulted in contagion to other 
Australian financial institutions.  
                                                          
9  International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2014, IMF, 
viewed 11 November 2014, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx>. 
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Implicit guarantee 
Actions taken by governments both in Australia and overseas to support their financial 
sectors during the GFC have reinforced perceptions of an implicit guarantee. Implicit 
guarantees arise when creditors believe that, if a bank were to fail, the government 
would step in to rescue the institution.  
Implicit guarantees reduce banks’ funding costs by moving risk from private investors 
onto the Government balance sheet — a contingent liability for Government. As a 
result, the creditor takes no (or a reduced) loss, making it less risky to invest in the 
institution. Creditors will therefore accept a lower interest rate, which lowers funding 
costs for the bank and provides a competitive advantage to those institutions most 
affected. 
Empirical studies have found that Australian ADIs, especially the largest ADIs, benefit 
from an implicit guarantee.10 This is also evident in the credit ratings of the major 
Australian banks, which all receive a two-notch credit rating uplift from credit rating 
agencies Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s due to expectations of Government support. 
Implicit guarantees create inefficiencies by: 
• Providing a funding cost advantage for banks over other corporations. 
• Giving large banks an advantage over smaller banks. 
• Weakening the market discipline provided by creditors. 
• Potentially creating moral hazard that encourages inefficiently high risk taking.11 
Rationale 
The Inquiry considers that these factors provide a compelling case for ensuring 
Australian ADIs have unquestionably strong capital ratios. The Inquiry’s judgement, 
based on the available evidence, is that the CET1 capital ratio of Australia’s major 
banks is currently not in the top quartile of internationally active banks, although it is 
likely to be above the median.12 Although this position does not suggest capital levels 
at Australian ADIs are weak, it also does not suggest they are unquestionably strong. 
Perceptions of an implicit guarantee introduce a range of damaging distortions into the 
financial sector that reduce efficiency. They also transfer risk from the banking sector 
                                                          
10  For example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability 
Assessment, IMF Country Report No. 12/308, IMF, Washington, DC. 
11  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2014, Global Financial Stability Report April 2014, IMF, 
Washington, DC; Independent Commission on Banking 2011, Final Report, Independent 
Commission on Banking, London, page 101. 
12  On a broader measure of capital, which includes CET1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, 
Australian major banks are ranked lower reflecting their proportionally greater use of CET1. 
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to taxpayers. In the Inquiry’s view, such factors make it appropriate to take steps to 
minimise implicit guarantees.  
Raising capital requirements means that a larger share of bank funding would be in 
the form of equity — which is not perceived to have a guarantee — rather than debt. In 
addition, the perceived value of the guarantee for remaining debt would be lessened, 
as the ADI is safer and there is less chance the guarantee will be called upon. This 
reduces the implicit guarantee, in conjunction with Recommendation 3: Loss absorbing 
and recapitalisation capacity and Recommendation 5: Crisis management toolkit, which 
strengthen credible options to resolve an ADI with minimal recourse to public finds. 
Options considered 
1. Recommended: Set capital standards such that Australian ADI capital ratios 
are unquestionably strong. 
2. Make no changes to capital ratio requirements. 
Option costs and benefits 
Summary of stakeholder submissions 
Submissions from ADIs do not generally support increases to capital requirements — 
especially equity requirements — for a number of reasons. 
They argue that increased capital, particularly equity, is unnecessary. As outlined in 
the Australian Bankers’ Association’s (ABA) second round submission (discussed later 
in this chapter), the Australian banks consider themselves to be highly capitalised 
relative to global peers. They argue that they are among the best capitalised banks in 
the world and are around or above the 75th percentile of capital ratios globally.13 
The banks submit that their absolute (not only relative) capital position is very strong. 
Several banks note that internal stress tests show their capital position is sufficient to 
absorb large economic shocks, and APRA’s stress-testing has not led the regulator to 
raise capital requirements.14 
Despite the banks’ submissions, the Inquiry notes that Standard & Poor’s classifies the 
major bank capital ratios as ‘adequate’ but not ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’.15 
Several of the major banks point to the need to consider capital within the context of 
broader settings for financial stability in Australia. They argue that these broader 
                                                          
13  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 36. 
14  For example, Westpac 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 71. 
15  Standard & Poor’s 2014, The Top 100 Rated Banks: Will 2014 Mark A Turning Point in Capital 
Cushioning?, Standard & Poor’s. 
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settings and conditions make Australia a safe environment, reducing or negating the 
need for additional equity.16 Such conditions include conservative prudential 
regulation, which is stricter in a number of aspects than in other countries, and 
intensive and effective supervision from APRA. 
The banks also point out that equity is their most expensive source of funding and that 
this cost will be passed on (at least in part) to consumers, ultimately slowing credit and 
GDP growth. They note that other forms of regulatory capital, such as Tier 2 capital, 
would provide protection from losses at a lower cost. The banks did not provide 
estimates of the extent to which competitive pressure would limit any rise in loan 
interest rates, but they did note that the sector is highly competitive. 
Some smaller ADIs suggest that it would be appropriate to impose an additional 
capital requirement on those banks APRA designates as domestic systemically 
important banks (D-SIBs), to offset funding advantages from perceptions of an implicit 
guarantee. They argue that offsetting the funding cost advantage of the implicit 
guarantee would improve competitive neutrality in the banking sector.17 
APRA considers Australian banks to be well capitalised, but acknowledges that 
overseas jurisdictions are continuing to increase capital requirements for their 
domestic banks. APRA’s preliminary view is that the major banks’ CET1 ratios are 
likely positioned broadly in the middle of the second highest quartile of internationally 
active banks, which is consistent with the Inquiry’s findings. 
In its submission and subsequent discussions, APRA notes that stress-testing is a 
useful tool for assessing the riskiness of banks and their capital position. However, 
APRA cautions against relying on stress-testing too heavily to determine exact capital 
levels, given the margin for error in such exercises.18 It notes that many banks are still 
developing and improving their stress-test modelling as well as the critical data that 
underpins the models. 
In addition, stress-testing exercises do not typically take into account more complex 
feedback loops and amplification mechanisms that can develop in practice. For 
example, banks are likely to respond to stress by cutting lending growth, which in turn 
may amplify stress and restrict economic recovery. Losses may also be more 
concentrated at one institution or a handful of institutions than can be assumed in the 
stress test. Even though a given institution may survive the average industry loss, it 
may be less resilient to a concentrated loss. As APRA notes in its most recent stress 
test, “… even though CET1 requirements were not breached, it is unlikely that 
                                                          
16  ANZ 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 4. 
17  Customer Owned Banking Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 15. 
18  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 50. 
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Australia would have the fully-functioning banking system it would like in such an 
environment”.19 
A number of analysts, think tanks and academics argue that, although equity funding 
may be expensive for the banks, increasing it does not impose large costs on the 
economy overall in terms of higher loan interest rates or lower GDP growth.20 They 
view greater use of equity funding as cheap insurance against the risks to which 
banking can expose depositors, Government, taxpayers and the broader economy. 
Capital levels at the major banks 
In the Inquiry’s judgement, capital levels at Australia’s major banks — as measured by 
CET1 capital — are likely to be above the global median but below the top quartile. 
The Inquiry has not sought to determine the exact capital position of Australian banks 
on a consistent basis compared with banks in other countries. It is a very complex area, 
given the varied national discretions taken by different countries, including Australia. 
This is a task for APRA, taking into account the recommendations in this report. 
However, the Inquiry has sought to determine a plausible range for the current capital 
ratios of Australian banks for comparison with the current global distribution. 
Based on the evidence available for the purposes of comparing with the global 
distribution, a plausible range for current Australian major bank CET1 capital ratios is 
10.0–11.6 per cent (Figure 4: Adjusted average Australian major bank CET1 capital ratios). 
The lower bound is derived from the latest Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) data, adjusted upwards by 0.8 percentage points to account for risk-weighted 
asset calculation differences based on APRA’s RCAP (Regulatory Consistency 
Assessment Program) data.21,22 The upper bound derives from a report submitted by 
the ABA which calculates capital ratios based on the Basel minimum requirements.23 
                                                          
19  Byres, W 2014, Seeking strength in adversity: lessons from APRA’s 2014 stress test on Australia’s 
largest banks, AB+F Randstad Leaders Lecture Series, 7 November, Sydney. 
20  For example, Admati, A and Hellwig, M 2013, The Bankers’ New Clothes, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. At the extreme, some academics argue that changes in capital levels will not 
affect bank funding costs at all under certain conditions. 
21  Australian major banks’ position is contained in a non-public BCBS report and was provided 
to the Inquiry by APRA. The adjustment for risk-weighting calculation differences are in 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
system Inquiry, page 81. 
22  Using the estimates from the ABA report, excluding those related to capital definitions 
(which the BCBS data adjusts for), the lower bound on the range would be 10.5 per cent. 
23  Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, Appendix A: International comparability of capital ratios of Australia’s major 
banks. The ABA report was commissioned from PricewaterhouseCoopers. It uses bank data 
for March and June 2014, while the BCBS global distribution is as at December 2013. Between 
December 2013 and March/June 2014 the major banks increased CET1 capital ratios by an 
average of around 0.5 percentage points. A stricter comparison of the major banks to the 
global distribution could take this into account and suggest an upper bound of only 
11.1 per cent. 
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Figure 4: Adjusted average Australian major bank CET1 capital ratios 
Based on December 2013 global distribution 
 
Sources: Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Appendix A: International comparability of capital ratios of Australia’s major banks; Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 81; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Basel III monitoring report September 2014, Bank for International 
Settlement, Basel; Inquiry calculations. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the available evidence suggests the major banks are not in the top 
quartile of CET1 capital ratios globally. 
This view is supported by APRA’s assessment that the largest Australian banks are 
broadly in the middle of the second-top quartile of their peers for CET1 capital ratios.24 
The Inquiry’s conclusion updates the observation in the Interim Report that Australia’s 
major banks were around the middle of the pack globally. That observation was based 
on data from the BCBS, which remains the most comprehensive data available for 
comparing capital levels across jurisdictions. However, although the BCBS data 
account for national differences in how capital is defined, they do not adjust for 
national differences in the way risk-weighted assets are calculated. Adjusting for this 
would move the Australian banks higher in the global distribution. 
BCBS reported capital levels 
Nonetheless, the BCBS provides the only available information about the distribution 
of global capital ratios, offering a useful context against which to compare Australian 
bank capital. The latest release, from December 2013, shows the CET1 capital global 
median and 75th percentile both increased to 10.5 per cent and 12.2 per cent 
respectively over the prior six months.25 In that time, the adjusted Australian major 
bank CET1 capital ratios reported by the BCBS increased by a lesser amount, to 
9.2 per cent on average. This highlights that many countries are still ‘catching up’ with 
                                                          
24  Byres, W 2014, Seeking strength in adversity: lessons from APRA’s 2014 stress test on Australia’s 
largest banks, AB+F Randstad Leaders Lecture Series, 7 November, Sydney. 
25  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Basel III Monitoring Report, September 2014, 
Bank for International Settlement, Basel. 
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their implementation of Basel III relative to Australia and, in a number of cases, are 
introducing stricter requirements than exist locally. It can be expected that the global 
distribution of capital levels will therefore continue to rise for some time yet. 
ABA reported capital levels 
The ABA submitted a report that endeavoured to adjust Australia’s major bank capital 
ratios for differences between the Australian framework and estimates against the 
Basel framework and against international practice. Against the Basel framework, the 
ABA report assessed the average CET1 capital ratio across the major banks to be 
around 11.6 per cent as at August 2014. This approach considered similar items to 
those in APRA’s submission, although the ABA’s estimated value within categories 
was higher in a number of cases.26 In the Inquiry’s view, this estimate forms a 
plausible upper bound on the range of adjusted Australian major bank capital ratios. 
Against its measure of international practice, the ABA report estimated a higher 
average CET1 capital ratio of 12.7 per cent. On this basis, it concluded that the major 
Australian banks were at or above the 75th percentile of identified international peers 
in terms of CET1 capital. Although this material was useful for considering the relative 
strength of Australian bank capital, its accuracy was limited by issues such as: 
• The restricted number of comparison countries and banks — it used 52 banks, 
compared to 102 in the BCBS report. 
• Minimal or no adjustment to foreign bank capital ratios to ensure they were on the 
same basis as the ABA-adjusted Australian bank capital ratios, which is crucial 
since the report directly compares these ratios. 
• Attempting to adjust some items to ‘international practice’ where credible 
benchmarks are not available, rather than to the minimums set out in the Basel 
framework, where benchmarks are clearer. 
There is no benchmark of international practice: all jurisdictions have implemented the 
Basel framework in a different manner, reflecting their domestic circumstances. As a 
result, it is highly complex to compare even two jurisdictions, let alone to compare all 
jurisdictions. This is reflected in Recommendation 4: Transparent reporting, which 
recommends using the Basel framework since a broader benchmark does not exist. In 
the Inquiry’s view, the ABA’s adjustments that go beyond comparisons to minimums 
in the Basel framework are not a plausible basis for international comparison. 
Benefits of higher capital 
Higher capital provides insurance against the large losses that can be caused by 
financial crises through reducing the likelihood of such crises. It achieves this by 
                                                          
26  APRA’s approach is outlined in APRA 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 81. 
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making individual financial institutions safer and by promoting greater investor 
confidence in the system. It also reduces distortions caused by perceptions of an 
implicit Government guarantee. The benefits of increasing capital are not linear; 
however, the incremental benefit will decrease as the starting level of capital rises. 
All financial crises are different, and the exact benefits of avoiding any particular crisis 
are therefore difficult to predict. Figures for the ‘average’ experience of a crisis should 
not be taken as precise estimates, but instead as indicative of the likely experience, 
noting that the actual magnitude can be much more severe.  
Despite this limitation, a safer banking system that is less prone to crises provides large 
benefits, which accrue to individuals, the economy, Government and taxpayers. 
Benefits to individuals 
Financial crises are costly to individuals, both through the direct effects of financial 
institution failure and falls in asset prices, and as a result of the large recessions that 
typically accompany such crises.  
Research on the ‘average’ financial crisis finds that the unemployment rate typically 
rises by around seven percentage points — over three times the increase in Australia 
during the GFC.27 The associated economic weakness lasts around four years on 
average, meaning that high unemployment can be protracted. The effect is often 
greatest for younger generations, particularly those trying to enter the workforce for 
the first time. 
Financial crises can substantially reduce the savings of an entire generation. In relative 
terms, the largest effect tends to be concentrated on those people with lower initial 
levels of wealth. This can have a lasting effect on society, particularly on those who are 
in retirement, or about to retire, and who have limited capacity to rebuild lost savings. 
Benefits to the economy 
In its review of 21 empirical studies, the BCBS found the median estimate of the cost of 
a crisis in terms of cumulative foregone output due to the economic downturn is 
63 per cent of one year’s GDP.28 The estimate range is 19–158 per cent of one year’s 
GDP, with the BCBS noting that the maximum cost of a crisis tends to be three to five 
times the average cost. Haldane estimated that the cost of the GFC, a particularly 
severe crisis, could be at least 90 per cent of 2009 world GDP.29 More recently, the 
                                                          
27  Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K 2009, This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
28  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010, An assessment of the long-term economic impact 
of stronger capital and liquidity requirements, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, page 10. 
29  Haldane, A 2010, The $100 billion dollar question, speech at the Institute of Regulation & Risk 
North Asia, 30 March, Hong Kong, Table 1, page 16. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
52 
Dallas Federal Reserve estimated the cost of the GFC to the United States economy at 
US$6–US$14 trillion (40–90 per cent of annual GDP).30 
The BCBS also estimates that financial crises occur, on average, every 20–25 years in a 
given country, implying a 4–5 per cent chance of a financial crisis in any given year. 
However, across the world, crises occur somewhere with much greater frequency, and 
these crises typically have spill-over effects for other countries. 
Combined with this estimated probability, the median cost of a financial crisis suggests 
an annual expected loss of around 2½–3 per cent of GDP. In dollar terms, based on 
2013 nominal GDP, this translates to an expected cost to the Australian economy of 
$40–$50 billion per year. If this estimate was instead based on the top of the BCBS’s 
range for the cost of a crisis, this figure would rise to $100–$120 billion per year.  
Given these large potential costs, even a small reduction in the probability or cost of a 
crisis would yield significant benefits.  
The Inquiry notes that the estimated benefit of avoiding crises will tend to understate 
the true benefit to the Australian economy, since it does not account for: 
• Reduced perceptions of implicit guarantees. Weaker perceptions of an implicit 
guarantee reduce Government’s contingent liability and create fewer distortions to 
competition and efficiency in the financial system and broader economy. In 
addition, because ADIs are safer, any remaining perceptions of guarantee would be 
reduced. 
• An economy with fewer crises is less likely to be volatile, which has welfare 
benefits and promotes long-term trust and confidence to support investment in the 
economy. In contrast, volatility undermines long-term confidence and the ability of 
individuals, businesses and Government to plan for the future, impairing allocative 
and dynamic efficiency. 
Benefits to Government and taxpayers 
Reducing the likelihood of financial crises would protect Government and taxpayers 
from the costs of giving direct support to the financial sector. It would also help 
prevent the deterioration of the fiscal position due to the deep recession typically 
associated with financial crises. 
The GFC clearly demonstrated the damage that can be done to governments’ fiscal 
position and the associated increase in net government debt. Chart 1 shows the change 
in general government net debt for a number of countries between 2007 and 2013, as a 
share of GDP. This captures the crisis period and the protracted recession that 
                                                          
30  Atkinson, T, Luttrell, D and Rosenblum, H 2013, How bad was it? The costs and consequences of 
the 2007–09 financial crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Staff Papers No. 20, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, page 1. 
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followed in many economies. In parts of Europe, the recession and associated fiscal 
costs continue more than six years after the crisis began. 
Chart 1: Change in general government net debt, 2007–2013 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2014, IMF, viewed 
11 November 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx>. 
 
The GFC and the associated economic downturn left the Australian federal and state 
governments with notably higher net debt, which has yet to peak, despite Australia’s 
less acute experience of the GFC. The Inquiry understands there is limited room before 
Australia’s AAA credit rating is threatened. Estimates suggest this would occur as 
Commonwealth and state debt levels approached around a 30 per cent net debt level.31 
Another financial crisis like the GFC could put Australia’s AAA credit rating in 
jeopardy, with likely knock-on effects for the credit ratings of Australian ADIs. This 
would make it more difficult for banks to access offshore funding markets, and would 
raise their funding costs.  
Cost of higher capital 
Overall, the expected cost of increasing capital requirements is small. The Inquiry 
estimates that a one percentage point increase in capital requirements would increase 
                                                          
31  Standard & Poor’s 2014, Ratings on Australia affirmed at ‘AAA/A-1+’ on monetary and fiscal 
flexibility; outlook remains stable, media release, 29 July. 
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the average interest rate on a loan by less than 10 basis points.32 This is the figure if the 
full cost is passed on to consumers with no offset in interest rates by the RBA. 
However, in a competitive market, the actual change in lending interest rates would be 
lower and the RBA may lower the cash rate if conditions warrant. The Inquiry asked 
APRA to review its approach to generating these estimates, and APRA confirmed this 
approach was reasonable and consistent with other studies. 
The Inquiry’s estimated effect on loan interest rates is roughly in the middle of the 
range found in a number of studies. The surveyed studies find increases in loan prices 
for a one percentage point increase in capital ratio are 1–22 basis points.33 The studies 
include: 
• APRA’s regulatory impact statement for the introduction of Basel III, which 
estimates a 5 basis points interest rate increase on a loan with a 50 per cent risk 
weight.34 
• A recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) study on the impact of Basel III, 
which found a 12 basis points increase in loan prices per percentage point increase 
in capital, falling to around 8 basis points if only considering the advanced 
countries.35 
This low cost reflects that changing capital requirements only affect a small portion of 
the funding of a loan. For example, a one percentage point rise in capital requirements 
affects the funding cost of less than 0.5 per cent of the average loan.36 That is, the 
funding cost on 99.5 per cent of the loan does not increase, and the incremental cost of 
equity over debt is only felt on the remaining 0.5 per cent.37 Changing the cost of this 
small slice of a loan’s funding therefore has a correspondingly small effect on the 
average funding cost.  
RBA staff research suggests that an interest rate increase of this magnitude would 
reduce real GDP by less than 0.1 percentage points, while other studies suggest the 
                                                          
32  The precise quantum of additional capital necessary to place Australian ADIs in the top 
quartile of global peers is left to APRA to determine — the one percentage point increase 
here is for indicative purposes only. 
33  See, for example, Barrell, R, Davis, E, Fic, T, Holland, D, Kirby, S and Liadze, I 2009, Optimal 
regulation of bank capital and liquidity: how to calibrate new international standards, Financial 
Services Authority Occasional Paper 38, London; Elliott, D 2009, Quantifying the effects on 
lending of increasing capital requirements, Center for Financial Stability; Kashyap, A, Hanson, S 
and Stein, J 2011, ‘A macroprudential approach to financial regulation’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol 25, no. 1; Miles, D, Yang, J, Marcheggiano, G 2011, Optimal bank capital, MPC 
Unit Discussion Paper No. 31., Bank of England, London. 
34  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2012, Implementing Basel III capital 
reforms in Australia, APRA, Sydney, page 15. 
35  Cohen, B and Scatigna, M 2014, Bank and capital requirements: channels of adjustment, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel, page 17. 
36  The proportion of funding affected for a given loan is the change in capital requirement 
multiplied by the risk weight on that loan. The average risk weight of the major banks is 
currently less than 45 per cent. 
37  Because higher capital makes the ADI safer, the funding cost of the 99.5 per cent of the loan 
may actually decrease to the extent that the risk premium demanded by debt and equity 
holders falls. 
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effect could be even lower.38 In addition, the effect on growth would likely be taken 
into account in macro-economic policy settings since the RBA considers actual lending 
rates when determining the cash rate.39 
The Inquiry’s estimate is consistent with a range of empirical studies that have 
estimated the effect of capital requirement changes on the economy (Table 2: Effect on 
GDP of a one percentage point rise in capital ratio). Studies examining the effect on GDP 
estimate that a one percentage point increase in capital ratios would potentially 
decrease annual GDP by 0.01–0.1 per cent ($150 million to $1.5 billion in terms of 2013 
GDP) per year. 
Table 2: Effect on GDP of a one percentage point rise in capital ratio* 
Study Effect on GDP** Notes 
Miles et al (2011) 1–5bps Effect on level of GDP 
BIS (2010) 3bps Estimated lower growth during transition to higher capital. 
After implementation period, GDP recovers to trend. 
BCBS (2010) 9bps Effect on level of GDP 
Barrell et al (2009) 10bps Effect on level of GDP 
Riksbank (2011) 6–16bps For low and high social cost of capital respectively 
*Capital ratio measured as equity to risk-weighted assets. 
**Note that definitions of capital vary across studies. 
Sources: Miles, D, Yang, J, Marcheggiano, G 2011, Optimal bank capital, MPC Unit Discussion Paper 
No. 31., Bank of England, London; Macroeconomic Assessment Group 2010, Assessing the macroeconomic 
impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements, Bank for International Settlement, 
Basel; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2010, An assessment of the long-term economic 
impact of strong capital and liquidity requirements, Bank for International Settlement, Basel, page 25; 
Barrell, R, Davis, E, Fic, T, Holland, D, Kirby, S and Liadze, I 2009, Optimal regulation of bank capital and 
liquidity: how to calibrate new international standards, Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper 38, 
London; Sveriges Riksbank 2011, Appropriate capital ratio in major Swedish banks — an economic analysis, 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, page 31. 
Reducing perceptions of an implicit Government guarantee reduces Government’s 
contingent liability. This benefit is not factored into the cost estimates above. The 
United Kingdom’s Independent Commission on Banking report estimated that around 
half the cost of its proposal to increase capital was offset by a reduction in the implicit 
guarantee.40 
                                                          
38  Lawson, J and Rees, D 2008, A sectoral model of the Australian economy, Reserve Bank of 
Australia Research Discussion Paper 2008-01, estimates that an unexpected 25 basis points 
increase in the cash rate reduces real GDP below its baseline by just more than 0.2 percentage 
points. A smaller estimate is provided in Jääskelä, J and Nimark, K 2008, A medium-scale open 
economy model of Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper 2008-07 and 
Dungey, M and Pagan, A 2009, Extending a SVAR Model of the Australian Economy, Economic 
Record, vol. 85 no. 268. 
39  For example, Battellino, R 2009, Some comments on bank funding, remarks to 22nd Australasian 
Finance and Banking Conference, 16 December, Sydney; Hansard 2009, Reference: Reserve 
Bank of Australia annual report 2008, House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, 20 February, Canberra. 
40  Independent Commission on Banking 2011, Final Report, Independent Commission on 
Banking, London, page 141. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
56 
Box 7: The cost of raising capital requirements 
To examine the potential effect on loan prices, this box provides a stylised example 
of a one percentage point increase in capital requirements. For simplicity, it does not 
account for a number of complications such as tax. 
The effect on pricing is primarily driven by the proportion of funding that changes 
from debt to equity, the cost of the debt funding that is being replaced, and the cost 
of the new equity funding in terms of shareholder-required return on equity (ROE). 
In Figure 5, a bank has a $100 portfolio of loans (the asset), which is funded by a 
mixture of debt and equity (the liabilities). 
Figure 5: Example of raising capital requirements 
 
Originally, the bank has a capital ratio of 8 per cent, with an average risk weight of 
50 per cent. The bank therefore: 
• Has $50 in risk-weighted assets ($100 x 50 per cent risk weight). 
• Uses $4 of equity funding ($50 x 8 per cent capital requirement) and $96 of debt 
funding. 
• Has a weighted average funding cost of 4.15 per cent given a cost of equity 
(target ROE) of 15 per cent, and an interest rate on debt funding of 3.7 per cent. 
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Box 7: The cost of raising capital requirements (cont.) 
Increasing the capital ratio by one percentage point requires an additional $0.50 of 
equity funding ($100 x 1 percentage point capital increase x 50 per cent risk weight). 
The additional cost is the cost of the new equity less the cost of the debt it replaces 
(15 per cent — 3.7 per cent) x $0.50, or $0.06. To retain the same ROE, the bank 
charges an additional 6 basis points on the loan.  
However, with greater equity, the bank would be safer so the risk premium built 
into both the cost of debt and investors’ required ROE should fall. In addition, 
competition may limit the extent to which the bank decides to increase prices for 
customers. These factors would reduce the increase in loan price. 
This is an indicative example that illustrates how capital increases affect pricing. 
Although the identified price increase should not be interpreted as a precise change 
that would occur, it gives the Inquiry confidence that the change in loan pricing due 
to a one percentage point rise in capital ratios would be less than 10 basis points. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry’s judgement is that, although Australian ADIs are generally well 
capitalised, strengthening the banking sector would deliver a net benefit to taxpayers 
and the broader economy. Evidence available to the Inquiry suggests the largest 
Australian banks are not currently in the top quartile of internationally active banks. 
Australian ADIs should therefore be required to have higher capital levels. 
Unquestionably strong capital positions would deliver benefits by providing greater 
insurance against future financial crises and the associated harm to individuals, the 
economy, Government and taxpayers. Moreover, the cost of strong capital positions— 
the ‘insurance premium’ to reduce the risk of financial crises — is low. This cost would 
be reduced by competition in the market, including the effect of the recommendations 
in this report. The Inquiry estimates that a one percentage point increase in capital 
ratios would, absent the benefits of competition, increase lending interest rates by less 
than 10 basis points, which could reduce GDP by 0.01–0.1 per cent. 
Although the benefits of higher capital are inherently difficult to quantify in a single 
number, to provide a net benefit to the economy, an additional percentage point of 
capital would only need to reduce the probability or severity of a crisis by 1 in 25 to 
1 in 30.41 
In addition, the RBA sets monetary policy, taking into account actual lending rates, 
and — to the extent that higher capital would affect GDP or inflation — can change the 
                                                          
41  As the expected average effect of a crisis is 2½–3 per cent of GDP per year, to justify a cost of 
capital of 0.1 per cent of GDP would require a reduction of 1 in 25 (0.1/2.5) to 1 in 30 (0.1/3) 
in the probability or severity of the crisis. 
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cash rate to at least partially offset the cost.42 Weighed against the risk of widespread 
unemployment, many households losing their savings, several years of economic 
recession and a large deterioration in the fiscal position, the Inquiry views this as a 
small cost. 
The Inquiry recognises that the benefits of additional capital are likely to diminish the 
higher the starting level is. For example, moving from 2 per cent to 3 per cent capital is 
likely to have a larger effect on stability than going from 15 per cent to 16 per cent and, 
at some point, adding additional capital will not provide sufficient benefit to justify the 
added cost. However, in the Inquiry’s judgement, capital levels at Australian ADIs are 
below this point and there are clear benefits to additional capital. 
Implementation considerations 
Determining the appropriate level of capital to ensure Australian ADI capital ratios are 
unquestionably strong necessarily involves judgement. In the Inquiry’s view, if 
requirements are set such that ADI capital ratios are positioned in the top quartile of 
internationally active banks, this will achieve the goal of ensuring they are, and are 
perceived to be, unquestionably strong. 
The optimal level of capital  
A body of empirical work estimates the ‘optimal’ bank equity ratio for specific 
countries; that is, the level at which the net benefit to the economy is maximised. To 
the Inquiry’s knowledge, such a study has not been undertaken for Australia. Studies 
from other countries typically find the optimal level of equity capital ratios is  
10–20 per cent of risk-weighted assets.43 
Current minimum CET1 requirements for Australian banks, including CET1 buffers, 
are 8 per cent for D-SIBs and 7 per cent for others. Even after adjusting these to account 
for differences to the Basel framework — as outlined above — Australia’s 
requirements are at the lower end of the range of international estimates of the capital 
ratio that maximises net benefits to the economy. 
                                                          
42  For example, Battellino, R 2009, Some comments on bank funding, remarks to 22nd Australasian 
Finance and Banking Conference, 16 December, Sydney; Hansard 2009, Reference: Reserve 
Bank of Australia annual report 2008, House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, 20 February, Canberra.  
43  See Miles, D, Yang, J, Marcheggiano, G 2011, Optimal bank capital, MPC Unit Discussion 
Paper No. 31., , Bank of England, London; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010, 
An assessment of the long-term economic impact of strong capital and liquidity requirements, Bank 
for International Settlements, Basel; Barrell, R, Davis, E, Fic, T, Holland, D, Kirby, S and 
Liadze, I 2009, Optimal regulation of bank capital and liquidity: how to calibrate new international 
standards, Financial Services Authority Occasional Paper 38, London; Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 
Appropriate capital ratio in major Swedish banks— an economic analysis, Sveriges Riksbank, 
Stockholm; Independent Commission on Banking 2011, Final Report, Independent 
Commission on Banking, London. 
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Of course, each system is different and there is no guarantee that what is appropriate 
for another country will be right for Australia. However, considering Australia’s 
characteristics and circumstances, the ranges found in these studies support the idea 
that higher bank capital ratios would have a net benefit in Australia.  
Further details 
Unquestionably strong levels of capital would be beneficial for all ADIs. It may be 
argued that only the largest, most systemically important ADIs should be held to such 
a standard. However, in the Inquiry’s view, the failure of an ADI would have adverse 
consequences for its customers and the economy, and has the potential to undermine 
confidence and trust in the system. As such, the Inquiry judges that this standard 
should apply to all ADIs. In addition, holding different parts of the banking system to 
substantially different standards would introduce an unwelcome distortion to the 
competitive neutrality of regulatory settings. 
The Inquiry recommends that increases in capital ratios from current levels should 
primarily take the form of increases in CET1, as the highest quality form of capital 
providing the greatest level of protection against a bank failing. However, APRA 
should use its discretion regarding whether part of such change should be through 
Tier 1 capital or total capital requirements. Appropriate transition periods should be 
used to limit the costs of transitioning to higher capital. 
In implementing this requirement, the interaction between this recommendation and 
the effects of Recommendation 2: Narrow mortgage risk weight differences should be taken 
into account. In addition, the Inquiry notes a higher capital base for all ADIs may 
reduce the need for future changes to the D-SIB buffer. 
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Narrow mortgage risk weight differences 
Recommendation 2 
Raise the average internal ratings-based (IRB) mortgage risk weight to narrow the difference 
between average mortgage risk weights for authorised deposit-taking institutions using IRB 
risk-weight models and those using standardised risk weights. 
Description 
APRA should adjust the requirements for calculating risk weights for housing loans to 
narrow the difference between average IRB and standardised risk weights. This should 
be achieved in a manner that retains an incentive for banks to improve risk 
management capacity. It should also appropriately recognise the differences in the 
risks captured by IRB and standardised risk weights.  
In making these changes, the adjusted framework should remain compliant with the 
Basel framework and remain risk sensitive. 
Objectives 
• Improve the competitive neutrality of capital regulation by limiting distortions 
caused by the differential regulatory treatment of different classes of ADI. 
• Retain an incentive for ADIs to improve risk management capacity. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Australia’s current capital framework for ADIs includes two approaches to 
determining risk weights for the purpose of calculating capital ratios. 
• Standardised approach: This is the default approach, where ‘standardised ADIs’ 
use a common set of risk weights that seek to reflect general risks of different broad 
asset classes. These risk weights are not tailored to a specific ADI and are set at a 
conservative level to ensure standardised ADIs are adequately capitalised. 
• IRB approach: Accredited ADIs (IRB banks) use their own internal models to 
determine risk weights for credit exposures. These risk weights are tailored to the 
internally assessed risks of the asset and institution, and are more granular than 
standardised risk weights. Achieving IRB accreditation requires a strong and 
sophisticated risk management framework and capacity. To date, APRA has only 
accredited the four major banks and Macquarie Bank to use IRB models. 
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Prior to Basel II being introduced in 2008, all ADIs were required to operate with the 
same risk-weight model, which resulted in the same capital for a given asset, including 
loans. Since the IRB approach was introduced, the divergence in mortgage risk weights 
between the two approaches has widened, as IRB banks have refined their models and 
adjusted their balance sheets in light of modelled risks. The average mortgage risk 
weight for an ADI using the standardised model is currently 39 per cent — more than 
twice the size of the average mortgage risk weight for banks using IRB models, which 
is 18 per cent.44 
IRB risk weights are lower for many reasons, including because this method reflects a 
more refined calculation of the risks at IRB banks. However, the Inquiry notes that the 
principle of holding capital relative to risk should apply, not only within an institution, 
but also across institutions. In the Inquiry’s view, the relative riskiness of mortgages 
between IRB and standardised banks does not justify one type of institution being 
required to hold twice as much capital for mortgages than another. This conclusion is 
supported by the findings of APRA’s recent stress test, which found regulatory capital 
for housing was more sufficient for standardised banks than IRB banks.45 
The gap between average IRB and standardised mortgage risk weights means IRB 
banks can use a much smaller portion of equity funding for mortgages than 
standardised banks. Because equity is a more expensive funding source than debt, this 
translates into a funding cost advantage for IRB banks’ mortgage businesses to the 
extent that the riskiness of mortgage portfolios is similar across banks. 
Given that mortgages make up a significant portion of the assets of almost all 
Australian ADIs, competitive distortions in this area could have a large effect on their 
relative competitiveness. This may include inducing smaller ADIs to focus on 
higher-risk borrowers. Restricting the relative competitiveness of smaller ADIs will 
harm competition in the long run. 
Rationale 
The Inquiry considers that, absent other policy objectives, competitive neutrality is an 
important regulatory principle. In the case of risk weights, two policy objectives justify 
a difference in risk weights between IRB banks and standardised ADIs: 
1. To encourage improved risk management capacity at ADIs. Achieving IRB 
accreditation can result in lower risk weights and a related reduction in 
funding costs. This is an incentive for banks to develop further risk 
management capacity to achieve accreditation. 
                                                          
44  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 9. 
45  “Regulatory capital for housing held by standardised banks was (just) sufficient to cover the 
losses incurred during the stress period; that was not the case for IRB banks”, Byres, W 2014, 
Seeking strength in adversity: lessons from APRA’s 2014 stress test on Australia’s largest banks, 
AB+F Randstad Leaders Lecture Series, 7 November, Sydney. 
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2. To conform with the principle that capital should be commensurate with 
risk. This enhances efficiency and gives ADIs incentives to align risk and 
capital. Where an institution can model its risks to an acceptable standard, 
estimates from these models should reflect the actual risk of a portfolio and 
more accurately align risk and capital (the IRB approach). Where that 
capability does not exist, a benchmark risk weight provides a conservative 
measure to ensure the ADI is appropriately capitalised (the standardised 
approach).  
The Inquiry accepts both policy objectives and believes they provide a reason for some 
difference in risk weights. It also notes a natural gap between risk weights under the 
two systems, reflecting that, unlike IRB risk weights, standardised risk weights take 
account of more than credit risk. However, in the Inquiry’s view, none of these provide 
a sufficient rationale for the magnitude of the differences that have developed between 
IRB and standardised mortgage risk weights. 
The Inquiry believes the incentive to improve risk management capacity can be 
maintained with a narrower difference between mortgage risk weights. In 
implementing this recommendation, APRA should preserve appropriate risk 
incentives and take into account differences in the broader frameworks for IRB and 
standardised ADIs. 
This recommendation addresses appropriate competitive neutrality of the 
risk-weighting framework. Larger ADIs may have a number of other advantages, such 
as economies of scale, more sophisticated business models, and a greater ability to 
diversify assets and manage risk. These are part of the market process; the Inquiry is 
not suggesting these are a problem. 
Options considered 
The Inquiry considered two options to narrow the difference between standardised 
and IRB mortgage risk weights: 
1. Recommended: Raise average IRB mortgage risk weights. 
2. Lower standardised mortgage risk weights. In submissions, some ADIs argue 
that a mortgage risk weight of around 20 per cent would be appropriate.46 
Option costs and benefits 
Raise average IRB mortgage risk weights 
ADIs that use the standardised risk-weight model strongly support narrowing the 
difference between IRB and standardised mortgage risk weights. These ADIs argue 
                                                          
46  For example, Suncorp Bank 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 6. 
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they are at a considerable competitive disadvantage. In some cases, these ADIs 
contend that, without change, they will be forced out of the market — materially 
lessening competition. Although ADIs using the standardised model generally 
advocate for lowering standardised mortgage risk weights, many indicate that raising 
IRB risk weights would also address the problem.47 This includes some smaller banks 
that have spent significant resources on IRB capacity but have not yet achieved IRB 
accreditation. 
In general, the major banks advocate for smaller ADIs to be supported in achieving 
IRB accreditation, rather than making changes to risk weights. They are particularly 
opposed to raising IRB risk weights, arguing that changes to the IRB model could 
move the resulting risk weights away from the underlying principle that risk weights 
should reflect the actual risk of the portfolio. They also note differences in risk between 
mortgage portfolios at the major banks and some other ADIs. In discussions, some 
major banks indicated they had no strong objections to reducing standardised risk 
weights for mortgages. 
One major bank submits that the effective difference between the credit risk portion of 
mortgage risk weights under the IRB and standardised models is small (in the order of 
seven percentage points), since reported standardised risk weights captured more than 
credit risk.48 Although the Inquiry accepts the broader point that IRB and standardised 
risk weights capture different things, its judgement is that the gap is not likely to be as 
small as suggested by the bank’s analysis. For example, that estimate adjusts for the 
D-SIB buffer, which is unrelated to risk weight models and not applied to all IRB 
banks. However, in implementing this recommendation, APRA should consider 
factors which generate a gap between standardised and IRB risk weights. 
In discussions, one major bank argued that raising IRB risk weights would have effects 
beyond the mortgage market. In particular, it may induce them to reduce other types 
of lending, such as business lending, to offset overall increases in funding costs. While 
each institution will make its own lending decisions, many factors other than mortgage 
risk weights will affect the type of lending banks undertake, including the level of 
demand for overall credit, the strength of returns for the banks, the rate of capital 
generation and competition in the sector. 
If this recommendation is adopted, APRA has indicated its strong preference is to 
narrow mortgage risk weights by raising IRB risk weights.49 This reflects the need to 
maintain appropriate prudential capital settings, particularly for Australian ADIs’ 
                                                          
47  Customer Owned Banking Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 27. 
48  National Australia Bank 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 11. 
49  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 11. 
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largest exposure class, and that lowering standardised risk weights below 35 per cent 
would not be permitted under the Basel framework. 
Stakeholder’s raised a number of concerns with the risk-weight approach to 
calculating capital ratios. The Basel Committee is already reviewing parts of the 
standardised and IRB framework. These measures include reducing the modelling 
choices in the IRB framework when determining estimates of credit, market and 
operational risk-weighted assets.50 This work is not due to be completed until the end 
of 2015 but may result in increases in some areas. 
This recommendation does not seek to eliminate entirely the difference in risk weights 
between the IRB and standardised models. It recognises that the current system 
provides incentives for ADIs to improve their risk management capabilities and that 
the IRB approach seeks to better align capital with risk. 
Other countries have also placed restrictions on IRB mortgage risk weights through a 
number of means. For example, Sweden, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom have all 
used or proposed a mortgage risk-weight floor of 15–25 per cent. New Zealand has 
made a number of changes to the Basel-specified parameters for IRB models. Norway 
will introduce a 20 per cent floor on the loss given default parameter, which is the 
same as the current practice in Australia. 
In addition to assisting with regulatory competitive neutrality, increasing IRB risk 
weights has two further benefits: 
1. It would reduce the likelihood of the IRB approach underestimating risk, or 
being subject to model risk or outright manipulation.51 A minimum average 
risk weight prevents very low risk weights being assigned in a manner that 
may not reflect the true risk of an asset. The Inquiry notes that models based 
on individual borrower characteristics rarely capture the systemic risk that can 
become the primary risk driver at the portfolio level. 
2. It would increase the capital IRB banks require, increasing their resilience. 
The principal cost of raising the average IRB mortgage risk weights is that greater use 
of equity, which is typically more expensive than debt, would raise the average cost of 
funding for IRB banks. The cost of meeting higher average mortgage risk weights is 
expected to be small. The required quantum of capital to achieve an average risk 
weight of 25–30 per cent would be roughly equivalent to a one percentage point 
increase in major banks’ CET1 capital ratios from current levels. This corresponds with 
a small funding cost increase for the major banks. Competition will limit the extent to 
                                                          
50  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Reducing excessive variability in banks’ 
regulatory capital ratios: a report to the G20, Bank for International Settlements, Basel. 
51  Byres, W 2012, Regulatory reforms — incentives matter (can we make bankers more like pilots?), 
remarks to the Bank of Portugal conference on Global Risk Management: Governance and 
Control, 24 October, Lisbon. 
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which this cost is passed on to consumers, and shareholders will likely bear some of 
the cost in the form of a lower ROE. This in turn should be at least partially offset by 
lower required returns due to the banks being less likely to fail. 
Lowering standardised mortgage risk weights 
The alternative option of lowering standardised mortgage risk weights to be closer to 
their IRB equivalents would have a similar primary benefit to the recommended 
option. It would promote competition and improve the future viability of smaller 
ADIs. In addition, as ADIs using standardised risk weights would need less equity 
funding, the costs identified above would run in the opposite direction, possibly 
giving those ADIs a funding cost reduction. 
However, this option suffers from several drawbacks relative to raising IRB risk 
weights: 
• It is non-compliant with the Basel framework. 
• It would mean standardised ADIs use less equity and other regulatory capital 
funding, which could weaken their prudential position, making these ADIs less 
resilient and increasing their probability of failure.  
• It would reduce the incentive to improve risk management practices and create an 
incentive for standardised ADIs to increase mortgage lending as a share of their 
balance sheet. 
Conclusion 
The costs to the economy of making the regulatory approach for mortgage risk weights 
more competitively neutral are modest. The Inquiry judges that these are outweighed 
by the long-term competition benefits of assisting to maintain a diversity of ADIs into 
the future. 
The Inquiry judges the option of lowering standardised mortgage risk weights to be 
substantially inferior to the recommended option of raising IRB mortgage risk weights. 
Implementation considerations 
The recommended option is predicated on the existing Basel framework, which the 
Inquiry understands is currently under review. The intention is to narrow the 
difference between IRB banks and standardised average mortgage risk weights. If the 
existing Basel framework alters, this should be taken into account. 
The Inquiry considers a range between 25 and 30 per cent to be appropriate, to be 
decided on by APRA in targeting an average IRB mortgage risk weight. This is based 
on international experience and the current average IRB and standardised mortgage 
risk weights of 18 per cent and 39 per cent respectively.  
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The risk weight gap could be narrowed in a variety of ways. In determining the 
approach, APRA should seek to maintain as much risk sensitivity in the capital 
framework as possible and recognise lenders mortgage insurance where appropriate. 
This recommendation is focused on mortgage portfolios, given the importance of this 
market for Australian ADIs. APRA could also investigate whether similar issues exist 
in other portfolios. 
The recommendation should be considered in conjunction with others in this report; in 
particular, Recommendation 1: Capital levels and Recommendation 4: Transparent reporting 
in relation to Australian ADIs’ capital position and transparency of the capital 
framework. 
To promote incentives for ADIs to develop IRB capacity, APRA could also consider 
how to make the accreditation process less resource intensive without compromising 
the (necessarily) very high standards that must be met. APRA has already indicated it 
is willing to explore a proposal to decouple the need to achieve internal model 
accreditation for both financial and non-financial risks simultaneously. That is, an ADI 
may be accredited for regulatory capital models for credit and market risks without 
having been accredited to model operational risk. The Inquiry supports exploring such 
initiatives.  
Some ADIs will not use the IRB approach, because it may not be cost effective for 
smaller institutions. As such, the gap between IRB and standardised mortgage risk 
weights should be closed to improve competitive neutrality, regardless of any 
assistance provided to help with IRB accreditation. 
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Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity 
Recommendation 3 
Implement a framework for minimum loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity in line 
with emerging international practice, sufficient to facilitate the orderly resolution of 
Australian authorised deposit-taking institutions and minimise taxpayer support. 
Description 
APRA should develop a loss absorbing and recapitalisation framework aligned with 
international standards: it should not generally seek to move outside international 
frameworks or ahead of global peers unless there are specific domestic circumstances 
to warrant this. 
This framework should provide sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity 
to facilitate the orderly resolution of ADIs. It should minimise negative effects on 
financial stability, ensure the continuity of critical functions and minimise the use of 
taxpayer funds. 
Total loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity should consist of an ADI’s equity as 
well as debt instruments on which losses can credibly be imposed in a resolution. This 
includes debt instruments that can be converted to equity or written off where 
specified triggers are met to recapitalise the ADI or its critical functions.  
The Inquiry supports pursing such a framework, but cautions Australia to tread 
carefully in its development and implementation as this area is complex and evolving. 
The Inquiry recommends that the framework follow these guiding principles: 
• Clearly set out the instruments eligible for inclusion in a loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity requirement. 
• Ensure clarity of the creditor hierarchy with clear layers of subordination between 
classes. 
• Ensure clarity of the mechanisms and triggers under which creditors will absorb 
losses. 
• Seek to ensure eligible instruments can be exposed to loss without adverse 
consequences for financial stability, including being held by investors who can 
credibly be exposed to loss. 
The Inquiry intends that this framework would only include specific liabilities and not 
deposits. Deposits are protected by a guarantee under the FCS of up to $250,000 per 
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account holder per ADI and by depositor preference. In Australia, deposits are not and 
should not be subject to bail-in.  
In considering eligible instruments, the benefit of the lower cost of less subordinated 
instruments, such as a new layer between Tier 2 and senior unsecured debt in the 
creditor hierarchy, should be weighed against the ability to credibly write off or 
convert the instrument without causing financial instability. The clearer the 
mechanisms and triggers under which creditors will absorb losses are in advance, the 
more likely it is that this can be achieved. To this end, where losses are to be imposed 
through instruments being converted to equity or written off, issuing new contractual 
instruments has substantive advantages over broad statutory bail-in powers. 
Objectives 
• Ensure Australian ADIs have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity 
in resolution to make it feasible to implement an orderly resolution. 
• Reduce perceptions that some banks are subject to an implicit Government 
guarantee to lessen market distortions created by this perception and improve 
competition in the banking sector. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
In a stable system, if financial institutions fail, they do so in an orderly fashion, without 
excessively disrupting the financial system, without interrupting the critical economic 
functions these institutions provide or exposing taxpayers to loss.52  
The Inquiry believes three aspects of Australia’s framework for the orderly resolution 
of ADIs could be strengthened: 
1. Effective crisis management powers for authorities. Recommendation 5: Crisis 
management toolkit addresses this aspect. 
2. Effective pre-positioning and planning for the use of those powers. The 
Inquiry supports further work by authorities on this aspect. 
3. Sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, which is addressed by 
this recommendation. 
Currently, Australia does not have requirements for loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity. Introducing a loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity 
                                                          
52  Bank of England 2014, The Bank of England’s approach to resolution, Bank of England, London, 
page 7. 
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framework creates credible alternatives to using taxpayer funds to resolve a bank and 
reduces perceptions of an implicit guarantee. 
This is a focus of ongoing international policy work building on the experience of 
many national governments during the GFC, where significant taxpayer funds were 
put at risk to assist troubled banks as no other credible options were available to 
support financial stability. In many cases, even capital instrument investors were 
bailed out, despite these instruments being intended to absorb losses. As a core part of 
the G20 agenda to end the problems associated with some institutions being perceived 
as ‘too-big-to-fail’, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is consulting on an international 
framework for loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity for global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs).53 Indications are that many countries will also adopt these 
standards for D-SIBs. As a small, open, capital-importing economy, Australia cannot 
stand outside international practice. 
An orderly resolution can be achieved with Government support, but this puts 
taxpayer funds at risk and protects bank creditors from loss. If Australia introduces a 
framework requiring banks to have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity, losses or recapitalisation costs are more likely to be borne by a failed bank’s 
shareholders and creditors rather than taxpayers. 
Further, if the market believes that Government support is the only viable option, this 
creates the perception of an implicit guarantee and the potential for associated 
distortions. The Australian Government support provided during the GFC, although 
not at the same level as in some other jurisdictions, has reinforced perceptions of an 
implicit guarantee for some banks in Australia. 
Perceptions of implicit guarantees have costs, creating a contingent liability for the 
Government and distortions in the market. They reduce market discipline and 
potentially confer funding advantages on the banks involved. Credit rating agencies 
explicitly factor in rating upgrades for banks they perceive to benefit from 
Government support, directly benefiting these banks.54 Reducing perceptions of 
implicit guarantees in Australia could therefore improve efficiency and competition in 
the banking sector. 
Rationale 
Australia’s prudential framework is not, and should not be, premised on the 
assumption that ADIs will never fail, nor that unsecured bank creditors will never be 
exposed to loss. Inevitably, failures can and will occur, the system will be exposed to 
crises and, at times, unsecured bank creditors will be exposed to loss.  
                                                          
53  Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2014, Adequacy of loss absorbing capacity of global systemically 
important banks in resolution, FSB, Basel. 
54  For example, see Standard & Poor’s 2013, Australia’s developing crisis-management framework 
for banks could moderate the Government support factored into ratings, Standard & Poor’s. 
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A loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity framework would help to implement an 
orderly resolution of a distressed ADI with minimum use of taxpayer funds. This 
would reduce perceptions of an implicit Government guarantee, thereby reducing the 
contingent liability of the Government and the associated market inefficiencies.  
Options considered 
The Inquiry considered two options: 
1. Recommended: Implement a framework for minimum loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity in line with emerging international practice, sufficient 
to facilitate the orderly resolution of Australian ADIs and minimise taxpayer 
support. 
2. Make no change to current arrangements. 
Option costs and benefits 
The banking sector disputes the need for additional loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity. However, banks generally acknowledge that such a framework is inevitable 
given the work underway to develop a set of international standards. 
In this context, most of the major banks argue strongly that senior unsecured debt 
should not be subject to bail-in. They contend that, were such a bail-in ever used, it 
could have a significant destabilising effect on the financial system. To this point, they 
note that senior unsecured debt is a vital funding source and that a loss of investor 
confidence in that market could be damaging. Instead, banks prefer a loss absorbing 
and recapitalisation capacity requirement in the form of existing Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital, or a new layer of loss absorbing debt distinct from regular senior unsecured 
debt. 
The banks also warn that a loss absorbing and recapitalisation framework would 
introduce costs, as bail-in debt would have higher spreads than existing debt, 
reflecting the additional risk. This could be exacerbated if the demand for these bail-in 
instruments is limited and spreads increased further to encourage greater holdings. 
Banks submit that changes in funding costs would be passed on to consumers, at least 
in part, which would raise the cost of credit and potentially affect GDP growth. 
APRA notes that the global debate is moving beyond how to reduce the probability of 
bank failure, which is addressed by capital requirements, and now focusing on how to 
reduce the cost of failure. This will result in a global loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity framework for G-SIBs to remove perceptions that such institutions are 
too-big-to-fail. Although Australia has no G-SIBs, when seeking funding in wholesale 
markets, the internationally active Australian banks must compete against banks that 
meet these global requirements. These competitors include other internationally active 
banks from jurisdictions that adopt these standards more broadly. 
Chapter 1: Resilience 
71 
The RBA acknowledges that the risks associated with a bail-in of creditors need to be 
carefully considered, but notes that this does not necessarily preclude its inclusion in 
the suite of available resolution tools. It advocates for taking a conservative approach 
to implementing such features in Australia. 
A very large number of submissions are concerned that introducing bail-in provisions 
in Australia could lead to depositors’ funds being bailed in to recapitalise a failed 
bank. The Inquiry strongly supports continuing the current Australian framework in 
which deposits are protected through an explicit guarantee under the FCS, supported 
by depositor preference. The Inquiry specifically does not recommend the bail-in of 
deposits. 
The ultimate shape of the framework will influence the cost-benefit analysis. In 
assessing this, the most relevant factors are implicit guarantees, funding costs, lending 
rates, GDP and credit ratings. 
Benefits 
If banks have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, a failed ADI is 
more likely to be resolved in a way that limits the effect of the failure on the broader 
economy, while minimising the use of taxpayer funds. This is a substantial benefit. As 
detailed in Recommendation 1: Capital levels, the costs of financial crises are wide 
ranging and severe. That recommendation focuses on reducing the probability of crises 
occurring in the first place, while this recommendation focuses on reducing the costs of 
crises that cannot be avoided. The magnitude of these avoided costs will depend on 
the specifics of the framework implemented. As an indicative measure, if the cost of 
financial crises is reduced by 10 per cent, it would provide an expected average benefit 
of 0.25–0.3 per cent of GDP per year ($4–$5 billion).55 
By making it more credible to achieve a resolution with minimal use of taxpayer funds, 
this recommendation also reduces perceptions of an implicit Government guarantee. 
There are clear benefits to the economy in minimising perceptions of implicit 
guarantees, including reducing Government’s contingent liability and improving 
efficiency by removing market distortions, thereby making the banking sector more 
competitive.  
Lending interest rates 
Making it more credible and feasible for creditors to bear losses would raise the costs 
of the relevant types of debt funding for affected ADIs by reducing perceptions of an 
implicit guarantee.  
Higher ADI funding costs could result in small increases in loan prices for customers. 
Banks have acknowledged in submissions that the cost of other forms of regulatory 
                                                          
55  Based on the expected average cost of a financial crisis of 2½–3 per cent of GDP  
($40–$50 billion) per year, as outlined in Recommendation 1: Capital levels. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
72 
capital would be less than the cost of increasing CET1 capital; the funding spread, and 
corresponding effect on lending interest rates, for subordinated debt is a fraction that 
of CET1 capital. Competitive pressure could see banks share some of the cost with 
investors through a lower ROE. Thus, the effect on loan interest rates is likely to be 
limited, even for a large increase in bail-in debt. 
From an economy-wide view, reducing the implicit guarantee would offset at least 
part of the cost to banks by providing a corresponding benefit to taxpayers and 
Government, and reducing market inefficiencies. Greater volumes of new 
subordinated debt could also reduce the cost of existing subordinated debt on issue, 
since potential losses would be spread across a larger pool of claims. It should also 
reduce the cost of more senior debt, as losses become less likely to reach senior classes. 
The Inquiry notes that markets for subordinated debt with conversion and write-off 
features are currently small and may require higher spreads to absorb large new 
issuance. This would particularly be the case if new requirements were implemented 
with short transitional arrangements. 
GDP 
The Inquiry expects the effect of higher lending rates on GDP to be minimal. An upper 
bound would be to assume that the full funding cost increase is passed through to loan 
interest rates, and that the RBA does not offset this through its setting of monetary 
policy. As discussed in Recommendation 1: Capital levels, the small expected effect on 
lending interest rates would lead to a correspondingly small effect on GDP. 
However, a large part of the cost is offset by reductions in perceptions of an implicit 
guarantee. In addition, the RBA would likely consider the effect on GDP when 
formulating monetary policy.56 
Credit ratings 
The net effect on credit ratings is unclear. Debt designed to more easily expose 
creditors to loss through write-off or conversion features is likely to be rated lower 
than debt without these features. However, it is not clear whether banks’ credit ratings, 
which are based on the risk of loss to senior unsecured debt, would change as a result 
of introducing a loss absorbing and recapitalisation framework. 
If the loss absorbing and recapitalisation framework increases ADIs’ subordinated 
debt, there would be a larger buffer before senior unsecured debt takes losses. It may 
therefore make senior debt safer. However, introducing the framework may be taken 
as a signal of a lower likelihood of Government support for banks, especially since this 
is an intended outcome of the framework. Currently, the major banks receive a 
                                                          
56  For example, Battellino, R 2009, Some comments on bank funding, remarks to the 
22nd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 16 December, Sydney; Hansard 2009, 
Reference: Reserve Bank of Australia annual report 2008, House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, 20 February, Canberra. 
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two-notch credit rating upgrade on the basis of expected Government support.57 
Credit rating agencies may reconsider this upgrade in light of credible mechanisms to 
impose loss. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry judges that there is a net benefit of a loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity framework.  
Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity on its own does not guarantee a 
successful resolution nor eliminate all perceptions of implicit guarantees. It must be 
part of a broader resolution framework that includes strong crisis management tools 
for regulators, as outlined in Recommendation 5: Crisis management toolkit. 
The extent of the net benefit will be influenced by the ultimate shape of the framework, 
including the quantum, the composition and the time given for transition. Generally, 
costs will be higher the larger the capacity required, the more subordinated the eligible 
instruments and the shorter the period required to build the capacity. Benefits will be 
greater where loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity is high and clear, and where 
creditor hierarchy and triggers are transparent. However, if designed carefully and 
according to the articulated principles, the framework can attain net benefits. 
Implementation considerations 
Sufficiency 
To minimise the need for taxpayer support, ADIs need sufficient capacity to absorb 
losses and, in some cases, provide the recapitalisation necessary to implement their 
resolution strategy.  
This may require enough capacity to fully recapitalise the institution. International 
work proposes that G-SIBs need a range of 16–20 per cent of risk-weighted assets and 
twice the Basel leverage requirement.58 A similar quantum may be appropriate for 
internationally active Australian ADIs. 
For smaller banks, an orderly resolution may be possible through activating the FCS or 
through a merger or acquisition at the point of resolution. In this case, the loss 
absorbing and recapitalisation capacity sufficient to implement the resolution plan is 
likely to be lower.  
The Inquiry recommends considering a graduated approach across the banking sector 
when developing the loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity framework for 
                                                          
57  Standard & Poor’s 2013, Australia’s developing crisis-management framework for banks could 
moderate the Government support factored into ratings, Standard & Poor’s. 
58  Financial Stability Board 2014, Adequacy of loss absorbing capacity of global systemically important 
banks in resolution, FSB, Basel, page 6. 
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Australia. This approach should take into account the likely resolution strategy for an 
ADI. 
Eligible instruments 
The framework should consider a broad range of equity and debt instruments.  
Equity instruments have the advantage of being well understood by investors. These 
instruments have a long history of automatically absorbing loss without causing 
systemic disruption. However, they are more expensive than debt funding and may 
not be available in resolution, having already been depleted. Experiences overseas 
suggest that ADIs only tend to enter resolution after significant losses have been 
incurred and there is little or no equity value left.59 That is, equity instruments may not 
be available to assist in recapitalising a distressed institution. 
Requiring eligible debt instruments would give the regulator greater confidence that 
the loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity will be available in resolution. These 
instruments are not depleted until a trigger has occurred, so — once triggered — they 
can act to replenish capital. This gives the regulator greater certainty about the 
resources that will be available when conducting their resolution planning. Debt 
instruments are also typically less expensive than equity instruments. 
Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments with conversion and write-off 
features, which already exist in the Basel framework, can provide loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity. Investors already hold these instruments. As these conversion 
features are relatively new, instances of instruments being converted into equity or 
written off are very limited. If constructed carefully, a new layer of contractual 
instrument in the creditor hierarchy between Tier 2 and unsecured senior debt would 
have similar benefits to Tier 2, at a lower cost. In substance, it should be no less 
credible than a Tier 2 instrument.  
Addressing challenges 
Stakeholder submissions, and a wide range of policy research and commentary, note a 
number of major difficulties in implementing a bail-in regime that can be credibly 
activated in a crisis. 
Most concerning is the possibility that activating a bail-in for creditors of one bank 
may actually worsen the crisis. This could occur if converting one bank’s creditors 
caused creditors of other banks to reassess the likelihood that they will take a loss, 
resulting in investors withdrawing funds (or refusing to roll over debt) to other banks 
in the system. This contagion could cause acute liquidity problems and distress in 
other banks, exacerbating the crisis. Also, if banks were unable to access international 
funding markets, it could take longer for them to resume lending to the economy once 
the crisis is over, potentially prolonging an economic downturn. 
                                                          
59  Gracie, A 2014, Making resolution work in Europe and beyond — the case for gone concern loss 
absorbing capacity, speech given at the Bruegel breakfast panel event, 17 July, Brussels. 
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Addressing these challenges is critical to developing a viable loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation capacity framework. Although such difficulties give reasons to be 
cautious, in the Inquiry’s view these can be addressed, especially given the 
considerable work underway on these issues globally. In developing its own 
framework, Australia should take account of this international work to create a system 
that, where possible, overcomes the problems associated with bail-in by being credible, 
predictable, in line with international practice, and having an appropriate transition 
period. 
Other considerations 
To keep any costs to a minimum, an appropriate implementation period should be 
allowed where the framework imposes a significant quantum. 
Developing a successful loss absorbing recapitalisation framework depends on a large 
number of other important aspects, which this Final Report will not discuss in detail. 
These aspects include: 
• Possible need for legislative change; for example, to ensure certainty of the creditor 
hierarchy. 
• Considering whether requirements form part of Pillar 1 or Pillar 2 requirements. 
• Ensuring the legal basis for exposing creditors to loss is sound and the framework 
adequately accounts for where an ADI is part of a group or operates across borders. 




Develop a reporting template for Australian authorised deposit-taking institution capital 
ratios that is transparent against the minimum Basel capital framework. 
Description 
APRA should develop a common reporting template that, where feasible, identifies the 
effect of areas where Australia’s capital framework for ADIs is different to the 
minimum requirements set out in the Basel framework. 
Objective 
• Reduce disadvantages that may arise for Australian ADIs due to difficulties in 
comparing Australian ADI capital ratios to international peers. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
No benchmark of international practice exists for calculating capital ratios. All 
countries use variations to the minimum Basel capital framework, making it 
challenging to determine a common international benchmark against which to 
compare Australian bank capital ratios. This inhibits the relative strength of Australian 
banks from being accurately assessed against banks from other jurisdictions. 
This problem arises because, in some areas, the Basel framework allows for more than 
one approach, or provides that a requirement should be specified but leaves it to 
national discretion to determine the detail. In addition, many individual jurisdictions 
adopt stronger standards than the Basel minimums. As a result, no two jurisdictions 
take exactly the same approach to calculating capital ratios. 
Like banks in all advanced countries, Australian bank capital requirements are based 
on the Basel framework but adjusted to meet domestic needs. This has resulted in 
aspects being more stringent in some areas, and less so in others, than the approaches 
taken in other jurisdictions. Thus, although Australian banks can be benchmarked 
against the Basel minimum, they cannot be benchmarked against other countries’ 
practices. 
Simply comparing Australian bank capital ratios to those reported by their 
international peers may therefore be misleading. 
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To make informed decisions and price debt appropriately, investors assess differences 
in banks’ financial strength, including capital. Although it is generally possible to 
identify significant differences in jurisdictions’ approaches to calculating capital ratios, 
estimating and comparing the effect of those differences is challenging. The banks have 
made substantial efforts to raise investors’ awareness of aspects of Australia’s 
requirements that are stronger than the minimums. However, investors are hesitant to 
trust banks’ self-reported adjusted capital ratios.  
Quantifying the cost of this lack of comparability is difficult. Australia’s major banks 
have some of the highest credit ratings in the world, which may suggest that costs are 
limited.60 Likewise Australian bank equity valuations are among the highest in the 
world. However, banks contend that the lack of transparency affects market pricing. 
They also suggest that market access may be compromised in times of market stress, 
when investors are particularly risk sensitive. 
The Inquiry encountered significant difficulty in comparing Australian banks’ capital 
ratios to those of international peers. As discussed in Recommendation 1: Capital levels, 
there are limited data available that try to compare capital across countries on a 
consistent basis, and every source that attempts this has drawbacks. 
The Inquiry was presented with several estimates against different benchmarks, all of 
which were only able to provide a partial analysis and yielded results that varied 
markedly.61 This demonstrates both the value of developing a consistent approach and 
the difficulty of achieving it. Even where stakeholders provided estimates of how 
Australian bank capital ratios compared to the Basel minimum requirements — 
leaving aside the added difficulties of comparing directly to international banks — the 
results had notable differences. 
The major banks submit that APRA could adequately address this issue by developing 
a standard template to quantify the areas where Australian bank capital ratios are 
more or less conservative than the minimum Basel requirements. They note that this 
work has begun but sought the Inquiry’s support to progress it as a priority.  
APRA submits that, in implementing the Basel framework to suit the Australian 
environment, its primary goals is ensuring capital adequacy for each ADI. However, 
APRA also sees value in comparing capital ratios appropriately, particularly for the 
largest banks operating internationally, and has no objection to ADIs reporting a 
capital ratio based on Basel minimum requirements. Nevertheless, it argues that the 
additional requirements imposed by each jurisdiction mean it is not practically 
possible to compute a comparison to the practices of other jurisdictions. 
                                                          
60  Many factors contribute to Australian banks’ credit ratings in addition to their capital ratios, 
including the strong Australian Government credit rating and the sound macro-economic 
environment in Australia. 
61  A number of submissions addressed this issue, including from APRA, the Australian 
Bankers’ Association, the major banks and Mòrgij Analytics. 
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Conclusion 
Without action, investors may not be able to assess Australian banks’ relative capital 
position. This can reduce access to funding and raise funding costs, particularly at 
times when investors are more sensitive to risk. Given the existence of a relatively 
low-cost option to address this situation, it is not desirable to maintain the status quo. 
This recommendation would be most beneficial if other countries implemented similar 
reporting mechanisms. Recognising that national discretions can impair comparisons 
across jurisdictions, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been working to 
address this issue, including by publishing survey data on how different countries use 
discretions.62 However, even in the absence of action by other countries, introducing 
such reporting in Australia is still of benefit. It would translate Australian ADI capital 
ratios into an easily understandable, known international benchmark, even if other 
countries have differences within their own jurisdictions. 
The Inquiry has not sought to quantify the extent to which transparent reporting may 
affect funding costs or access to funding. However, it notes that the benefits are likely 
to be more pronounced in times of market stress. Most of the cost of implementing this 
option would fall to the major banks, which see a substantial net benefit in this change. 
The Inquiry notes that APRA has begun developing reporting in conjunction with 
industry in line with the current recommendation. Given this reporting would be most 
beneficial to banks with investors that seek exposure across banks in multiple 
jurisdictions, APRA should consider whether reporting should be voluntary to avoid 
imposing costs on those banks for which it would serve no benefit. 
An alternative option is to change the way capital ratios are calculated to be more 
consistent with the Basel minimum framework, in effect reducing APRA’s use of 
national discretion. This may achieve a similar outcome with regard to international 
transparency. However, it would have a wider range of costs and take substantially 
longer to implement than the recommended option. As such, the Inquiry does not 
recommend this approach. 
                                                          
62  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Basel capital framework national discretions, 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel. 
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Crisis management toolkit 
Recommendation 5 
Complete the existing processes for strengthening crisis management powers that have been 
on hold pending the outcome of the Inquiry. 
Description 
In September 2012, the previous Government consulted on a comprehensive package, 
Strengthening APRA’s crisis management powers.63 The CFR has also recommended 
separate changes to resolution arrangements and powers for FMI.64 In 2013, these 
processes were put on hold as part of a Government moratorium on significant new 
financial sector regulation pending the outcome of this Inquiry. Government should 
now resume these processes, with a view to ensuring regulators have comprehensive 
powers to manage crises and minimising negative spill-overs to the financial system, 
the broader economy and taxpayers. 
The Inquiry strongly supports enhancing crisis management toolkits for regulators. It 
is important for the two processes to be concluded, giving due consideration to 
industry views on the packages. 
Objectives 
• Promote a resilient financial system. 
• Enable the orderly resolution of distressed financial institutions. 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Given the importance of ADIs, insurers, superannuation funds and FMI to the 
functioning and stability of the financial system and economy, regulators need 
comprehensive powers to facilitate the orderly resolution of these institutions. 
Responding to local and global changes, CFR agencies reviewed the existing legislative 
provisions for prudentially regulated institutions and FMI. These reviews paid close 
attention to international standards and developments, particularly G20 and FSB 
initiatives to promote resilient financial systems and frameworks that resolve financial 
distress, including the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
                                                          
63  Treasury 2012, Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers: Consultation Paper, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
64  Stevens, G 2012, ‘Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation’, letter to 
The Hon. Wayne Swan, MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, 10 February. 
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Institutions (Key Attributes).65 Although Australia has strong frameworks, the reviews 
identified gaps and areas that could be strengthened. 
The Government consultation paper Strengthening APRA’s crisis management powers 
canvassed a number of options in relation to all APRA-regulated industries. The 
package does not include statutory bail-in powers outlined in the Key Attributes or 
general structural requirements, such as ring-fencing, being pursued in some 
jurisdictions. It includes: 
• Directions powers, including clarifying that APRA may direct a regulated 
institution to pre-position for resolution — that is, require changes at an institution 
to make it more feasible to successfully resolve that institution if it were to fail. 
• Group resolution powers, including extending certain powers to authorised 
non-operating holding companies (NOHCs) and subsidiaries in a range of distress 
situations. 
• Powers to assist with resolving branches of foreign banks. 
The CFR recommendations for strengthening the crisis management framework for 
FMI included: 
• Introducing a specialised resolution regime for FMI. 
• Clarifying the application of location requirements for FMI operating across 
borders. 
Since these processes were put on hold, international developments have included 
updates to the Key Attributes, yielding additional guidance on areas such as 
cross-border information sharing, and resolving FMI and FMI participants. Some 
countries have also introduced structural reforms, such as mandating a form of 
ring-fencing, or a NOHC structure for institutions with certain risk profiles or of a 
certain size, with the aim of improving resolvability. These approaches emphasise 
reducing risks to core banking activities from more complicated and risky forms of 
banking, and simplifying institutions to make them more easily resolved. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes progressing the packages would deliver a substantial net benefit. 
A range of resolution options — more ‘tools in the toolkit’ — would maximise the 
likelihood that a viable option will be available in any given situation to achieve an 
orderly resolution. The Inquiry notes the high costs associated with the disorderly 
failure of an institution, particularly where this creates financial system instability or 
                                                          
65  Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2014, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions, FSB, Basel. 
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the need for Government support. The Inquiry also notes that many of the proposed 
powers would have a limited regulatory burden in normal times. 
In relation to the package of resolution powers for APRA, industry submissions largely 
support the package, although they raise practical and legal issues with some of the 
proposals.66 
APRA’s submission to the Inquiry stresses the vital role that crisis management 
powers play in the prudential framework.67 In any future crisis, these reforms would 
provide a wider range of tools, making it more likely that a credible, low-cost option 
for preventing a disorderly failure could be found, without risking taxpayer funds. 
The RBA advocates for progressing the CFR proposals on FMI regulation as a matter of 
priority.68 It notes that the continuity of FMI services is critical for the financial system 
to function. In addition, the RBA notes that, where FMI is domiciled offshore, 
Australian regulators need to have sufficient influence to prevent Australian functions 
from being compromised in a resolution. 
The Inquiry does not recommend pursuing industry-wide structural reforms such as 
ring-fencing. These measures can have high costs, and require changes for all 
institutions regardless of the institution-specific risks. Neither APRA nor the RBA nor 
the banking industry saw a strong case for these reforms. 
Nevertheless, APRA submits that it may be beneficial to require structural changes for 
specific institutions in some situations, where substantial risks or significant 
organisational complexity may impede supervision or an orderly resolution. The 
powers included in the consultation package provide sufficient flexibility to do this 
effectively.  
Given the time that has passed since the initial consultation in progressing the reform 
packages — in particular, the considerable international developments over this period 
— a view should be taken as to whether additional proposals warrant inclusion.  
All proposals should go through the appropriate consultation, regulatory assessment 
and compliance cost assessment processes. 
                                                          
66  Submissions on the consultation paper are available on the Treasury website, viewed 
11 November 2014, 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/APRA/
Submissions>. 
67  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 38. 
68  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 4. 
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Financial Claims Scheme 
Recommendation 6 
Maintain the ex post funding structure of the Financial Claims Scheme for authorised 
deposit-taking institutions. 
Description 
Government should retain the current FCS funding model for ADIs, under which 
payouts are recovered from liquidating the failed ADI and, where this is insufficient, 
an ad hoc levy can be placed on the banking industry. 
Objectives 
• Ensure the FCS has an appropriate and efficient funding structure. 
• Minimise the ongoing regulatory costs of the FCS. 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
The FCS is a fundamental component in protecting depositors in Australia, providing 
a guarantee on deposits of up to $250,000 per account holder per ADI. The FCS allows 
depositors to access protected deposits quickly, without having to wait for a 
liquidation process to be completed. 
Currently the FCS is funded ex post. If an ADI fails and the FCS is activated, 
Government provides the necessary funds and then reclaims them from the proceeds 
of liquidating the institution. Where the liquidation proceeds are insufficient, 
Government can place a levy on industry to make further recoveries. 
A number of bodies, including the IMF and the CFR, proposed an alternative ex ante 
funding model, which is also being consulted on by the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers.69 The former Government also announced it would adopt ex ante 
funding.70 Under this model, ADIs with FCS-protected funds would be charged an 
ongoing levy to compensate for the guarantee the FCS provides. 
                                                          
69  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF, 
Washington DC; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Association of 
Deposit Insurers 2014, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel. 
70  Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Economic Statement, August 2013, statement by the Hon. 
Chris Bowen MP and Senator the Hon. Penny Wong, Canberra. 
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Conclusion 
The proposed ex ante funding model has a number of appealing features, including: 
• Being based on a user-pays principle. 
• Enabling levy funds to be deployed to aid in wider ADI resolution purposes. 
• Offering the potential to build a fiscal buffer. 
However, an ex ante levy would be an ongoing cost for all ADIs. In contrast, the 
current ex post model only imposes a levy if the FCS is triggered and insufficient funds 
are recovered through liquidation to recoup the costs. Because Australia’s depositor 
preference arrangements reduce the risk of an ADI’s assets being insufficient to meet 
insured deposits, the case for an ongoing levy is less justified. 
The Inquiry notes that the recommendations in this chapter would further strengthen 
the resilience of the Australian banking sector by reducing the risk of failure and 
mitigating the costs of failures that do occur. If adopted, these recommendations 
weaken the case to charge an ex ante levy for the FCS. 
The Inquiry notes that the consultation package outlined in Recommendation 5: Crisis 
management toolkit, includes a number of measures designed to strengthen the FCS and 
Government’s ability to recoup costs. These include an additional payment option that 
allows APRA to transfer deposits to a new institution using the funding available 
under the FCS. 
On this basis, in the Inquiry’s view, it is preferable to retain an ex post funding model 
that avoids placing an ongoing financial burden on the industry. 




Introduce a leverage ratio that acts as a backstop to authorised deposit-taking institutions’ 
risk-weighted capital positions. 
Description 
APRA should introduce a leverage ratio as a backstop requirement, providing a floor 
to ADIs’ risk-weighted capital requirements. This should be introduced as part of 
Australia’s adoption of the Basel framework and in line with the international 
timetable. 
The minimum leverage ratio should be comparable with Australia’s global peers. In 
the Inquiry’s view, an appropriate range is likely to be 3–5 per cent, calculated in 
accordance with the Basel framework. 
Objectives 
• Limit systemic risk and the potential for shocks to be transmitted through the 
financial system. 
• Retain the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, while providing a mechanism 
that accounts for limitations and risks in modelling risk weights. 
• Maintain investor confidence in the strength of Australian banks. 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Leverage is a useful and necessary part of the banking system. It allows a bank to take 
savers’ funds — whether in the form of deposits or creditors lending to the bank — 
and channel them to borrowers to fund investment in the economy. However, leverage 
also introduces risks. A highly leveraged institution has smaller buffers available to 
absorb loss before insolvency. Leverage can also amplify the effect of shocks on an 
institution’s balance sheet. This may spread shocks to other institutions and cause 
systemic risks. 
A number of countries have introduced leverage ratios, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Canada. Australia does not currently have a minimum 
leverage ratio requirement, although APRA has indicated that it may introduce one in 
line with the Basel framework. Details of how this would operate are being reviewed 
internationally. 
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Currently in Australia, restrictions on leverage are achieved indirectly by ensuring 
ADIs use capital funding in proportion with risk. In the Inquiry’s view, the practice of 
relating capital requirements to risk is appropriate. 
However, there are concerns that, in some instances, the risk-weighted approach may 
lead to insufficient levels of capital.71 This danger is possible under the standardised or 
IRB approach, but is greatest for IRB models, as there is potential for ‘model risk’. For 
example, if the historical data are too benign, the models that underlie the 
risk-weighting system may underestimate the true risk, leading to inappropriately low 
levels of capital.72 Concerns have also been raised that banks may have the capacity —
and incentive — to manipulate IRB models to achieve a lower capital requirement. 
Studies have revealed substantial variation among IRB risk-weight models across 
countries.73 Although this does not suggest IRB models are unsuitable, it does give 
reason to be cautious about their outputs. 
A number of ADIs support having capital requirements commensurate with risk, 
meaning that capital requirements should generally be determined by the 
risk-weighted capital ratio. Similarly, APRA supports the principle of aligning capital 
with risk, being the primary driver of bank capital positions. 
Both options would introduce monitoring and reporting costs for ADIs, although these 
are not expected to be large. As a backstop, the leverage ratio would not generally 
require ADIs to change their level of capital. 
Conclusion 
Whether a leverage ratio is a binding constraint or a backstop to the risk-weighted 
approach, the benefits are similar. Both options discourage excessive leverage and 
protect against risk being substantially underestimated, leading to weaker capital 
positions. However, the costs and risks will be greater with a binding constraint. 
In the Inquiry’s view, having a leverage ratio as a meaningful backstop provides 
appropriate insurance against the risks inherent in risk-based capital requirements, 
while retaining the advantages of having capital requirements commensurate with 
risk. 
                                                          
71  For example Tarullo, D 2014, Rethinking the aims of prudential regulation, speech at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference, 8 May, Chicago. 
72  Byres, W 2012, Regulatory reforms — incentives matter (can we make bankers more like pilots?), 
remarks to the Bank of Portugal conference on Global Risk Management: Governance and 
Control, 24 October, Lisbon. 
73  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP): Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book, Bank for International 
Settlements, Basel. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
86 
Direct borrowing by superannuation funds 
Recommendation 8 
Remove the exception to the general prohibition on direct borrowing for limited recourse 
borrowing arrangements by superannuation funds. 
Description 
Government should restore the general prohibition on direct borrowing by 
superannuation funds by removing Section 67A of the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) on a prospective basis.74 This section allows 
superannuation funds to borrow directly using limited recourse borrowing 
arrangements (LRBAs). The exception of temporary borrowing by superannuation 
funds for short-term liquidity management purposes (contained in Section 67 of the 
SIS Act) should remain. 
Direct borrowing in this context refers to any arrangement that funds enter into where 
the borrowing is used to purchase assets directly for the fund. 
Objectives 
• Prevent the unnecessary build-up of risk in the superannuation system and the 
financial system more broadly. 
• Fulfil the objective for superannuation to be a savings vehicle for retirement 
income, rather than a broader wealth management vehicle (see Recommendation 9: 
Objectives of the superannuation system in Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement 
incomes). 
                                                          
74  The term ‘borrowing’ includes all loans as defined by subsection 10(1) of the SIS Act. 
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Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Further growth in superannuation funds’ direct borrowing would, over time, increase 
risk in the financial system. As discussed in the Interim Report, the Inquiry notes an 
emerging trend of superannuation funds using LRBAs to purchase assets.75 Over the 
past five years, the amount of funds borrowed using LRBAs increased almost 18 times, 
from $497 million in June 2009 to $8.7 billion in June 2014.76 The limited recourse 
nature of these arrangements is intended to alleviate the risk of losses from assets 
purchased using a loan resulting in claims over other fund assets. 
Borrowing, even with LRBAs, magnifies the gains and losses from fluctuations in the 
prices of assets held in funds and increases the probability of large losses within a 
fund. Because of the higher risks associated with limited recourse lending, lenders can 
charge higher interest rates and frequently require personal guarantees from 
trustees.77,78 In a scenario where there has been a significant reduction in the valuation 
of an asset that was purchased using a loan, trustees are likely to sell other assets of the 
fund to repay a lender, particularly if a personal guarantee is involved. As a result, 
LRBAs are generally unlikely to be effective in limiting losses on one asset from 
flowing through to other assets, either inside or outside the fund. In addition, 
borrowing by superannuation funds implicitly transfers some of the downside risk to 
taxpayers, who underwrite adverse outcomes in the superannuation system through 
the provision of the Age Pension. 
Superannuation funds use diversification to reduce risk. Selling the fund’s other assets 
will concentrate the asset mix of the fund — small funds that borrow are already more 
likely to have a concentrated asset mix.79 This reduces the benefits of diversification 
and further increases the amount of risk in the fund’s portfolio of assets. 
The GFC highlighted the benefits of Australia’s largely unleveraged superannuation 
system. The absence of leverage in superannuation funds meant that rapid falls in 
asset prices and losses in funds were neither amplified nor forced to be realised. The 
absence of borrowing benefited superannuation fund members and enabled the 
superannuation system to have a stabilising influence on the broader financial system 
and the economy during the GFC. Although the level of borrowing is currently 
                                                          
75  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-116. 
76  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2014, Self-managed superannuation fund statistical report — 
June 2014 (Asset allocation tables), ATO, viewed 28 October 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Quarterly
-reports/Self-managed-super-fund-statistical-report---June-2014/>. 
77  The lending institution can only make a claim on the asset against which a loan is made and 
does not have recourse to make claims on the other assets held in the fund. 
78  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 185. 
79  Rice Warner 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 30. 
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relatively small, if direct borrowing by funds continues to grow at high rates, it could, 
over time, pose a risk to the financial system. The RBA states that “The Bank endorses 
the observation that leverage by superannuation funds may increase vulnerabilities in 
the financial system and supports the consideration of limiting leverage”.80 In 
addition, such direct borrowing could also compromise the retirement incomes of 
individuals. APRA was of the view that “… the risks associated with direct leverage 
are incompatible with the objectives of superannuation and cannot adequately be 
managed within the superannuation prudential framework”.81 
Borrowing by superannuation funds also allows members to circumvent contribution 
caps and accrue larger assets in the superannuation system in the long run (see the 
Taxation of superannuation discussion in Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes. 
Conclusion 
Direct borrowing by superannuation funds could pose risks to the financial system if it 
is allowed to grow at high rates. It is also inconsistent with the objectives of 
superannuation to be a savings vehicle for retirement income. Restoring the original 
prohibition on direct borrowing by superannuation funds would preserve the 
strengths and benefits the superannuation system has delivered to individuals, the 
financial system and the economy, and limit the risks to taxpayers. 
Many submissions support this recommendation. Some propose alternatives to 
address the risks surrounding borrowing, including imposing a maximum cap on fund 
assets that can be invested in a single asset other than cash or bonds.82,83 These 
alternatives would limit the risk associated with borrowing by superannuation funds, 
and provide funds with more flexibility to pursue alternative investment strategies. 
However, these options would also impose additional regulation, complexity and 
compliance costs on the superannuation system. 
In implementing this recommendation, funds with existing borrowings should be 
permitted to maintain those borrowings. Funds disposing of assets purchased via 
direct borrowing would be required to extinguish the associated debt at the same time. 
                                                          
80  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 20. 
81  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 32. 
82  Barton Consultancy 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 3. 
83  Rice Warner 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 30. 
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Chapter 2: Superannuation and 
retirement incomes 
Australia needs an efficient superannuation system given the system’s size and 
growth, the role it plays in funding the economy and its importance in delivering 
retirement incomes. The superannuation system is large by international standards 
and has grown rapidly since the Wallis Inquiry in 1997. It is the second largest part of 
the financial sector and, according to some forecasts, could have assets that exceed 
those of Australia’s banking system within the next 20 years.1 
Australia’s superannuation system has considerable strengths.2 It plays an important 
role in providing long-term funding for economic activity in Australia — both directly 
and indirectly through funding financial institutions — and it contributed to the 
stability of the financial system and the economy during the global financial crisis 
(GFC). 
Superannuation is also critical to help Australia meet the economic and fiscal 
challenges of an ageing population. Life expectancy in Australia is the fourth longest of 
any country, and is projected to continue to increase.3,4 There will be economic benefits 
if the growing proportion of older people can sustain their level of consumption in 
retirement. 
The Inquiry sees scope to improve the efficiency of the superannuation system in a 
number of areas. The superannuation system is not operationally efficient due to a lack 
of strong price-based competition and, as a result, the benefits of its scale are not being 
fully realised. Substantially higher superannuation balances and fund consolidation 
over the past decade have not delivered the benefits that would have been expected; 
these benefits have been offset by higher costs elsewhere in the system rather than 
being reflected in lower fees. Other design features also contribute to inefficiencies, 
                                                          
1  Industry Super Australia, using information from Deloitte, forecasts superannuation assets 
will exceed those of the banking system by the early 2030s. Industry Super Australia 2014, 
First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 117. 
2  For example, the 2014 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index ranks Australia’s 
superannuation system second out of 25 countries. Its rating of ‘B+’ describes “… a system 
that has a sound structure, with many good features, but has some areas for improvement 
that differentiates it from an A-grade system”. Mercer 2014, Melbourne Mercer Global 
Pension Index, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, Melbourne, page 7. 
3  United Nations 2013, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, United Nations, viewed 
12 November 2014, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/mortality.htm>. 
4  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australian Life Tables 2005–07, Canberra, page 17. 
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leading to higher costs and sub-optimal outcomes for members, such as the 
proliferation of multiple accounts. 
Superannuation assets are not being efficiently converted into retirement incomes due 
to a lack of risk pooling and an over-reliance on account-based pensions. This 
contributes to a lower standard of living for Australians in retirement and, for some, 
during working life — meaning people may have to save more than they did 
previously to reach the same level of retirement income. 
Tax concessions in the superannuation system are not well targeted at improving 
retirement incomes, which has a number of consequences. It increases the cost of the 
superannuation system to taxpayers; it increases distortions due to higher levels of 
taxation elsewhere in the economy and due to the differences in the way other savings 
vehicles are taxed; and it contributes to the broader problem of policy instability, 
which imposes unnecessary costs on superannuation funds and their members and 
undermines long-term confidence in the system. 
In looking at superannuation policy settings from a financial system perspective, the 
Inquiry has also considered the associated social policy objectives. However, the 
Inquiry has not explicitly considered social policy settings, such as whether retirement 
incomes are adequate, or Age Pension policy settings, because these are outside the 
Inquiry’s terms of reference. The Inquiry has also made observations about the effects 
of taxation policy on the superannuation system and has referred them to the Tax 
White Paper. 
Recommended actions 
The Inquiry sees significant scope for the superannuation system to meet the needs of 
superannuation fund members better and provide broader benefits to the financial 
system and the economy. Specifically, the Inquiry believes action can be taken in the 
following three areas: 
• Set clear objectives for the superannuation system. A clear statement of the 
system’s objectives is necessary to target policy settings better and make them more 
stable. Clearly articulated objectives that have broad community support would 
help to align policy settings, industry initiatives and community expectations. 
• Improve operational efficiency during accumulation. Subject to the outcome of a 
review, a formal competitive process may be needed to allocate new default fund 
members to MySuper products. 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes 
91 
A formal competitive process would extend competitive pressures from the 
wholesale default fund market to the broader default fund market and improve 
after-fee returns.5 It would also reduce costs for funds and compliance costs for 
employers, who would no longer be required to select default funds for employees. 
This recommendation should only be implemented subject to the outcome of a 
review of the superannuation system’s efficiency and competitiveness. This caveat 
acknowledges it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Stronger Super 
reforms, although the Inquiry has reservations about whether these reforms alone 
will significantly improve system efficiency and member outcomes. 
• Improve efficiency in retirement. Greater use of risk pooling could significantly 
increase retirement incomes generated from accumulated balances. This could 
allow individuals to allocate consumption throughout their lives better (greater 
dynamic efficiency) by reducing the savings required to achieve a target level of 
income in retirement. This could be achieved by: 
– Removing barriers to new product development. 
– Using behavioural biases to encourage rather than discourage the use of 
products that provide longevity risk protection. 
This recommendation would involve trustees pre-selecting a comprehensive 
income product for retirement (CIPR) option for their members. Pre-selected 
options have been demonstrated to influence behaviour but do not limit personal 
choice and freedom. They would bring the policy philosophy at retirement closer to 
that of the accumulation phase. 
Managing longevity risk through effective pooling in a CIPR could significantly 
increase private incomes for many Australians in retirement and provide retirees 
with the peace of mind that their income will endure throughout retirement, while 
still allowing them to retain some flexibility to meet unexpected expenses. An 
enduring income stream would give retirees the confidence to spend in retirement, 
which would help to sustain economic growth as the population ages and reduce 
the extent to which longevity risk falls on the taxpayer. 
                                                          
5  The wholesale default fund market refers to large corporations tendering for a default 
superannuation fund for their employees. Lower fees reflect the buying power of a large 
corporation and lower member acquisition costs for funds. Many award superannuation 
fund members similarly receive wholesale benefits through lower fees as a result of lower 
member acquisition costs. 
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To support and complement these recommendations: 
• All employees should be able to choose the superannuation fund that receives their 
Superannuation Guarantee (SG) contributions. 
• Superannuation funds should provide retirement income projections on member 
statements to improve member engagement (recommended in 
Appendix 1: Significant matters). 
• The Tax White Paper should consider the removal of tax barriers to a seamless 
transition to retirement and target superannuation tax concessions to the 
superannuation system’s objectives. Adjustments to tax settings and efforts to 
improve equity have been major contributors to superannuation policy change in 
the past. The Inquiry believes community concerns about these issues need to be 
addressed to achieve greater policy stability and long-term confidence and trust in 
the system. 
The package of superannuation measures, including introducing a formal competitive 
process to allocate new default fund members to MySuper products, would deliver 
better outcomes and a more seamless experience for superannuation members 
throughout their lives (illustrated for default fund members in Figure 6: The 
superannuation system for default fund members). This package has the potential to 
increase retirement income for a male on average weekly ordinary-time earnings by 
25–40 per cent in retirement (excluding the Age Pension).6 While these estimates are 
illustrative and based on models which cannot fully reflect the unique circumstances 
of different individuals, the Inquiry is confident that significant increases in retirement 
incomes can be achieved. The package would also move the system’s focus away from 
employers, towards individuals. 
                                                          
6  Estimates were prepared using Australian Government Actuary modelling and input from 
Treasury models. The benefits of lower superannuation fees and savings from maintaining 
a single superannuation account over a person’s working life (discussed in 
Recommendation 10: Improving efficiency during accumulation) account for more than 
10 percentage points, and the remaining portion reflects the use of a CIPR. The models 
compare retirement income from an account-based pension, drawn down at minimum 
rates, to the results from a CIPR. Increased income and improved risk management comes 
at a cost of reduced flexibility and smaller bequests from superannuation. Further details 
are provided in Recommendation 11: The retirement phase of superannuation. The combined 
effects over 37 years of work would be that annual retirement income (excluding the Age 
Pension) would increase from $26,000 to between $33,000 and $38,000. 
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Figure 6: The superannuation system for default fund members 
 
The Inquiry has also made recommendations to improve the resilience of, and 
confidence in, the superannuation system, including: 
• Improving governance by requiring a majority of independent directors on 
superannuation trustee boards and aligning penalties for director misconduct with 
those of managed investment schemes (MISs). 
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• Improving the quality of financial advice and empowering consumers through 
improved disclosure and transparency (recommended in Chapter 4: Consumer 
outcomes). 
• Restoring the prohibition on direct borrowing in superannuation funds to preserve 
an important strength of the superannuation system, which was demonstrated 
during the GFC (recommended in Chapter 1: Resilience). 
Principles 
In making its detailed recommendations, the Inquiry has been guided by the following 
principles: 
• Government intervention in the superannuation system should support a clear 
objective to provide income in retirement. 
• Retaining freedom and choice within a compulsory system is fundamental to 
meeting the needs of individual superannuation fund members, even though this 
may involve costs. 
• The efficiency of the superannuation system should be improved by policy 
measures aimed at removing barriers to innovation and increasing competitive 
pressures. 
• In designing superannuation policy settings, policy makers should recognise and 
respond to consumers’ significant behavioural biases. 
• Individuals should bear responsibility for their financial decisions.7 However, 
because of mandatory contributions and the implications of Age Pension outlays 
for taxpayers, Government has a responsibility to adopt policy settings that deliver 
appropriate outcomes for superannuation fund members. 
Conclusion 
Implementing the package of recommendations in this chapter, and continuing to 
develop policy based on the principles outlined above, would improve outcomes for 
superannuation fund members. The superannuation system would also support the 
stability of the financial system and help Australia to manage the economic and fiscal 
challenges of an ageing population. 
                                                          
7  Refer to Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes for more details. 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes 
95 
Objectives of the superannuation system 
Recommendation 9 
Seek broad political agreement for, and enshrine in legislation, the objectives of the 
superannuation system and report publicly on how policy proposals are consistent with 
achieving these objectives over the long term. 
Description 
Government should seek broad agreement on the following primary objective for the 
superannuation system: 
To provide income in retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension. 
In achieving this primary objective, Government should also seek broad agreement on 
the subsidiary objectives of the superannuation system, as set out in Table 3. 
Table 3: Subsidiary objectives of the superannuation system 
Subsidiary objective Why the objective is important 
Facilitate consumption 
smoothing over the 
course of an individual’s 
life 
Superannuation is a vehicle for individuals to fund consumption in retirement 
largely from working life income. The system should facilitate consumption 
smoothing while providing choice and flexibility to meet individual needs and 
preferences. 
Help people manage 
financial risks in 
retirement 
Risk management is important as retirees generally have limited opportunities 
to replenish losses. The retirement income system should help individuals 
manage longevity risk, investment risk and inflation risk. Products with risk 
pooling would help people to manage longevity risk efficiently. 
Be fully funded from 
savings 
A fully funded system, as opposed to an unfunded system, is important for 
sustainability and stability. The system is designed to be predominantly 
funded by savings from working life income and investment earnings, where 
superannuation fund members in general have claims on all assets in the 
fund. 
Be invested in the  
best interests of 
superannuation fund 
members 
Superannuation funds are managed for the sole benefit of members, which 
means the investment focus should be on maximising risk-adjusted returns, 
net of fees and taxes, over the lifetime of a member. This results in auxiliary 




Government from the 
retirement income 
system 
Government’s total contribution to the retirement income system, through 
both the Age Pension and superannuation tax concessions, needs to be 
sustainable and targeted. Higher private provisioning for retirement should 
reduce the burden on public finances. 
Be simple and efficient, 
and provide safeguards 
The system should achieve its objectives at the minimum cost to individuals 
and taxpayers. Complexity is less appropriate for a compulsory system, as it 
tends to add to costs and to favour sophisticated and well-informed investors. 
Given the compulsory nature of SG contributions, the system needs 
prudential oversight and should provide good outcomes in both the 
accumulation and retirement phases for disengaged fund members. 
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The superannuation system spans two of the three pillars of Australia’s retirement 
income system: the mandatory savings pillar and the voluntary savings pillar.8 
Objectives 
• Provide a framework for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
superannuation system. 
• Contribute to greater long-term confidence and policy stability through agreed 
objectives, against which superannuation policy proposals can be assessed. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
The superannuation system does not have a consistent set of policies that work 
towards common objectives. For example, the current framework provides significant 
support and guidance to superannuation fund members during the accumulation 
phase through mandatory savings and default arrangements. However, the framework 
does not provide the same degree of support at retirement, when individuals confront 
a complex set of financial decisions. 
The lack of an agreed policy framework and objectives reduces the efficiency of the 
system. Submissions acknowledge that this lack of clear purpose is affecting the 
operational efficiency of the system. Some submissions state: 
Without clarity of purpose, superannuation and retirement policy and regulatory 
architecture cannot be aligned and, therefore, cannot deliver the right outcomes. This 
ultimately drives up costs and complexity.9  
A coherent overarching framework will allow development of an efficient long-term 
strategy and reduce the incidence of short-term policy changes.10 
The absence of agreed objectives contributes to short-term ad hoc policy making. It 
adds complexity, imposes unnecessary costs on superannuation funds and their 
                                                          
8  As discussed in the Interim Report, the three pillars comprise the Age Pension, mandatory 
SG contributions and voluntary savings, both inside and outside superannuation. The 
mandatory superannuation pillar ensures a minimum level of retirement savings by 
employees and the voluntary savings pillar enables individuals to tailor additional savings 
to achieve their individual goals. Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry 
Interim Report, Canberra, page 2-97. 
9  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 6. 
10  Actuaries Institute 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
attachment, page 4. 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes 
97 
members, and undermines long-term confidence in the system. Submissions note that 
many superannuation policies have been introduced and then subsequently repealed 
or amended (in some cases, repeatedly). One submission states: 
Constant short-term change involves a significant and perhaps unnecessary cost for the 
industry and consumers to bear.11 
The lack of an agreed policy framework also increases the cost of the superannuation 
system to Government because tax concessions are not being efficiently targeted at 
meeting the system’s objectives. 
Rationale 
Clearly defining the objectives of the superannuation system is a prerequisite to 
achieving the objectives efficiently. Consistent policy settings across the accumulation 
and retirement phases would meet the retirement income needs of Australians more 
efficiently and effectively. It would also assist Government in implementing policy 
settings that are well targeted and sustainable over the long term. One submission 
notes: 
Defining the objectives of superannuation will allow the efficacy of the retirement 
income system to be measured. It will also enable a more reasoned assessment of the need 
for future policy changes and hopefully see an end to the ad hoc policy tinkering of the 
past two decades. The articulation of the objectives and system design principles will also 
help foster a bi-partisan, enduring commitment to the superannuation system, ensuring 
stability and long-term confidence in the system.12 
Objectives that guide policy making and frame community and industry debate would 
help build confidence in the system by providing a framework for considered and 
cohesive change. Greater clarity around objectives can help reduce complexity and 
costs in the system. Importantly, in supporting greater policy stability, the Inquiry is 
not seeking to avoid future change. The system needs to adapt to changing 
circumstances but avoid unnecessary or ad hoc changes that cannot be sustained over 
time. 
Options considered 
1. Recommended: Seek broad political agreement for the objectives of the 
superannuation system. 
                                                          
11  Actuaries Institute 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 4. 
12  Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, attachment, page 5. 
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2. Recommended: Enshrine the objectives in legislation. Government should report 
publicly on how policy proposals are consistent with achieving the objectives in the 
long term.  
3. Establish a publicly funded independent body to assess the superannuation 
system’s performance and report on superannuation policy changes. 
Option costs and benefits 
Seek broad political agreement for the objectives of the superannuation system 
Given superannuation is both compulsory and a tax-preferred long-term savings 
vehicle, Government has a clear role in defining the system’s objectives. 
Submissions agree that articulating clear objectives is a critical step towards greater 
policy consistency and stability, and a prerequisite to achieving the objectives 
efficiently. In general, submissions nominate two major objectives: providing income 
in retirement and reducing pressure on the Age Pension. A number of stakeholders 
raise the importance of the superannuation system for national savings and funding 
economic activity. However, funding economic activity is a consequence of a 
well-designed long-term savings vehicle that invests in the interests of its members, 
rather than an objective in itself. 
The Inquiry’s single primary objective prioritises the provision of retirement incomes 
and precludes the pursuit of other objectives at the expense of retirement incomes. It 
will help reorient the community mindset around superannuation, away from account 
balances and towards the provision of retirement incomes. Nobel Laureate Robert 
Merton wrote: “Sustainable income flow, not the stock of wealth, is the objective that 
counts for retirement planning”.13 
Assessing the current superannuation system against the primary and subsidiary 
objectives outlined in this chapter identified a number of weaknesses that have given 
rise to recommendations in this report. These include the lack of focus on retirement 
incomes over other objectives, the lack of operational efficiency in the system, the lack 
of risk management in retirement, the inefficiency in converting wealth to retirement 
income, the ability of superannuation funds to borrow rather than be fully funded 
from savings, poorly targeted tax concessions, and safeguards that could be 
strengthened to assist members. 
Enshrine the objectives in legislation and provide more Government reporting 
Submissions strongly agree with the need for greater policy stability to promote 
long-term confidence in the system. Submissions also acknowledge that the ability to 
                                                          
13  Merton, R 2008, The Future of Retirement Planning, CFA Institute: Research Foundation 
Publications, vol. 2008, no. 1, page 11. 
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respond to changing circumstances is important but that new policies must be well 
considered and take a long-term perspective. 
Enshrining the primary and subsidiary objectives in legislation would provide a 
framework against which Government and the broader community could assess 
superannuation policy proposals. Parliamentary approval would be required to amend 
the objectives over time. 
Increased transparency around the objectives of policy proposals would help frame 
parliamentary and public debate. This could be done in regulatory impact statements 
at little cost. In addition, Government could periodically assess the extent to which the 
superannuation system is meeting its objectives. This could be done in a stand-alone 
report or as part of the Intergenerational Report, which is prepared every five years. 
Establish a publicly funded independent body to assess the superannuation 
system’s performance and report on superannuation policy changes 
A number of submissions suggest establishing an independent authority for retirement 
incomes. The authority would publish data, conduct research and analysis relevant to 
retirement incomes policy, and assess policy changes or proposals over the long term. 
Some stakeholders go further and propose that such a body should be responsible for 
developing policy. 
However, the Inquiry has concerns about the appropriate accountability mechanisms 
for such an agency. It is difficult to set a mandate and target for an independent body 
due to the complex trade-offs between stakeholder interests and policy objectives. The 
Inquiry has not seen strong evidence that an independent body would significantly 
improve policy outcomes. Establishing and operating a new authority would involve 
costs to Government. 
Conclusion 
Defining the objectives of the superannuation system is necessary to build an efficient 
superannuation system. The Inquiry recommends greater reporting by Government on 
how policy proposals better fulfil the objectives of the system over the long term. 
Stating the objectives would also help to align community expectations and industry 
initiatives with policy settings. 
The Inquiry recommends that the Tax White Paper consider the objectives of the 
superannuation system when evaluating superannuation tax policy proposals. 
Implementation considerations 
A first step towards obtaining broad political agreement to superannuation system 
objectives could be to establish a joint parliamentary inquiry to consider the 
proposed objectives and make a recommendation to Parliament. Parliament could 
enshrine the objectives in the preamble to a major piece of superannuation legislation 
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or in another instrument or charter. However, stating the objectives of the 
superannuation system in legislation is only intended to guide the policy-making 
process and is not intended to provide a platform for courts to reinterpret the law. 
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Improving efficiency during accumulation 
Recommendation 10 
Introduce a formal competitive process to allocate new default fund members to MySuper 
products, unless a review by 2020 concludes that the Stronger Super reforms have been 
effective in significantly improving competition and efficiency in the superannuation system. 
Description 
Subject to the findings of a review of the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
superannuation system, Government should introduce a formal competitive process to 
allocate new workforce entrants to MySuper products. The competitive process could 
be an auction or tender. Current default fund members would also benefit as funds 
would not be allowed to price discriminate between their existing and new MySuper 
members. This competitive process would replace the industrial relations system in 
selecting default superannuation funds for workers. 
The Productivity Commission (PC) should hold an inquiry by 2020, following the full 
implementation of MySuper (part of the Stronger Super reforms) to determine whether 
further reform would be beneficial. 
Objective 
• Enhance efficiency in the superannuation system to improve long-term net returns 
to members and build trust and confidence in funds regulated by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
As discussed in the Interim Report, funds could lower fees without compromising 
returns to members.14 Fees have not fallen by as much as would be expected given the 
substantial increase in the scale of the superannuation system. As noted by the Super 
System Review, a major reason for this is the absence of strong consumer-driven 
                                                          
14  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-100. 
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competition, particularly in the default fund market.15 This reflects members’ lack of 
engagement and reliance on employers to choose default funds for their employees. 
The Stronger Super reforms implemented in response to the Super System Review 
aimed to address these issues. Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, the 
Inquiry has some reservations about how effective these reforms will be in generating 
competition and the extent to which they will improve after-fee returns for members. 
In the Interim Report, the Inquiry compared the fees in Australia to those overseas. 
Submissions challenge the observation that operating costs and fees appear high by 
international standards. They argue that the different features and structures of 
pension systems globally make comparisons difficult. A Deloitte Access Economics 
report, commissioned by the Financial Services Council, argues “… fees can be driven 
by a number of factors, and may not be directly comparable across jurisdictions”.16 The 
Inquiry accepts many of these arguments and acknowledges that some unique features 
of the Australian system contribute to elevated costs and therefore higher fees. 
Other submissions attempt to make international comparisons across funds. The 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) states, “In international 
terms, Australian defined contribution (DC) members are paying fees consistent with 
members of similar funds overseas”.17 Since the Australian superannuation system is 
several times larger than DC systems overseas, Australian funds could be expected to 
have lower fees after accounting for differences in features.18 
A major concern of the Inquiry, shared by the Super System Review, is that the 
Australian system as a whole has been unable to realise the full benefits of scale. The 
Deloitte Access Economics report concludes, “… using international experiences as a 
benchmark, it appears that there may be scope for lower fees in the Australian 
system”.19 If fees and costs could be reduced, net returns, and ultimately retirement 
incomes, could be higher. 
In some cases, higher costs and fees may be in the interests of members. For example, 
alternative asset classes, such as infrastructure and other unlisted investments, tend to 
                                                          
15  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One: Overview and 
Recommendations, Canberra, page 7. 
16  Deloitte Access Economics 2014, Financial performance of Australia’s superannuation products, 
Financial Services Council, Canberra, page 6. 
17  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
18  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-100, Chart 4.1. 
19  Deloitte Access Economics 2014, Financial performance of Australia’s superannuation products, 
Financial Services Council, Canberra, page 6. 
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be more expensive to manage, but they may also diversify risks and offer higher 
after-fee returns for members. Submissions support this point.20 
Factors driving higher costs and fees and a lack of price-based competition in Australia 
include: 
• Supply-side issues: market fragmentation; costly asset management and active 
investment strategies; taxation and provision of insurance; and government policy 
changes. 
• Demand-side issues: weak member-driven competition due to lack of member 
interest; complexity; lack of comparability of fees and performance; and agency and 
structural problems. 
Market fragmentation increases costs 
The fragmented nature of the Australian superannuation system has limited the extent 
to which superannuation fund members benefit from scale economies, 
notwithstanding recent fund consolidations. This contributes to higher fees and lower 
after-fee returns to members. Australia has 294 APRA-regulated funds, most of which 
have a small asset base and tend to have higher fees than larger funds (Chart 2: Fees by 
fund size).21,22 In June 2013, around 80 per cent of these APRA-regulated 
superannuation funds held only around 20 per cent of assets.23,24 
                                                          
20  For example, Financial Services Council 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, Chapter 1, page 27; SuperRatings 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 15; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 19; Mercer 2014, Second 
round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 25. 
21  In this report, APRA-regulated funds refers to only those with more than four members. 
22  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly 
Superannuation Performance (interim edition), June ed., APRA, Sydney, page 8. 
23  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2013, Superannuation Fund-level Rates of 
Return, June ed., APRA, Sydney, pages 5–9. 
24  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly 
Superannuation Performance (interim edition), June ed., APRA, Sydney, page 8. 
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Chart 2: Fees by fund size 
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Source: Rice Warner.25 Line of best fit added by Financial System Inquiry. 
The substantial expansion in the scale of the superannuation system over the past 
decade could have been expected to significantly lower fees for fund members. The 
size of the average fund increased from $260 million in assets in 2004 to $3.3 billion in 
2013, whereas average fees fell by 20 basis points over the same period.26,27 This point 
was highlighted in the Interim Report but not widely addressed in second round 
submissions. Rice Warner estimates that system growth and scale could have reduced 
fees by 45 basis points.28 Two-thirds of the estimated benefits from scale and lower 
margins over the past decade have been offset by increases in fund costs (Figure 7: 
Drivers of changes in average fees between 2004 and 2013).29 
                                                          
25  Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
6 November 2014. 
26  Entities with more than four members. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 3 June 2014. 
27  Rice Warner 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 17 June 2014. 
28  Estimate based on data from Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the 
Financial System Inquiry, 6 November 2014. 
29  Rice Warner 2014, Superannuation Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
23 July 2014. 
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Figure 7: Drivers of changes in average fees between 2004 and 2013 
APRA-regulated funds; basis points (bps) 
 
Source: Rice Warner.30 
Weak member-driven competition 
Australia’s superannuation system is different from a traditional competitive market. 
Compulsory contributions, coupled with a complex system, contribute to disengaged 
consumers and weak member-driven competition. A high degree of fragmentation has 
persisted because of the lack of strong competitive pressures. This is widely recognised 
in submissions. ASFA explains, “In an efficient market, consumers (members) would 
move away from less cost efficient funds to more cost efficient funds, eventually 
driving merger activity. However, without engagement, the expected customer 
movement away from these higher cost funds will not happen, removing a potential 
driver of merger activity”.31 
Agency and structural issues  
Another factor contributing to the lack of member-driven competition is the role of 
employers in selecting default funds. Although the benefits from a fund’s performance 
fully accrue to employees, much of the costs of administering SG contributions are 
borne by employers. For this reason, the PC’s inquiry into default superannuation 
funds in modern awards found employers “… might have little incentive to invest 
                                                          
30  Rice Warner 2014, Superannuation Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
23 July 2014. 
31  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 16. 
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time and effort into making choices that are in the best interests of their employees”. 
The PC also found that employers face high search costs, may lack information and 
expertise to make an appropriate choice for their employees and may choose a fund 
based on auxiliary benefits specific to the employer, such as low administrative 
requirements.32 
Although employers, as agents for their employees, are generally ineffective in driving 
competition in the superannuation market, there are exceptions. Some large 
corporations tender for their default fund to obtain wholesale fee discounts for 
employees. ASFA notes, “Fee-based competition has always been strong in the tender 
processes for default funds that have been undertaken by large employers”.33 In 
addition, some default funds specified in awards effectively benefit from lower 
member acquisition costs to obtain wholesale fee discounts for employees. As a result, 
an individual’s employer can have a significant bearing on their retirement income. 
Preliminary evidence on the effectiveness of MySuper and SuperStream reforms 
The Super System Review’s recommendations aimed to address many of the issues 
above. MySuper was introduced as a simple, low-cost, default superannuation 
product. SuperStream will reduce costs by streamlining the administrative functions of 
superannuation funds. Other elements of the Stronger Super reforms included 
measures to improve fee transparency and fund governance.34 The Super System 
Review argued that its package of reforms could reduce fees by up to 70 basis points 
for the most expensive investment options in larger funds.35 
The Inquiry agrees with many submissions that it is too early to draw firm conclusions 
about the long-term effects of these reforms on average fees and net returns to 
members. Funds have only been able to offer MySuper products since 1 July 2013 and 
many are still absorbing one-off costs of the reforms. Additionally, accrued default 
amounts do not need to be rolled over into MySuper products until 2017. 
Preliminary evidence shows a net reduction in average MySuper fees against 
comparable default options of 15 basis points between 30 June 2011 and 
31 March 2014.36 The fall in average fees between 2011 and 2014 reflected a reduction 
                                                          
32  Productivity Commission 2012, Default Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 60. 
33  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 39. 
34  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Stronger Super, Canberra, pages 15–63. 
35  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One: Overview and 
Recommendations, Canberra, page 19. 
36  Based on a $50,000 balance. Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial 
System Inquiry, 6 November 2014, page 6, Table 4. 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes 
107 
in asset-based fees, which were partially offset by higher fixed-dollar fees. Three of the 
four market segments increased fees in default products between 2011 and 2014.37 
The Inquiry has some reservations about whether the legislated MySuper reforms will 
significantly improve the competitive dynamics and efficiency of the superannuation 
system and realise the full benefits of scale, as follows: 
• Despite some early signs of fee reductions, the fees offered on MySuper products 
still vary widely, with a difference of 136 basis points between the highest and 
lowest fees (Chart 3: Range of MySuper fees).38 Differences in asset allocation and 
investment strategy could account for variations in fees. However, data suggests 
that higher MySuper investment fees do not strongly correlate with the allocation to 
growth assets.39 
• The reduction in MySuper fees against comparable default options appears to have 
been largely due to the Future of Financial Advice reforms prohibiting commissions 
in MySuper products, rather than the introduction of MySuper. Removing these 
commissions is estimated to reduce fees by 25 basis points, which exceeds the 
estimated reduction in fees to date for default products.40 However, the reduction 
in MySuper fees from removing commissions will not be fully realised until all 
accrued default amounts are moved to MySuper products, which is required to be 
completed by 2017. 
There is a risk that some MySuper fee reductions are at the expense of member 
returns through changes in asset allocation and investment strategy.41 Furthermore, 
MySuper trustees are required to consider annually whether members are 
disadvantaged by the fund’s scale compared to MySuper members in other funds.42 
It is questionable whether this requirement will be sufficient to drive significant 
fund consolidation in the absence of stronger competitive pressures. 
                                                          
37  Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
6 November 2014. 
38  Note that there are differences between the data used by Rice Warner and the MySuper data 
for June 2014 published by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). This 
reflects recent updates to data and differences in reporting fees between APRA’s data and 
product disclosure statements. 
39  Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
6 November 2014, page 10, Graph 3. 
40  Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
6 November 2014. 
41  For example, some MySuper products have benchmark asset allocations to cash and fixed 
income of up to 50 per cent. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, 
Quarterly MySuper Statistics, June 2014, APRA, Sydney. 
42  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, s29VN(b). 
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Chart 3: Range of MySuper fees 
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Source: Rice Warner, using a combination of APRA data and product disclosure statement information.43 
Rationale 
Government intervention in the superannuation system is warranted to improve the 
system’s efficiency in the accumulation phase. The system lacks traditional market 
forces, due in part to substantial Government intervention. Also, the outcomes of the 
superannuation system ultimately affect both its members and taxpayers through the 
level of Age Pension payments. 
A more efficient system would ensure that all default fund employees, including the 
disengaged, receive the benefits of wholesale competition — not only employees of 
certain large corporations and those covered by modern awards. It would also allow 
individuals to retain a single account throughout their working life to avoid paying 
multiple fees. Finally, it would mean the majority of future scale economies would 
benefit members through lower fees and higher retirement incomes, rather than being 
eroded by higher costs. 
Fees can have a significant effect on retirement incomes and the total level of 
superannuation savings. For example, if average fees in APRA-regulated funds were 
reduced by 30 basis points, this would increase total member balances and funds 
available for long-term investment by more than $3.5 billion per annum.44 Such a fee 
                                                          
43  Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
6 November 2014. 
44  A reduction in fees of 30 basis points corresponds to the difference between the average fee 
of the top quartile of MySuper products and all MySuper products. The fee reduction could 
be achieved through a formal competitive process, in part by better realising scale benefits. 
By comparison, Rice Warner estimates potential scale benefits in the superannuation sector 
of 20 basis points over the next four years: Rice Warner 2014, MySuper Fees, Data provided 
to the Financial System Inquiry, 6 November 2014. The 30 basis point fee reduction has been 
applied to assets of $1.2 trillion in APRA-regulated funds as at 30 June 2014. Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Superannuation Performance (interim 
edition), June ed., APRA, Sydney, page 8. 
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reduction would increase the accumulated balance at retirement for a male employee 
on average weekly ordinary-time earnings by around $32,000, and provide up to 
approximately an extra $2,000 per year in retirement income (in 2014 dollars).45 
Options considered 
The Interim Report raised the first option below. The second option was raised in 
submissions and stakeholder discussions. 
1. Recommended: Introduce a formal competitive process to allocate new default 
fund members to MySuper products, unless a review by 2020 concludes that the 
Stronger Super reforms have significantly improved competition and efficiency in 
the superannuation system. 
2. Allow employers to choose any MySuper product as the default product for their 
employees and/or strengthen the MySuper licensing process. 
Option costs and benefits 
Introduce a formal competitive process to allocate new default fund members to 
MySuper products, unless a review determines it is not necessary 
Under this option, each fund would be required to compete for new workforce 
entrants to be allocated to the fund’s MySuper product, thereby building on the 
MySuper framework. Individuals would retain the right to exercise choice (see 
Recommendation 12: Choice of fund). Employers would no longer be required to select 
default funds for employees, and there would be generally no need to specify default 
funds in employment contracts, including awards. 
This option would stimulate competition in the default fund market and extend the 
benefits of wholesale competition, which are currently only obtained by larger 
corporations and through awards, to the broader workforce. More of the benefits of 
scale would accrue to members, ensuring fee reductions do not come at the expense of 
lower net returns.  
The benefits of this option would not be limited to new workforce entrants. As 
mentioned, successful funds would be required to provide the same product to their 
existing default members. Better outcomes in the default fund market would be 
expected to have flow-on effects to the non-default (or ‘choice’) market. Fees charged 
for default products provide a point of comparison against which more fee-sensitive 
consumers can assess choice products. 
                                                          
45  Modelling prepared for the Financial System Inquiry using Treasury models, October 2014. 
The models are based on a 30-year-old male worker in 2014 who retires at age 67.  
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A number of stakeholders support a process to foster competition. National Seniors 
Australia recommends “… the government further investigate auctioning management 
rights to default super funds as a way of fostering fee competition between super 
funds and, subject to a satisfactory auction design, commit to implementing this 
approach”.46 Other stakeholders believe the current level of competition between 
MySuper products is reasonable. 
Existing members would retain their active fund when they change employment, 
without having to take action. Currently, in many cases, members have to consolidate 
accounts or exercise choice when they change employers to remain in their fund. This 
option addresses the main driver of account proliferation and would reduce the extent 
of workers paying fees and insurance in multiple accounts or losing superannuation 
accounts.47 This could increase superannuation balances at retirement by around 
$25,000 and retirement incomes by up to $1,600 per year.48 
This option would remove the role of the industrial relations system in selecting 
default funds. This would reduce employers’ compliance costs and address concerns, 
raised in several submissions, about superannuation funds offering employers 
inducements to choose the fund.49 It would also better align incentives between 
employers and employees. 
A potential downside of this option is less tailoring of life insurance policies and 
investment strategies to specific demographics of fund members; for example, if 
members work in the same industry. Some superannuation funds have been able to 
tailor insurance and other product features because of the homogeneous nature of their 
membership. 
It is possible that the competitive process conducted by Government could create 
perceptions that Government is implicitly underwriting product performance of the 
                                                          
46  National Seniors Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 5. 
47  For example, as at 30 June 2014, there were six million lost superannuation accounts with a 
total value of just under $16.8 billion. Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2014, Lost and 
ATO-held super overview, ATO, viewed 27 October 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/Research-and-statistics/In-detail/Super-statistics
/Lost-and-ATO-held-super/Lost-and-ATO-held-super-overview>. 
48  Modelling prepared for the Financial System Inquiry using Treasury models, October 2014. 
Based on assumptions of 37 years of work with an average of 2.5 accounts over a person’s 
working life, fixed fees of $80 per account and $140 for insurance per account per annum 
(in 2014 dollars). 
49  For example, see Association of Superannuation Funds Australia 2014, First round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 31; Australian Institute of Superannuation 
Trustees 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 35; and 
Equip 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 9. 
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successful funds. Government should continue to make it clear that it does not 
guarantee the performance of any fund, including those selected through any 
competitive process. 
Stakeholders raise a number of concerns with how a competitive process would be 
designed. The Inquiry agrees with submissions’ arguments that a competitive process 
would not be effective if it focused on fees alone. However, large corporates run 
competitive tenders and there is no evidence to suggest that these tenders in the 
wholesale market have either disadvantaged members or been unable to balance lower 
costs with asset allocation strategies that maximise returns to members. See the 
Implementation considerations section for a detailed discussion of potential design issues 
and how these could be overcome. 
Superannuation system review by 2020 
Funds and their members have incurred significant costs as the Stronger Super reforms 
have been implemented. Although the Inquiry has some reservations regarding the 
extent to which the reforms will increase superannuation system efficiency, it 
recognises the need for full implementation of MySuper to allow it the opportunity to 
work before embarking on further reform. The outcomes of these reforms should be 
reviewed after all accrued default amounts have been rolled into MySuper products in 
2017, by which time MySuper products will have been in operation for at least four 
years. Submissions support such a review. 
Allow all employers to choose any MySuper product as the default fund for their 
employees and/or strengthen the MySuper licensing process 
The Inquiry considered two additional alternatives to the current arrangements. 
The first alternative involves abolishing the new Fair Work Commission (FWC) 
process for selecting default funds in awards and allowing all MySuper products to be 
listed in awards. Under this alternative, employers could select any MySuper product 
to satisfy the requirements under an award. 
A number of submissions support this option, arguing that present arrangements are 
costly to members, Government and industry, and duplicate APRA’s MySuper 
licensing process. Some stakeholders are also concerned that the FWC selection 
process lacks transparency. 
The Inquiry believes that this alternative would only be effective if there were an 
alternative quality filter for default fund selection. The PC’s inquiry into default funds 
in awards found that a ‘quality filter’ is needed, stating: “The Stronger Super reforms 
serve largely to standardise features and promote disclosure to improve comparability 
between MySuper products, rather than filter out any products which may not 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
112 
represent the best interests of employees”.50 The PC made a number of 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of this filter, which the Inquiry 
supports and which are still to be implemented by Government. 
This option could also increase employers’ compliance costs, particularly new 
employers, by requiring them to select a fund from a large number of MySuper 
products that are not easily comparable. In its report, the PC quoted CPA Australia as 
saying, “To allow all MySuper products to be listed as default funds for a modern 
award would result in overwhelming choice making it difficult for [employers] to 
differentiate and make an informed choice in much the same way as if no funds were 
listed”.51 
The second alternative involves strengthening the current requirements for MySuper 
products, which could be achieved by imposing stricter MySuper licensing 
requirements, including caps on fees. Fee caps could be effective in reducing fees, but 
would not necessarily improve returns net of fees and may lead to clustering of fees 
around caps. A stricter approach to regulating MySuper products would 
fundamentally change APRA’s role from authorisation to approval. It would increase 
the cost of the validation process for funds and risk APRA having to withdraw funds’ 
MySuper authorisation. This would have adverse implications for employers, who 
would have to choose another default product for their employees, and contribute to 
the proliferation of individuals with multiple accounts. 
Conclusion 
Introducing a formal competitive process has considerable merit and is likely to 
deliver substantial benefits to superannuation fund members. It would stimulate 
competition between funds on fees and returns to deliver better member outcomes. 
Although this is expected to generate further fund consolidation, the Inquiry does not 
have major concerns given the current high degree of fund fragmentation. The 
recommendation would build on the recent Stronger Super reforms and extend the 
benefits of wholesale competition to the broader default fund market. 
Although industry would bear costs to participate in the competitive process, these 
costs are expected to be small relative to the benefits for members from reduced fees. 
While considering the Stronger Super reforms to be a positive and significant step 
forward, the Inquiry has some reservations as to whether these reforms alone will 
significantly improve superannuation system competition and efficiency. Recognising 
                                                          
50  Productivity Commission 2012, Default Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 10. 
51  Productivity Commission 2012, Default Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 171. 
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it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness, the Inquiry recommends a review of the 
superannuation system by 2020 before proceeding with further reform. 
Implementation considerations 
Review of the superannuation system by 2020 
A PC inquiry into superannuation system efficiency and competitiveness should occur 
by 2020, after the MySuper implementation is complete in 2017. The inquiry should 
consider: 
• The nature of competition in the superannuation default fund market, including 
how employers select default funds. 
• Changes in fees and returns net of fees and taxes (including links to scale 
economies, asset allocation and/or type of investing) in both accumulation and 
retirement products. 
• The distribution of fees for similar products. 
• Flow-on effects to the choice market. 
The PC inquiry should determine whether implementing a formal competitive process 
would deliver net benefits. 
Design of the competitive process 
Default funds for new members could be selected through a range of competitive 
processes, including auctions or tenders. New workforce entrants could be assigned to 
a MySuper product when they apply for a tax file number. 
Designing a robust process will require careful thought and consultation. Without 
pre-empting the findings of its inquiry, the PC should begin preliminary work to 
design the competitive process. This work should commence from 2015 to provide the 
inquiry with a clear proposal against which to assess the benefits of further policy 
change. 
In designing the competitive process, the merits of different approaches should be 
considered, as well as the associated metrics and frequency of running the competitive 
process using an evidence-based approach. This should include: 
• Reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of competitive processes used in large 
corporate tenders, used by the Northern Territory Government and in other 
jurisdictions, such as Chile, New Zealand and Sweden. 
• Quantifying the costs and benefits of different mechanisms. 
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• Assessing the incentives embedded in the scheme to evaluate its robustness to 
gaming and collusion. 
Principles for designing the competitive process should include:52 
• Best interests: ensure incentive compatibility with meeting the best interests of 
members, encourage long-term investing, discourage excessive risk taking and 
encourage a focus on after-fee returns. 
• Competition: drive pressure on funds to be innovative and efficient, diversify asset 
allocation and maximise long-term after-fee returns by rewarding best performers. 
Facilitate new superannuation fund entrants to the market. 
• Feasibility: ensure the process is low-cost and easy to administer, and minimises 
regulatory costs on industry. 
• Credibility and transparency: make relevant information public; avoid room for 
gaming the process; and ensure metrics are clear, simple, difficult to dispute and 
difficult to manipulate. 
• Regular assessment and accountability: regularly conduct a repeat process that 
requires default funds to earn their right to receive new members, and ensure funds 
are accountable for the outcomes they deliver members. 
Criteria for selecting the successful funds should focus on expected after-fee returns 
based on asset allocation and investment strategy, fees and past performance. This 
would help avoid fee reductions at the expense of member returns. Any other 
requirements deemed necessary could be included as pre-selection criteria to 
participate in the competitive process. 
The Inquiry agrees with stakeholders that the formal competitive process also needs to 
be carefully designed and implemented (see Table 4: Potential design issues of a 
competitive process). 
                                                          
52  Drawn in part from the PC’s recommended principles for designing a selection process: 
Productivity Commission 2012, Default Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 23. 
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Table 4: Potential design issues of a competitive process 
Potential design issues or concerns Response or design approach 
A formal competitive process is 
unproven. Furthermore, 
governments have a poor track 
record of running formal competitive 
processes. 
Large corporate funds successfully run tenders. A number of 
other jurisdictions use competitive tendering in pension funds; for 
example, New Zealand, Chile, and Sweden. Governments 
around Australia run successful tenders, including the Future 
Fund, and the Northern Territory Government for its public sector 
superannuation scheme. 
The market disruption would be too 
great. 
The effect on market structure could be gradual, as only new 
entrants to the workforce would be assigned to funds under the 
competitive process. By default, existing members would remain 
in their current fund, thereby minimising market disruption. 
Unsuccessful funds may have increased switching rates; 
however, current switching rates are very low.53 All funds can still 
compete for choice members. 
A Chilean-style auction that selects 
a single or small number of 
successful bidders would inhibit 
competition and innovation, and 
lead to excessive market 
concentration. 
A significant number of successful funds would be selected, 
which would drive competition and innovation. Some market 
consolidation is likely to occur, but excessive market 
concentration can be avoided if a sufficient number of funds are 
selected through the competitive process. 
Fees should not be the sole focus. 
This would result in a ‘race to the 
bottom’ whereby funds change 
asset allocation and investment 
strategies to reduce fees. 
The Inquiry agrees with this sentiment and considers a focus 
solely on fees is not in members’ best interests. As discussed 
above, the focus should include expected ability to generate high 
after-fee returns based on asset allocation and investment 
strategy, as well as past performance.  
How will the competitive process 
lower fund costs? 
Competitive pressures will help to keep fund costs down as 
assets in the system continue to grow. Member acquisition costs 
will fall as funds do not need to compete for default fund 
members (outside the tender process). More consolidation of 
funds and reduced proliferation of multiple accounts across 
members will better realise the benefits of scale. 
Focusing on the default fund market 
and only targeting new entrants to 
the workforce is too narrow-focused. 
It will not address competition and 
efficiency issues in the broader 
superannuation system. 
Successful funds would be required to offer the same fees and 
MySuper products to all members (both new and existing). They 
could not price discriminate across the market. Outcomes in the 
default market represent a baseline against which choice 
products could be compared and could be expected to drive 
greater competition. Transfers to these funds would be facilitated 
by the recommendations to allow all employees choice of fund 
(discussed in this chapter) and increase member engagement 
(see Appendix 1: Significant matters for further detail). 
A competitive process would lead to 
the loss of existing high-performing 
corporate funds. 
Existing corporate funds could be allowed to continue to receive 
new default fund members from new entrants to the workforce 
provided the fund gives members comparable benefits to funds 
successful in the formal competitive process. 
                                                          
53  A Roy Morgan Research report, based on approximately 30,000 interviews each year with 
members of superannuation funds, shows rates of switching between superannuation 
funds in the range of 2 per cent to 5 per cent since 2005. Roy Morgan Research 2013, 
Superannuation and Wealth Management in Australia Report, December 2013, page 29. 
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Potential design issues or concerns Response or design approach 
Any competitive process can be 
gamed. 
Careful design, rigorous execution and the highest standards of 
probity and expertise will be required. As mentioned above, other 
jurisdictions and corporations already run tenders successfully. 
Past performance is not an accurate 
predictor of future performance. 
Past performance would be only one element of the selection 
process when assessing expected ability to generate high 
after-fee returns to members. 
What would stop unsuccessful funds 
significantly increasing their fees for 
existing default fund members? 
Funds that do this could be disqualified from future competitive 
processes.  
Prompts on myGov for individuals to look at a central repository 
of MySuper dashboards would also help encourage members to 
engage with superannuation and transfer to the fund that best 
meets their needs (see Appendix 1: Significant matters for further 
details). 
What if a successful high-performing 
fund underperforms? 
Funds could lose the right to receive new members. Members 
would be advised if their fund was no longer deemed a 
successful fund. 
A competitive process would impose 
costs on employers, who would 
have to make contributions to 
multiple funds. 
While SuperStream will simplify how contributions are made, 
Government should consider implementing a national ‘payment 
hub’ or ‘clearing house’ by which employers make 
superannuation contributions to multiple funds. This concept has 
been implemented in other countries, including New Zealand and 
Sweden. 
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The retirement phase of superannuation 
Recommendation 11 
Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income product for members’ 
retirement. The product would commence on the member’s instruction, or the member may 
choose to take their benefits in another way. Impediments to product development should be 
removed. 
Description 
Government should require superannuation fund trustees to pre-select an option for 
members to receive their superannuation benefits in retirement. Details of the 
pre-selected option would be communicated to the member during their working life. 
At retirement, the member would either give their authority to commence the 
pre-selected option or elect to take their benefits in another way. This approach would 
simplify decisions at retirement and deliver better outcomes for retirees (Figure 8: 
Stylised example of decision making for superannuation benefits). No income stream would 
commence without the member’s instruction. 
The pre-selected option should be a comprehensive income product for retirement 
(CIPR) that has minimum features determined by Government. These features should 
include a regular and stable income stream, longevity risk management and flexibility. 
CIPRs would be low-cost and include a ‘cooling off’ period. Their design could vary 
with the member’s known characteristics, such as the size of their superannuation 
benefits, and take account of the possibility of cognitive impairment at older ages. 
A combination of underlying products would likely be required to provide these 
features; for example, an account-based pension paired with a pooled product that 
provides longevity risk protection. To offer these products, funds may need to partner 
with another provider, such as a life insurance company. 
Regulatory impediments to developing retirement income products, which include tax 
policy settings, need to be removed. These changes should not discourage the use of 
CIPRs or other products that provide longevity risk protection. 
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Figure 8: Stylised example of decision making for superannuation benefits 
 
Objectives 
• Better meet the needs of retirees, including those who are disengaged or less 
financially sophisticated, and provide a more seamless transition to the retirement 
phase of superannuation. 
• Achieve the objectives of the superannuation system (discussed earlier in this 
chapter) by strengthening the focus on providing retirement incomes. 
• Improve Australians’ standard of living during their working lives and retirement 
through greater risk pooling. 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Complex decisions 
Managing multiple financial objectives and risks in retirement is complex. For 
example, retirees may seek to maximise income while trying to retain flexibility to 
meet unexpected expenses and manage longevity, investment and liquidity risks. 
Individuals have to manage these problems without the guidance that exists in the 
accumulation phase, where funds are required to offer simple, low-cost default 
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accounts. MySuper is an accumulation product only, despite the Super System Review 
recommendation that MySuper products include a retirement income stream.54 
Information from stakeholders suggests that many retirees find it challenging to 
navigate the transition to the retirement phase of superannuation. When DC members 
notify their superannuation fund of their retirement, many funds recommend they 
speak to an affiliated financial adviser. Research has demonstrated that the quality of 
this advice can vary significantly.55 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some advisers 
have limited knowledge of longevity risk and how it can be managed.56 Although the 
Inquiry makes recommendations to improve the quality of advice, it will take time for 
such improvements to occur. Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes explores this issue in further 
detail. 
In any case, many people do not seek professional advice, and funds and advisers 
overwhelmingly recommend account-based pensions. Stakeholders advise that, for 
less financially literate individuals, the simplest option is to take the entire benefit as a 
lump sum because other options can be difficult to understand and may require 
completing complicated forms. A recent survey commissioned by AustralianSuper 
found that “… 85% of pre-retirees are not confident in having an informed 
conversation around retirement income”.57 Managing income and risks can be 
particularly difficult for people later in retirement if they suffer from cognitive 
impairment. 
Behavioural biases 
The complexity of retirement decisions is compounded by behavioural biases.58 
Mandatory superannuation contributions have been used to overcome behavioural 
biases in saving behaviour, such as decision making that disproportionately focuses on 
the short term; however, these biases do not end at retirement. In part, behavioural 
biases explain the dominance of account-based pensions and lump sums. 
                                                          
54  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part Two: 
Recommendation Packages, Chapter 7: Retirement, Recommendation 7.1, Canberra, page 207. 
55  Shadow shopping research conducted by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) found that only 3 per cent of financial advice about retirement was 
“good quality”. ASIC 2012, Report 279: Shadow shopping study of retirement advice, ASIC, 
Sydney, page 8. This study was conducted before the Future of Financial Advice reforms. 
56  Longevity risk is not covered in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s 
compulsory RG 146 qualifications for superannuation advisers. This could be improved by 
raising competency standards, as recommended in Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes. 
57  AustralianSuper 2014, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 10 September 2014. 
58  See Benartzi, S 2010, Behavioral Finance and the Post-Retirement Crisis, Allianz of America, 
USA, for a discussion of these biases. 
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Limited range of income stream products 
Australians who wish to convert their superannuation assets into an income stream 
generally have the choice of an account-based pension or an annuity. A 
well-functioning market would be expected to provide a wider range of products that 
meet different needs and preferences. This would allow people to combine products to 
achieve their desired levels of income, risk management and flexibility. However, 
there are tax, regulatory and other impediments to developing innovative retirement 
income products. 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of retirees, at least 94 per cent of pension assets are 
in account-based pensions, which provide flexibility but lack risk management 
features and may not deliver high levels of income from a given accumulated 
balance.59,60 The lack of a significant market for products with longevity risk protection 
sets Australia apart from most other developed economies.61 Evidence suggests that 
the major worry among retirees and pre-retirees is exhausting their assets in 
retirement.62 An individual with an account-based pension can reduce the risk of 
outliving their wealth by living more frugally in retirement and drawing down 
benefits at the minimum allowable rates.63 This is what the majority of retirees with 
account-based pensions do, which reduces their standard of living.64,65 The difficulty in 
                                                          
59  Plan for Life 2014, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 23 June 2014. 
60  A measure of income from a given accumulated balance, ‘income efficiency’ is the expected 
present value of income in retirement as a percentage of a product’s purchase price. The 
income efficiency of a 65-year-old male’s account-based pension, drawn down at minimum 
rates, is around 70 per cent. Australian Government Actuary, Data provided to Financial 
System Inquiry, 11 June 2014. 
61  The size of Australia’s annuity market is only around 0.3 per cent of gross domestic 
product, compared with 28.8 per cent in Japan, 15.4 per cent in the United States and more 
than 40 per cent in some European countries. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2013, ‘Survey of annuity products and their guarantees’, paper presented at 
the Insurance and Private Pensions Committee meeting, Paris, 5–6 December.  
62  More than half of the respondents to a survey were either worried or extremely worried 
about outliving their savings. When asked to identify the single most important feature in a 
retirement income product, twice as many members identified “income that lasts a lifetime” 
as the second most popular response. Investment Trends 2013, December 2013 Retirement 
Income Report, Investment Trends, Sydney. Note: Based on a survey of 5,730 Australians 
aged 40 and older. Results from another survey suggest that more than 90 per cent of 
Australians over the age of 50 believe that “money that lasts my lifetime” is somewhat 
important or very important. National Seniors Australia and Challenger 2013, Retirees’ needs 
and their (in)tolerance for risk, National Seniors Australia, Brisbane, page 10. 
63  The regulatory prescribed minimum rates range from 4 per cent for people aged 55 to 64, to 
14 per cent for those over the age of 95. 
64  Most retirees draw down their account-based pensions at the minimum allowable rates. 
Rothman, G and Wang, H 2013, ‘Retirement income decisions: take up and use of 
Australian lump sums and income streams’, paper presented at the 21st Colloquium of 
Superannuation Researchers, Sydney, 9–10 July, page 19. 
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managing this risk is also exacerbated by the uncertainty as to how long a retiree will 
live.66 
Rationale 
The potential gains to members, the economy and taxpayers from a more efficient 
retirement phase are significant and warrant intervention. Higher income in retirement 
and a wider range of retirement income products would better meet the varied needs 
of retirees. The economy will benefit if the growing proportion of people in retirement 
can sustain their level of consumption. 
Combinations of products enable retirees to balance the three desired features of 
retirement income products: high income, risk management features and flexibility 
(Figure 9: Desired features of retirement income products). Pooling of longevity risk would 
give retirees greater confidence to consume. Alternatively, by improving the 
superannuation system’s efficiency in providing retirement income, people may be 
able to save less during their working lives to reach a given level of retirement income. 
                                                                                                                                                          
65  Research suggests that these below-optimal rates result in lower welfare for individuals. 
Bateman, H and Thorp, S 2008, ‘Choices and Constraints over Retirement Income Streams: 
Comparing Rules and Regulations’, Economic Record, vol 84, pages S17–S31. 
66  Although the life expectancy of a 65-year-old female today is about 89 years, 10 per cent of 
65-year-old females will die before they reach 77 years and 10 per cent will live past 
100 years. Even if individuals knew their life expectancy (which is generally not the case), 
the probability of a 65-year-old dying at a particular age is no greater than about 5 per cent. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australian Life Tables 2005–07, Canberra, using 25-year 
mortality improvement factors.  
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Figure 9: Desired features of retirement income products 
 
Private provision of longevity risk protection could benefit taxpayers and the broader 
economy. It would shift some of the longevity risk borne by Government, as the 
provider of the Age Pension, to the private sector. Assets underlying products with 
longevity risk protection could be invested with a longer time horizon, helping to fund 
long-term investments and develop the corporate bond market in Australia as funds 
seek more investments that provide a steady flow of income. 
Options considered 
The Interim Report broadly identified four options that would enable the retirement 
phase to better achieve the objectives of the superannuation system and position 
Australia to manage the challenges of an ageing population: 
1. Recommended: Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a CIPR for 
members. 
2. Recommended: Remove impediments to retirement income product 
development. 
3. Provide policy incentives that encourage retirees to purchase retirement 
income products that help manage longevity and other risks. 
4. Mandate specific retirement income products (in full or in part, or for later 
stages of retirement). 
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Option costs and benefits 
Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a CIPR for members 
Under this option, superannuation fund trustees would be required to pre-select 
CIPRs for members to receive their superannuation benefits. Members would retain 
the freedom to take their benefits in another way if they desired. Appropriately 
designed pre-selected options would offer an effective, low-cost means of improving 
retirement income and risk management for superannuation fund members without 
limiting personal freedom and choice. This option would also help to develop markets 
for a wider range of income products with enhanced risk-management characteristics. 
Greater use of products that pool longevity risk could significantly increase retirement 
incomes. For many retirees, incomes from CIPRs could be 15–30 per cent higher than 
those from the current typical strategy of drawing the minimum amount from an 
account-based pension.67 The Inquiry notes that one of the primary reasons why 
incomes are significantly higher in products that pool longevity risk is that they reduce 
bequests from superannuation. Although the system should accommodate bequests, it 
should not do so to the detriment of retirement incomes. 
Pre-selected options would simplify the process of using an accumulated balance to 
generate an income stream. The member guides that exist for the accumulation phase 
currently cease at retirement. Pre-selected options would bring the policy philosophy 
in the retirement phase closer to that of the accumulation phase. 
People can benefit from pre-selected CIPRs in different ways. CIPRs can improve 
retirement incomes and risk management outcomes, especially for the disengaged and 
those who are less financially sophisticated, by providing a comprehensive option that 
balances a number of objectives and risks. The design of CIPRs can also guide more 
engaged members by providing a framework for decision making. Johnson and 
Goldstein (2013) suggest such an approach would be effective for three main reasons:68 
1. Effort — real or psychological costs of moving from the pre-selected option. 
2. Implied endorsement — products are perceived to be recommended. 
3. Loss aversion and reference dependence — decisions are affected by the 
starting point. 
                                                          
67  Australian Government Actuary modelling prepared for the Financial System Inquiry 
shows that CIPR examples 1, 2 and 3 described in the Implementation considerations section of 
this recommendation increase expected income in retirement by 14 per cent, 30 per cent and 
31 per cent respectively, excluding income from the Age Pension. Australian Government 
Actuary, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 10 October 2014. 
68  Johnson, E and Goldstein, D 2013, ‘Decisions by default’, in Shafir, E (ed.), The Behavioral 
Foundations of Public Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pages 417–427. 
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Pre-selecting options can have a significant influence on decision making. This was 
shown in an Australian experiment that involved individuals allocating savings 
between account-based pensions and annuities. The study found that the distribution 
of allocations was strongly clustered around the pre-selected allocations (Chart 4). 


















Source: Bateman et al.69 This study referred to pre-selected options as defaults. The allocation to annuities 
was pre-selected for participants who were able to change the allocation as they desired. 
Although designing CIPRs would be more complex than designing accumulation 
accounts, trustees are well placed to select appropriate CIPRs for their members, 
within a defined framework. ASFA argues “… trustees should exercise their fiduciary 
duty to consider longevity, market risk and inflation risk in designing post-retirement 
arrangements in much the same way they need to consider investment risk and 
insurance needs throughout the accumulation stage”.70 Funds would incur the costs of 
selecting, establishing and maintaining CIPRs, but these costs would be justified by the 
benefits to members. 
However, CIPRs would be less beneficial to individuals with very high or very low 
superannuation balances. Those with small balances are likely to continue to take their 
benefit as a lump sum and rely primarily on income from the Age Pension. Individuals 
with very high balances may be able to generate satisfactory retirement income from 
an account-based pension, drawn down at minimum rates. 
                                                          
69  Bateman, H, Eckert, C, Iskhakov, F, Louviere, J, Satchell, S and Thorp, S 2013, Default and 
1/N Heuristics in Annuity Choice, School of Risk and Actuarial Studies Working Paper 2014/1. 
70  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 101. 
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A change in the way superannuation benefits are taken could affect Age Pension costs, 
as discussed in the Implementation considerations section later in this recommendation. 
Remove product development impediments  
As discussed in the Interim Report, regulatory and other policy impediments are 
hampering the development of retirement income products such as deferred lifetime 
annuities (DLAs) and group self-annuitisation (GSA) schemes.71 These impediments 
include rigid standards to qualify for earnings tax exemptions. The Inquiry supports 
the review of retirement income stream regulation being undertaken by Government, 
which is examining ways to reduce or remove barriers to developing a market for 
DLAs. 
However, increasing the range of products alone will not be sufficient to improve 
outcomes for retirees significantly. Behavioural biases and other system incentives will 
continue to impede the widespread use of pooled longevity risk products, despite 
evidence that many individuals would be better off.72 
Provide policy incentives to encourage the use of retirement income products that 
manage longevity and other risks 
Several submissions support using tax and Age Pension incentives to encourage 
take-up of income products with longevity risk protection. The Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees (AIST) recommends “… policy incentives that encourage 
retirees to purchase retirement income products that help them deliver their optimal 
retirement experience”.73 In the past, favourable treatment of products with better risk 
management features by the Age Pension means test has been shown to increase their 
use.74 
Although policy incentives would be likely to increase the use of superannuation to 
generate retirement incomes, incentives generally increase the cost of the retirement 
                                                          
71  Deferred lifetime annuities are a form of lifetime annuity where the commencement of 
income payments is delayed for a set amount of time after purchase. In a GSA scheme, 
participants contribute funds to a pool that is invested in financial assets. Regular payments 
from the pool are made to surviving members. GSAs allow pool members to manage 
idiosyncratic longevity risk but do not completely eliminate the risks associated with 
increases in life expectancies across Australia. GSAs differ from a lifetime annuity by not 
providing a guaranteed income stream. Instead, the adjustments to payments over time are 
subject to investment performance, mortality assumptions and experience. 
72  Benartzi, S, Previtero, A and Thaler, R 2011, ‘Annuitization puzzles’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol 25, no. 4, pages 143–164. 
73  Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 43. 
74  Sales of annuities fell significantly after both the reduction in the asset test exemption in 
2004 and its abolition in 2007. Plan for Life 2014, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
28 March 2014. 
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income system to taxpayers. However, it is important that tax and Age Pension 
settings do not discourage people from using CIPRs. 
Mandate specific retirement income products 
Mandatory use of certain retirement income products would achieve effective risk 
pooling and ensure superannuation is used to provide income throughout retirement. 
It would also overcome issues with adverse selection in products with longevity risk 
protection. 
Mandatory use of products that pool longevity risk could disadvantage groups with 
lower life expectancies.75 This could be mitigated by pricing products to reflect the 
characteristics of members, including their life expectancy, although this would be 
complex and add costs. 
People tend to have diverse needs in retirement, and no given product or combination 
of products will be appropriate for everyone. Many submissions caution that 
compulsory income streams could result in poor outcomes for some individuals and 
stifle innovation. Although this option could help achieve the objectives of the 
superannuation system, it would remove individuals’ flexibility to tailor their 
retirement plans to suit their needs and is not consistent with the Inquiry’s philosophy. 
Conclusion 
Pre-selected CIPRs and greater use of longevity risk pooling at retirement could 
significantly improve the superannuation system’s efficiency in providing retirement 
incomes and better meet the needs of retirees. 
In making this recommendation, the Inquiry sought to balance the desire to increase 
system efficiency in providing retirement incomes with a degree of individual freedom 
and choice. The Inquiry favours an approach that preserves freedom and choice. 
However, if introducing pre-selected CIPRs does not achieve the intended objectives of 
this recommendation, Government could consider forms of defaults that commence 
automatically on retirement. Tax and Age Pension incentives could also be used to 
better achieve the objectives of the superannuation system. 
High-quality advice may be useful to some individuals to help them manage their 
financial affairs in retirement. Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes contains recommendations 
to improve the quality of financial advice. 
                                                          
75  For a discussion of these issues, see Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Australia’s future tax 
system: Report to the Treasurer, Part Two, Detailed analysis, vol 1 of 2, Canberra, page 122. 
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Implementation considerations 
Developing CIPRs will take considerable time. This recommendation should be 
implemented with sufficient lead time to allow superannuation funds to design 
products or form partnerships with other providers. 
As pre-selected CIPRs are expected to influence retirees’ decisions, it is important they 
provide good outcomes for large numbers of members. This recommendation involves 
trustees potentially designing, advising on and delivering CIPRs. For these reasons, 
Government should establish a mechanism to ensure each CIPR provides the required 
features, which should be specified in regulation. Ongoing regulatory oversight will 
also be required. Meeting regulatory requirements should provide trustees with some 
protection against breaching their fiduciary obligations. 
CIPRs should be offered as a pre-selected option to all members of APRA-regulated 
funds — not only to MySuper members. Decisions about retirement are more complex 
than most decisions made in the accumulation phase. Individuals who leave the 
default system are still likely to benefit from CIPRs. Self-managed superannuation 
fund trustees should not be required to design or offer CIPRs because the trustees are 
the fund’s members. 
Government would need to consider how the Age Pension means test applies to new 
income stream products. In principle, the means test should not discourage products 
that manage longevity risk, should aim to provide neutral treatment of products with 
longevity risk protection, and should not make it difficult for individuals to smooth 
their income and consumption over retirement. Without some amendments to the Age 
Pension means test, some CIPRs could increase the cost of the Age Pension to 
taxpayers.76 
Design of CIPRs 
People have different needs in retirement and will value the three desired attributes of 
retirement products (income, risk management and flexibility) differently. CIPRs 
should deliver a balance of these attributes. As no single product has all these features, 
a CIPR is likely to be a combination of products. A working group convened for the 
Inquiry by the Actuaries Institute recommends “… a portfolio approach is likely to be 
more suitable than a single default product. A sensible default might include an 
account-based product and another product with longevity risk protection”.77 
                                                          
76  Under the principles of the current means test, products with longevity risk pooling tend to 
increase Age Pension costs in the early years of retirement (due to faster depletion of assets 
when the assets test is binding) and reduce costs in later years (because of higher income 
when the income test is binding). 
77  Working group convened for the Financial System Inquiry by the Actuaries Institute 2014, 
Retirement Income: options for managing Australia’s longevity risk, Sydney, page 1. 
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Superannuation funds may work with life insurance companies, other funds or other 
entities to provide CIPRs. 
Many people will live for several decades after retirement. CIPRs should therefore 
provide exposure to growth assets to increase retirement income. Rice Warner advises 
that “… any investment period of 20 or more years requires a significant proportion of 
growth assets.”78 Using CIPRs will allow superannuation funds to take a longer-term 
investment perspective and reduce the need for retirees to worry about sequencing 
risk. 
Although CIPRs may include a combination of products, members should still be able 
to transition smoothly from the accumulation phase to the retirement phase.79 Cooling 
off periods coupled with the provision of a (diminishing) return of capital in the event 
of early death may be appropriate for some pooled products. These products could be 
purchased using either a one-off payment or a series of premiums. 
CIPRs could vary with known characteristics of the member, including the size of their 
superannuation benefits. A trustee could decide to recommend lump sum benefits to 
members with balances below a certain (low) threshold. 
Example CIPRs 
Examples of CIPRs that would provide the required features are described in Table 5. 
Table 5: Examples of comprehensive income products for retirement 











CIPR 1 DLA 23% Exhaust balance at 
age 85 
77% 
CIPR 2 Deferred GSA 17% Exhaust balance at 
age 85 
83% 
CIPR 3 GSA 75% Minimum rates 25% 
(a) Deferred products commence payments at age 85. 
                                                          
78  Rice Warner 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 14. 
79  For example, an income product provided by a life insurance company could be paired with 
an account-based pension in the same way accumulation accounts include life insurance. 
80  These allocations were designed to smooth retirement income from the CIPR (excluding the 
Age Pension). In practice, retirees would want to smooth total income, including the Age 
Pension. This would alter the proportion invested in deferred products. The current Age 
Pension means test makes it difficult to smooth total income. 
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The annual income expected to be generated by each of the above CIPRs for a male 
retiring at 65 years of age with a superannuation balance of $400,000 (a typical balance 
in a mature superannuation system) is shown in Chart 5: Expected annual income from 
example CIPRs. The chart shows the amount of income he can expect to receive if he is 
still alive at each age. The income from an account-based pension drawn down at 
minimum rates — the most common strategy used by retirees at present — is included 
for comparison.81 
The income streams represented in Chart 5 are only illustrative. They highlight the 
benefits of pooling and the ability to draw down an account-based pension faster 
without the retiree running the risk of outliving their wealth. The expected income 
from products is sensitive to assumptions regarding investment returns, draw-down 
rates and mortality. 
Chart 5: Expected annual income from example CIPRs82 




















Account-based pension drawn down at minimum rates
 
Source: Australian Government Actuary modelling.83 
                                                          
81  The full set of assumptions underlying these results and a sensitivity analysis are available 
in Australian Government Actuary 2014, Towards more efficient retirement income products: 
Paper prepared for the Financial System Inquiry, November 2014. 
82  Produced using a stochastic model. The aim of achieving a relatively smooth income stream 
is affected by market and mortality variations.  
83  Australian Government Actuary, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
10 October 2014. 
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Retirees using CIPRs would obtain significantly higher and smoother private 
retirement incomes while reducing the risk of outliving their savings (Chart 5 and 
Table 6). This is achieved through the loss of some flexibility and smaller bequests for 
some. As a portion of each CIPR is invested in an account-based pension, individuals 
retain some flexibility. 
Table 6: Expected net present value of income from example CIPRs 
For a 65-year-old male with a $400,000 accumulated balance (excludes Age Pension) 









Account-based pension drawn 
down at minimum rates 
$275,000 _ _ 
CIPR 186 $314,000 $40,000 14 
CIPR 2 $357,000 $82,000 30 
CIPR 3 $359,000 $85,000 31 
Source: Australian Government Actuary modelling.87 
                                                          
84  Net present value, rounded to the nearest $1,000. Includes retirement income only (not 
bequests). 
85  Rounded to the nearest $1,000.  
86  A similar increase in retirement income could be achieved with a combination of two thirds 
of assets in an account based pension drawn down at minimum rates and one third of 
assets used to purchase a GSA. 
87  Australian Government Actuary, Data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
10 October 2014. 
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Choice of fund 
Recommendation 12 
Provide all employees with the ability to choose the fund into which their Superannuation 
Guarantee contributions are paid. 
Description 
Government should remove provisions in the Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 1992 that deny some employees the ability to choose the fund that 
receives their SG contributions due to the exclusions given to enterprise agreements, 
workplace determinations and some awards.88,89 
Objective 
• Remove barriers to members engaging with their superannuation by ensuring all 
employees, to the extent possible, have the right to choose their superannuation 
fund. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
A significant minority of employees cannot choose the superannuation fund that 
receives their SG contributions. In particular, this affects employees with a 
superannuation fund nominated in an enterprise agreement, a workplace 
determination or a state-based award. A 2010 ASFA paper found that around 
20 per cent of employees cannot choose their fund.90 These exemptions contribute to 
employees having multiple superannuation accounts and paying multiple sets of fees 
and insurance premiums, which reduces retirement income. (See the 
Recommendation 10: Improving efficiency during accumulation for further discussion on 
the cost of multiple accounts.) For some individuals, lack of choice contributes to 
disengagement with superannuation. 
                                                          
88  Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, Part 3A, s32C. 
89  In principle, this recommendation should apply to all employees but, for Constitutional 
reasons, the Commonwealth cannot instruct changes to state agreements and awards. 
90  Clare, R 2010, ‘Choosing to choose’, Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, 
paper presented at the 18th Annual Colloquium of Superannuation Researchers, Sydney, 
12-13 July, page 9. 
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When legislation was introduced to allow employees to choose their superannuation 
fund, concerns were raised about the compliance costs to employers from having to 
make contributions to multiple funds. However, changes in technology and the 
introduction of SuperStream are reducing these costs. Many employers use clearing 
houses to make payments to multiple superannuation funds, and Government already 
provides a free clearing house service for small businesses. 
Submissions note that choice contributes to higher superannuation fees in Australia 
relative to some other countries. However, extending choice to the remaining 
20 per cent of employees is not expected to increase costs significantly for industry. 
Conclusion 
As a general principle, the Inquiry believes everyone should be able choose the fund 
that receives their SG contributions. The superannuation system should assist 
members to achieve their individual goals and make savings decisions that suit their 
personal circumstances. Several submissions highlight the benefits of choice in 
providing flexibility for members and lowering fees through greater competition.  
Accordingly, regulatory impediments to individuals exercising choice should be 
removed. State governments should be encouraged to allow all employees choice. 
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Governance of superannuation funds 
Recommendation 13 
Mandate a majority of independent directors on the board of corporate trustees of public offer 
superannuation funds, including an independent chair; align the director penalty regime 
with managed investment schemes; and strengthen the conflict of interest requirements. 
Description 
Government should amend the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 to 
mandate that public offer APRA-regulated superannuation funds have a majority of 
independent directors on their trustee boards. The chair should also be independent. 
An arm’s length definition of independence should apply. 
Government should introduce civil and criminal penalties for directors who fail to 
execute their responsibility to act in the best interests of members, or who use their 
position to further their or others’ interests to the detriment of members. 
To ensure effective arrangements for dealing with conflicts of interest, each director’s 
interests should be deemed to have been disclosed only when they have been 
acknowledged by all other directors. 
Objectives 
• Improve the governance of public offer superannuation funds, thereby protecting 
the best interests of members. 
• Align the governance requirements and penalty regime for superannuation 
directors with those applying to directors of responsible entities of MISs. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Although there is little empirical evidence about the relationship between quality of 
governance in Australian superannuation funds and their performance, high-quality 
governance is essential to organisational performance. Some overseas research 
suggests that good governance adds one percentage point to pension fund returns.91 
The governance framework for Australian superannuation funds has shortcomings 
                                                          
91  Ambachtsheer, K 2007, Pension Revolution: A Solution to the Pensions Crisis, John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, page 130. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
134 
that are inconsistent with good governance principles and, in the Inquiry’s view, need 
to be addressed. 
Including independent directors on boards is consistent with international best 
practice on corporate governance. Independent directors improve decision making by 
bringing an objective perspective to issues the board considers. They also hold other 
directors accountable for their conduct, particularly in relation to conflicts of interest.92 
At present, independent directors are not required on the boards of public offer 
superannuation entities. Some superannuation trustee boards have independent 
directors but others do not. A recent survey by Mercer found that 11 out of 19 funds 
without independent directors would not make changes to their board structure. Of 
the remaining eight funds, five said they would only appoint independent directors if 
it were mandated.93 
APRA recently issued prudential standards to improve the governance of 
superannuation trustee boards and the way in which these boards prevent conflicts of 
interest from influencing decisions.94 However, structural requirements for the 
superannuation trustee boards are not aligned to other entities that manage funds on 
behalf of others, such as MISs. MISs must have either a majority of independent 
directors on the board of the responsible entity of the scheme, or a majority of 
independent members on their compliance committees.95 The requirements for 
superannuation funds are also inconsistent with governance requirements for many of 
the entities they invest in, even though governance theory suggests that these 
requirements should be aligned.96 Under the ASX Corporate Governance Principles, 
entities listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) are required to have a 
majority of independent directors on an “if not, why not” basis.97 
The Super System Review recommended that at least one-third of board members 
should be independent on those boards with equal representation (with the remainder 
of positions equally split between employer and employee representatives), and a 
                                                          
92  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004, OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris, pages 64–65. 
93  Mercer 2014, Super funds under-prepared for independent directors and increasing 
scrutiny, media release, 22 July, Melbourne, viewed 7 November 2014, 
<http://www.mercer.com.au/newsroom/2014-superannuation-governance-survey.html>. 
94  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2012, Prudential Standard SPS 510: 
Governance, APRA, Sydney; APRA 2013, Prudential Standard SPS 521: Conflicts of Interest, 
APRA, Sydney. 
95  Corporations Act 2001, s601JA and s601JB. 
96  Ambachtsheer, K 2007, Pension Revolution: A Solution to the Pensions Crisis, John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, page 41. 
97  ASX Corporate Governance Council 2014, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations: 3rd Edition, Recommendation 2.4, ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
Sydney, page 17. 
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majority should be independent on all other boards.98 This would improve the current 
standards, but if independent directors are to have an effective influence on board 
decisions, all superannuation funds need a majority of independent directors. 
In defined benefit schemes sponsored by a single employer, equal representation of 
employees and employers is appropriate and consistent with the governance models 
of defined benefit pension funds internationally. These funds would continue to 
operate using the structure for which equal representation was designed, with the 
employer bearing the financial risk from the board’s decisions. 
The equal representation model has less relevance in the current superannuation 
system, which predominantly consists of public offer DC funds and funds less focused 
on a single employer. As more fund members exercise choice, directors appointed by 
employer and employee groups are less likely to represent the broader membership of 
public offer funds (see Recommendation 12: Choice of fund). Given the diversity of fund 
membership, it is more important for directors to be independent, skilled and 
accountable than representative. 
As part of Government’s recent consultation process on reforms to superannuation 
fund governance, some stakeholders argued against mandating independent directors 
on superannuation boards.99 The main arguments opposing the proposal were that 
appointing independent directors should be at the discretion of the fund based on its 
particular circumstances and needs, and that those funds using the equal 
representation model have generated higher returns than other funds in recent years. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the performance of these funds is driven 
by their equal representation model. 
At present, superannuation directors are not subject to criminal or civil penalties in 
relation to their duty to act in the best interests of members. A member who has 
incurred loss or damage as a result of director misconduct can seek recovery through 
civil action — or APRA can disqualify the director. This is inconsistent with the regime 
applying to the directors of responsible entities of MISs under the Corporations 
Act 2001, who are subject to criminal and civil penalties.100 The absence of criminal and 
civil penalties in relation to misconduct by superannuation directors represents a 
significant gap in the current framework. 
                                                          
98  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part Two: 
Recommendation Packages, Recommendation 2.7, Canberra, page 56. 
99  For example, the submission by Industry Super Australia suggests placing a positive 
obligation on funds to consider making up to one-third of the directors on their board 
independent directors. Industry Super Australia 2014, In members’ best interests: ISA 
submission to Government discussion paper, Industry Super Australia, Sydney, page 12. 
100  Corporations Act 2001, s601FD and Part 2D.1. 
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APRA Prudential Standard SPS 521 includes a requirement to maintain a register of 
director interests. Although these requirements are broadly appropriate, conflict of 
interest requirements need to be particularly strong for superannuation funds because 
there is a trustee relationship between the fund and members, and most members are 
required by law to participate in the superannuation system. The requirements could 
be strengthened by specifying that each board member must acknowledge when a 
director adds an interest to the register. This would focus the attention of the board on 
director interests and ensure a rigorous oversight process. 
Some submissions are concerned that this requirement would expand boards and 
increase costs to members. If superannuation fund boards expand to accommodate 
more independent directors, boards should justify to their members and APRA why 
such an expansion is required for the fund’s proper governance and operation. 
The need to strengthen superannuation funds’ governance is particularly important 
given that members lack the power to remove directors who breach their duties. In 
MISs, unit-holders typically do not have rights to appoint or remove directors, but 
they do have the right to vote to replace the responsible entity managing their funds. 
Members in superannuation funds have no rights in this regard. 
Conclusion 
Requiring a majority of independent directors, with an independent chair, would 
strengthen the governance of superannuation funds. The Inquiry is not convinced by 
arguments that independent directors would have a negative effect on superannuation 
returns. 
Strengthening disclosure arrangements and introducing civil and criminal penalties for 
director misconduct would increase the incentive for all directors to act in the best 
interests of superannuation fund members. 
The Inquiry notes that directors of life insurance companies are not subject to civil and 
criminal penalties for breaching their duties to policy holders. Government should 
consider whether there is a case for also aligning the penalties applying to life 
insurance directors with those applying to MIS directors. 
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Taxation of superannuation 
Observation 
In reviewing the taxation of contributions and investment earnings in 
superannuation, the Tax White Paper should consider: 
• Aligning the earnings tax rate across the accumulation and retirement phases. 
• Options to better target superannuation tax concessions to the objectives of the 
superannuation system. 
Objectives 
• Remove tax barriers to enable a more seamless transition to retirement. 
• Better target superannuation tax concessions to achieve the objectives of the 
superannuation system discussed earlier in this chapter and, in doing so, reduce the 
cost of the superannuation system to Government, reduce distortions to the 
allocation of funding in the economy, and improve long-term confidence and policy 
stability in the superannuation system. 
Discussion 
Problem the observation seeks to address  
As acknowledged in submissions, superannuation is seen as an attractive savings and 
wealth management vehicle for middle- and higher-income earners due to the highly 
concessional tax treatment of contributions and earnings (Chart 6: Share of total 
superannuation tax concessions by income decile). According to Rice Warner, “It is 
self-evident that the tax concessions for superannuation are tilted towards those 
Australians who have the most income and wealth, and who have the highest personal 
marginal tax rates”.101 
Superannuation tax concessions are not well targeted at the objectives of the 
superannuation system discussed earlier in this chapter. As illustrated in Figure 4.3 of 
the Interim Report, a small minority of members hold a high proportion of 
superannuation assets.102 Individuals with very large superannuation balances are able 
to benefit from tax concessions on funds that are likely to be used for purposes other 
than providing retirement income, such as tax-effective wealth management and estate 
                                                          
101  Rice Warner 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 24. 
102  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-121. 
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planning.103 The AIST supports “… a focus on promoting and delivering greater equity 
in the system to build retirement incomes over the course of every person’s working 
life, as opposed to making superannuation a tax effective wealth creation vehicle and 
estate planning tool, for the few”.104 
As a result, the majority of tax concessions accrue to the top 20 per cent of income 
earners (Chart 6). These tax concessions are unlikely to reduce future Age Pension 
expenditure significantly.105 





















First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth Top
Per centPer cent
Income decile  
Source: Treasury, based on an analysis of 2011–12 Australian Taxation Office data.106 
Poorly targeted tax concessions increase the cost of the superannuation system to 
Government. In turn, this increases the fiscal pressures on Government from an ageing 
population. Giving high-income individuals larger concessions than are required to 
achieve the objectives of the system also increases the inefficiencies that arise from 
                                                          
103  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-126. 
104  Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
105  As noted in the Interim Report, “… the large number of accounts with assets in excess of 
$5 million could each receive annual tax concessions more than five times larger than the 
single Age Pension”. Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim 
Report, Canberra, page 2-120. 
106  Treasury 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 29 October 2014. 
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higher taxation elsewhere in the economy, including differences in the tax treatment of 
savings (refer to the Appendix 2: Tax summary). 
In addition, tax concessions contribute significantly to policy instability and 
undermine long-term confidence in the superannuation system. Around half of the 
announced policy changes over the past 10 years appear to have been aimed at 
addressing concerns related to the targeting and equity of tax concessions.107 Despite 
this, concerns remain and continue to undermine public confidence in the fairness and 
sustainability of policy settings. 
The differential tax rates on earnings between the accumulation phase (taxed at 
15 per cent) and the retirement phase (tax-free) of superannuation have adverse effects 
as they: 
• Create a tax boundary that limits pension product innovation and acts as a barrier 
to funds offering whole-of-life superannuation products. This increases costs in the 
superannuation system by requiring multiple, separate accounts between the 
accumulation and retirement phases.108 
• Can contribute to sub-optimal investment strategies in the years approaching 
members’ retirement by focusing attention on investing until the point of 
retirement (the end of the accumulation phase), rather than investing over the long 
term beyond the point of retirement. 
• Provide an opportunity for tax arbitrage in superannuation between the 
accumulation and retirement phases. Capturing these benefits by allocating specific 
assets to individuals can result in a shift away from investment pooling and 
diversification in superannuation and reduce the efficiency of the system. It can 
also provide non-neutral outcomes between different types of funds, as mentioned 
in the Interim Report. 
                                                          
107  Financial System Inquiry analysis of Government policy announcements in annual Budget 
documents, Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook statements, Pre-Election Fiscal 
Outlooks and Economic Statements. 
108  For example, if a retiree has commenced a pension and later decides to make a contribution 
to superannuation, the retiree will need to open a new accumulation account and a new 
pension superannuation account. This results in some members having multiple pension 
accounts in retirement.  
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Options considered 
Align the earnings tax rate between the accumulation and retirement phases 
As noted in some submissions, aligning the earnings tax rate between the 
accumulation and retirement phases would result in significant simplification benefits. 
This was also recommended by Australia’s Future Tax System Review (AFTS).109 
Aligning the earnings tax rate could be revenue-neutral for Government, would 
reduce costs for funds, would help to foster innovation in whole-of-life 
superannuation products, would facilitate a seamless transition to retirement and 
would reduce opportunities for tax arbitrage. However, a positive tax rate in 
retirement could reduce equity for some lower-income individuals taking income 
streams. 
Better target tax concessions 
The Inquiry considered two options to better target superannuation tax concessions at 
achieving the objectives of the system. Both options would limit tax concessions for 
individuals with large superannuation balances. 
1. Reduce the non-concessional contribution cap and better target superannuation 
contribution tax concessions 
Some submissions suggest applying a more neutral tax treatment of superannuation 
across taxpayers. This could be done by implementing the AFTS recommendation to 
tax superannuation contributions at marginal rates less a flat-rate rebate. 
Tightening the non-concessional contribution cap — currently $540,000 over three 
years — would help to target the tax concessions for superannuation contributions 
better by reducing the extent to which individuals could accrue very large balances in 
the system in the future. The administrative and compliance costs would be relatively 
low. However, it would reduce individuals’ flexibility to save for their retirement at 
different times of their life and could adversely affect individuals with broken work 
patterns. 
                                                          
109  AFTS made a number of recommendations regarding the taxation of savings and 
superannuation. AFTS recommended taxing long-term savings (including superannuation) 
at a lower rate to avoid discriminating against individuals who choose to defer 
consumption and save. It also recommended implementing a more neutral tax treatment of 
superannuation contributions across taxpayers. This Inquiry endorses these 
recommendations. Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Australia’s future tax system: Report to 
the Treasurer, Canberra. 
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2. Levy additional earnings tax on superannuation account balances above a certain 
limit 
This option imposes a higher rate of earnings tax on individuals with superannuation 
balances in excess of a certain limit. It would target superannuation tax concessions to 
achieve the objectives of the system and reduce costs to taxpayers. It would also 
facilitate the removal of the non-concessional contribution cap. 
The Inquiry is aware that similar policy proposals in the past have not succeeded due 
to their complexity and the high costs of implementation.110 Industry express a strong 
view that imposing a different rate of earnings tax inside a pooled superannuation 
trust based on members’ individual incomes would impose high compliance costs and 
complexity on funds. Submissions also stress the need to avoid options that impose 
large compliance costs on funds.111 
To avoid these large compliance costs, stakeholders raise alternative implementation 
options to which the Inquiry is attracted. One approach is to apply the higher rate of 
earnings tax to affected individuals outside the superannuation system, with the 
option of paying the tax liability out of superannuation benefits — similar to the 
mechanism for applying the tax on excess contributions. To reduce complexity further, 
the tax could be calculated on a simplified tax base.112 This option would increase 
Government revenue.113 
Conclusion 
Superannuation taxation arrangements should be reformed to place policy settings on 
a more sustainable footing over the long term. Superannuation tax arrangements 
should be targeted to achieve the objectives of the superannuation system, reduce the 
cost of the retirement income system to Government, better position Australia to meet 
                                                          
110  The previous Government proposed capping earnings tax concessions in retirement at 
$100,000 before a higher rate of tax would apply. The proposal was not implemented. In 
addition, the high costs of administration resulted in the abolition of reasonable benefit 
limits in 2007.  
111  For example, see Mercer 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 32; Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission 
to the Financial System Inquiry, page 57. 
112  For example, the Australian Taxation Office could calculate superannuation earnings net of 
taxes and fees using existing account balance and contribution data, without the need for 
additional reporting. A less attractive alternative is to deem a rate of earnings on account 
balances based on industry-wide average returns, or based on long-run average returns. 
This could be justified on the basis of being a penalty rate of tax that seeks to discourage 
higher balances. The account balance limit could only apply in the retirement phase, if that 
further reduced implementation costs. 
113  The increase in Government revenue in the short term would be reduced by 
implementation costs for the Australian Taxation Office. 
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the fiscal challenges of an ageing population and reduce funding distortions in the 
economy. 
The choice between options to better target superannuation tax concessions rests partly 
on the treatment of very large superannuation balances already in the system, which 
are likely to be used for purposes other than providing retirement incomes. Tighter 
contribution limits could reduce the future prevalence of very large superannuation 
balances. On the other hand, account balance limits would address the 
disproportionate allocation of tax concessions to individuals with very large balances 
now and in the future, and reduce the costs of these concessions. 
The Inquiry has not recommended a specific option because a range of relevant 
considerations fall outside its scope — in particular, interactions and alignment with 
the broader taxation system. 
Implementation considerations 
Prior to implementation, Government should consult with industry to avoid 
unintended consequences for industry and fund members. 
Individuals have made superannuation contributions and decisions based on the 
existing rules and tax arrangements. If Government introduces a higher rate of 
earnings tax for account balances above a certain limit, transitional arrangements 
should be considered. For example, individuals with account balances above the limit 
could be given the opportunity to transfer assets out of the superannuation system 
without detriment. 
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Chapter 3: Innovation 
The arrival of digital technology — the synthesis of computing and communications 
technology — marks the advent of one of the most ubiquitous generally applicable 
technologies the world has ever seen. Its impact has been, and continues to be, 
revolutionary for most industries, altering business operations and resulting in major 
productivity gains. 
For the financial system, technology-driven innovation is transformative. New 
business models, products and services are emerging, driving competition and 
changing the way users interact with the system. Opportunities for innovation are 
abundant as, fundamentally, the sector revolves around recording, analysing and 
interpreting transactions and managing associated information flows. With no physical 
products to manage, these processes readily lend themselves to improvements via 
digital technologies. Consequently, the sector has already invested significantly in a 
range of technologies, leading to: 
• Increased self-service. The introduction of the ATM represented a major first step 
towards self-service. More recently, it has been followed by online banking and 
insurance products, and the growth of comparator sites. 
• Evolving infrastructure and delivery models. Cloud computing, real-time online 
‘chat’ services and mobile payments platforms are changing the physical 
infrastructure used in financial services’ operations and delivery. 
• Alternative business models. Technology is facilitating the disintermediation of 
traditional institutions, attracting many new entrants and non-traditional 
businesses. New technology-enabled mechanisms for accessing finance and 
obtaining credit are emerging in the Australian market, such as crowdfunding and 
peer-to-peer lending. 
• Fast, frictionless payments. Electronic payments are growing in volume and 
progressing towards real-time funds transfers. Friction is diminishing with 
contactless terminals and the growing use of biometrics for payment authorisation. 
Some consumers are also accessing alternative mediums of exchange, such as 
digital currencies. 
• Increased use of data. The financial sector’s ability to capture, store and analyse 
vast amounts of data enables firms to customise products for consumers, more 
finely segment customer groups and sharpen targeting of marketing initiatives. It is 
also improving risk modelling, risk-based pricing and research. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
144 
• Increased potential for international integration and dependency. Users and 
intermediaries can access international products, services and markets more easily, 
and foreign players have more opportunities to enter and compete in local markets. 
As observed in the Interim Report, the disruptive effects of innovation have the 
potential to deliver significant efficiency benefits and improve user outcomes, 
notwithstanding costs associated with adjustment for industry, and possible 
uncertainty for some consumers about change. 
As technology continues to increase network speeds, broaden distribution networks 
and heighten levels of interconnectivity, these changes can also amplify the risks of 
innovation across the system. The pace of technology-driven market developments can 
challenge regulatory frameworks and make it difficult for regulators to adapt with 
sufficient speed. Failure to manage these risks may result in system-wide impacts 
and/or adverse consumer outcomes. 
Recommended actions 
The Inquiry believes the innovative potential of Australia’s financial system and 
broader economy can be galvanised by taking action to ensure policy settings facilitate 
future innovation that benefits consumers, businesses and government. Specifically, 
the Inquiry believes action can be taken in the following areas: 
• Industry and government can work together to identify innovation opportunities 
and emerging network benefits. Where competitive forces prevent these 
opportunities from being fully realised, government should facilitate industry 
coordination. The Inquiry recommends establishing a permanent public–private 
sector collaborative committee to facilitate financial system innovation and enable 
timely and coordinated policy and regulatory responses. 
Digital identity is a significant current example of an area where network benefits 
can be harnessed more effectively through public–private sector collaboration, and 
Government facilitating industry action. The Inquiry recommends developing a 
national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital identities in which 
public and private sector identity providers would compete to supply trusted 
digital identities, enhancing consumer choice, privacy, innovation and system 
efficiency. 
• Government and regulators can remove unnecessary impediments to innovation. 
The Wallis Inquiry advocated functional frameworks to ensure risks emanating 
from similar economic functions are regulated in the same way and to provide 
entities performing the same function with competitive neutrality. This Inquiry 
believes graduating such functional frameworks can reduce barriers to innovation, 
while ensuring regulation is broadly risk-based. Graduation involves providing 
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lower-intensity regulation for new entrants that pose smaller risks to the system — 
that is, it targets regulation to where it is most needed in the system. 
A dynamic and efficient payments system is an important component of the 
broader financial system as it underpins most transactions in the economy. At 
present, payments regulation is complex and fragmented. Developing clearly 
graduated functional regulation would facilitate innovation in the payments 
system. The Inquiry recommends mandating the ePayments Code, narrowing the 
scope of the Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) regime, and introducing a 
new two-tier framework for prudential regulation of purchased payment facilities. 
The Inquiry also recommends broadening the application of interchange fee caps 
across payment systems (including companion card systems) and proposes 
lowering current caps. Significant changes are recommended to the current rules on 
customer surcharging by merchants to allow system providers to ban customer 
surcharging for low-cost payment methods and apply fixed limits for medium-cost 
payment methods. Only higher-cost system providers would remain subject to the 
current arrangements. 
Further graduating the regulation of market-based financing could improve the 
financial system’s efficiency in funding future growth. Amending restrictive 
regulation that prevents small firms from seeking financing online from the general 
public could facilitate innovation in this area. The Inquiry recommends facilitating 
crowdfunding by adjusting fundraising and lending regulation, streamlining 
issuers’ disclosure requirements and allowing retail investors to participate in this 
new market with protections such as caps on investment. 
Amending unnecessarily technology-specific regulation and removing superfluous 
regulation can facilitate innovation. Technology-specific regulation can impede 
innovation by preventing the adoption of best technology or innovative 
approaches. For example, regulation may entrench the use of cheques or 
paper-based disclosure documentation, creating inefficient outcomes. 
See Recommendation 39: Technology neutrality. 
• Government and regulators can support data-driven business models. As 
increasing amounts of data are collected and more sophisticated analytical 
techniques emerge, data can be used to develop alternative business models, 
products and services that improve consumer outcomes and system efficiency. 
These innovations can be facilitated by increasing access to de-identified and 
aggregated public sector data, improving consumers’ access to their personal 
information, and enabling access to private sector data where this does not reduce 
incentives to collect the data. These processes could be aided by developing 
standards for accessing and formatting data, including product information, and 
addressing consumer privacy concerns to strengthen confidence and trust in the 
use of data. The Inquiry recommends Government commission the Productivity 
Commission to hold an inquiry into the costs and benefits of increasing access to 
and improving the use of data, subject to privacy considerations. 
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• Regulators need flexibility to respond to future developments. As market 
developments occur, regulators need to balance the benefits and risks of innovation 
and take a system-wide view. Regulators need appropriate frameworks, skills, 
capabilities and powers to manage emerging risks. Regulators should also have 
appropriate accountability mechanisms to assess the impacts of their policies on 
competition, innovation and efficiency. These mechanisms are discussed in 
Chapter 5: Regulatory system. 
Principles 
The Inquiry believes policy settings should facilitate innovation and market 
developments where these improve system efficiency and consumer outcomes. In 
making the following recommendations, the Inquiry has been guided by these 
principles: 
• Industry and government should work together to identify innovation 
opportunities and emerging network benefits. Government should facilitate 
industry coordination where competitive forces prevent these opportunities from 
being fully realised. 
• Regulation should be functional to ensure competitive neutrality and facilitate 
innovative business models. Regulation should also be graduated to enable market 
entry and ensure regulation is targeted to where it is most needed. At times, this 
may increase risks for some consumers, but it is expected to improve consumer 
outcomes overall. 
• Regulation should aim to be technology neutral in design. Regulation should only 
be technology specific where selecting a common standard would improve overall 
system efficiency. Review mechanisms are needed to ensure technology-specific 
regulation does not become an impediment to innovation over time. 
• Policy settings should aim to reduce information asymmetries by improving access 
to public and private sector data, subject to appropriate privacy safeguards to 
preserve consumer confidence and trust in the system, and maintaining private 
sector incentives to collect data. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes implementing the package of recommendations in this chapter, 
and continuing to develop policy based on these principles, will contribute to 
developing a dynamic, competitive, growth-oriented and forward-looking financial 
system for Australia. 
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Collaboration to enable innovation 
Recommendation 14 
Establish a permanent public–private sector collaborative committee, the ‘Innovation 
Collaboration’, to facilitate financial system innovation and enable timely and coordinated 
policy and regulatory responses. 
Description 
Government should establish a committee to facilitate financial system innovation, the 
Innovation Collaboration (IC), consisting of senior industry, Government, regulatory, 
academic and consumer representatives. 
The minister responsible should propose and take forward an implementation 
approach for forming and operating the IC. The IC should include representatives 
from: financial sector start-ups and innovators; consumer groups; academia; and 
relevant Government agencies and regulators, such as the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Taxation Office. 
The IC should aim to: 
• Improve Government and regulator awareness and understanding of financial 
system innovation and the benefits of emerging business models.1 
• Identify and promulgate action on emerging network benefits and innovation 
opportunities that provide user benefits and positive system-wide effects, and 
identify impediments to innovation. 
• Facilitate interactions between financial sector innovators, Government and 
regulatory agencies in a single coordinated forum. 
• Enable submissions to be made to the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) where 
system-wide regulatory responses may be required. 
                                                          
1  These are often referred to as ‘disruptive’ business models — those that disrupt existing 
value chains in financial services. Examples include crowd financing mechanisms that 
remove the need for a financial institution to intermediate between borrower and lender. 
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Objectives 
• Embed understanding of, and openness to, financial sector innovation within 
Government and regulators through closer collaboration with industry and 
innovators. 
• Ensure Government, regulators, industry, consumers and academia work together 
to identify financial system–wide opportunities and potential network benefits, 
where Government may need to coordinate and facilitate industry action. 
• Ensure financial system innovators, start-ups and/or firms with innovative 
products have a single entry point for dealing with regulators and Government on 
innovation and a forum in which their views can be heard. 
Discussion 
Innovation is an essential ingredient in building a dynamic, competitive, 
forward-looking and growth-oriented financial system. Although the benefits of 
innovation are difficult to quantify, efficiency gains and improved consumer 
convenience are evident in a range of areas, such as online banking, payments and 
insurance. As the pace of technology-enabled innovation accelerates, it is crucial that 
Government and regulators be aware of, and enable, the benefits of innovation to flow 
through the financial system while appropriately managing risks. 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Low awareness of, and impediments to, innovation 
For many innovators, the entry point into the Australian financial system is via 
regulators: organisations with strong ‘safety’ mandates and generally low-risk 
appetites. Stakeholder discussions indicate Government and regulators have limited 
understanding of and openness to innovation, resulting in regulatory approaches that 
unnecessarily impede innovation in some areas. In some cases, regulators may not 
have regard to the whole-of-system benefits of innovation where such developments 
fall beyond the breadth of their existing regulatory mandates. 
Siloed perspectives and inability to identify system-wide opportunities 
Existing Government structures and regulatory architecture tend towards a siloed 
view of the financial system. They also have a low awareness of issues that are 
increasingly important to the financial sector (but were not traditionally so), such as 
data use and privacy. Lack of industry input and the absence of a system-wide 
perspective hamper efforts to identify system-wide opportunities and network benefits 
efficiently. Consequently, Government and regulators may fail to take timely, or any, 
action to facilitate or coordinate innovation that is beneficial to consumers and overall 
system efficiency. 
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Inability to influence Government and regulators in a coordinated way 
In the absence of a forum with a system-wide view, there is no mechanism to influence 
Government and regulators when a coordinated change, a regulatory response or 
harmonised processes are needed. In some cases, innovations do not clearly fit into 
existing regulation or under the responsibility of a single regulator. For example, 
elements of some payments system innovations (discussed later in this chapter) may 
be affected by financial system licensing, taxation, and privacy and data requirements 
that fall under the remits of several regulators and Government agencies. 
No single point of contact for innovators 
Lack of a single point of entry for innovators, start-ups and those with innovative 
products can be a significant challenge given the complexity of regulation and 
regulatory mandates. Stakeholders, particularly new entrants, point to a lack of 
consolidated entry and liaison points where impediments can be discussed and, if 
necessary, arguments put forward for their removal. Innovators often do not have a 
voice with regulators or at regulatory forums and tend to have limited understanding 
of regulation. 
Potential impacts on international competitiveness 
In many countries, policy settings are deliberately pro-innovation as governments seek 
to foster dynamic, vibrant financial services sectors. In Asia, the monetary authorities 
of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, for example, have statutory mandates to 
promote and market financial sector development, including providing streamlined 
entry points for new entrants.2 
The Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom runs Project Innovate to 
support industry innovation that improves consumer outcomes.3 The United Kingdom 
‘fintech’ industry also has its own industry body, Innovate Finance, to support 
technology-led financial services innovators.4,5 This body affords members a single 
                                                          
2  Hong Kong Monetary Authority 2014, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre, 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, viewed 31 October 2014, 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre.shtml>; 
Monetary Authority of Singapore 2014, Singapore Financial Sector, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, viewed 31 October 2014, 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/singapore-financial-centre.aspx>; Bank Negara Malaysia 2013, 
Financial Sector Development, Bank Negara Malaysia, viewed 31 October 2014, 
<http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=en_fsd&pg=en_fsd_intro&ac=737&lang=en>. 
3  Wheatley, M 2014, Making innovation work for firms and customers, address at Bloomberg by 
Chief Executive, Financial Conduct Authority, 19 May, London. 
4  ‘fintech’ refers to a synthesis of technology and financial services. 
5  Innovate Finance 2014, Vision, Innovate Finance, viewed 16 October 2014, 
<http://innovatefinance.com/#content-region>. 
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point of access to regulators, policy makers, investors, customers, educators, talent and 
commercial partners. 
Conclusion 
The pace of innovation in the financial sector is rapid. Estimates suggest $27 billion of 
current banking industry revenue is under threat of digital disruption.6 Accordingly, 
Government and regulators need to be aware of innovative developments to respond 
in a considered, timely and coordinated manner. Various industry bodies support 
more collaboration between industry and policy makers.7 
With a mix of stakeholders, the recommended IC model merges industry and policy 
expertise to help identify innovation opportunities. Innovators could access a forum 
that offers them a better entry point to financial sector regulators and improves their 
potential to influence across agencies — if necessary, through the CFR. 
The Inquiry considered alternatives to the IC model, including a solely industry-led 
model. However, with no direct link to Government, there was concern such a model 
would have limited ability to influence policy. The Inquiry also considered extending 
existing regulator mandates to include business promotion, as occurs in other 
jurisdictions. Chapter 5: Regulatory system recommends ASIC’s mandate include a 
specific requirement to consider competition issues, a complement to this 
recommendation. 
Industry should note that international experience suggests the best results for 
collaboration occur where the fintech industry has its own representative body of 
innovators and new entrants to ensure it can speak with a unified voice. Industry 
representatives might then also be selected and rotated from this body for the IC. 
                                                          
6  KPMG 2014, Unlocking the potential: the Fintech opportunity for Sydney, The Committee for 
Sydney, Sydney. 
7  Refer, for example, to Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 80; Australian Payments Clearing Association 2014, Second 
round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 16; Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 117. 




Develop a national strategy for a federated-style model of trusted digital identities. 
Description 
Government should, in consultation with the private sector, develop a national 
identity strategy based on a federated-style model in which public and private sector 
identity providers would compete to supply trusted digital identities to individuals 
and businesses.8 
Government should identify a minister responsible for the strategy. The strategy 
should detail policy principles for the model (see below), intended outcomes, an 
implementation approach, and a high-level structure for the trust framework9 needed 
to implement the model. Consideration should also be given to initial seed funding if 
required; for example, for pilot projects. 
The model should be: 
• Voluntary, and enable consumer choice and convenience. 
• Transparent and privacy enhancing. 
• Cost effective, flexible and innovative, and enable the best use of technology. 
• Secure, resilient and interoperable. 
A joint public–private sector taskforce should be established to develop the detail of 
the trust framework and standards required to deliver the model. Standards would 
                                                          
8  A federated model is a decentralised model where multiple identity credentials are 
produced by government and commercial providers to provide access to public and private 
sector services in a contestable market. In contrast, under a syndicated model, a single 
identity credential is issued, typically by government, providing single sign-on access to 
public and private sector services. 
9  A trust framework is an agreed set of standards and rules that enables parties accepting 
digital identity credentials to trust the identity, security, and privacy policies of parties 
issuing credentials, and vice versa. OIX Open Identity Exchange 2014, Trust Frameworks, 
OIX Open Identity Exchange, viewed 19 November, 
<http://openidentityexchange.org/resources/trust-frameworks/>. 
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need to address identity proofing, authentication, sharing of legal liability, fraud, 
accreditation mechanisms for identity providers and the role of trust brokers. 
Objectives 
• Articulate a strategic vision and coordinated approach to digital identity 
management in Australia that enables the development of a competitive, innovative 
and dynamic market for identity services and maximises network benefits. 
• Improve the efficiency of digital identity processes in the financial system, 
minimise costs and regulatory burden for institutions, and draw on the respective 
strengths and expertise of the public and private sectors. 
• Facilitate innovation by improving consumer choice and convenience, and reducing 
friction in the digital economy. 
• Ensure digital identity management processes help to prevent crime, improve 
security and enhance privacy. 
Discussion 
Box 8: The future of digital identity 
Digital identity relates to how parties — whether individuals, businesses or 
government — confirm the identities of other parties for online financial 
transactions. Currently, this usually involves two main stages: 
• Identity verification. For an individual, this is based on confirmation of 
attributes such as name, date of birth and address using government-issued, 
paper-based credentials like drivers’ licences and passports. Increasingly, these 
attributes are able to be verified via online mechanisms.  
• Identity authentication. After identity verification, the individual will usually be 
issued with credentials they can use to authenticate they are the right person 
when attempting to access a service. These credentials often include a user name 
and password plus a token or e-certificate for additional security. Over time, 
other methods incorporating biometrics may become more common. 
The Inquiry’s recommended strategy for a federated-style system of trusted digital 
identities would improve convenience and security for individuals by reducing 
reliance on paper-based mechanisms; enhance privacy and enable consumer choice 
in identity providers; improve efficiency by reducing repetitive processes 
undertaken by individuals, businesses and government, and reducing the number 
of credentials managed by each party; and facilitate innovation and best use of 
technology through the development of a competitive market for identity services. 
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Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Participants in Australia’s financial system have always needed, and continue to need, 
confidence in peoples’ identities. Australia’s current identity infrastructure is 
fragmented, consisting of a largely uncoordinated network of identity credentials.10 
The system has developed organically, driven by different standards, policies and 
legislative requirements. Australia has no clear strategic vision for digital identity 
management and, consequently, little coordination and limited ability to attain 
potential network benefits that would lower costs and reduce duplicative processes. 
Many public sector stakeholders have interests in digital identity management and, 
although Government has some existing governance mechanisms, the lack of clear 
ownership of identity policy is impeding progress. 
Previous industry attempts to coordinate on identity issues have been unsuccessful, 
such as the Trust Centre initiative announced in 2006 involving a number of the major 
banks. Despite the potential efficiency benefits, competing commercial interests have 
limited industry’s ability to collaborate.11 
Consumers’ preferences for accessing financial services online are increasing the need 
for efficient and secure digital identity solutions. Australia’s current approach to 
identity management results in significant process duplication, as individuals apply to, 
and government and businesses undertake to, verify and re-verify identities at 
multiple points. Traditionally, identity verification has involved paper-based and 
face-to-face processes, which are slow and onerous for consumers, and costly and 
cumbersome for organisations. 
Of eight major streams of regulatory reform since 2005, research by the Australian 
Bankers’ Association (ABA) shows industry project expenditure has been highest in 
relation to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, which 
includes Know Your Client (KYC) identification rules.12 Anti-money laundering 
(AML) projects have resulted in an estimated $725 million in expenditure (more than 
                                                          
10  No single government identity credential exists; instead, approximately 20 government 
agencies manage more than 50 million core identity credentials. A comparable number of 
credentials are also issued by private sector and other organisations. Sourced from 
Attorney-General’s Department 2014, National Identity Proofing Guidelines, Draft Version 5.1, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 3. Refer also to the Interim Report for further 
discussion. 
11  The 2006–07 Trust Centre was initiated by Westpac and involved St.George Bank, National 
Australia Bank and the Commonwealth Bank. Refer to Finextra 2006, ‘Westpac backs 
customer ID management initiative’, Finextra, 10 November, viewed 29 September 2014, 
<http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=16141>; Finextra 2007, 
‘Westpac exits The Trust Centre’, Finextra, 27 November, viewed 29 September 2014, 
<http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=17782>. 
12  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
9 July 2014.  
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three times as much as the next highest expenditure) related to the United States’ 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, highlighting the KYC regulatory burden and 
potential to reduce costs by improving identity processes.13 
Fraud concerns are increasing, and the Australian Institute of Criminology observes 
that “Criminal misuse of identity not only impedes consumer activity and confidence 
in the financial system, but costs business and government substantial sums in 
responding to and preventing these crimes”.14 In 2011, Australians lost an estimated 
$1.4 billion through personal fraud incidents.15 Each year, an estimated 4–5 per cent of 
Australians experience identity crime resulting in financial loss.16 Identity theft and 
false identities are key enablers of superannuation fraud, and serious and organised 
crime.17 An enhanced digital identity infrastructure can help to reduce this risk. 
Context 
Existing elements for a federated-style model 
Australia already has a number of elements in place for a federated-style system of 
trusted digital identities, as set out in Table 7: Existing elements for a federated-style model. 
                                                          
13  The other six streams were the ePayments Code, Financial Claims Scheme, Future of 
Financial Advice reforms, National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, over-the-counter 
derivatives reforms and privacy reforms. 
14  Smith, R G and Hutchings, A 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Results of the 2013 
online survey, Research and Public Policy Series 128, Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Canberra, page ix. 
15  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2012, Personal Fraud, 2010–2011, cat. no. 4528.0, ABS, 
Canberra. 
16  Attorney-General’s Department 2014, National Identity Proofing Guidelines, Draft Version 5.1, 
Australian Government, Canberra, page 3. 
17  Australian Crime Commission 2011, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, Australian 
Government, Canberra, pages 26, 43–45, 78. 
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A secure online service that enables government agencies, financial 
institutions and other businesses to verify information on identity 
documents directly with the document issuing agency 
Third Party Identity Services 
Assurance Framework 
Framework and standards for accrediting commercial identity service 
providers, issued by the Department of Finance 
National e-Authentication 
Framework 
Framework and standards for authenticating the identity of another party 
to a desired level of assurance or confidence 
National Identity Proofing 
Guidelines 
A best-practice, risk-based approach for government to verify the identity 
of a person using evidence to meet the required level of assurance 
Gatekeeper Public Key 
Infrastructure Framework 
A framework that enables accredited third parties to provide digital 
certificates for verifying and authenticating identity when dealing with 
public sector agencies 
myGov digital credentials Provides secure single sign-on access to various government services 
including Medicare, Centrelink, electronic health records, the Australian 
Taxation Office, and a digital mailbox to receive government 
correspondence 
VANguard Delivered by the Department of Industry, VANguard acts as a ‘trust 
broker’ for business-to-government and government-to-government 
transactions. It provides authentication services that enable government 
agencies to accept a business user’s previously established digital 
credentials such as AUSkey, Medicare and Verisign 
Australian Business Register Provides business identification services for dealing online with 
government, including issuance of a unique identifier, known as an 
Australian Business Number (ABN) 
AUSkey Linked to the ABN, AUSkey is a secure digital credential that 
authenticates the identity of businesses for online transactions with 
Commonwealth, state, territory and local government agencies 
Private sector digital identity 
credentials 
Many private sector organisations, such as banks, already have 
high-quality and high-assurance digital credentials in place 
International and other developments 
Other countries have adopted various approaches to digital identity. As noted in the 
Interim Report, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada have adopted 
federated models. New Zealand, India and Estonia have syndicated models, with 
high-assurance, government-issued credentials incorporating biometrics designed to 
                                                          
18  Based on a number of Australian Government sources: Attorney-General’s Department 
(AGD) 2013, Documentation Verification Service — About DVS, Canberra; Australian 
Government Information Management Office (AGIMO) 2013, Third Party Identity Services 
Assurance Framework, Department of Finance, Canberra; AGIMO 2009, National 
e-Authentication Framework, Department of Finance and Deregulation, Canberra; AGD 2014, 
National Identity Proofing Guidelines, Draft Version 5.1, Canberra; AGIMO 2009, Gatekeeper 
Public Key Infrastructure Framework, Department of Finance and Deregulation, Canberra; 
Australian Government, About myGov, Canberra; Australian Government, VANguard 
Government Authentication Services: About us, Canberra; Australian Business Register 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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enable digital service delivery. Private sector initiatives include the work of 
organisations such as the FIDO Alliance, Open Identity Exchange and Edentiti.19 
For entity identification, international developments include initiatives to develop a 
Global Legal Entity Identifier System to provide unique identifiers to companies 
participating in global financial markets.20 The aim is to create legal entity identifiers 
for each entity to enable improved efficiency in global transactions. 
Rationale 
Developing a national identity strategy based on a federated-style model, with a 
framework and common standards, would support the growth of a competitive 
market in identity services that enables best use of technology and promotes 
innovation. A federated-style model suits the Australian context as Australia has not 
had a history of government-issued identity cards and has a strong privacy ethos 
compared to other jurisdictions. This model has the potential to provide consumers 
with choice and convenience while enhancing privacy. Australia already has in place 
many foundational elements for a federated-style system, and this model seeks to 
leverage and build on these existing effective elements. 
Options considered 
The Inquiry considered different models as a basis for a national digital identity 
strategy: 
1. Recommended: Develop a national identity strategy based on a 
federated-style system in which public and private sector identity providers 
compete to supply trusted digital identities to individuals and businesses. 
Government (in consultation with the private sector) sets up a trust framework 
and standards to facilitate a competitive market in identity services, and 
enable consumer and business choice in credentials. 
2. Develop a national identity strategy based on a syndicated model in which a 
single government identity credential is issued to provide individuals (and 
businesses) with single sign-on access to public and private sector services. 
                                                          
19  FIDO Alliance 2014, About the FIDO Alliance, FIDO Alliance, viewed 1 October 2014, 
<https://fidoalliance.org/about>; Open Identity Exchange (OIX) 2014, About, OIX, viewed 
1 October 2014, <http://openidentityexchange.org/about/>; Edentiti 2014, Home, Edentiti, 
viewed 1 October 2014, <http://www.edentiti.com/edentitisite/index.html#home>. 
20  Legal Entity Identifier Regulatory Oversight Committee (LEIROC), The Legal Entity Identifier 
Regulatory Oversight Committee — LEIROC, LEIROC, viewed 1 October 2014, 
<http://www.leiroc.org/>. 
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Option costs and benefits 
National strategy for a federated-style identity model 
Developing a national strategy in consultation with the private sector would support 
both common understanding and stakeholder buy-in. Innovation would be enhanced 
by a competitive market for identity providers. Several submissions note the 
importance of enabling continuing innovation in identity solutions.21 One industry 
body has already indicated its willingness to help coordinate industry-wide views.22 
Another stakeholder supports a decentralised model, as relying on multiple possible 
corroborating sources of identity may prove more secure over the long term.23 
Currently, identity must be verified and authenticated at multiple points during the 
provision and consumption of financial services. A streamlined process would reduce 
the high compliance costs associated with AML KYC requirements. Within 
Government services, improvements in identity management are already delivering 
significant efficiency gains, as shown in Box 9: myGov case study — quantification of 
efficiency benefits below. The efficiency benefits of implementing coordinated digital 
identity management across the entire financial system are likely to be many multiples 
of the estimates shown below. 
                                                          
21  Refer, for example, to National Seniors Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 30; Centre for Digital Business 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 24. 
22  Australian Payments Clearing Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 17. 
23  Centre for International Finance and Regulation 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 20. 
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Box 9: myGov case study — quantification of efficiency benefits 
myGov is an online gateway to multiple government services using a single set of 
digital credentials. Almost one in three adult Australians are now registered to 
access government services via myGov.24 The Department of Human Services 
conservatively estimates that myGov will generate around $547 million in efficiency 
savings and reduced red tape burden over 10 years, as shown in the table below.25 
Considerable work is underway to simplify digital identity processes and expand 
the usage of myGov to other government agencies at both the Commonwealth and 
state/territory levels. myGov’s efficiency benefits indicate it has the potential to play 
an ongoing and significant role in Australia’s future identity model. 
myGov element Efficiency improvements Average annual savings 
1.  Account creation 
and linking 
Time, cost and resource savings from reduced 
duplication in identity verification processes and 




Time, cost and resource savings from having a 
single account and set of credentials rather than 
multiple accounts 
$28 million 
3. Easy access to 
multiple services 
Improved convenience and time savings to 
authenticate identity for linked services 
$9 million 
4. Easy access to 
digital mail 
Improved convenience and time savings with 
single log-in to one mailbox for all linked 
services 
$2 million 
5. Managing mail Time savings from single mailbox and reduction 
in managing physical mail 
$14 million 
 
Enhanced digital identity processes improve efficiency and security across the digital 
economy. Even in the current fragmented identity environment, one firm’s shift to 
electronic methods for identity verification has reduced costs by more than 
30 per cent.26 This firm also observed that 86 per cent of fraud and suspected money 
laundering events occurred where accounts had been established using face-to-face 
document verification after initial electronic verification failed. In contrast, 14 per cent 
of fraud and suspected money laundering events occurred when accounts had been 
opened using electronic verification.27 A number of submissions note that increased 
                                                          
24  PSnews online 2014, ‘myGov users pass five million’, PSnews online, 30 September, viewed 
2 October 2014, 
<http://www.psnews.com.au/aps/Page_psn4292.html?utm_source=psn429&utm_medium=
email&utm_content=news2&utm_campaign=newsletter_aps>. 
25  Department of Human Services 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
23 September 2014. 
26  ING Bank Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 1. 
27  ING Bank Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 1. 
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access to government data would also improve data matching rates for identity 
verification.28 
A federated-style identity model would involve implementation and set-up costs for 
both Government and the private sector. This would include the initial investment to 
develop a trust framework. Appropriate privacy protections and mechanisms would 
need to be considered to maintain consumer confidence and trust in the system. 
Mechanisms for ongoing public–private sector collaboration and review could also be 
required. 
National strategy for a syndicated identity model 
A syndicated (centralised) system of digital identity across public and private sector 
services has the potential to generate the most significant network benefits. One 
submission advocated developing a single database for KYC to meet all local and 
global identity requirements to maximise cost savings.29 However, a syndicated model 
with a high-assurance digital identity for use across the economy also involves 
significant costs for Government and potentially the private sector. 
Public sector stakeholders indicate that current Government deployment of identity 
services could not be expanded simply. It would require significant further investment 
to ensure adequate assurance levels. For the private sector, a Government-operated 
system could present costs in terms of adapting to Government-issued credentials and 
future flexibility. It could impede the adoption of innovative solutions and deployment 
of the best available technology, reducing overall efficiency over time. 
Many Australians may object to this option on the basis of privacy concerns. It could 
be viewed as a digital version of the unpopular Australia Card initiative, which was 
rejected in 1987, or the Access Card, which was terminated in 2007.30,31 
Conclusion 
A national strategy based on a federated-style model best balances the attainment of 
network benefits with ongoing innovation in digital identity solutions, contributing to 
overall financial system efficiency. It draws on the strengths of the public and private 
                                                          
28  Refer, for example, to Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 121; and ING Bank Australia 2014, Second 
round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 2. 
29  Stockbrokers Association of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 11. 
30  Fraser, A 2014, ‘MPs urged to spruik doomed Australia Card’, The Australian, 1 January, 
viewed 1 October 2014, 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/cabinet-papers/mps-urged-to-spruik-doomed-
australia-card/story-fnkuhyre-1226792641896>. 
31  Centre for Digital Business 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 9. 
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sectors and facilitates the best use of technology. It enhances consumer choice and 
convenience and, with appropriate design, could enhance privacy and security. 
A coordinated approach would also facilitate innovation across the broader economy 
by helping to reduce ‘e-friction’. 
A syndicated model potentially presents significant network benefits. However, there 
would be a trade-off with ongoing innovation in digital identity solutions, as the 
Government-issued identity credential would be locked in as the single solution across 
the system and any innovative changes would need to be driven by Government. 
Maintaining such a solution would be at significant cost to Government, could 
produce less flexible outcomes and could impede the continued best use of technology. 
Over time, this could result in less efficient outcomes for the financial system 
compared with a federated-style model. 
The Inquiry believes a federated-style model is preferable on the basis of cost, 
innovation and efficiency, and future flexibility for consumers, businesses and 
Government. 
Implementation considerations 
Public–private sector taskforce and timing 
The Inquiry recommends establishing a joint public–private sector taskforce with a set 
operating time frame; for example, over a 12-month period concluding at the end of 
2015. The taskforce should consist of public and private sector stakeholders and, where 
possible, be representative of multiple sectors and levels of government. Terms of 
reference should be published and include dates for major milestones. 
The taskforce should select a small number of pilot programs to be completed over the 
next two years to inform its development of the trust framework. It should consider 
whether any interim steps are needed to prepare for implementing the digital identity 
model. Steps might include amending AML KYC requirements, expanding 
government datasets included in the Document Verification System (DVS), enabling 
broader access to DVS, and changing privacy requirements for access to, and use of, 
certain datasets. 
The taskforce should also consider establishing a mechanism to enable private sector 
input into the ongoing review and maintenance of the trust framework to ensure it 
remains fit for purpose. 
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Clearer graduated payments regulation 
Recommendation 16 
Enhance graduation of retail payments regulation by clarifying thresholds for regulation by 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority.  
Strengthen consumer protection by mandating the ePayments Code. Introduce a separate 
prudential regime with two tiers for purchased payment facilities.  
Description 
Australia has a complex framework for regulating payments. Relevant provisions are 
contained in numerous laws, regulations and instruments administered by ASIC, 
APRA and the Payments System Board (PSB). 
• The regulators should publish a clear guide to the framework for industry, and in 
particular for new entrants, that outlines thresholds and regulatory requirements. 
Government and ASIC, in consultation with the other regulators, should simplify and 
improve consumer protection regulation for retail payment service providers.32 In 
doing so, they should make the following changes: 
• Narrow the AFSL regime for non-cash payment facilities so that only service 
providers that provide access to large, widely-used payment systems require an 
AFSL. This would remove the need to exempt services linked to small payment 
systems from the regime, such as public transport cards and road toll devices. 
– The thresholds of ‘large’ and ‘widely used’ could cover a system providers with 
annual transaction values over $100 million and more than 50 payee groups or 
annual transaction values over $500 million and more than five payee groups.  
– The definition of a payee group should be designed from the customer’s 
perspective. A system that provides access to several merchants would be 
                                                          
32  For the two payments recommendations, the term ‘service providers’ refers to entities that 
enable end-users (consumers and businesses) to make and receive payments in payment 
systems. The most common example of a service provider is a Bank. See Figure 10: Overview 
of the payments system and Figure 11: Retail payments system fees and charges for more 
information. 
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considered to provide access to a single payee group where the customer 
associates the merchants with a single merchant brand.33 
– Thresholds should be designed to provide clear guidance for new entrants, 
rather than to substantially alter the current regulatory perimeter. 
• Government and ASIC should extend basic consumer protection regulation under 
the currently voluntary ePayments Code to all service providers.34 
APRA, in consultation with other regulators, should develop a separate, two-tier 
prudential payments regime for purchased payment facilities (PPFs)35 to replace the 
current single-tier regime, which is a modified version of the authorised deposit-taking 
institution (ADI) regime.36 
• The new regime would offer PPFs a choice between two tiers. The lower tier would 
maintain the current 100 per cent liquidity ratio requirement but reduce other 
prudential requirements to lower compliance costs. The higher tier would reduce 
liquidity requirements but strengthen other prudential requirements. Lower 
liquidity requirements would ensure competitive neutrality between PPFs and 
other ADI service providers. 
• APRA should publish clear thresholds for the new regime so that it only captures 
PPFs of sufficient scale. For example, it could only apply to PPFs that hold more 
than $50 million of stored value and enable individual customers to hold more than 
$1,000.37 APRA should remove exemptions for services providers that do not allow 
deposits to be redeemed for Australian currency.38 
The regulators should review the extent to which their current powers enable them to 
regulate system and service providers using alternative mediums of exchange to 
                                                          
33  An example is a gift card grouping several merchants under a single shopping centre brand, 
or a frequent flyer program providing access to several merchants. 
34  The ePayments Code is enforced by ASIC and provides some consumer protections. The 
code provides guidance for setting and changing terms and conditions, and rules for 
determining who pays for unauthorised transactions and recovering mistaken internet 
payments. 
35  PPFs hold stored value relating to payment systems but are not traditional ADIs. An 
example is PayPal. 
36  Some payments systems use ADI accreditation as a means of assurance for providing access 
their systems. The PSB should work with industry to ensure that entities regulated under 
the new two-tier regime, as well as entities that will shortly no longer require a specialist 
credit card institution ADI licence, will still be able to access core payments infrastructure, 
including the New Payments Platform. 
37  The current prudential threshold for stored-value holdings is $10 million. 
38  This could result in prudential regulation applying to some service providers, such as 
providers of prepaid cards that operate on widely-used systems.  
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national currencies, such as digital currencies.39 For example, the RBA should review 
the definitions in the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 to ensure they are 
sufficiently broad. 
Objectives 
Ensure retail payments system regulation: 
• Maintains confidence and trust in the payments system. 
• Is better understood by industry, particularly new entrants, and accommodates 
rapid market development. 
• Provides adequate consumer protections. 
• Provides competitive neutrality for PPFs. 
Discussion 
Given its vital role in the economy, the payments system must be efficient and trusted. 
Currently, Australia’s payments industry is undergoing rapid innovation, giving 
consumers access to an increasing array of online and mobile payment options. 
Over the past five years, the volume of non-cash payments in Australia has grown at 
an annual rate of 8–9 per cent.40 
Payments system regulation needs to be able to accommodate future changes in 
structure and technology. Figure 10: Overview of the payments system presents an 
overview of Australia’s payments system. In the past, regulation focused on ADIs 
(Area A), which were the main service providers. But now, non-traditional business 
models have emerged (Areas B to E). The Inquiry expects that new PPFs (Area C) will 
emerge in the future, including PPFs that may be attached to supply chains and other 
on-line purchasing systems. 
Some payment systems also incorporate new mediums of exchange such as digital 
currencies. International peer-to-peer networks that process digital currency payments 
on distributed ledgers (Area D) are difficult to regulate because there is no clearly 
identifiable operator.41 However, commercial services using digital currencies in 
‘closed loop’ systems (Area C) could be regulated like other retail payment services. 
                                                          
39  An example of a digital currency is Bitcoin. 
40  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Payments System Board Annual Report, RBA, Sydney, 
page 19. 
41  A distributed ledger is a public ledger for determining who owns an asset — in this case, a 
digital currency. Transactions are processed by open-source peer-to-peer systems and then 
recorded on public ledgers, of which several copies are held by users of the system. 
No single party operates the system or is responsible to its users. 
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Figure 10: Overview of the payments system 
 
Although payment services linked to funds at risk in investment products (Area B) are 
rare, these could grow in the future. Eventually, these could be linked to managed 
investment schemes (MISs), as well as superannuation funds, allowing members to 
make payments with their superannuation balances during the drawdown phase.42 
Regulation should not impede such developments. 
                                                          
42  The Inquiry’s recommendation would ensure that basic consumer protections would apply 
to these service providers, but would not affect how these service providers are prudentially 
regulated, as the funds used for making payments would not be considered ‘stored value’. 
Chapter 3: Innovation 
165 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Some submissions note that current retail payments system regulation is fragmented, 
complex and lacks clarity.43 It is not always applied on a functional basis and may not 
accommodate future innovation, such as digital currencies. 
Elements of graduated, functional regulation exist. However, regulation generally 
lacks clear criteria and transparent thresholds. Combined with regulator discretion in 
administering the law, this generates complexity and uncertainty, particularly for new 
entrants. 
The ePayments Code provides some consumer protections; however, it is not 
mandatory and as such does not cover all consumers.44 The application of the AFSL 
regime is complex and costly. ASIC has given multiple class orders and individual 
exemptions because the breadth of current regulation captures entities that should not 
need an AFSL.45 
Before the Wallis Inquiry, participation in payment systems tended to be restricted to 
banks. Reforms post-Wallis sought to expand access to payment systems, but 
recognised that this could involve entities holding funds equivalent to deposits. 
Government sought to address this issue by introducing a prudential regime for PPFs. 
However, the scope of the prudential regime for PPFs is unclear because it involves a 
number of exemptions and declarations.46 The current PPF regime also involves 
significant compliance costs and does not provide competitive neutrality with other 
ADIs. Although PPFs have simpler capital requirements than traditional ADIs, they 
have significantly stricter liquidity requirements.47 This can place PPFs at a 
competitive disadvantage and provides a perverse incentive for smaller service 
providers to limit their growth to avoid entering the PPF regime. 
                                                          
43  For example, refer to Australian Payments and Clearing Association 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 10–11. 
44  Examples of non-subscribers to the ePayments Code include a three-party system provider 
as well as some banks, credit unions, building societies and finance companies. 
45  This has included relief for gift cards, prepaid mobile accounts, loyalty schemes and 
electronic road toll devices. For further details, refer to Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) 2005, Regulatory Guide 185, Non-cash payment facilities, ASIC, Sydney. 
46  For example, whether a PPF is redeemable for Australian currency currently determines 
whether that facility falls within APRA’s prudential regime or whether it should be subject 
to RBA authorisation. To date, exemptions and declarations have meant that no PPFs are 
authorised by the RBA. 
47  PPFs must hold high-quality liquid assets that are of equal value to their stored-value 
liabilities, while standard ADIs have lower liquidity requirements. 
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Options considered 
The Inquiry considered maintaining the existing approach of using various 
exemptions to narrow the scope of the AFSL regime to target the entities that should 
be regulated. Although this would involve relatively small costs over the immediate 
term, the complexities and impediments to innovation that the current approach 
creates would grow over time. A more transparent approach to regulation that does 
not require exemptions would improve industry understanding and provide greater 
certainty. The Inquiry also considered maintaining the voluntary nature of the 
ePayments Code as an alternative to extending it to all service providers. However, the 
Inquiry believes the ubiquity of electronic payments necessitates consistent consumer 
protections to maintain confidence and trust in the system. 
The Inquiry also considered maintaining the current prudential regime for PPFs as 
well as reducing the liquidity requirements of the current regime. However, both 
approaches maintain relatively high compliance costs for PPFs with simple business 
models. The recommended two-tier approach allows PPFs to trade off compliance 
costs and competitive neutrality to suit their business models, rather than have 
regulation determine this for them. The Inquiry also considered maintaining the 
current thresholds and exemptions for applying prudential regulation, but these create 
uncertainty for industry. Increasing thresholds ensures smaller service providers are 
not unintentionally captured. 
Regulators should review the extent to which their current powers enable them to 
regulate system and service providers using alternative mediums of exchange to 
national currencies, such as digital currencies. The Payment Systems (Regulation) 
Act 1998 empowers the PSB to regulate “funds transfer systems that facilitate the 
circulation of money”. It is not clear that the PSB can regulate payment systems 
involving alternative mediums of exchange that are not national currencies. Currently, 
national currencies are the only instruments widely used to fulfil the economic 
functions of money — that is, as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of 
account.48 
Digital currencies are not currently widely used as a unit of account in Australia and as 
such may not be regarded as ‘money’. However, their use in payment systems could 
expand in the future. It will be important that payments system regulation is able to 
accommodate them, as well as other potential payment instruments that are not yet 
conceived. Current legislation should be reviewed to ensure payment services using 
alternative mediums of exchange can be regulated — from consumer, stability, 
competition, efficiency and AML perspectives — if a public interest case arises. This 
review could take place within a broader review of the system’s capacity to 
accommodate future payment systems. 
                                                          
48  Robleh, A 2014, ‘The economics of digital currencies’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q3, 
Vol 54, No. 3. 
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Conclusion 
The recommended approach to clearly graduate regulation provides increased 
certainty to industry while accommodating innovation. The functional criteria for 
determining when regulation should apply are broad so thresholds can be adjusted to 
reflect market developments.  
Replacing piecemeal exemptions in the AFSL regime with functional regulation would 
improve efficiency and ensure current and future business models are appropriately 
regulated. Extending the ePayments Code to all service providers would help protect 
all consumers from fraud and unauthorised transactions.  
Giving PPFs flexibility could generate lower compliance costs, enhance competitive 
neutrality and better facilitate participation from non-traditional financial institutions, 
supporting innovation and competition.  
Ensuring current regulation can accommodate services using alternative mediums of 
exchange would support innovation and confidence in the payments system. 
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Interchange fees and customer surcharging 
Recommendation 17 
Improve interchange fee regulation by clarifying thresholds for when they apply, broadening 
the range of fees and payments they apply to, and lowering interchange fees. 
Improve surcharging regulation by expanding its application and ensuring customers using 
lower-cost payment methods cannot be over-surcharged by allowing more prescriptive limits 
on surcharging. 
Description 
To improve the transparency and efficiency of interchange fee regulation,49 the PSB 
should consider:  
• Publishing thresholds for determining which system providers will be regulated.  
• Broadening interchange fee caps to include all amounts paid to customer service 
providers in payment systems,50 including service fees in companion card 
systems.51 
• Lowering interchange fees by reducing interchange fee caps, but also: 
– Replacing three-year weighted-average caps with hard caps, so every 
interchange fee falls below the interchange fee caps. This would also reduce 
differences in fees paid by small and large merchants. 
– Applying caps as the lesser of a fixed amount and a fixed percentage of 
transaction values, instead of only one of these components.52 This would also 
                                                          
49  Interchange fee regulation is enforced through standards that cap interchange fees paid by 
merchant service providers to customer service providers (see Figure 11: Retail payments 
system fees and charges). The caps are currently applied on a three-year weighted-average 
basis. The caps are 12 cents per transaction for debit systems and 0.5 per cent of transaction 
values for credit systems. 
50  That is, all amounts paid by merchant service providers and system providers to customer 
service providers. 
51  These are individually negotiated fees between payments system operators and customer 
service providers rather than centrally established fees. 
52  The proposal would add a fixed-percentage component to debit system caps (which already 
have a fixed-amount component) and a fixed-amount component to credit systems (which 
already have a fixed-percentage component). 
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increase the use of electronic payments for smaller-value transactions and 
ensure fees reflect costs for larger-value transactions.53 
The Inquiry considers that surcharging regulation should ensure merchants can 
surcharge to reflect their relative costs of accepting different payment methods.54 This 
could be better achieved by providing merchants with clearer surcharging limits, 
which could reduce over-surcharging and improve enforceability. To implement this, 
the PSB should consider allowing: 
• Low-cost system providers, such as systems subject to debit interchange fee caps, to 
prevent merchants from surcharging. This would prevent customers from being 
surcharged for using low-cost payment mechanisms that involve minimal 
acceptance costs for merchants, relative to other payment methods. 
• Medium-cost system providers, such as systems subject to credit interchange fee 
caps, to apply surcharge limits set by the PSB. This would make it easier to prevent 
over-surcharging, while still allowing merchants to reflect their relative costs of 
accepting different payment methods. 
• Higher-cost system providers to continue to apply reasonable cost-recovery rules. 
This would give merchants the flexibility to reflect the different costs of higher-cost 
payment methods. 
The PSB should consider whether mechanisms are required to prevent merchants from 
only accepting payment methods they can surcharge. The PSB may also wish to 
consider other alternatives to improve the accuracy and efficiency of surcharging. 
Objectives 
• Clarify regulation and enhance competitive neutrality between system providers. 
• Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of price signals, and reduce the potential 
for cross-subsidisation between customer groups and merchant groups. 
                                                          
53  This proposal would have a greater impact on credit systems than debit systems. If the PSB 
is inclined to implement this proposal for credit systems, it may wish to phase in fixed-value 
caps to smooth transitional costs. 
54  Surcharging regulation is enforced through standards that currently prevent system 
providers from banning merchants from surcharging, while still allowing system providers 
to restrict merchants from surcharging above their reasonable cost of accepting different 
payment methods (see Figure 11: Retail payments system fees and charges). 
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The scenarios set out in Box 10 illustrate some of the practical outcomes these 
proposals could achieve, particularly in reducing costs and over-surcharging. 
Box 10: Cameos on how the proposed reforms would improve outcomes  
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Discussion 
Following the Wallis Inquiry, Australia was one of the first countries to implement 
interchange fee caps. Interchange fee caps have since become more common and are 
currently applied in 38 jurisdictions.55 
As outlined in the Interim Report, the Inquiry believes interchange fee caps improve 
the efficiency of the payments system.56 Without interchange fee caps, price signals for 
customers are less clear and outcomes are less efficient because customers can be 
encouraged to use higher-cost payment methods. 
Figure 11: Retail payments system fees and charges shows the cycle of potential fees and 
charges involved in payment systems. For each transaction they accept, merchants 
(Box E) pay merchant service fees to merchant service providers (Box D), which in turn 
pay interchange fees to customer service providers (Box B). Customer service 
providers can then pass some of this revenue on to customers (Box A) in the form of 
reward points and other benefits. 
Merchants can complete this cycle by surcharging their customers to recoup their 
transaction acceptance costs. However, this can be difficult when the system provider 
has high market penetration, as surcharging can cause the customer to switch to 
another merchant that does not surcharge.57 Merchants can either absorb the costs of 
high-reward payment methods (involving high interchange fees and therefore high 
merchant service fees) or pass them on to all customers in the form of higher prices. 
Interchange fee caps restrict this cycle by limiting how much revenue customer service 
providers can pass on to customers using higher-cost payment methods, in the form of 
reward points or other benefits.  
Some submissions argue that, rather than reducing the prices merchants charge for 
their products, interchange fee caps increase merchant profit margins.58 They note that 
there is a lack of clear evidence showing caps have reduced product prices. Although 
caps are unlikely to result in immediate price reductions, the Inquiry agrees with the 
                                                          
55  Hayashi, F, Maniff, J 2014, Interchange fees and network rules: a shift from antitrust litigation to 
regulatory measures in various countries, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, 
page 1. 
56  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-28. 
57  The Inquiry has received confidential feedback from merchants, including large merchants, 
that feel unable to surcharge customers due to the risk of losing customers.  
58  For example, see Visa 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 14; MasterCard 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 6. 
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RBA that the competitive process should drive down prices over time and improve 
efficiency.59 
Some jurisdictions, particularly the European Union, are now implementing lower 
interchange fee caps than Australia and applying caps more functionally to capture all 
amounts paid to customer service providers.60 The European Union is also considering 
allowing interchange fee–regulated system providers to impose more prescriptive 
surcharge rules on merchants. 
Figure 11: Retail payments system fees and charges 
 
                                                          
59  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 4. 
60  European Commission 2013, New rules on Payment Services for the benefit of consumers 
and retailers, media release, 24 July, Brussels, viewed 18 November, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-730_en.htm?locale=en>. 
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Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Interchange fee caps 
Thresholds for interchange fee regulation. Currently, the rationale for limiting 
interchange fee regulation to selected system providers lacks transparency. Publishing 
thresholds for designating system providers for interchange fee standards would give 
system and service providers, particularly new entrants, certainty about how 
regulation is applied. This would support innovation by enabling providers to plan for 
future growth and development, and would also enhance competitive neutrality. 
Thresholds could be based on a combination of system providers’ annual transaction 
values and market shares. 
Broadening interchange fee caps to include all payments made to customer service 
providers. Incentive payments used in most systems and service fees used in 
companion card systems can achieve the same outcome as interchange fees; however, 
they are not currently captured by interchange fee caps. Applying interchange fee caps 
on a broader functional basis would help prevent alternative payments from avoiding 
caps and provide competitive neutrality for four-party and companion card payments 
system providers. 
Lowering interchange fee caps. Payments system efficiency could be increased by 
lowering interchange fee caps. The Inquiry acknowledges that lowering interchange 
fee caps would disrupt business models and involve transitional costs. Lower 
interchange fee flows may cause some service providers to reduce customer rewards. 
The Inquiry considers that these costs would be outweighed by lower product prices 
for all consumers, resulting from lower fees charged to merchants, and reduced 
cross-subsidisation. 
Replacing three-year weighted-average caps with hard caps. The current approach of 
using three-year weighted-average caps enables system providers to meet the caps by 
charging high fees for transactions involving smaller merchants without market 
power, while setting low fees for merchants with market power and high transaction 
volumes.61 Introducing hard caps would help address this imbalance while also 
reducing total interchange fees. 
Applying caps as the lesser of a fixed amount and a fixed percentage of transaction 
values. Applying fixed-percentage caps to debit systems, in addition to existing 
fixed-value caps, would ensure low fees for small value transactions. This would 
increase the rate of merchants accepting these transactions. Applying fixed-value caps 
to credit systems, in addition to fixed-percentage caps, would ensure the proportional 
cost of fees decreases as the value of transactions rises, better aligning fees with the 
costs of processing transactions. However, this could significantly affect some credit 
                                                          
61  American Express 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 13. 
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card system and service providers. If the PSB is inclined to implement this approach, it 
should phase in fixed-value caps to smooth transitional costs. 
The Inquiry considered banning interchange fees altogether. This could improve 
efficiency by forcing customers and merchants to pay directly for the benefits they 
each receive. There are examples of payment systems operating without interchange 
fees in other countries.62 However, the Inquiry considers that banning interchange fees 
would have high transitional costs. Instead, the Inquiry recommends that the PSB 
consider reducing interchange fees in the short term, and then consider further 
lowering fees in the longer term, depending on market conditions. 
Table 8: Summary of interchange fee cap options 















Reduced Increased No change Transitional costs 
Lower caps Reduced No change No change Transitional costs 
Introduce hard 
caps 
Reduced No change Increased Transitional costs  
Apply caps as 
lesser of fixed 
amount and 
fixed percentage 
Reduced Increased Decreased Transitional costs 


















Customer surcharging standards 
Functional application of surcharging standards. Merchant surcharging standards do 
not currently apply to all system providers. This allows unregulated system providers 
to ban merchants from surcharging, even if they operate higher-cost systems. 
                                                          
62  For example, domestic debit card systems in Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, 
Finland and Denmark have set their interchange fees to zero. Hayashi, F, Cuddy, E 2014, 
Credit and Debit Card Fees in Various Countries, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
Kansas City, page 5. 
63  This includes cross-subsidies between customers using lower-cost and higher-cost payment 
methods, and between smaller and larger merchants. 
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Applying surcharging standards to all system providers would address this concern 
and ensure consistency for merchants and customers. 
Providing clearer surcharging limits. The Inquiry agrees with the RBA that 
surcharging can improve the efficiency of the payments system by providing accurate 
price signals to customers.64 In addition, some consumer groups, such as Choice, 
acknowledge that accurate surcharging can provide positive outcomes.65  
However, the current reasonable cost surcharge rules are difficult for system providers 
to enforce, potentially complex for merchants to comply with and can cause frustration 
for consumers, as evidenced by the more than 5,000 submissions the Inquiry received 
on the matter.66 The rules are complex because each merchant needs to calculate its 
acceptance costs, which can involve subjective judgements about a number of factors.67 
The rules are difficult to enforce because system providers have limited visibility of 
these calculations. 
The Inquiry proposes that the PSB consider the following alternative arrangements to 
simplify compliance and improve the accuracy of surcharging: 
• Allow low-cost system providers to ban surcharges to encourage consumers to use 
low-cost payment methods. System providers could qualify as ‘low-cost’ if their 
interchange fees are below debit interchange fee caps. To ensure competitive 
neutrality, three-party systems could qualify if the costs they charge merchants are 
equivalent to those of other low-cost system providers.  
• Allow medium-cost system providers to enforce set surcharge limits to simplify 
surcharging for merchants and improve customer understanding. The PSB could 
set limits to approximate payment acceptance costs. System providers could qualify 
as ‘medium-cost’ if their interchange fees are below credit interchange fee caps. To 
ensure competitive neutrality, three-party systems could qualify if the costs they 
charge merchants are equivalent to those of other medium-cost system providers. 
• Allow higher-cost system providers to continue to enforce reasonable 
cost-recovery surcharging rules but require them to disclose this so their customers 
                                                          
64  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 6. 
65  Choice 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 22. 
66  These submissions were part of a campaign against surcharging, which encouraged 
submissions to the Inquiry. The organiser of the campaign provided a submission: 
Bartosch, K 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry.  
67  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2012, Guidance Note: Interpretation of the Surcharging 
Standards, RBA, viewed 3 November 2014, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/reforms/cards/201211-var-surcharging-stnds
-guidance/guidance-note.html>. 
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better understand why they may be surcharged. Although this retains the 
weaknesses of the current arrangements, it would be difficult to determine fixed 
surcharging limits for different higher-cost system providers. Maintaining the 
current arrangements would give merchants the flexibility to surcharge for the 
different acceptance costs of higher-cost payment systems. 
These options could reduce over-surcharging by giving merchants clearer guidance on 
maximum surcharge limits. They would allow customers to avoid paying surcharges 
by using low-cost payment methods. The PSB should also consider whether 
mechanisms are required to prevent merchants from only accepting payment methods 
they can surcharge. 
These new rules would be easier to comply with and enforce as merchants, system 
providers and customers would know the surcharge limits for low- and medium-cost 
payment methods.  
These proposals would make surcharging arrangements more effective, but not 
perfectly accurate. The PSB would need to estimate set surcharge limits for 
medium-cost systems and equivalent acceptance costs for three-party systems. A 
transitional period would be needed to give merchants and service providers time to 
adapt to the new rules. The Inquiry supports the PSB considering these proposals in 
greater detail and implementing a solution that improves the effectiveness of 
surcharging. 
Enforcing reasonable cost surcharge limits. The Inquiry considered imposing the 
current reasonable cost surcharging rules through Government regulation. However, 
regulators indicated this would involve considerable administration costs, as 
reasonable acceptance costs would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. This 
option would also require strengthening regulators’ powers to seek documents to 
prove over-surcharging, and creating new penalties to discourage over-surcharging.  
Conclusion 
The proposals for interchange fee standards should improve clarity, enhance 
competitive neutrality, improve the efficiency of price signals and reduce 
cross-subsidisation. The proposals for surcharging standards should make surcharging 
standards simpler and more accurate, while encouraging system providers that are not 
subject to interchange fee standards to reduce their costs. 




Graduate fundraising regulation to facilitate crowdfunding for both debt and equity and, 
over time, other forms of financing. 
Description 
Government should continue its current process to graduate the fundraising regime to 
facilitate securities-based crowdfunding. This would enable entities to make public 
offers of securities to a potentially large number of people (the ‘crowd’). The risks 
associated with crowdfunding investments would require some adjustments to 
consumer protections, including capping individuals’ investments and clearly 
communicating the risks. 
Government should then use the policy settings for securities as a basis to assess wider 
fundraising and lending regulation to ensure it facilitates other forms of 
crowdfunding, including peer-to-peer lending. 
A range of crowdfunding models is emerging globally. Crowdfunding facilitates the 
funding of projects or businesses, where small amounts of money are raised from the 
‘crowd’ via an online facilitator (or platform).68 Financial crowdfunding models 
include: 
• Securities-based crowdfunding, where the ‘crowd’ invests in an issuer in exchange 
for securities — either equity (crowd-sourced equity funding, CSEF) or debt.69 
• Peer-to-peer lending, where an online intermediary facilitates lending between 
individuals, often in the form of unsecured personal loans, potentially to fund a 
business.70 
                                                          
68  Crowdfunding can be financial or non-financial. Non-financial crowdfunding is where 
entities seek donations in exchange for some non-financial reward. This is not regulated as 
funding. 
69  Crowdfunding does not include non-public offers of securities. In Australia, the Australian 
Small Scale Offerings Board provides offers of securities to retail investors under the 
‘20 in 12’ prospectus exemption in s708(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. 
70  Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) 2012, OSC Exempt Market Review: Considerations for 
New Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions, OSC Staff Consultation Paper 45-710. 
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Objectives 
• Graduate fundraising regulation to facilitate innovations in fundraising emerging 
from new technologies and ensure policy settings are consistent across funding 
methods. 
• Provide firms, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with 
additional funding options. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Funding for SMEs is essential to facilitate productivity growth and job creation in the 
Australian economy. However, compared with large corporates, SMEs — particularly 
start-ups — generally have more limited access to external financing and higher 
funding costs. These issues are discussed in more detail in the Interim Report.71 
Globally, crowdfunding is emerging as an alternative funding source for SMEs. Since 
2009, overall fundraising via crowdfunding has grown by around 50 per cent annually, 
although crowdfunding still accounts for a very small share of total financing.72 
In Australia, current regulatory settings impede the development of crowdfunding.73 
• Offers of securities — Proprietary companies are generally prohibited from 
making public offers of securities (equity and debt), and shareholder numbers are 
capped at 50 non-employee shareholders. Start-ups or other small businesses have 
no viable alternative structures, as the public company structure has costly 
compliance requirements. 
• Peer-to-peer lending — Licensing requirements apply to direct lender–borrower 
models and intermediated lending models that operate as a MIS.74 
The regulatory framework should facilitate financing via the internet. 
                                                          
71  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 2-59. 
72  The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) surveyed estimates of market 
growth and size. It notes that estimates suggest “activity has been growing fast, at yearly 
rates above 50 per cent since 2009”, and “there seems to be a 50/50 breakdown between 
financial and non-financial categories”. ESMA 2014, Position Paper: Crowdfunding, European 
Union, Paris, page 3. 
73  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2014, Crowd sourced equity funding: Report, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 14. 
74  For example, RateSetter and SocietyOne. 
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Context 
Other jurisdictions are adjusting regulatory regimes to accommodate crowdfunding. 
For securities-based crowdfunding, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
implemented regulatory regimes in mid-2014. Canada is finalising its proposed regime 
for equity and debt fundraising. In the United States, regulators are yet to settle rules 
for CSEF.75 Peer-to-peer lending is more advanced globally than CSEF, as 
accommodating peer-to-peer lending typically has required less significant regulatory 
adjustment. 
In Australia, Government will consult on a proposed regulatory model for CSEF. The 
2014 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s (CAMAC) CSEF report 
considered that, for CSEF to operate in the best interests of investors and issuers, a 
specific regulatory structure is required. Elements of the CAMAC proposal include: 
• Placing a cap on an issuer’s fundraising — no more than $2 million in any 12-month 
period — and limited disclosure requirements. 
• Introducing caps on investments by investors — $2,500 per issuer, and $10,000 
overall, in any 12-month period — and communicating the high risks to investors. 
• Requiring issuance to occur via a licensed intermediary that is prohibited from 
providing investment advice, soliciting investors and lending to investors.76 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry recommends that Government should graduate fundraising regulation to 
facilitate securities-based crowdfunding and consider more holistic regulatory settings 
to facilitate internet-based financing. A well-developed crowdfunding system can aid 
broader innovation and competition in the financial system. Submissions generally 
support a more accommodative regulatory regime and note that crowdfunding would 
give some SMEs, particularly start-ups, more funding options.77 Stakeholders suggest 
that Australia is already lagging other jurisdictions in facilitating crowdfunding.78 
                                                          
75  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2014, Crowd sourced equity 
funding: Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
76  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2014, Crowd sourced equity 
funding: Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
77  Banki Haddock Fiora 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Attachment B, page 4. 
78  For example, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 20. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
180 
ASIC highlights the risks associated with crowdfunding, particularly CSEF.79 For 
investors, these include fraud, issuer failure and dilution — that is, initial ‘crowd’ 
investors could be diluted by subsequent equity issues. For issuers, risks include action 
by investors if outcomes do not meet their expectations. The Inquiry acknowledges 
these risks. However, measures such as limiting individuals’ investments and 
communication to them of the risks of crowdfunding would help mitigate such 
concerns. 
For securities-based crowdfunding, Government should promptly allow issuers to 
make public offers of simple securities, including common shares and non-convertible 
debt.80 
For peer-to-peer lending, the current MIS regime may be able to accommodate 
different types of platforms — including pooled investment mechanisms and ‘bulletin 
board’ models — where investors choose to lend to specific ventures. Consideration 
should be given to graduating the MIS regime, but also to facilitating other 
mechanisms for direct lending, with policy settings consistent with securities-based 
crowdfunding. 
When new regulatory settings are in place, Government should monitor crowdfunding 
activity to determine whether settings require adjustment. Of particular interest would 
be consumer protection concerns and the allocative efficiency of crowdfunding. To this 
end, crowdfunding platforms could be required to make information about their 
activities public, which would support research and policy analysis.81 
Other recommendations in this chapter could help facilitate crowdfunding, including 
Recommendation 14: Collaboration to enable innovation, Recommendation 19: Data access and 
use and Recommendation 20: Comprehensive credit reporting. 
                                                          
79  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, pages 84–85. 
80  This approach is similar to that being considered by the Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC). OSC 2014, Introduction of Proposed Prospectus Exemptions and Proposed Reports of 
Exempt Distribution in Ontario, OSC, Ontario. 
81 Such as funds raised, average investment, and degree that offers are over- or 
under-subscribed. 
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Data access and use 
Recommendation 19 
Review the costs and benefits of increasing access to and improving the use of data, taking 
into account community concerns about appropriate privacy protections. 
Description 
Government should commission the Productivity Commission (PC) to commence, by 
the end of 2015, an inquiry into the costs and benefits of increasing access to and 
improving the use of data, subject to privacy considerations. Increasing access to data 
could enhance consumer outcomes, better inform decision making, and facilitate 
greater efficiency and innovation in the financial system and the broader economy but 
could also involve privacy risks. 
The PC should consider potential mechanisms to: 
• Increase private sector, academic and community access to public sector data. 
• Encourage the use of appropriately de-identified public data to inform government, 
private sector and consumer decision making. 
• Improve individuals’ access to public and private sector data about themselves, 
such as by defining relevant data, standardising its collection and aggregation in 
datasets, and formalising access entitlements and arrangements. 
• Increase access to private sector data while maintaining private sector incentives to 
collect data, such as through data-sharing arrangements, cost-recovery 
arrangements and user charges. 
• Further standardise the collection and release of public and private sector data and 
product information, so datasets can be created and combined more effectively. 
• Enhance and maintain individuals’ confidence and trust in the way data is used. 
The PC should report to the Treasurer on how better use of data can improve user 
outcomes, including potential amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act) and 
other legislation. 
Objectives 
• Improve the quality of business and consumer decision making, public policy 
development and implementation, and research into how the financial system and 
broader economy function. 
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• Better enable innovative business models that rely on data, where they improve 
user outcomes and overall system efficiency. 
• Increase the utility of public institutions that hold data. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Data is becoming increasingly integral to how the financial system and broader 
economy function. By 2020, the amount of data held globally is predicted to be 
44 times larger than it was in 2009.82 Ever-expanding computational power and 
smarter algorithms are enabling this data to be used more effectively. This is helping 
businesses better understand and meet the needs of consumers, improve product 
offerings, manage risks and reduce costs. 
National governments globally are encouraging these trends through open data 
policies.83 Some private sector organisations, non-government organisations and 
academic institutions have also incorporated open data policies or are actively 
contributing to the amount of publicly available data.84 However, to date, and 
especially in Australia, there has been very little debate around whether Government 
policies could increase access to private sector data to boost innovation and 
competition. 
The increasing use of data is not without risk. The 2014 update of the Australian 
Privacy Principles made significant progress in defining how individuals can access 
and control their personal data.85 Globally, there is growing debate about the use of 
data and how societies should balance privacy and efficiency considerations.86 
The scenario set out in Box 11: A cameo on the potential benefits of enhanced data usage, 
based on existing and/or emerging data-driven financial products and services from 
around the world, highlights the power of data to drive competition and improve user 
outcomes. 
                                                          
82  Gantz, J and Reinsel, D 2010, The digital universe decade — are you ready? International Data 
Corporation iView, Framingham, Massachusetts, page 2. 
83  Davies, T 2014, Open data policies and practice: an international comparison, Paper for European 
Consortium for Political Research Panel P356 – The Impacts of Open Data, page 1. 
84  Herzberg, B 2014, The Next Frontier for Open Data: An Open Private Sector, World Bank, 
viewed 22 October 2014, 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/next-frontier-open-data-open-private-sector>. 
85  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, which amends the Privacy 
Act 1988. 
86  For example, see Acquisti, A 2010, The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
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Box 11: A cameo on the potential benefits of enhanced data usage 
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Access to public sector information 
As the PC has previously noted, “... unlike many other countries, Australia makes 
relatively little use of its public [sector] data resources, even though the initial costs of 
making data available would be low relative to the future flow of benefits”.87 The 
National Commission of Audit noted that Australian governments have only released 
around 3,200 datasets, compared with 10,000 datasets in the United Kingdom and 
200,000 datasets in the United States.88 The PC also observed that, “... academics, 
researchers, data custodian agencies, consumers and some Ministers are eager to 
harness the evidentiary power of administrative data, but this enthusiasm generally is 
not matched by policy departments”.89 
This reluctance could be due to the costs of making data available and usable, and 
risks around quality assurance. However, these considerations should be weighed 
against the fact that decisions not to release data prevent public and private sector 
decisions from being better informed. The Inquiry is mindful that financial regulators 
release significant amounts of data, but sees scope to release more, including both 
aggregated data and de-identified datasets of personal information. 
Access to personal information 
The Australian Privacy Principles give individuals the right to access personal 
information about themselves; however, a number of impediments are still preventing 
consumers from being able to use their data effectively:  
1. Little guidance is available on how personal information should be provided, 
including delivery method, timelines and standards for representing data.  
2. In most cases, consumers are unable to authorise trusted third parties to access 
their personal information directly from their service provider. This reduces 
the ability of competitors to offer consumers better value or tailored services, 
or develop advice services to better inform consumer decision making.  
                                                          
87  Productivity Commission 2013, Annual Report 2012–13, Chapter 1: Using administrative data 
to achieve better policy outcomes, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 1. 
88  National Commission of Audit 2014, Towards Responsible Government: The Report of the 
National Commission of Audit, Phase One, Chapter 10.5: Data, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, page 235. 
89  Productivity Commission 2013, Annual Report 2012–13, Chapter 1: Using administrative data 
to achieve better policy outcomes, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 1. 
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3. Confusion exists over what constitutes personal information, which may limit 
individuals’ access to data.90 
Access to private sector data 
In many circumstances, private sector organisations have strong incentives to restrict 
access to the data they hold, as it serves as a competitive advantage. However, this 
may create inefficiencies where the benefits to the economy of releasing data are 
greater than the benefits to individual institutions of restricting access. In this sense, 
publicly accessible data can suffer from the ‘common good’ problem: it is 
undersupplied because the gains to society are difficult to monetise. 
The Inquiry does not suggest that all, or even most, private sector data should be 
released publicly. In many cases, private returns are necessary to justify investments in 
developing datasets. The challenge is to maintain commercial incentives for 
developing datasets, while facilitating the release of data where this improves 
efficiency. 
Standards for datasets and product information 
Standards for collecting and representing data can improve the use of data and 
enhance its network qualities. They can enable datasets to be combined and aid 
algorithms that mine datasets to find meaning. Although progress has been made in 
standardising data collection, particularly through programs such as Standard 
Business Reporting, much work still needs to be done. In some cases, poor 
coordination prevents standards from being developed or widely used. Another 
contributing factor is the cost involved in adjusting how data is collected and 
represented to comply with standards. 
Confidence and trust 
For the potential of data to be fully realised, individuals must have confidence and 
trust in how their personal information is stored and used. Without confidence and 
trust, individuals would be unwilling to volunteer their personal information and may 
avoid using services that develop datasets based on observations of individuals’ 
behaviour.91 Some reports suggest that individuals do not understand how their 
                                                          
90  For example, see Grubb, B 2014, ‘Spies can access my metadata, so why can’t I? My 
15-month legal battle with Telstra’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October, viewed 
23 October 2014, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/consumer-security/spies-can-access-my-metadata-
so-why-cant-i-my-15month-legal-battle-with-telstra-20141010-1146qo.html>. 
91  For example, payment services that collect data on individuals’ purchasing decisions. 
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personal information is currently collected and used. When they do find out, they can 
lose trust and may stop using services that collect their personal information.92 
Rationale 
A number of submissions support data sharing within privacy limitations and 
increasing the use of standards, including those from Choice, the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, the Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia and the ABA. Others note the benefits to policy makers, regulators and 
researchers of having access to high-quality data for understanding how the financial 
system functions and improving policy decision making.93 Although issues regarding 
accessing and using data are important for the financial system, they also have much 
broader implications.  
The outcomes of the proposed PC inquiry should improve the way Australia’s 
financial system data ecosystem functions by increasing data sharing and the utility of 
datasets. As the Privacy Act has only recently been updated after an extensive review, 
any PC recommendations to amend the Privacy Act could be considered in a broader 
post-implementation review of the Privacy Act. This would ensure another forum to 
explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and protecting individuals’ privacy. 
Both processes would foster much-needed public debate on these complex issues, 
which Government, business and society will need to grapple with for some time to 
come. 
Option considered 
Recommended: The PC should consider the costs and benefits to the financial system 
and broader economy of mechanisms to: increase access to public sector data; 
individuals’ access to their personal information; access to private sector data; the use 
of standards for datasets and product information; and confidence and trust in the use 
of data. The PC should recommend where amendments to the Privacy Act and other 
legislation could enable better use of data and improve public welfare. 
Option costs and benefits 
The costs and benefits of potential options the PC inquiry could consider are discussed 
below. The cost of the actual PC inquiry is likely to be minimal, considering the 
potential benefits of improving the use of data. 
                                                          
92  For example, see World Economic Forum and Bain and Company 2011, Personal Data: The 
Emergence of a New Asset Class, World Economic Forum, page 6.  
93  For example, see Centre for International Finance and Regulation 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 20–21. 
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Access to public sector data 
Broadening access to public sector data has significant benefits. One report suggests 
this could add around $16 billion per annum to the Australian economy, as a 
conservative estimate.94 The Inquiry strongly supports the National Commission of 
Audit’s recommendations to extend and accelerate publishing de-identified 
administrative data and stocktake suitable datasets for public release.95 
However, the main challenge will be overcoming the disincentives to release data. The 
PC may wish to consider price signals to address this, such as a program that provides 
additional funding to agencies for the first year they release new datasets or charging 
agencies for each year they do not release data.  
Access to personal information 
Some submissions note that individuals would benefit from being able to access their 
personal information more readily and in more standardised formats, such as in 
machine-readable format, and from being able to share their information with trusted 
third parties more seamlessly.96 Consumers could better understand their 
circumstances and improve their decision making, as well as identify better-value 
offerings from other service providers. 
Consumers are increasingly using online resources to inform their financial decision 
making — up from 25 per cent in 2005 to 40 per cent in 2011,97 and the Inquiry believes 
this could grow significantly. When considering options in the Australian context, the 
PC may wish to consider regulatory models such as ‘midata’ in the United Kingdom98 
and Smart Disclosure in the United States.99 It may also be possible to create standard 
protocols to enable consumers to allow trusted third parties to access some of their 
personal information. For example, the PC could consider whether introducing such 
standards could facilitate opportunities for ‘data banks’ to store personal data that 
                                                          
94  Lateral Economics 2014, Open for Business: How open data can help achieve the G20 growth 
target, Lateral Economics, Melbourne, page 10. 
95  National Commission of Audit 2014, Towards Responsible Government: The Report of the 
National Commission of Audit, Phase One, Chapter 10.5: Data, Recommendation 61, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 236. 
96  Refer, for example, to Choice 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, pages 26–31. 
97  ANZ 2011, Adult Financial Literacy in Australia: Full report of the results from the 2011 ANZ 
Survey, ANZ, Melbourne, page 102. 
98  United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2011, The midata vision of 
consumer empowerment, media release, 3 November, London, viewed 18 November 2014, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-midata-vision-of-consumer-
empowerment>. 
99  United States Government 2014, An introduction to smart disclosure, Data.gov, 
Washington DC, viewed 11 November 2014, 
<https://www.data.gov/introduction-smart-disclosure-policy/>. 
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individuals volunteer. Individuals could then choose to provide access to parts of this 
information to trusted third parties. 
Access to private sector data 
Increasing access to private sector data would have large efficiency benefits across the 
economy. It would support innovation and competition, as new entrants and smaller 
businesses with smaller datasets could better compete with larger incumbents. Online 
comparator sites and other advice services could better serve their clients, and 
consumers could make more informed choices. Industry and government should 
continue to progress initiatives for sharing data with consent, and initiatives allowing 
greater access to commercial data where this would improve user outcomes. In 
particular with greater flexibility of disclosure mechanisms, issuers and firms should 
make available prominently and publicly at no cost, mandated disclosure in a central 
place. For example, all PDSs of an issuer could be made available on their website. 
The PC should consider the conditions under which the release or sharing of private 
data would create net benefits to the economy, and not reduce incentives for 
businesses to collect the data in the future. In many cases, potential disincentives could 
be addressed by compensating businesses that share their data. It may be efficient to 
charge users of data to fund this compensation, such as through an access regime. In 
other cases, businesses could be compensated through greater access to others’ data.100 
Alternatively, if the data is viewed as a ‘pure’ public good, Government may be 
justified in compensating providers and releasing the data for free. 
Standards for datasets and product information 
Standardising datasets can improve data functionality by improving ease of use and 
allowing datasets to be combined. This can assist the process of turning data into 
meaningful information. The Standard Business Reporting initiative has invested 
considerable resources to standardise financial datasets and currently operates on a 
voluntary basis.101 The PC may wish to consider whether additional actions are 
necessary to unlock the potential of data through standardisation — both for public 
and private sector datasets. 
Standards could also cover how financial product information is reported, so third 
parties could use automated processes to create market-wide datasets of available 
products.102 The Inquiry believes new advice and comparison services would be 
                                                          
100  For example, financial institutions share consumer credit data through credit bureaus. 
101  Australian Business Register 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 2. 
102  For example, a 2010 Choice survey found that credit card providers use at least 10 different 
billing methods, making it difficult for consumers to compare information. Choice 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 27. 
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developed if product information was better standardised, supporting consumers in 
making more informed choices and enhancing competition.  
Although the Inquiry’s first preference would be for private sector models to develop, 
some stakeholders are concerned that comparison services can face conflicted 
incentives, which may lead them to provide poor advice or misleading comparisons.103 
The PC may wish to consider these issues, particularly in circumstances where 
Government provision is the most effective option.104 Government provision can avoid 
conflicted incentives, but it can come at a cost to taxpayers and involve moral hazard. 
The Inquiry encourages the PC to consider these issues further. 
Confidence and trust 
Increasing confidence and trust in the way data is collected and used can increase the 
amount of data institutions are able to collect and use. As a result, some restrictions on 
the use and collection of data can actually increase the amount of data available. The 
Privacy Act is a vital piece of infrastructure in Australia’s data ecosystem.  
The PC may wish to consider other means of enhancing confidence and trust and 
reduce the risk of it being eroded. These outcomes can be achieved by ensuring 
individuals benefit from sharing their personal information and have visibility and 
control over how their information is used. Specific options could include 
standardising processes for correcting data errors and limiting how widely data can be 
shared. Increasing transparency through data breach reporting and greater disclosure 
of how data is used and collected could also assist, particularly in building sustainable 
levels of confidence and trust over time. The PC may also wish to consider how to best 
balance efficiency and security in relation to controls on international data transfers.  
Conclusion 
The PC is best placed to consider the costs and benefits to consumers, the financial 
system and the broader economy of increased access to and improved use of data, and 
to explore options the Inquiry has not considered. 
                                                          
103  Choice 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, supplementary 
document, page 3. 
104  There are already examples of state governments providing comparator services for 
electricity and gas (see www.yourchoice.vic.gov.au and www.energymadeeasy.gov.au), and 
the Federal Government will establish a comparator service for insurance in North 
Queensland by March 2015. Cormann, M (Minister for Finance and Acting Assistant 
Treasurer) 2014, Initiatives to help address insurance affordability for North Queensland, 
media release, 23 October, Canberra, viewed 23 October 2014, 
<http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2014/1023-initiatives.html>. 
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Comprehensive credit reporting 
Recommendation 20 
Support industry efforts to expand credit data sharing under the new voluntary 
comprehensive credit reporting regime. If, over time, participation is inadequate, 
Government should consider legislating mandatory participation. 
Description 
Industry should continue to implement the new comprehensive credit reporting (CCR) 
regime on a voluntary basis. This would allow credit providers to share individuals’ 
‘positive’ credit history data, such as loan repayment history. 
Industry believes that CCR will not be operational until March 2015, at the earliest. 
Also, industry suggests that significant portions of credit data will not be exchanged 
until late 2016 or early 2017, reflecting, in part, major transitional issues for credit 
providers.105 
In 2017, Government should review industry’s participation in CCR to determine 
whether a regulatory incentive or legislation for mandatory reporting is required. 
Government could also consider expanding CCR to include more data fields. 
Objectives 
• Reduce information imbalances between lenders and borrowers, and facilitate 
competition between lenders. 
• Improve access to and reduce the cost of credit for borrowers, including SMEs. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Industry participation in CCR 
At present, credit providers have limited access to credit data on competitors’ 
customers. The previous credit reporting regime was based on sharing ‘negative’ 
credit events, such as an individuals’ history of defaults. 
                                                          
105  Australian Retail Credit Association (ARCA) 2014, Additional material to the Financial System 
Inquiry, ARCA, Sydney, page 4. 
Chapter 3: Innovation 
191 
More comprehensive sharing of credit data would reduce information imbalances 
between lenders and borrowers. It would also facilitate borrowers switching between 
lenders and greater competition among lenders. Overall, more comprehensive credit 
reporting would likely improve credit conditions for borrowers, including SMEs. 
Personal credit history is a major factor in credit providers’ decisions to lend to 
consumers, but also to new business ventures and smaller firms. 
Empirical evidence suggests CCR reduces the likelihood that originated loans will 
default (reducing interest rates) and/or increases the availability of credit.106 Most 
OECD countries have some form of ‘positive’ credit reporting, either via a public credit 
register or private reporting body, reflecting the benefits of more comprehensive credit 
reporting.107 
In Australia, legislation for CCR came into effect in March 2014, although the regime is 
not yet fully implemented. Industry is developing a data-sharing agreement based on 
reciprocity between credit providers. Under the proposed agreement, each participant 
would select the data categories they wish to share, and in turn gain access to the same 
categories from other participants (via credit reporting bodies). Data exchange would 
be supported by a compliance framework, where participants would be able to raise 
instances of non-compliance by other participants.108 The Australian Retail Credit 
Association (ARCA) anticipates finalising the agreement by March 2015 at the 
earliest.109 
Participation in CCR is voluntary, so the pace and extent of eventual participation in 
the regime is not yet clear. 
For credit providers, participation will depend on the perceived net benefits, which 
will differ between different classes of credit provider. For a major institution with a 
relatively large customer base, early and full participation may provide, at least 
                                                          
106  International Finance Corporation 2012, Credit Reporting Knowledge Guide, International 
Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank), Washington, DC. Also see Barron, J and 
Staten, M 2003, ‘The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience’, in Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, ed. Miller, M, MIT 
Press, Boston. 
107  Expert Group on Credit Histories (to the European Commission) 2009, Report of the Expert 
Group on Credit Histories, DG Internal Market and Service, Paris; Rothemund, M and 
Gerhardt, M 2011, The European Credit Information Landscape, European Credit Research 
Institute, Brussels; Australian Law Reform Commission 2008, Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Volume 3, Report 108, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
108  The Australian Retail Credit Association (ARCA) 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 3. Under the proposed agreement, there are three tiers of 
data: negative (data typically disclosed pre-March 2014); partial (information on current 
credit accounts, plus ‘negative’ data); and comprehensive (repayment history plus ‘partial’ 
data). 
109 The Australian Retail Credit Association (ARCA) 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 4. 
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initially, relatively larger benefits to other, smaller participants than for the institution 
itself. 
As participation and system-wide data grow, net benefits increase for all CCR 
participants. Further, credit providers that do not participate are at risk of adverse 
selection with respect to potential new borrowers; a risk that becomes more acute as 
industry participation increases.110 
Ultimately, the system would be expected to deliver better credit outcomes for 
providers that participate relative to those that do not. It is difficult to determine 
ex ante the level of participation at which this would occur, but Veda suggests that this 
is likely to occur before participation reaches 50 per cent.111 
Extension to SME data 
Submissions generally argue that the costs of mandatory reporting of SME data would 
outweigh the benefits. Reporting of SME data would impose further compliance costs 
on credit providers. However, the additional data would not likely reduce information 
imbalances. This is because the credit health of the business owner(s) as an individual 
remains the primary information source for credit decisions, rather than information 
about the SME itself. 
Expanding CCR data fields 
Submissions generally support expanding CCR data with more data fields — 
particularly account balances. However, additional data fields would have to be 
balanced against privacy concerns, and would require amendment of the Privacy Act. 
The need for additional data fields could be considered in the proposed review of CCR 
participation and the proposed PC inquiry into data access and use (see the previous 
recommendation). 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes that CCR would lead to better credit decisions across the system 
including for SMEs, and supports industry efforts to expand credit data sharing under 
the new voluntary CCR regime. However if, over time, participation is inadequate, 
Government should consider legislating mandatory industry participation, or a 
regulatory incentive. The Inquiry does not support mandating reporting of SME data. 
In principle, the Inquiry supports expanding the number of CCR data fields, as 
theoretical and empirical studies suggest that more, high-quality credit data lead to 
better credit decisions and improved credit conditions for borrowers. 
                                                          
110  Johnson, S 2013, ‘Consumer lending: implications of new comprehensive credit reporting’, 
JASSA — The FINSIA Journal of Applied Finance, no. 3. 
111  Based on modelling undertaken by Veda (a major credit bureau), which models the impact 
of rising industry participation in comprehensive credit reporting on lenders’ credit 
decisions. 
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Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes 
The financial system plays a vital role in meeting the financial needs of individual 
Australians. To fulfil this role effectively, consumers should be treated fairly and 
financial products and services should perform in the way consumers are led to 
believe they will. Consumers have a responsibility to accept their financial decisions, 
including market losses, when they have been treated fairly. However, financial 
system participants, in dealing with consumers, should have regard to consumer 
behavioural biases and information imbalances. Recent consumer experiences reveal 
poor industry standards of conduct and areas for enhancement in the current 
framework. 
The current regulatory framework focuses on disclosure, financial advice and financial 
literacy, supported by low-cost dispute resolution arrangements. Product disclosure 
plays an important part in establishing the contract between issuers and consumers. 
However, in itself, mandated disclosure is not sufficient to allow consumers to make 
informed financial decisions. As the Interim Report noted, affordable, quality financial 
advice can bring significant benefits to consumers, especially where they may not be 
equipped to make complex financial decisions. 
The framework needs to more effectively align the governance and corporate culture 
of financial firms, employees and other representatives. Currently, in seeking to align 
commercial incentives with consumer outcomes, the regulatory framework is focused 
on point of sale. Recent examples of poor conduct suggest the alignment needs to start 
at the point of product design, and then be strengthened through distribution and 
advice. 
Improved financial literacy enables consumers to be more engaged and to make more 
informed decisions about their finances. The Inquiry notes support from submissions 
on the importance of financial literacy for consumers. There are numerous examples of 
financial industry and Government programs that aim to educate consumers and raise 
their awareness of financial management issues, and the Inquiry encourages 
continuation of these efforts. However, in the Inquiry’s view, increasing financial 
literacy is not a panacea. Further measures are needed to support the fair treatment of 
consumers. 
The Inquiry also supports continuing industry and Government efforts to increase 
financial inclusion. Reviews and proposed changes to the financial services framework 
should involve consumer organisations in policy development, alongside industry, 
regulators and other stakeholders. 
In making its recommendations, the Inquiry has deliberately focused on the issues of 
most concern and has not suggested changes to current arrangements that are 
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generally working well, such as alternative dispute resolution systems. The Inquiry 
recognises the importance of continuing to have an adequate consumer dispute 
resolution system. 
The Inquiry also considered the scope for self-regulation. Industry self-regulatory 
approaches are often more successful in setting governance, customer service or 
technical standards that supplement the law, than in addressing sector-wide conduct 
issues, particularly where there are commercial pressures that may undermine 
standards. In some cases, there may also be a first-mover disadvantage. In these cases, 
government regulation may be required. On this basis, the Inquiry looks to firms and 
industry to take forward initiatives for a number of the recommendations in this 
chapter. These include raising industry standards and levels of professionalism, more 
effectively disclosing risk and fees, and improving guidance and disclosure for general 
insurance. 
This Inquiry’s recommendations focusing on consumer outcomes, in this and related 
chapters, combine deregulatory elements, self-regulation and new regulation. They 
build on recent changes, such as the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) and product 
disclosure reforms, accommodate and promote market discipline and aim to reduce 
calls for future significant changes to the regulatory framework. 
A number of recommendations focus on increasing accountability of issuers and 
distributors. In the Inquiry’s view, firms that already invest in customer-focused 
business practices and procedures would not be required to change their operations 
significantly. The Inquiry’s expectation is that costs involved in changing practices 
should be low. In addition, the Inquiry believes that, in complying with these 
recommendations, firms would also be likely to benefit from long-term savings 
through increased customer retention and avoid further regulatory costs. 
In the Inquiry’s view, these recommendations should also have limited effect on 
incentives for product innovation. To the extent that there is a change in the design or 
distribution of certain products, the Inquiry considers that this is appropriate to 
promote consumers buying products that meet their needs.  
Underlying a regulatory framework is the essential requirement that regulators are 
strong, independent, accountable and focused on enforcing the existing framework in 
a timely and proactive way. This chapter should therefore be read together with 
Chapter 5: Regulatory system, which makes recommendations to strengthen the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
Recommended actions 
The Inquiry recommends taking the following actions to promote the fair treatment of 
consumers, to improve efficiency and build confidence and trust in the financial 
system. 
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1. Make issuers and distributors more accountable for design and distribution of 
products and introduce a product intervention power. To promote positive consumer 
outcomes, product issuers and distributors should take greater responsibility for the 
design and targeted distribution of products. This should strengthen consumer 
confidence and trust in the system and reduce the number of cases where consumer 
behavioural biases and information imbalances are disregarded. ASIC should also be 
enabled to take a more proactive approach to reduce the risk of significant detriment to 
consumers. 
2. Focus financial firms and advisers on the interests of consumers. To build 
confidence and trust in the financial system, firms need to take steps to create a culture 
that focuses on consumer interests. This should include addressing conflicted 
remuneration in life insurance advice and stockbroking. Underscoring the importance 
of improved standards and accountability, the Inquiry recommends giving ASIC 
enhanced powers to ban individuals from financial firm management. The Inquiry 
recommends lifting the minimum competency standards for financial advisers, 
improving transparency of adviser firm ownership and relabelling general advice 
(see also Recommendation 40: Provision of financial advice and mortgage broking). In 
addition, the Inquiry recommends enabling better access to quality guidance for home 
building and contents insurance to reduce the risk of underinsurance. 
3. Facilitate innovative forms of disclosure, including by encouraging industry to 
further use technology. Although the disclosure regime has evolved to reduce 
complexity over the last decade, consumer behavioural biases and commercial 
disincentives limit its effectiveness. The Inquiry sees scope to promote efficient 
communication of information to consumers in a way that responds to technological 
advances and changing consumer preferences (see also Recommendation 39: Technology 
neutrality). Risk and fee disclosure remains variable and consumer understanding low. 
In addition, industry should develop consistent standards to improve disclosure of 
risk and fees. 
The Senate Economics References Committee’s report on ASIC’s performance was 
released shortly before publication of the Inquiry’s Interim Report. The Inquiry 
indicated that it would consider the Senate Committee’s recommendations in its final 
deliberations. In particular, the Senate Committee recommended that this Inquiry 
consider the adequacy of Australia’s conduct and disclosure approach to the 
regulation of financial firms. The Inquiry has considered issues raised by the Senate 
Committee, and makes recommendations in this chapter, including in relation to 
product issuer and distributor accountability, product intervention power, adviser 
competency and register, and banning powers.1 
                                                          
1  The Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Performance of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, Canberra, page 393, 443. 
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Figure 12 illustrates the Inquiry’s recommendations in the context of a typical product 
life cycle. 
Figure 12: Recommendations to improve consumer outcomes 
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Principles 
In developing recommendations to improve consumer outcomes in the financial 
system, the Inquiry has been guided by the objective of ensuring the fair treatment of 
participants, particularly consumers of financial products and services. The principles 
underlying this objective are: 
• A fair, well-functioning financial system allows consumers to take on risk to make a 
return. Inevitably, this means consumers will incur gains and losses from market 
movements. 
• Consumers should bear responsibility for their financial decisions. To assist them in 
doing this:  
– Consumers should receive fair treatment from financial firms. 
– Consumers should have access to competent, good-quality, customer-focused 
advice and guidance. 
– Information provided to consumers should be accessible, engaging and 
understandable. 
– Financial literacy strategies should be an important element of the consumer 
framework. 
• Product issuers and distributors should take responsibility for the design, targeting 
and distribution of financial products. 
• ASIC should be proactive in its supervision and enforcement to reduce the risk of 
significant detriment to consumers. 
• Consumers should have access to timely and low-cost dispute resolution. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry considers implementing the following package of recommendations 
would enhance the fair treatment of consumers. It would strengthen the accountability 
of product issuers and distributors, reduce the risk of significant consumer detriment 
from unfair treatment, and encourage a customer-focused culture in financial firms. 
Implementing these recommendations would strengthen consumer confidence and 
trust in the system and improve system efficiency. 
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Strengthen product issuer and distributor accountability 
Recommendation 21 
Introduce a targeted and principles-based product design and distribution obligation. 
Description 
Government should amend the law to introduce a principles-based product design 
and distribution obligation.2 The obligation would require product issuers and 
distributors to consider a range of factors when designing products and distribution 
strategies. In addition to commercial considerations, issuers and distributors should 
consider the type of consumer whose financial needs would be addressed by buying 
the product and the channel best suited to distributing the product. Industry should 
supplement this principles-based obligation with appropriate standards for different 
product classes. 
The obligation would cover: 
• During product design, product issuers should identify target and non-target 
markets, taking into account the product’s intended risk/return profile and other 
characteristics. Where the nature of the product warrants it, issuers should 
stress-test the product to assess how consumers may be affected in different 
circumstances. They should also consumer-test products to make key features clear 
and easy to understand. 
• During the product distribution process, issuers should agree with distributors on 
how a product should be distributed to consumers. Where applicable, distributors 
should have controls in place to act in accordance with the issuer’s expectations for 
distribution to target markets. 
• After the sale of a product, the issuer and distributor should periodically review 
whether the product still meets the needs of the target market and whether its risk 
profile is consistent with its distribution. The results of this review should inform 
future product design and distribution processes. This kind of review would not be 
required for closed products.3 
                                                          
2  This obligation would not apply to credit products regulated under the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009, because the responsible lending obligation currently requires 
assessment of suitability on an individual basis. 
3  Closed products are those not accepting new customers or funds, of which legacy products 
are a subset. 
Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes 
199 
These requirements would be scalable, depending on the nature of the product. 
Compliance with this obligation should be straightforward for simple products that 
are likely to be suitable for most consumers. For example, simple, low-risk products 
such as basic banking products would not require extensive consideration and may be 
treated as a class, with a standard approach to their design and distribution. 
A serious breach of this obligation should be subject to a significant penalty. 
Objectives 
• Reduce the number of consumers buying products that do not match their needs, 
and reduce consequent significant consumer detriment. 
• Promote fair treatment of consumers by firms that design and distribute financial 
products. 
• Promote efficiency and limit or avoid the future need for more prescriptive 
regulation. 
• Build confidence and trust in the financial system. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
The existing framework relies heavily on disclosure, financial advice and financial 
literacy. However, disclosure can be ineffective for a number of reasons, including 
consumer disengagement, complexity of documents and products, behavioural biases, 
misaligned interests and low financial literacy.4 Many consumers do not seek advice, 
and those who do may receive poor-quality advice. Many products are also distributed 
directly to consumers. 
Such issues have contributed to consumer detriment from financial investment 
failures, such as Storm Financial, Opes Prime, Westpoint, agribusiness schemes and 
unlisted debentures, which have affected more than 80,000 consumers. Losses from 
these failures totalled more than $5 billion, or $4 billion after compensation and 
liquidator recoveries.5 Although these losses have a number of contributing causes, 
poor product design and distribution practices that disregarded consumer behavioural 
biases and information imbalances played a significant role. A recent independent 
report on improving consumer compensation arrangements identified scope to make 
                                                          
4  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 3–57. 
5  These figures include losses involving the more substantive cases of financial investment 
failures in the last 10 years, such as Storm Financial, Opes Prime, Westpoint, Great 
Southern, Timbercorp and Banksia Securities.  
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product issuers more responsible for product distribution.6 Although FOFA has made 
significant changes to reduce incentives for inappropriate distribution where personal 
advice is provided, more can be done during the product design phase to complement 
these measures. 
The current quality of product design and distribution controls is variable. ASIC’s 
report on Regulating Complex Products observed that some consumers acquire 
structured products that are riskier than they realise.7 For example: 
• Insufficient information provided in the disclosure documents, advertising and 
seminars relating to over-the-counter contracts for difference (CFD) made it 
difficult for retail consumers to make informed investment decisions. 
• Some firms distributing hybrid securities included sales information in addition to, 
or inconsistent with, the information in the prospectus. This information tended to 
emphasise high yield while downplaying risk. 
The Inquiry is also concerned that certain less complex add-on insurance products may 
not meet the needs of some consumers. For example, an ASIC report revealed 
Consumer Credit Insurance (CCI) products being bought by consumers whose 
situation made them ineligible to claim under the policy.8 The Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS) found that 11 per cent of claims on CCI products were declined, 
compared with 3 per cent of all personal general insurance claims.9 
A number of recent high-profile ASIC enforceable undertakings (EUs) demonstrate 
some firms had serious compliance issues in providing personal advice and internal 
controls.10 Although these examples raise potential breaches of the personal advice 
regime and occurred before the significant FOFA changes, they also demonstrate 
weaknesses in processes for, and controls on, product distribution to consumers that 
are not limited to the provision of personal advice. 
The financial services industry has already attempted to address this problem through 
broader risk management processes and specific initiatives. For example, the 
                                                          
6  Commonwealth of Australia 2012, The Treasury, Compensation arrangements for consumers of 
financial services, report prepared by R St John, Canberra, pages 149–150. 
7  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 384: Regulating 
complex products, ASIC, Sydney, page 4. 
8  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Report 256: Consumer credit 
insurance: A review of sales practices by authorised deposit taking institutions, ASIC, Sydney, 
pages 22–23. 
9  Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 2014, General Insurance Code of Practice: Overview of the 
year 2012/2013, FOS, Melbourne, page 51. 
10  For example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Enforceable 
Undertaking (EU) with Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited, 25 October; ASIC 
2011, EU with UBS Wealth Management Australia Ltd, 17 March; ASIC 2013, EU with 
Macquarie Equities Ltd, 29 January. 
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Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) has developed product approval 
principles for retail structured finance products. However, these do not cover all 
issuers and distributors, and, in any event, are not enforceable.11 
This recommendation takes into account the Senate Economics References 
Committee’s report on ASIC’s performance. The Senate Committee suggested that 
urgent attention should be given to providing ASIC with the necessary toolkit to 
prevent consumer detriment by subjecting the product issuer to more positive 
obligations in regard to the suitability of its product.12 
Rationale 
To improve consumer outcomes, the framework should promote the targeting of 
products to those consumers who would benefit from them. This would reduce the 
incidence of consumers buying products that do not match their needs, building 
consumer confidence and trust in the financial system. It would also benefit individual 
firms by improving customer relationships. 
Options considered 
The Inquiry raised two options in its Interim Report to reduce the number of 
consumers buying products that do not match their needs: 
1. Recommended: Introduce a targeted product design and distribution 
obligation. 
2. Introduce individual appropriateness test at point of sale for complex 
products. 
In response to the Interim Report, submissions also suggested the following additional 
option: 
3. Implement a new obligation through a fully self-regulatory approach by 
setting expectations for industry and monitoring their progress, with 
regulatory follow-up if progress is not made. 
Option costs and benefits 
Introduce a targeted product design and distribution obligation 
Increasing the accountability of product issuers and distributors in this way would 
boost consumer confidence and trust in the system, and is supported in submissions 
                                                          
11  Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) 2012, Principles relating to product 
approval — retail structured financial products, AFMA, Sydney. 
12  The Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Performance of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 442–443. 
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by many consumer groups and financial advice groups. However, industry 
submissions note that many firms already have sophisticated controls in place, and 
regulatory intervention would increase product costs or decrease product offerings for 
consumers.13 Submissions from issuers, distributors and industry groups also raise 
concerns about the difficulty for product issuers in determining the suitability of 
products and the additional compliance cost involved with introducing the new 
obligation. Firms believe their processes would need to be reviewed even if they 
already have controls in place. 
However, the Inquiry notes the proposed obligation is likely to have substantial 
benefits for consumers. As discussed earlier, in conjunction with other measures, a 
product issuer and distributor obligation could reduce the incidence of cases such as: 
• Storm Financial, where margin lending products did not suit consumer risk 
profiles, such as those approaching retirement who could only cover significant 
losses by selling the family home. Close to 2,800 consumers faced around 
$500 million net losses.14 
• Opes Prime, where complex securities lending arrangements were not understood 
by consumers. As a result, hundreds of clients, many of whom were retail 
consumers, faced close to $400 million net losses.15 
The Inquiry considers that industry concerns about implementation costs can be dealt 
with by ensuring the obligation builds on good practice, is principles-based and is 
applied on a scaled basis, allowing scope for firms to adapt their existing practices. 
Thus, the new obligation would impose minimal costs on firms with existing good 
practices. Some incremental costs for industry may include client categorisation, record 
keeping, updating documentation and staff training, as well as monitoring changes in 
the external environment. In addition, the regulator would require additional 
resources to establish initial guidance and monitor compliance. 
Some stakeholders suggest that a new obligation of this kind should be limited to the 
design and distribution of complex products. Although many of the recent cases of 
concern involve distribution of complex products to retail clients, examples of concern 
have also included distribution of less complex products such as add-on insurance and 
debentures. Recent EUs have raised concerns with the quality of distribution plans for 
credit cards.16 The Inquiry’s view is that the obligation should not be restricted. As a 
                                                          
13  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 50. 
14  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 191. 
15  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013, Verdict in Opes Prime director 
trial, media release, 6 September. 
16  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012, Enforceable Undertaking with 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 6 March. 
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matter of principle, the proposed obligation should be universal in its nature and 
scalable in line with the nature of the product. 
This option would deliver benefits to industry, including strengthening internal risk 
management for product design, which may mitigate future problems, as well as 
signalling a higher level of customer focus. This approach should also avoid new, more 
complex and interventionist regulation in the future, promoting efficiency in the 
financial system overall. 
This recommendation aligns with policy objectives in peer jurisdictions; however, the 
Inquiry has taken a principles-based approach that is less prescriptive. The European 
Union and the United Kingdom have introduced regulated product governance 
arrangements, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions has 
suggested that issuers evaluate whether their general distribution strategy is 
appropriate for the target market, particularly for structured products.17 The United 
Kingdom recently assessed compliance with the new product governance obligation, 
suggesting that although firms’ processes and procedures are of variable quality, the 
obligation is playing a positive role in focusing firms on consumer needs.18 
Introduce individual appropriateness test at point of sale 
In the European Union, an individual product appropriateness test is being introduced 
for product issuers and distributors at point of sale.19 An appropriateness test requires 
the assessment of some of an individual’s personal circumstances before making the 
product available to them. In Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, intermediaries are 
required to assess consumers’ knowledge and experience of certain complex products 
before providing services to them.20 In the United States, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority has introduced heightened supervision expectations on issuers 
and distributors for complex products.21 
An individual appropriateness test, where no personal advice is provided, would 
introduce significant costs for issuers and distributors due to necessary changes to the 
sales process. Appropriateness tests are also open to manipulation. The Inquiry 
                                                          
17  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2014, Consultation Paper: MIFID/MiFIR, 
ESMA, Paris, page 39; Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Regulatory Guide: The 
responsibilities of providers and distributors for the fair treatment of consumers, FCA, London; 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 2013, Report FR 14/13 
Regulation of retail structured products, IOSCO, Madrid, pages 43,52. 
18  Financial Services Authority (now the Financial Conduct Authority) (FCA) 2012, Retail 
product development and governance — structured product review, FCA, London, page 11. 
19  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2014, Consultation Paper: MIFID/MiFIR, 
ESMA, Paris, page 136. 
20  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 384: Regulating 
complex products, ASIC, Sydney, page 41. 
21  Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 2012, Regulatory notice 12-03: Heightened 
supervision for complex products, FINRA, Washington DC, pages 5–6.  
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believes that the objective can be achieved by taking a principles-based approach to 
product design and distribution that is less prescriptive. 
Implement new obligation through a fully self-regulatory approach 
This option would build on the recent work of AFMA, relying on the financial services 
industry to monitor how standards are applied and take relevant disciplinary action if 
required. However, recent experience with industry self-regulation in the financial 
sector suggests that improving the design and distribution of products for consumers 
would not be achieved by self-regulation alone.  
The Inquiry considers that past industry-led standards have not been sufficient by 
themselves to address serious conduct issues; for example, managing conflicts in 
financial advice driven by remuneration. Despite efforts over many years, the financial 
advice industry failed to improve financial advisers’ conduct, leaving it unable to 
prevent or reduce the effect of recent serious cases of poor advice. 
Although AFMA standards on product approval practices are valuable, they do not 
cover the whole industry and are not subject to substantive monitoring and 
enforcement. Self-regulation alone would also fail to underscore the importance of this 
recommendation to improve consumer outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Product issuers and distributors are best placed to understand the features of a 
product and its appropriate target market. Introducing a targeted design and 
distribution obligation for all products would decrease the number of consumers 
buying products that do not meet their needs, and would make the industry more 
customer-focused in product design. Therefore, the Inquiry recommends introducing a 
principles-based regulatory obligation that enables industry to develop standards of 
practice tailored to product classes. 
The Inquiry recognises that some firms have already made significant progress in 
designing products for and distributing products to suitable target markets. For firms 
that are already designing products and distribution strategies in this way, the new 
obligation is not likely to have a significant effect. The Inquiry considers that this 
best-practice approach taken by some firms should become standard practice.  
Implementation considerations 
This recommendation should not limit the kinds of products that could be developed 
and issued. The Inquiry supports the role of innovation and its benefits to consumers. 
The new obligation would help target innovative products to consumers whose needs 
align with product features. This may mean certain products are not marketed to 
certain kinds of retail consumers, or are not marketed to consumers unless certain 
conditions are met — an approach consistent with existing good practice. 
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This recommendation should also be considered in conjunction with other 
recommendations in this report, particularly those in Chapter 5: Regulatory system. 
Implementing this recommendation would require adequate regulator capabilities to 
review financial firms’ internal controls and to understand the relevant product 
markets and consumer behavioural biases. 
Circumstances beyond those reasonably foreseeable at the time would not be expected 
to be taken into consideration by issuers and distributors.  
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Introduce product intervention power 
Recommendation 22 
Introduce a proactive product intervention power that would enhance the regulatory toolkit 
available where there is risk of significant consumer detriment. 
Description 
Government should amend the law to provide ASIC with a product intervention 
power. ASIC should be equipped to take a more proactive approach to reducing the 
risk of significant detriment to consumers with a new power to allow for more timely 
and targeted intervention. This power should be used as a last resort or pre-emptive 
measure where there is risk of significant detriment to a class of consumers. This 
power would enable intervention without a demonstrated or suspected breach of the 
law. Given the potential significant commercial impact of this power, the regulator 
should be held to a high level of accountability for its use. 
This power would allow the regulator to intervene to require or impose: 
• Amendments to marketing and disclosure materials. 
• Warnings to consumers, and labelling or terminology changes. 
• Distribution restrictions. 
• Product banning. 
This power is not intended to address problems with pricing of retail financial 
products, where consumers might be paying more than expected for a particular 
product or where a large number of consumers have incurred a small detriment. 
The power would be limited to temporary intervention for 12 months. The temporary 
intervention could be extended by Government if more time was needed either by 
industry to change its relevant practices or for Government to implement permanent 
reform. The power could be used against an individual firm or class of firms in relation 
to a product or class of products. The power would be subject to a judicial review 
mechanism. 
ASIC would be required to consult with the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) prior to using this power when it may affect an APRA-regulated 
body. Government should review the use of this power after five years. 
Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes 
207 
The Inquiry’s view is that providing ASIC with this new power complements the need 
for a proactive market-based regulator. The efficacy of this power depends on a strong, 
independent and accountable regulator. As part of its overall assessment of ASIC’s 
performance against its mandate, the proposed Financial Regulator Assessment Board 
should assess the use of this new power. (See Chapter 5: Regulatory system for a range of 
complementary recommendations.) 
Objectives 
• Reduce significant detriment arising from consumers buying financial products 
they do not understand. 
• Limit or avoid the future need for more prescriptive regulation. 
• Build consumer confidence and trust in the financial system and, in turn, improve 
efficiency through increased consumer engagement and participation. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Currently, ASIC can only take action to rectify consumer detriment after a breach or 
suspected breach of the law by a firm. Further, ASIC can only take enforcement action 
against conduct causing consumer detriment on a firm-by-firm basis, even where the 
problem is industry-wide.  
Australia has had cases of significant consumer detriment where ASIC had exhausted 
its current regulatory toolkit and where there was no clear basis to take enforcement 
action. These include: 
• Mortgage managed investment schemes (MISs), where close to 100 were frozen in 
the market downturn during the global financial crisis. More than 4,000 consumers 
received hardship relief, indicating that many did not expect an investment of this 
type to be illiquid.22 
• Unlisted debenture investments, such as Banksia Securities, where many 
consumers thought the products they bought were like bank term deposits. More 
than 1,500 consumers have lost more than $100 million after recoveries to date.23 
Prior to the collapses, ASIC took action to stop a number of individual pieces of 
                                                          
22  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2011, Statutory 
oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 28 February, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 10. 
23  McGrathNicol 2012, Banksia Securities Limited Cherry Fund Limited (Receivers and Managers 
appointed to both companies): Receivers and Managers’ Report to debenture holders, Sydney, 
page 14; McGrathNicol 2014, Banksia Securities Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed): 
Circular to debenture holders, Sydney, page 1. 
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marketing, but that did not correct consumers’ overall impressions about the level 
of risk involved. 
In both cases, ASIC responded to the emerging risk of significant consumer detriment 
by providing guidance on the nature of disclosure that should accompany these 
products. However, ASIC did not have power to impose such disclosure requirements, 
instead seeking to create an expectation on firms to provide clearer disclosure that 
outlined the risk and central features of the products.  
There have also been cases where ASIC lacked a broad toolkit to respond effectively 
and in a timely way to an emerging risk of significant consumer detriment. For 
example, the following cases involving leveraged investment strategies that 
exacerbated the loss for many consumers: 
• Agribusiness schemes, where the product did not perform in the way that 
consumers were led to believe, including schemes relying on ongoing sales to fund 
their operations. Many consumers did not understand the potential risk of 
borrowing to invest in these products. In total, more than 65,000 consumers 
invested and lost close to $3 billion. 
• Financial collapses that involved poor distribution practices, such as Storm 
Financial and Opes Prime. More than 3,000 consumers lost more than $1.4 billion, 
of which around half was recovered.24 
Although these cases have a number of contributing causes, a strong, independent and 
accountable ASIC, as recommended in Chapter 5: Regulatory system, in combination 
with early intervention using the proposed power, would likely reduce consumer 
losses in similar situations. 
Changes in technology mean that consumers have increasing access to complex 
products, which can involve complicated structures and heightened risk. These 
products may be difficult for consumers to understand, testing the limits of the 
disclosure-based regulatory regime. For example, some structured products have a 
high degree of risk, but are labelled, described and promoted in a way that suggests 
they have lower risk.25 In such cases, consumers may still not understand the 
risk/return trade-off or the central features of the financial product or strategy, even 
where they are accurately disclosed. 
Although complexity does not necessarily correlate to higher risk, complex features 
make it particularly difficult for consumers to assess the risk and appropriate pricing 
                                                          
24  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 191; ASIC 2013, Verdict in Opes Prime director trial, 
media release, 6 September. 
25  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 340: ‘Capital 
protected’ and ‘capital guaranteed’ retail structured products, ASIC, Sydney, page 8. 
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of higher-risk products. ASIC found that 71 per cent of survey respondents, including 
industry participants, consumers and financial literacy specialists, believe that 
Australian consumers do not understand the risk involved with complex products.26 
Also, complex products are particularly influenced by behavioural biases: people 
respond automatically and unconsciously to try to simplify the decision-making 
process, leading to poor financial decisions.27 
That said, the risk of consumer confusion about risk and features is not limited to 
complex products. Past case studies involving margin loans, mortgage schemes and 
debentures indicate consumers may also misunderstand less complex products and 
their core features and risk.28 Many consumers find information imbalances or 
behavioural biases hard to overcome. Some current product distribution strategies also 
hamper understanding. For example, investors in CFDs may rely disproportionately 
on issuer marketing materials, which may not provide a sufficient basis for making an 
informed decision.29 (See Recommendation 21: Strengthen product issuer and distributor 
accountability.) 
This recommendation takes into account the Senate Economics References 
Committee’s report on ASIC’s performance. The Senate Committee suggested that 
urgent attention should be given to providing ASIC with the necessary toolkit to 
prevent consumer detriment through allowing ASIC to intervene and prohibit the 
issue of certain products in retail markets.30 
Rationale 
The Inquiry believes that targeted early intervention would be more effective in 
reducing harm to consumers than waiting until detriment has occurred. The regulator 
should be able to be proactive in its supervision and enforcement. Significant 
consumer detriment could be reduced if ASIC had the power to stop a product from 
being sold or, where the product had already been sold, to prevent the problem from 
affecting a larger group of consumers. 
                                                          
26  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, ASIC Stakeholder survey, 
ASIC, Sydney, page 28. Survey conducted by Susan Bell Research, covering 1,468 
stakeholders. 
27  Kahneman, D 2011, Thinking Fast and Slow, Penguin Books Ltd, London, page 224. 
28  For example, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009, 
Inquiry into financial products and services in Australia, Canberra, Commonwealth of 
Australia, pages 28–30, 56–58; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
2012, Regulation impact statement: Mortgage schemes: Strengthening disclosure under RG 45, 
ASIC, Sydney, pages 12–13. 
29  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2010, Report 205: Contracts for 
difference and retail investors, ASIC, Sydney, page 8. 
30  Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, pages 442–443. 
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Options considered 
The Inquiry raised two options in its Interim Report to reduce consumer detriment: 
1. Recommended: Introduce a product intervention power. 
2. Introduce default products for a range of basic financial needs; for example, 
deposits, home and contents insurance and basic investments. 
In response to the Interim Report, submissions also suggested the following additional 
option: 
3. Prohibit distribution of certain classes of non-mainstream products to retail 
consumers. 
Option costs and benefits 
Introduce product intervention power 
Most consumer group submissions support a broad intervention power.31 The banking 
industry supports the ability to ban products temporarily where detriment to 
consumers is significantly likely, but not to prescribe terminology or restrict product 
features, due to the potential constraints on product innovation.32 However, many 
industry stakeholders do not support changes of this nature, citing concerns about 
misuse of the power obstructing legitimate business opportunities. Others believe such 
a power needs court or parliamentary oversight. They question whether ASIC’s 
cultural and skills mix is sufficient to carry out the responsibilities associated with such 
a power. On the other hand, some believe additional powers “… would allow ASIC to 
react quickly to market developments”.33 
Some stakeholders believe the nature of the powers would create uncertainty, 
constrain innovation, detract from consumer accountability and introduce costs that 
may be borne by consumers. They are also concerned about the reputational cost if the 
new power is used. The Inquiry considers these concerns can be addressed by the 
design and implementation of the power. Specifically: 
• If the power is used effectively, it should not significantly affect innovation. The 
power is expected to be used infrequently and as a last resort or pre-emptive 
measure. In addition, this power is not intended to be used for pre-approval of 
                                                          
31  For example, Superannuation Consumers’ Centre 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, pages 14–15. 
32  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 51. 
33  Deloitte Access Economics 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 58. 
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products as this is likely to result in moral hazard: the perception that no regulator 
intervention implies a low-risk product. 
• This power is not intended to alleviate consumers from bearing responsibility for 
their financial decisions. This would be made clear when the power is 
implemented. 
• Firms with robust product design and distribution practices should not face 
additional regulatory costs as the focus would be on products being distributed to 
consumers who do not understand the central features of the products, such as risk. 
ASIC engagement with potentially affected firms would allow these firms to 
change their practices before any use of the power, thereby limiting public 
reputational damage. 
• The regulator would be accountable for the use of its power, and it would be 
subject to post-implementation review. ASIC would be expected to engage with 
potentially affected firms and to consult with Council of Financial Regulators 
colleagues before any use of the power, including consulting with APRA where 
prudentially regulated firms may be affected.  
This recommendation would be consistent with policy responses in most peer 
jurisdictions, which have taken an increasingly proactive regulatory stance. In 2012, 
the United Kingdom introduced product intervention rules, and since then it has used 
them to restrict the distribution of contingent convertible instruments.34 Similar 
changes have been reflected in Europe through amendments to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive, with a view to increasing consumer protection.35 The 
US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has the power to declare certain practices 
unfair, deceptive or abusive.36 However, the Inquiry believes that the same outcome 
can be achieved in Australia with a less extensive power than is in place in these 
jurisdictions. 
Many cases of financial firm failure include situations where consumers have failed to 
understand the risk/return trade-off involved in a product, even if disclosure and 
advice were compliant. Examples of cases discussed earlier have affected a significant 
number of Australians, and involved large uncompensated losses. Although it is hard 
to quantify the dollar value of the consumer detriment the power might prevent, the 
Inquiry believes that the benefits to consumers would be substantial. 
                                                          
34  Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 2014, Restrictions in relation to the retail distribution of 
contingent convertible instruments, FCA, London. 
35  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2014, Consultation Paper: MIFID/MiFIR, 
ESMA, Paris, page 166. 
36  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, USA, s1031. 
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In addition, as discussed in Recommendation 21: Strengthen product issuer and distributor 
accountability in this chapter, consumer confidence and trust in the financial system can 
be improved by shifting to a more proactive regulator. 
Introduce default products 
Introducing default products would involve significant new powers and require 
considerable resources and skilled personnel. Although some areas may need default 
products, such as superannuation, where consumers are compelled to participate, the 
Inquiry does not believe this rationale extends to other product types. Widening the 
pool of default products may risk significantly limiting innovation and reducing 
competition. 
Prohibit distribution of products 
Some international jurisdictions have prohibited the distribution of certain classes of 
product to retail consumers. For example, in the United Kingdom, non-mainstream 
investment products are prohibited from being distributed to retail consumers.37 
Although such measures may reduce the risk of detriment, they take a broad approach 
and remove choice across a range of products for consumers who may understand the 
risk involved. For this reason, the Inquiry does not recommend them. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes it is important to reduce consumer detriment and rebuild 
consumer confidence and trust in the financial system in the longer term. A more 
proactive approach to improving retail consumer outcomes underscores the 
importance of financial firms treating consumers fairly. This is a significant new power 
that is consistent with having a proactive regulator. The power should be used 
carefully, and ASIC should be accountable for its use as discussed in Chapter 5: 
Regulatory system. 
Implementation considerations 
Accountability would be an important part of the application of this new power. ASIC 
would be expected to issue general policy (after public consultation) describing when 
the power may be used, the process of engagement with affected parties, consultation 
with other regulators before the use of the power, transparency in its use and public 
reporting of the review of each use of this power. An affected product issuer or 
distributor, or class of affected firms, should be able to seek judicial review on the use 
of the power. 
Given the significance of this new kind of power, Government should review its use 
after five years. 
                                                          
37  Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 2013, PS13/3: Restrictions on the retail distribution of 
unregulated collective investment schemes and close substitutes, FCA, London. 
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Facilitate innovative disclosure 
Recommendation 23 
Remove regulatory impediments to innovative product disclosure and communication with 
consumers, and improve the way risk and fees are communicated to consumers. 
Description 
Government should amend the law to remove regulatory impediments to innovative 
communication of product disclosure information, such as the use of online 
communication tools, new media, self-assessment tools and videos. This change 
should occur in two phases: 
1. By ASIC giving individual exemptions from the law through its current pilot 
project to allow innovative communication of mandated product disclosure 
information. 
2. By implementing a broader exemption through legislation, taking into account 
the effectiveness of innovative disclosure under ASIC’s pilot project. 
Industry should develop standards for disclosing risk and fees, and, if significant 
progress is not made within a short time frame, Government should consider a 
regulatory approach. 
Objectives 
• Promote more engaging and effective communication with consumers to increase 
consumer understanding and facilitate better decision making. 
• Reduce the number of consumers buying products that do not match their needs. 
• Promote efficiency, including competition, by better informing consumers. 
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Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Product disclosure 
Mandated product disclosure requirements, which set form and content requirements, 
are impeding issuers from developing innovative approaches to communicating 
disclosure information.38 With technological developments, such as those enabling 
online financial services, consumer expectations have changed, but the current regime 
inhibits the ability of firms to meet these expectations. 
The Inquiry supports the need for mandated product disclosure, which is necessary to 
inform the market and to support issuers and consumers in setting out the terms of 
their contract. However, the Inquiry sees scope to provide issuers with more flexibility 
to communicate mandated disclosure to better engage and inform consumers. 
Consumers can more effectively use information that is accessible, engaging and 
understandable. Research shows that presenting financial product information in 
shorter disclosure documents that are better signposted, and using plain English and 
graphics, can improve consumer understanding.39 Although there has been limited 
research on the benefits of new media compared with paper-based disclosure, new 
media offers opportunities for more engaging communication. 
An ASIC pilot project is underway to test innovative approaches to disclosure. Issuers 
in this pilot will provide consumers with a key facts sheet and a self-assessment tool 
using a variety of electronic media, including video, audio and interactive 
presentations. ASIC will provide individual relief necessary to facilitate the pilot. 
Risk and fee disclosure 
With the exception of the new standard risk measure in the MySuper product 
dashboard, the law generally does not provide detailed requirements on how to 
disclose risk. Yet evidence shows that consumers frequently misunderstand risk 
relating to financial products. ASIC found that 45 per cent of survey respondents, 
including industry participants, consumers and financial literacy specialists, believe 
consumers do not understand that higher reward often means higher risk, and 
71 per cent believe that consumers fail to fully understand the risk involved in complex 
                                                          
38  A number of legislative provisions require issuers to provide documents and in some cases 
prescribe the format; for example, the Corporations Regulations 2001 for superannuation and 
simple managed investment products, the Corporations Act 2001 for prospectus 
requirements, and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 and the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 for credit contracts and consumer leases. 
39  For example, Susan Bell Research 2008, The provision of consumer research regarding financial 
product disclosure documents: Research report for the Financial Services Working Group, Susan 
Bell Research, Sydney. 
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products.40 Behavioural economists highlight that individuals are prone to making 
systematic errors in decisions that involve assessing risk and uncertainty, such as 
when making insurance or investment decisions.41 
The law mandates standardised communication of fees for superannuation and simple 
MISs. Despite these more prescriptive fee disclosure provisions, ASIC has recently 
reported varied compliance practices and is consulting on clarifications to the law. 
However, even after these clarifications of current law, aspects of fee disclosure would 
remain open to industry to standardise further where the law does not set specific 
requirements. These areas include:  
• Improving treatment of buy–sell spreads in unit prices. 
• Reducing differences in fee disclosure between superannuation and simple MISs. 
• Improving the provision of fee information by issuers of underlying investment 
entities. 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry considers that innovative disclosure can improve consumer engagement 
and understanding, and that industry should pursue innovative disclosure and 
alternative forms of communication. The Inquiry endorses the ASIC pilot project and 
encourages industry to continue to engage with ASIC about forms of innovative 
disclosure. 
The Inquiry is aware that commercial factors can work against creating more 
innovative disclosure. Although removing impediments may or may not provide 
sufficient incentive for industry incumbents to innovate, it may allow new entrants to 
drive different forms of disclosure. 
The results from ASIC’s pilot should be considered when drafting new laws to 
facilitate innovative disclosure, including the findings from consumer testing within 
the pilot. Consideration should also be given to domestic and international research on 
the presentation of mandated information. 
The Inquiry also considers improved disclosure of risk would assist consumers to 
make more informed decisions about financial products. Improving consistency of fee 
presentation would enhance allocative efficiency; for example, by promoting fee-based 
competition in superannuation. 
                                                          
40  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, ASIC Stakeholder Survey, 
ASIC, Sydney, page 28. Survey conducted by Susan Bell Research, covering 1,468 
stakeholders. 
41  Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 2013, Occasional Paper No.1, Applying behavioural 
economics at the Financial Conduct Authority, FCA, London, page 5. 
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The Inquiry recommends a self-regulatory, flexible approach to improving 
communication of risk and fees, allowing tailoring for different classes of products and 
avoiding prescriptive regulation, which would involve higher compliance costs. 
Industry should build on existing measures to improve consumer understanding of 
risk by including risk measures for investment products; for example, simple and 
non-simple MISs, securities and structured products. Industry should also consider 
examples of risk measures used in Europe and Canada. In developing risk measures, 
industry should consider: 
• Whether a risk measure should be applied broadly across all classes of product. 
• Whether there are more effective alternatives to risk measures, such as: 
– Disclosure on relative expected or promised return against a well-regarded 
benchmark like the official cash rate. 
– Tools that assist consumers to understand how products would be likely to 
perform in different market conditions. 
– Prominent warnings about whether a product is leveraged and what this means 
for consumers if there is a serious market downturn. 
Proposed measures should be consumer-tested to maximise their effectiveness. 
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Align the interests of financial firms and consumers 
Recommendation 24 
Better align the interests of financial firms with those of consumers by raising industry 
standards, enhancing the power to ban individuals from management and ensuring 
remuneration structures in life insurance and stockbroking do not affect the quality of 
financial advice. 
Description 
Better align the interests of financial firms with those of consumers by: 
• Industry raising standards of conduct and levels of professionalism to build 
confidence and trust in the financial system. 
• Government amending the law to provide ASIC with an enhanced power to ban 
individuals, including officers and those involved in managing financial firms, 
from managing a financial firm. This would enhance adviser and management 
accountability. 
• Government amending the law to require that an upfront commission for life 
insurance advice is not greater than ongoing commissions. This would reduce 
incentives for churning and improve the quality of advice on life insurance. 
• ASIC reviewing the effect of current stockbroking remuneration structures on the 
quality of consumer outcomes. If this review raises significant concerns, ASIC 
should advise Government on the need to remove the sector’s exemption from the 
ban on conflicted remuneration. 
Objectives 
• Improve the culture of financial firms and build consumer trust in those firms. 
• Align remuneration structures with a customer-focused culture. 
• Promote efficiency in the financial advice sector through increased consumer 
participation and engagement. 
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Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Poor standards of conduct and professionalism 
Recent cases of poor financial services provision raise serious concerns with the culture 
of firms and their apparent lack of customer focus. Research in 2009 suggested that 
financial firms may not be implementing systems and procedures within their 
organisations that promote ethical culture and integrate governance, risk management 
and compliance frameworks.42 In 2011–12, approximately 94 per cent of ASIC’s 
banning orders involved significant integrity issues, where the alleged conduct would 
breach professional and ethical standards and/or the conduct provisions in the 
Corporations Act 2001.43 The remaining 6 per cent of cases involved competency issues. 
The Inquiry considers that cases of consumer detriment and poor advice reflect 
organisational cultures that do not focus on consumer interests. Such cultures promote 
short-term commercial outcomes over longer-term customer relationships. This has 
contributed to a lack of consumer confidence and trust in the system. In research 
undertaken by Roy Morgan, only 28 per cent of participants gave financial planners 
‘high’ or ‘very high’ ratings for ethics and honesty, and trust in bank managers was 
held by just 43 per cent of participants.44 In addition, ASIC found only 33 per cent of 
stakeholders agreed that financial firms operate with integrity.45 
Banning power 
ASIC has observed phoenix activity in financial firms, where senior people from a 
financial firm with poor operating practices may establish a new business or move to 
an alternative firm.46 Currently, ASIC can prevent a person from providing financial 
services, but cannot prevent them from managing a financial firm. Nor can ASIC 
remove individuals involved in managing a firm that may have a culture of 
non-compliance. 
Life insurance 
In light of recent evidence, the Inquiry is concerned about high upfront commissions 
for life insurance advisers. This has been a longstanding industry practice reflecting 
                                                          
42  Smith, J 2009, Professionalism and Ethics in Financial Planning, Victoria University, 
Melbourne, page 347. 
43  Deloitte 2012, FOFA Perspective: Advice delivery, Financial Services Risk and Regulatory Review, 
Deloitte, Sydney, page 19. 
44  Roy Morgan Research 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
5 November 2014, Australians aged 14+. 
45  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, ASIC Stakeholder survey, 
ASIC, Sydney, page 31. Survey conducted by Susan Bell Research, covering 1,468 
stakeholders. 
46  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 46. 
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that life insurance has higher arranging costs, such as managing the underwriting 
process, and that consumers are often not independently motivated to purchase life 
insurance. With the exception of group life insurance policies inside superannuation 
and an individual life insurance policy for a member of a default fund, life insurance 
products are exempt from the FOFA ban on commissions. This allows individual life 
policies to be sold with high upfront commissions, creating an incentive for advisers to 
make a sale, rather than provide strategic advice. For example, these policies can have 
100–130 per cent of the first year’s premium payable as upfront commissions, with an 
ongoing trail commission of around 10 per cent. A recent ASIC report on life insurance 
revealed significant problems with both compliance and the consequences for 
consumers.47 More than a third of the personal advice reviewed failed to comply with 
the laws relating to appropriate advice and prioritising the needs of the consumer. 
Upfront commissions can affect the quality of advice. ASIC found that 96 per cent of 
advice rated as a ‘fail’ was given by advisers paid under an upfront commission 
model. ASIC also found high upfront commissions encourage advisers to replace a 
consumer’s policy rather than retain it.48 In some cases, this may result in inferior 
policy terms. To date, industry approaches to address the issues in life insurance have 
not worked.49 
Stockbrokers 
In recent years, ASIC has identified compliance issues in the stockbroking industry.50 
The Inquiry is aware of concerns with the prevalence of ‘grid’ commissions for 
advisers, where commission-based remuneration is received soon after advice is given, 
with the potential to create a conflict of interest between the adviser and the consumer. 
Australia and the United States are the only jurisdictions that use a grid commission 
structure. In most other major financial centres, stockbrokers are paid a salary and 
discretionary bonus. The Inquiry recognises it may be difficult for individual firms to 
change remuneration models without policy intervention because stockbrokers would 
move firms. 
                                                          
47  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 413: Review of retail 
life insurance advice, ASIC, Sydney, page 6. 
48  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 413: Review of retail 
life insurance advice, ASIC, Sydney, page 5, 42.  
49  However, note that the Financial Services Council and Association of Financial Advisers 
have now established a working group to address the issues raised by the ASIC report; 
Financial Services Council 2014, John Trowbridge to chair FSC-AFA life insurance working 
group, media release, 17 October. 
50  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, ASIC accepts enforceable 
undertaking from Macquarie Equities Ltd, media release, 29 January; ASIC 2011, ASIC 
accepts legally enforceable undertaking from UBS Wealth Management Australia, media 
release, 17 March.  
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Conclusion 
To build confidence and trust in the financial system, financial firms need to be seen to 
act with greater integrity and accountability. The Inquiry believes changes are required 
not only to the regulatory regime and supervisory approach, but also to the culture 
and conduct of financial firms’ management, which needs to focus on consumer 
interests and outcomes. A change in culture in line with community expectations 
should promote confidence and trust in the financial system and limit the need for 
more significant regulation.  
Raising standards of conduct and levels of professionalism would require both a 
coordinated industry approach and focus of attention by individual firms. Industry 
associations could lead this initiative, with stakeholder input from ASIC and consumer 
organisations. Introducing or enhancing individual firm or industry codes of conduct 
is one way in which industry could set raised standards and hold themselves 
accountable. 
An enhanced banning power should improve professional behaviour, management 
accountability and the culture of firms, by removing certain individuals from the 
industry and preventing them from managing a financial firm. This should also 
include individuals who are licence holders or authorised representatives, or managers 
of a credit licensee. It should prevent those operating under an Australian Financial 
Services Licence from moving to operate under a credit licence and vice versa. 
For life insurance, the Inquiry recommends a level commission structure implemented 
through legislation requiring that an upfront commission is not greater than the 
ongoing commission. This would provide a balanced and cost effective approach to 
better align the interests of advisers and consumers. The remuneration model needs to 
be sustainable; otherwise there is a risk that providers may exit the market, making it 
more difficult for consumers to obtain life insurance advice. The findings of the 
Financial Services Council and the Association of Financial Advisers working group 
should also be considered during the development and implementation phases. 
Alternative models of remuneration, such as delayed vesting of commissions and 
clawback arrangements, may simply delay the issue of churn and are complex. At this 
stage, the Inquiry does not recommend removing all commissions, as some consumers 
may not purchase life insurance if the advice involves an upfront fee. However, if level 
commission structures do not address the issues in life insurance, Government should 
revisit banning commissions. 
The Inquiry has not determined the percentage amount of the level commissions that 
should apply in the life insurance sector. This should be left to the market and 
industry. 
The Inquiry notes the FOFA ban on conflicted remuneration and associated measures 
are relatively new and should bring significant change to the industry and benefits for 
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consumers. However, some incentive-based remuneration models remain, including 
grandfathered arrangements and other specific exclusions. The Inquiry believes that 
these instances of conflicted remuneration should be monitored, and Government 
should intervene if further significant issues are observed.  
Specific attention is required in the stockbroking sector in the immediate future. Unlike 
in the life insurance industry, a recent review of practices in stockbroking has not been 
undertaken. The Inquiry considers that ASIC should review current remuneration 
practices in stockbroking and advise Government on whether action is needed. 
The Inquiry believes that better aligning the interests of financial firms with consumer 
interests, combined with stronger and better resourced regulators with access to higher 
penalties, should lead to better consumer outcomes. 
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Raise the competency of advisers 
Recommendation 25 
Raise the competency of financial advice providers and introduce an enhanced register of 
advisers. 
Description 
Government should continue the current process to raise the minimum competency 
standards for financial advisers.51 
In the Inquiry’s view, the minimum standards for those advising on Tier 1 products 
should include: 
• A relevant tertiary degree. 
• Competence in specialised areas, such as superannuation, where relevant. 
• Ongoing professional development — including technical skills, relationship skills, 
compliance and ethical requirements — to complement the increased focus on 
standards of conduct and professionalism in Recommendation 24: Align the interests of 
financial firms and consumers in this chapter. 
The standards should be reviewed regularly to ensure they take into account 
developments in the financial sector. In addition, compliance with the standards needs 
to be actively monitored. Transitional arrangements should be made to allow 
opportunity for advisers to upskill, and include recognition of professional experience. 
In addition, ASIC should complete the establishment of an enhanced public register of 
all financial advisers, which includes those who are employees. The Inquiry considers 
that the register should include licence status, work history, education, qualifications 
and credentials, areas of advice, employer, business structure and years of 
experience.52 
                                                          
51  Government is currently considering mechanisms to raise minimum education 
requirements. 
52  Government has recently announced an enhanced register: Cormann, M (Minister for 
Finance and Acting Assistant Treasurer) 2014, An enhanced public register of financial 
advisers, media release, 24 October, Canberra. 
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Objectives 
• Increase the likelihood of consumers receiving customer-focused quality advice. 
• Promote confident and informed consumer use of financial advisory services. 
• Facilitate consumer access to information about financial advisers’ experience and 
qualifications to improve transparency and competition. 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Competency standards 
The Interim Report observed that affordable, quality financial advice can bring 
significant benefits for consumers.53 However, according to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS), “the major criticism of 
the current system is that licensees’ minimum training standards for advisers are too 
low, particularly given the complexity of many financial products”.54 This affects 
confidence and trust in the sector and can prevent consumers from seeking financial 
advice. 
A number of high-profile cases where consumers have suffered significant detriment 
through receiving poor advice, and a series of ASIC studies, have revealed issues with 
the quality of advice. For example, ASIC’s report on retirement advice found that only 
3 per cent of Statements of Advice were labelled ‘good’, 39 per cent were ‘poor’ and the 
remaining 58 per cent ‘adequate’.55 Although these cases and many of these studies 
occurred before the FOFA reforms to improve remuneration structures, this is not the 
only issue. Adviser competence has also been a factor in poor consumer outcomes. 
ASIC’s review of advice on retail structured products found insufficient evidence of a 
reasonable basis for the advice in approximately half of the files.56 
                                                          
53  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 3-63. 
54  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009, Inquiry into 
financial products and services in Australia, Canberra, page 87. 
55  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2012, Report 279: Shadow 
shopping study of retirement advice, ASIC, Sydney, page 8. 
56  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 377: Review of advice 
on retail structured products, ASIC, Sydney, page 12. 
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Under the current framework, ASIC guidance sets out the minimum knowledge, skills 
and education for people who provide financial advice to comply with the 
Corporations Act 2001 and licence conditions. The training standards vary depending 
on whether the adviser is dealing with Tier 1 or Tier 2 financial products.57 As a 
minimum, current education standards are broadly equivalent to a Diploma under the 
Australian Qualifications Framework for Tier 1 products, and to a Certificate III for 
Tier 2 products. 
Register of advisers 
As the PJCCFS stated, “the licensing system does not currently provide a distinction 
between advisers on the basis of their qualifications, which is unhelpful for consumers 
when choosing a financial adviser”.58 ASIC currently has a public record of financial 
advice licensees and is notified of authorised representatives. However, ASIC has little 
visibility of employee advisers, or access to the type of information that an enhanced 
register could hold, such as length of experience and employment history. ASIC argues 
that transparency about advisers through an enhanced register is an important piece 
missing from the regulatory framework.59 Most stakeholders support introducing such 
an enhanced register. 
Conclusion 
The benefits of improving the quality of advice are significant. To achieve this, the 
Inquiry believes that minimum competency standards should be increased and the 
current Government process to review these standards should be prioritised. 
In advance of the completion of the Government process, some adviser firms have 
recently announced they are increasing their own qualification requirements. 
However, low minimum competency standards have been a feature of the industry for 
a substantial length of time, and change is needed across the board. Many stakeholders 
are highly concerned about the low minimum education standards of financial 
advisers, with most supporting lifting education requirements to degree level. 
                                                          
57  Tier 2 products are generally simpler and better understood than Tier 1 products and are 
therefore subject to lighter training standards, including a lower educational level. Tier 2 
includes basic banking products and general insurance products. Tier 1 covers the 
remainder, including superannuation, managed investment schemes, life insurance, 
securities and derivatives. 
58  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009, Inquiry into 
financial products and services in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 90. 
59  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 46. 
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Internationally, Singapore and the United Kingdom are seeking to raise minimum 
competency standards.60 The Inquiry is of the view that Australia should set high 
standards in comparison with peer jurisdictions. Although the Inquiry does not 
recommend a national exam for advisers, this could be considered if issues in adviser 
competency persist. 
For individual advisers and firms, the cost of undertaking further and ongoing 
education would be significant. However, this is a necessary transition to move 
towards higher standards of competence and would deliver long-term benefits for 
consumers. The cost would be mitigated by an appropriate transition period. 
Raising the minimum competency standards may increase the cost of advice for 
consumers. However, various cost effective market developments are emerging, such 
as scaled or limited advice and using technology to deliver advice.61 The Inquiry 
encourages advisers to develop new models for delivering advice more cost effectively 
to sit alongside existing comprehensive face-to-face advice models. 
The requirement for higher education standards may cause some existing advisers to 
exit the industry and may deter some from entering, potentially causing an ‘advice 
gap’ for some consumers. Transitional arrangements to give advisers appropriate time 
to upgrade their qualifications would help manage this risk. Raising standards would 
also increase confidence and trust in the industry, encouraging more individuals to 
choose financial advisory services as a career path, and increasing the supply of 
financial advisers. 
The Inquiry has not made a recommendation in relation to mortgage brokers. 
However, it considers that ASIC should continue to monitor consumer outcomes in 
this area and the performance of the industry in relation to its obligations under the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009. 
In relation to the register of advisers, the Inquiry supports the establishment of the 
enhanced register to facilitate consumer access to information about financial advisers’ 
experience and qualifications and improve transparency and competition. Further 
                                                          
60  Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 2013, MAS issues response to consultation on 
recommendations of Financial Advisory Industry Review, media release, 30 September, 
Singapore. In the United Kingdom, the Retail Distribution Review increased the minimum 
education standards for advisers to the equivalent of the first year of tertiary education: 
Financial Conduct Authority 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
24 October 2014. 
61  Investment Trends data shows that 85 per cent of planners say they currently provide 
scaled advice to new clients. Around half (46 per cent) of these planners say they intend to 
provide even more single-issue advice (either scaled and/or transactional) over the next 
12 months. While new advice and advice reviews over web chat is currently a niche, many 
advisers are interested in utilising this technology to engage with clients: Investment 
Trends 2014, May 2014 Planner Business Model Report, Investment Trends, Sydney. Based on 
a survey of 1,038 financial planners. 
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consideration could be given to adding other fields, such as determinations by the 
FOS.62 The register should be designed to take account of possible future 
developments in automated advice and record the entity responsible for providing 
such services. 
                                                          
62  Issues that would have to be addressed in achieving this include that determinations are 
currently made only against licence holders.  
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Improve guidance and disclosure in general insurance 
Recommendation 26 
Improve guidance (including tools and calculators) and disclosure for general insurance, 
especially in relation to home insurance. 
Description 
The general insurance industry should guide consumers as to the likely replacement 
value for home building and contents for the purpose of insurance. If significant 
progress is not made by industry within a short time frame, Government should 
consider introducing a regulatory requirement to provide this guidance at the point of 
renewal or on entering into a contract with a new insurer. 
The general insurance industry should enhance existing tools and calculators for home 
insurance, including providing up-to-date information about building costs and 
building code changes. 
The general insurance industry should complete its work on improving disclosure in 
insurance product disclosure documents, including consumer testing, and providing 
information at the appropriate point in the sales process. 
Objectives 
• Reduce the incidence of inadvertent underinsurance by assisting consumers to 
make an informed decision about the sum insured. 
• Increase the ability of consumers to make informed decisions when taking out 
insurance. 
• Enhance consumer understanding of insurance policies, especially key features, 
caps and limits, and exclusions. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Many stakeholders are concerned about underinsurance flowing from natural disasters 
and high premiums, especially in disaster-prone areas. The cost of insurance can be 
high, especially for coverage in higher-risk areas such as flood plains and 
cyclone-prone areas, leading to non-insurance and underinsurance. The Inquiry 
believes this issue should be primarily handled by risk mitigation efforts rather than 
direct government intervention, which risks distorting price signals. (For more 
discussion on relevant issues, see Box 12: General insurance and natural disasters). 
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Studies after natural disasters reveal inadequate levels of insurance.63 After the 
Canberra bushfires in 2003, ASIC found affected consumers were underinsured by 
27 per cent on average. Research undertaken by Legal Aid NSW in relation to the Blue 
Mountains bushfires of 2013 found, “of the 68 survey participants who were insured 
and had suffered a total loss of their home at the Blue Mountains, a total of 82 per cent 
experienced some level of underinsurance for their home building policy and/or home 
contents policy”.64 
Replacement value 
The current regulatory settings allow insurers to provide guidance on the replacement 
value of home building or contents without needing to comply with the personal 
advice rules.65 At present, this is not working and insurers are not typically providing 
guidance on replacement value. The Inquiry believes that commercial disincentives 
mean insurers are reluctant to provide this type of guidance. Although many insurers 
provide online calculators to estimate replacement value, insurers typically refrain 
from giving guidance on the replacement value either over the phone or on a renewal 
notice. A recent ASIC report identified that most insurers operate on a ‘no advice’ or 
factual information model.66  
The draft Productivity Commission (PC) report on natural disaster funding 
arrangements commented on a number of important issues consumers face during 
natural disasters, including a lack of consumer understanding about risk and 
insurance leading to non-insurance and underinsurance.67 Underinsurance often 
occurs because most standard home building and contents insurance policies require 
the consumer to decide on the amount of insurance. One of the causes of 
underinsurance includes consumers setting their replacement value amounts too low, 
due to a lack of knowledge and the specialist skills required to more accurately 
estimate the cost of rebuilding a home and replacing home contents.68 
The ASIC report found that “consumers frequently sought assistance from insurers 
about how best to decide a sum insured amount”. However, in many instances, sales 
staff advised they were not able to assist. Insurers have access to information that 
allows them to assess replacement value better than consumers. However, insurers 
typically do not give phone-based guidance or refer consumers to existing online tools 
                                                          
63  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2005, Report 54: Getting home 
insurance right, ASIC, Sydney; ASIC 2007, Report 89: Making home insurance better, ASIC, 
Sydney. 
64  Legal Aid NSW 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
65  Corporations Act 2001, s766B(6). 
66  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 415: A review of the 
sale of home insurance, ASIC, Sydney, pages 9, 10, 47. 
67  Productivity Commission 2014, Draft Report: Natural disaster funding arrangements, 
Volume 1, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 31. 
68  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2005, Report 54: Getting home 
insurance right, ASIC, Sydney, page 5. 
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and calculators, which would help with these replacement estimates.69 Renewal 
notices also typically do not include this information. The Inquiry believes that it is 
important for insurers to provide guidance on replacement value to consumers to 
lessen the risk of underinsurance. 
Tools and calculators 
Tools and calculators can be updated to help consumers estimate replacement costs 
more accurately. The Inquiry acknowledges that the insurance market has developed 
some tools to address ‘estimation risk’; for instance, providing ‘uplift’ factors to sums 
insured, indexation or inflation adjustments to sums insured, and technological tools 
designed to assist consumers. However, the Inquiry sees further scope to address this 
issue, including the industry improving tools and calculators by referencing up-to-date 
building costs and changes in building codes that may affect rebuild cost. The draft PC 
report discussed how information imbalances may increase underinsurance due to 
consumers being unable to access relevant information, such as changes to building 
codes that may increase the cost of building a home.70 
Disclosure 
Although general insurance has a specific product disclosure regime, the industry 
lacks standard practice in describing a policy’s key features and exclusions. The PC 
also commented on the difficulties consumers face in understanding the information 
they receive about their insurance policy.71 
Survey results highlight that even when consumers take the time to read insurance 
documentation including the product disclosure statement, many misunderstand it, 
scan it briefly due to over-reliance on sales staff or fail to understand it due to its 
complexity.72 For example, as a consequence of recent natural disasters, it became clear 
many consumers did not understand whether they were covered for flood. A survey 
by the Caxton Legal Centre after the Queensland floods of 2011 found that of 
participating consumers: 
• 51 per cent read the policy but misunderstood important exclusions or limitations. 
• 12 per cent received the policy but never read it. 
• 4 per cent tried to read the policy but gave up as they could not understand it. 
                                                          
69  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 415: A review of the 
sale of home insurance, ASIC, Sydney, page 10.  
70  Productivity Commission 2014, Draft Report: Natural disaster funding arrangements, 
Volume 2, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 385. 
71  Productivity Commission 2014, Draft Report: Natural disaster funding arrangements, 
Volume 2, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 385. 
72  Caxton Legal Centre Inc 2011, Submission to the Standing Committee on Social Policy and 
Legal Affairs: Inquiry into the operation of the insurance industry during disaster events, 
page 16. 
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Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes that underinsurance would reduce if, as standard practice, 
insurers gave consumers relevant information, guidance and advice on home building 
and contents insurance. Some stakeholders argue that total replacement policies would 
be the best solution to the issue of underinsurance. However, this may increase risk for 
insurers, which may exacerbate affordability issues. The Inquiry considered whether 
introducing standardised or default insurance products would reduce the risk of 
consumers failing to understand policies’ key features and exclusions. On balance, the 
Inquiry considers the consequent reduction in competition and potential disincentive 
for innovation does not warrant this kind of response. 
The Inquiry encourages insurers to provide consumers with enhanced guidance about 
likely replacement values, and to develop further and make consumers aware of tools 
that can help them to purchase adequate insurance cover. Industry should standardise 
the way replacement costs are estimated. To the extent this is limited by the existing 
regulatory regime, industry should work with Government to resolve. Such estimates 
should be given at the time of purchase, and changes to replacement costs should be 
communicated to consumers at each renewal. 
Insurers providing consumers with enhanced guidance on replacement values would 
lessen the risk of underinsurance and increase confidence and trust in the sector. This 
may also reduce the need for governments to provide assistance after natural disasters. 
If, within the short term, industry has not made significant progress in providing this 
guidance to consumers, the Inquiry considers that Government should require 
industry to provide it. 
The Inquiry believes the general insurance industry should complete its recent work 
on reducing complexity and facilitating consumer understanding of key features and 
exclusions, including relevant consumer testing. This work can be a useful supplement 
to the key facts sheet for home building insurance, which was introduced in 
November 2014.73 Insurers could also incorporate elements of the key facts sheet when 
giving information, guidance and advice over the phone and online. 
The Inquiry believes that the recommendations build on existing industry work and 
practices, and should have lower implementation costs than compliance with a 
prescriptive regulatory regime. 
                                                          
73  Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985, Part 4, Division 4. 
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Box 12: General insurance and natural disasters 
Many stakeholders raised concerns in relation to general insurance. The Interim 
Report highlighted two issues on general insurance and natural disasters: 
1. The costs of insurance, especially for coverage in higher-risk areas, such as 
flood plains and cyclone-prone areas. It observed that increased use of 
risk-based pricing is likely to increase premiums in these areas. 
2. The incidence of underinsurance following a natural disaster, especially 
inadvertent underinsurance, where homeowners underestimate the cost of 
rebuilding. 
Cost of insurance 
High premiums can lead to calls for government intervention; for example, in 
relation to the cost of home and strata title insurance in North Queensland. The 
Australian Government Actuary, which has completed two reports on the issue, 
attributed recent price increases to historic underpricing of coverage, higher 
reinsurance costs and the cost of natural disasters. It also found that insurers were 
providing appropriate risk-based products and pricing.74 
The Inquiry recognises a few areas where the absence of private sector providers 
creates a need for governments to provide insurance; for example, for terrorism 
insurance or cover for catastrophic personal injuries. However, in most cases, the 
Inquiry considers the main role of government is to support the market in working 
as effectively as possible rather than subsidising prices. The costs of natural disaster 
insurance can be reduced through improved data, further mitigation efforts — such 
as building flood levies, and in the case of states and territories, by reducing the tax 
burden on insurance contracts (see Appendix 2: Tax summary). The Inquiry notes 
Government has recently decided to provide a comparison website for home 
insurance in North Queensland and has clarified that unauthorised foreign insurers 
may provide some competition and offer lower prices in targeted areas prone to 
natural disaster.75 
                                                          
74  Australian Government Actuary (AGA) 2014, Second report on investigation into strata title 
insurance price rises in North Queensland, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,  
pages 19–20; AGA 2012, Report on investigation into strata title insurance price rises in North 
Queensland, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 7, 16–17. 
75  Cormann, M (Minister for Finance and Acting Assistant Treasurer) 2014, Initiatives to help 
address insurance affordability in North Queensland, media release, 23 October, Canberra; 
Senate Economics Legislation Committee 2014, Hansard transcript, 31 October, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 13–25. 
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Box 12: General insurance and natural disasters (cont.) 
Insurance coverage and underinsurance 
Price competition can also help to address underinsurance. For mass-marketed 
insurance products, governments can play a role in encouraging comparison 
websites. In Chapter 3: Innovation, the Inquiry recommends the PC review how data 
can be used more effectively to enhance consumer outcomes, better inform decision 
making, and facilitate greater efficiency and innovation in the financial system. 
Statutory insurance is insurance that is mandatory; for example, compulsory 
third-party motor vehicle insurance, workers’ compensation insurance and 
professional indemnity insurance. While there are strong justifications for making 
some insurance cover mandatory (especially liability insurance) where the 
detriment is to third parties, governments imposing this requirement should take 
steps to encourage an adequate market (where they do not provide the cover 
themselves). Where governments provide insurance in competition with the private 
sector, this should be done on the basis of competitive neutrality. 
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Chapter 5: Regulatory system 
Australia needs strong, independent and accountable regulators to help maintain trust 
and confidence in the financial system. This is critically important for attracting 
investment and supporting growth. The quality of oversight and supervision is vital in 
maintaining financial stability and achieving positive consumer outcomes. 
Appropriate firm culture is critical, but needs to be supported by proactive regulators 
with the right skills, culture, powers and funding. 
Australia’s regulatory system, as described in the Interim Report, is a legacy of the 
Wallis Inquiry’s functional approach to regulation.1 This means regulators generally 
focus on particular outcomes across the system, rather than particular sectors.2 The 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) specialises in prudential 
regulation of banking, insurance and superannuation, while the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) has a broader conduct and market integrity 
mandate.3 
Since the Wallis Inquiry, Australia’s regulatory system has undergone significant 
change. The overall approach to prudential regulation changed significantly in the 
wake of the collapse of HIH Insurance Limited (HIH) in 2001. There has been a 
stronger focus on developing tools for crisis management and resolution. APRA also 
acquired a more active role in the superannuation sector.4 In addition, ASIC’s mandate 
expanded significantly, assuming responsibility for regulating credit as well as 
financial market supervision. 
The global financial crisis (GFC) prompted policy makers and regulators around the 
world to reconsider their approach to maintaining financial stability. Some countries at 
the epicentre of the crisis have since expanded their prudential perimeters and 
adopted more formal and centralised institutional arrangements. This includes 
establishing single entities with responsibility for macro-prudential regulation. 
Australia has long adopted what could be called a ‘macro-prudential’ approach to 
supervision under the rubric of financial stability. Yet, Australia’s institutional 
structure is relatively informal and decentralised. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
and APRA each have responsibility for financial stability. However, most 
macro-prudential tools can only be deployed by APRA. This places a strong premium 
on cooperation between the two agencies. 
                                                          
1  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra,  
page 3–90. 
2  The exception is the Payments System Board, which focuses on the payments industry. 
3  This is described as the ‘twin peaks’ model. 
4  This includes trustee licensing, the capacity to make prudential standards and authorisation 
of MySuper products. 
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Against the background of developments overseas, the Inquiry has considered 
whether Australia should change its institutional arrangements for making and 
implementing financial stability policy. 
However, the Inquiry does not see a strong case for change in this area. Although 
Australia’s approach has advantages and disadvantages, alternative institutional 
approaches are yet to be tested — as indeed is the effectiveness of many 
macro-prudential tools. For this reason, the Inquiry recommends no fundamental 
change to the current institutional arrangements for financial stability policy and no 
change to the prudential perimeter at this time.5 However, it believes that the RBA 
should continue to monitor risks in the non-prudentially regulated sector, and the 
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) should periodically consider whether change is 
required.6 
The Inquiry does not see a need to expand the permanent membership of the CFR to 
include the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) or the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO), as these agencies can already attend meetings as necessary. 
However, there would be benefit in increasing the transparency of the CFR’s 
deliberations, including its assessment of financial stability risks and how these are 
being addressed. 
The Inquiry also considered whether superannuation outside self-managed 
superannuation funds (SMSFs) should still be subject to prudential regulation by 
APRA and whether to narrow ASIC’s responsibilities. 
The Interim Report identified that defined contribution superannuation is different to 
banking and insurance and therefore needs to be regulated differently. Unlike deposit 
accounts, defined contribution superannuation balances are intended to be exposed to 
market risk, and do not guarantee a particular return. However, the Inquiry believes 
the compulsory nature of superannuation justifies ongoing prudential regulation by 
APRA, including the availability of compensation in the event of fraud or theft. 
Some submissions suggest that SMSFs might be prudentially regulated by APRA.7 The 
Inquiry does not support this. The defining characteristic of the SMSF sector is that 
trustee members are directly responsible for each fund and must take responsibility for 
their own decisions. 
                                                          
5  The section on graduated payments regulation in Chapter 3: Innovation recommends making 
some changes to the current authorisation regime that applies to purchased payment 
facilities. It recommends that the current arrangements should be replaced with a two-tiered 
authorisation regime.  
6  The Financial Stability Board produces an annual survey of the global shadow banking 
sector, including that in Australia. 
7  Financial Services Council 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Chapter 3, page 89; Actuaries Institute 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 8. 
Chapter 5: Regulatory system 
235 
The Inquiry agrees there is scope to separate ASIC’s registry business from the rest of 
its functions, but is not persuaded that there is a strong case for removing other 
functions. Neither has it recommended any additions to ASIC’s responsibilities.8 The 
Inquiry accepts the view that there are synergies between functions—such as market 
supervision, insolvency and consumer protection—that would be lost if these 
functions were moved to other agencies. The Inquiry has not recommended giving the 
ACCC sole responsibility for consumer protection because these powers are an 
important part of ASIC’s enforcement toolkit. The Inquiry sees value in an integrated 
consumer regulator for financial services.9 
Although there is no need for major change to the responsibilities of the regulators, the 
Inquiry has identified some weaknesses in how financial regulation is implemented 
and believes there is scope to improve regulatory processes. It notes: Government 
lacks a process for holding regulators accountable for their overall performance; some 
significant weaknesses exist in regulator funding arrangements and enforcement tools, 
particularly for ASIC; and competition and efficiency in designing and applying 
regulation may not be adequately considered. 
Recommended actions 
While the Inquiry does not recommend major changes to the overall regulatory 
system, it believes action should be taken in the following five areas to improve the 
current arrangements and ensure regulatory settings remain fit for purpose in the 
years ahead: 
• Improve the regulator accountability framework: Australia needs a better 
mechanism to allow Government to assess the performance of financial regulators. 
The Inquiry recommends establishing a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board 
(Assessment Board) to undertake annual ex post reviews of overall regulator 
performance against their mandates. It also recommends that Government should 
provide more clarity around its expectations of regulators, including its appetite for 
risk in the financial system, while regulators should develop better performance 
indicators. These new arrangements should ensure, among other things, regulators 
give stronger and more transparent consideration to competition and compliance 
cost issues. 
• Improve the effectiveness of our regulators: Australia’s regulatory system will 
continue to be challenged by the pace of technological change. Especially in 
payments and financial markets, new business models are challenging existing 
                                                          
8  The Interim Report asked whether ASIC should regulate technology providers and 
superannuation administrators of scale, and whether securities dealers who are not direct 
market participants should be regulated as market participants: Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, pages 3-106 to 3-108. 
9  ASIC currently has exclusive responsibility for consumer protection in relation to financial 
services and credit, while the ACCC has these powers in relation to the rest of the economy. 
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regulatory frameworks. The emergence of new technology is placing demands on 
regulators to be more flexible, and raising issues relating to identity, privacy and 
cyber security. Australia’s regulators need the funding and skills to meet these 
challenges into the future, including encouraging innovation through appropriately 
graduated approaches. 
The Inquiry recommends that ASIC and APRA should both be strengthened 
through increased budget stability built on periodic funding reviews, and greater 
operational flexibility. ASIC, APRA and the payment systems function of the RBA 
should also commit to six-yearly capability reviews. These exercises should ensure 
they have the required skills and culture to maintain effectiveness in an 
environment of rapid change, as will the recommendation in Chapter 3: Innovation 
that Government create a new public-private collaboration mechanism to facilitate 
regulatory change in response to innovation. 
• Strengthen ASIC: Instances of misconduct and consumer loss in the financial 
system have prompted questions about the effectiveness of consumer protection, as 
well as the adequacy of ASIC’s resources and the design of the regulatory 
framework in which it operates. The public expectation is that ASIC will act as a 
pro-active watchdog in supervising all financial services providers. However, in 
practice, ASIC has a very wide remit but limited powers and resources. 
The Senate Economics References Committee’s report on ASIC’s performance was 
released just before the publication of the Interim Report. The Interim Report 
indicated that the Inquiry would consider the Senate Committee’s 
recommendations in the lead-up to its Final Report.10 
Several of the recommendations in this Final Report are consistent with those of the 
Senate Committee. The Inquiry has recommended some fundamental changes to 
the regulatory framework governing the financial services industry (see Chapter 4: 
Consumer outcomes). These measures are part of a broad shift in Australia’s 
approach to consumer protection in the financial sector — away from primarily 
relying on disclosure and financial literacy. 
The Inquiry has also recommended changes in how ASIC approaches its consumer 
protection role. In particular, the Inquiry considers that ASIC should devote more 
attention to industry supervision, including more proactively identifying and 
weeding-out misconduct. It has also recommended several measures to strengthen 
ASIC, including better funding, enhanced regulatory tools (including the proposed 
product intervention powers discussed in Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes), stronger 
licensing powers to address misconduct, and substantially higher criminal and civil 
penalties. 
                                                          
10  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 3-89.  
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In light of the significance of these changes, the Inquiry recommends that ASIC 
should be the first regulator to undergo a capability review, along with the funding 
review that would take place under the recommendation for increased budget 
stability. This would help to ensure ASIC has the appropriate skills and culture to 
adopt a flexible risk-based approach to its future role. Its overall performance 
would also be subject to annual review by the proposed new Assessment Board. 
• Rebalance the regulatory focus towards competition: Not surprisingly, regulators 
have increased their focus on resilience in the wake of the GFC. However, the 
Inquiry believes there is complacency about competition, and that the current 
framework does not systematically identify and address competition trade-offs in 
regulatory settings. 
Although the ACCC is responsible for competition policy in the financial sector, 
this is part of its broader economy-wide responsibilities. Furthermore, the ACCC is 
not responsible for reviewing how decisions by other regulators affect competition. 
It is not always clear how APRA and ASIC balance their core regulatory objectives 
against the need to maintain competition. Policy makers and regulators need to 
take increased account of competition when making regulatory decisions, while 
ASIC should be given an explicit competition mandate. Periodic external reviews of 
the state of competition should be conducted, including assessing whether 
Australia can reduce barriers to market entry for new domestic and international 
competitors. 
• Improve the process of implementing new financial regulations: Since the GFC, 
Australia’s financial system has been influenced by new global standards and the 
increasing scope and complexity of cross-border financial regulation. Substantial 
regulatory change has resulted from international developments and decisions 
made in major offshore financial centres, concurrent with a large number of 
domestically driven changes, especially in financial advice and superannuation. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest Australia’s compliance burden is 
substantially larger than in jurisdictions overseas, work commissioned by the 
Inquiry suggests that improved regulatory processes could reduce industry costs 
and lead to better outcomes. Specifically, the Inquiry recommends that Government 
and regulators adhere to minimum implementation lead times and monitor impacts 
more thoroughly post-implementation. 
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Principles 
In making recommendations in this chapter, the Inquiry has been guided by the 
following principles:11 
• The system must have highly skilled, effective regulators that are both independent 
and accountable for discharging their mandates. 
• Competition is the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system and is 
generally preferred to Government intervention as the mechanism for efficient, 
resilient and fair outcomes. Policy makers and regulators should minimise barriers 
to domestic and international competition and seek to encourage competition. 
• Regulators and regulation must be forward looking, with the flexibility and 
capability to cope with a changing environment. Effective regulators need to be 
able to offer competitive salaries. 
• Regulation and regulators should be cost effective, and the benefits of regulation 
should outweigh the cost. Costs should be allocated to those who create the need 
for regulation. 
• The culture of firms is important and will affect the need for regulation. 
Conclusion 
Adopting the recommendations in this chapter will make Australia’s regulators more 
effective, more adaptable and more accountable, with greater independence in some 
areas, such as funding. It will also increase the focus on competition and improve how 
regulations are made and reviewed. 
                                                          
11  Drawing on the principles set out in Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System 
Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, pages 1–7. 




Create a new Financial Regulator Assessment Board to advise Government annually on how 
financial regulators have implemented their mandates. 
Provide clearer guidance to regulators in Statements of Expectation and increase the use of 
performance indicators for regulator performance. 
Description 
Government should create a new Assessment Board to provide it with ex post, annual 
reports on the performance of APRA, ASIC and the payment systems regulation 
function of the RBA. They would be assessed against their statutory mandates as well 
as against the priorities identified in Statements of Intent (SOIs).12 
The reports would consider how the regulators have balanced the different 
components of their mandates as well as how they are allocating resources and 
responding to strategic challenges. Reports should include the views of regulators and 
be made public once Government has had the opportunity to consider a response. The 
Assessment Board need not be established as a separate agency and could be 
supported by a separate secretariat housed in Treasury. This would separate the 
provision of support to the Assessment Board from Treasury’s ongoing policy role as a 
CFR agency. 
It is not intended that the Assessment Board should direct the regulators — it would 
report to Government. It would also be precluded from examining individual 
complaints against regulators or the merits of particular regulatory or enforcement 
decisions. However, it would be asked to assess how regulators have used the powers 
and discretions available to them. In the case of ASIC, a significant issue would be its 
use of the temporary product intervention power recommended in Chapter 4: Consumer 
outcomes.  
The Assessment Board would replace the current Financial Sector Advisory Council 
(FSAC). It would consist of between five and seven part-time members with industry 
and regulatory expertise. It would not include current employees of regulated entities. 
However, members would be expected to consult extensively with industry and 
consumer stakeholders. Diversity of membership should act as a safeguard against the 
                                                          
12  The Assessment Board would not review the mandates of regulators or the frameworks they 
administer. 
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Assessment Board being unduly influenced by the views of one particular group or 
industry sector.13 
Government should also set out more clearly how regulators should interpret their 
mandates in Statements of Expectation (SOEs). SOEs should also set out: 
• A statement of the strategic direction Government expects regulators to take, 
including in response to changing circumstances. 
• A broad outline of Government’s tolerance for financial sector risk. 
Regulators should increase their use of outcomes-focused performance indicators. 
These could be included in SOIs, as per the practice of New Zealand regulators, or in 
annual reports.14,15 Performance indicators should cover core regulatory objectives as 
well as competition and compliance cost objectives. 
Regulators should more clearly explain in their annual reports how they have balanced 
the different parts of their mandates, particularly the effect of their decisions on 
competition and compliance costs. This information would be an important input into 
the Assessment Board’s annual reviews, along with other relevant reports produced by 
regulators.16 
These recommendations are intended to be consistent with, and not duplicate, 
Government’s Regulator Performance Framework (see Implementation considerations). 
Objectives 
• Create a formal mechanism for Government to receive annual independent advice 
on regulator performance. 
• Strengthen the accountability framework governing Australia’s financial sector 
regulators. 
                                                          
13  A code of conduct for members could also be used to address this issue. 
14  See, for example, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), 2014, Statement of Intent, RBNZ, 
Wellington, page 11. 
15  Increased use of performance indicators in annual reports is likely to be consistent with the 
new performance reporting requirements that will apply under the Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act 2013, these requirements would be broader than the 
Regulator Performance Framework that Government has already announced. 
16  For example, ASIC publishes a Strategic Outlook as well as periodic reports on relief 
decisions and enforcement outcomes. APRA and ASIC both publish periodic stakeholder 
surveys. 
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Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Australia’s financial regulators operate within complex accountability frameworks. A 
range of bodies carry out narrow rather than overall performance assessments. For 
example, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) conducts performance audits 
in relation to particular programs or activities, and the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation reviews Regulation Impact Statements (RISs) on proposed regulatory 
changes, while the courts and other quasi-judicial bodies review specific decisions. 
The main problem with the current arrangements is Government lacks a regular 
mechanism to assess the overall performance of its financial regulators. Parliament has 
mechanisms to do this, including review of annual reports. However, parliamentary 
scrutiny tends to be episodic and focus on particular issues or decisions. The 
complexity of regulator mandates presents a challenge to effective monitoring, 
especially as Parliament is not supported in this role through regular independent 
assessments of annual reports. 
The core mandates of the regulators are generally clear. APRA is responsible for 
maintaining financial stability; protecting the claims of authorised deposit-taking 
institution depositors and insurance policy-holders; and promoting prudent 
management of non-SMSF superannuation funds. ASIC is responsible for consumer 
protection and market integrity. The RBA and Payments System Board (PSB) are 
responsible for financial stability and controlling risk in the financial system. Each 
regulator is required to balance these core responsibilities against other objectives, 
including promoting competition and efficiency, maximising business certainty and 
minimising compliance costs. However, there is some inconsistency in how these other 
objectives are framed in relation to APRA and ASIC, including whether or not they 
apply at all.17 
Regulators currently receive little guidance about how they should balance the 
different objectives in their respective mandates. At present, SOEs typically list each 
regulator’s objectives, without guidance from Government on its tolerance for risk, or 
how it expects the regulators to balance the different components of their mandates, 
                                                          
17  The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 requires APRA to consider efficiency, 
competition, contestability and competitive neutrality alongside financial safety and stability. 
The objects clauses in the Banking Act 1959 and Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act 1993 
do not mention competition or efficiency. The objects clauses in the Insurance Act 1973 and 
Life Insurance Act 1995 identify competition and innovation as objectives (subject to industry 
viability). There is no reference to reducing compliance costs. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) requires ASIC to promote commercial certainty 
and economic development and efficiency while reducing business costs. However, there is 
no explicit reference to competition in the ASIC Act (or the objects clause for Chapter 7 of the 
Corporations Act 2001). 
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especially where there may be a trade-off between objectives.18 Similarly, annual 
reports by regulators provide scant information on how they have balanced their 
different objectives. As the Inquiry noted in its Interim Report, regulators’ annual 
reports lack performance indicators. 
The FSAC, created as a recommendation of the Wallis Inquiry, is currently the main 
formal mechanism for industry stakeholders to provide advice to Government. 
Although FSAC has attracted high-calibre members, and has performed a useful role 
in relation to some issues, it has been hampered by the lack of a clear mandate and 
regular work program. This means that its influence has varied over time. 
Rationale 
A more effective review mechanism that provides Government with regular formal 
advice on the overall performance of regulators will improve regulator accountability. 
Options considered 
The Interim Report proposed improving SOEs, SOIs and annual reports. It identified 
two options to strengthen external oversight of financial regulators: an 
Inspector-General of Regulation and a ‘unified oversight authority’. Second round 
submissions also suggest the CFR could play a larger role in monitoring the 
performance of regulators.  
1. Recommended: Create a new Assessment Board to advise Government 
annually on how regulators have implemented their mandates, based on 
regulator self-assessments, periodic capability reviews and industry 
consultation. 
2. Recommended: Provide clearer guidance to regulators in SOEs, and increase 
the use of performance indicators to strengthen regulator reporting. 
3. Appoint an Inspector-General of Regulation or unified oversight authority for 
financial system regulators. 
4. Formalise the CFR and task it to hold regulators accountable for performance 
against their mandates. 
5. Place APRA and ASIC under the control of boards comprising executive and 
non-executive directors.  
Options costs and benefits 
Submissions generally support improved accountability mechanisms for regulators. 
                                                          
18  For example, lowering barriers to entry may benefit consumers by strengthening competition 
but also increase risks for end-users. Likewise, higher barriers to entry can have the opposite 
effect. 
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Annual reviews of performance by a new Assessment Board 
Establishing a new Assessment Board has the potential to provide more focused 
oversight of regulator performance. However, the success of the Assessment Board 
will depend on how it approaches its task. Some of the risks associated with this 
recommendation are that the Board simply becomes another accountability process 
that adds to costs without adding value, or that it attempts to intervene directly in the 
work of the regulators. Another risk is that it undermines Treasury’s relationship with 
the other CFR agencies. 
The Inquiry has sought to address these risks by making it clear that the Assessment 
Board should have a diverse membership to avoid being unduly influenced by a 
particular group; limiting the Board’s mandate to ex post overall assessments of 
regulator performance; ensuring the Board bases its assessments on existing outputs 
where possible; and suggesting that the Board be supported by a separate secretariat 
within Treasury. A diverse membership would also help ensure a balance of views and 
deal with potential conflicts involving individual members.  
Improve SOEs and increase use of performance indicators 
There appears to be widespread support for improving SOEs and SOIs, and increasing 
the use of performance indicators as a means of enhancing regulator accountability. 
The main issues are the extent to which Government is willing to be more explicit 
about trade-offs in regulatory policy (especially its risk appetite) and the capacity of 
regulators to devise performance indicators that adequately capture the complexity of 
their work. While Government may be reluctant to set out views, and developing 
performance indicators is a difficult exercise, the Inquiry believes that increased efforts 
in these areas would enhance regulator accountability. 
Inspector-General of Regulation or unified oversight authority 
The Inquiry does not support the Inspector-General model because it would involve 
creating a new agency. The Assessment Board would replace the existing FSAC. The 
Inspector-General model would place considerable reliance on a single person, while 
the Assessment Board can include members with expertise across the regulators. 
Finally, the Inquiry considers an Assessment Board is more suited to undertaking an 
overall review of regulator performance, while the Inspector-General model is better 
suited to undertaking more detailed assessments of administrative processes of the 
type currently performed by the ANAO and the Inspector-General of Taxation (in 
relation to the ATO). 
Formalise the CFR as oversight body 
The Inquiry does not support creating a separate body with an overarching oversight 
or review role because it would fundamentally change the current regulatory system. 
If the CFR was to perform this role, as some submissions suggest, it would be 
transformed from a mechanism to facilitate cooperation between regulators into a 
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separate agency in its own right. This would result in overlapping responsibilities and 
weaken accountability. 
Place APRA and ASIC under the control of boards 
This option was raised by the Senate Economics References Committee in its report on 
the performance of ASIC.19 It has also been identified as an option for the ACCC in the 
Draft Report of the Competition Policy Review.20 
The non-executive board model was used by APRA when it was established. 
However, the Royal Commission into the collapse of HIH concluded that this 
arrangement had blurred accountability for regulatory outcomes between the board 
and the chief executive officer, and that APRA would be better headed by a small 
full-time executive, with the capacity to establish an advisory board if necessary.21 
Conclusion 
The Inquiry believes that creating a new Assessment Board to review regulator 
performance is the best way to address the gap it has identified in the current 
accountability framework. This option would facilitate improved scrutiny of regulator 
performance without creating new agencies or compromising existing accountability 
relationships. This recommendation is not intended to reduce the independence of 
regulators in executing their statutory mandates. 
Implementation considerations 
Interaction with Government’s new Regulator Performance Framework 
Under the new Regulator Performance Framework, regulators will have to undertake 
an annual externally-validated self-assessment of their performance to minimise the 
burden on their regulated populations. Selected regulators will also have their 
performance assessed externally by a review panel every three years, with the option 
of an annual review for major regulators. 
Annual reviews by the Assessment Board would be broader than the process 
envisaged under the Regulator Performance Framework. Although they would 
encompass compliance cost issues, this would be only one element of overall 
performance. To avoid duplication, the Assessment Board could act as the validation 
body for each regulator’s annual self-assessment, and this assessment could be used in 
the Board’s deliberations. This would remove the need for two separate processes. 
                                                          
19  Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Recommendation 55, 
page 433. 
20  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Competition Policy Review, Draft Report, Canberra, Draft 
Recommendation 47, page 63. 
21  HIH Royal Commission 2003, The Failure of HIH Insurance Volume 1 of 3, Part Three, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Recommendations 18 and 19. 
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Other issues 
Government should consider whether agencies outside the Treasury portfolio that 
have a significant effect on the financial system, such as AUSTRAC, should be assessed 
by the Assessment Board. 
The remit of the Assessment Board should be narrow and specifically exclude:  
• Assessments of the merits of relief for particular transactions, enforcement actions 
and individual complaints against the regulators. 
• Matters of financial system regulation policy, such as whether the mandates of 
regulators are appropriate. 
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Execution of mandate 
Recommendation 28 
Provide regulators with more stable funding by adopting a three-year funding model based 
on periodic funding reviews, increase their capacity to pay competitive remuneration, boost 
flexibility in respect of staffing and funding, and require them to undertake periodic 
capability reviews. 
Description 
Government should continue to determine the level of funding for APRA and ASIC. 
However, APRA and ASIC should be given greater year-to-year certainty in their 
funding profiles as well as more flexibility in how they spend their budgets, including 
their remuneration policies. Adopting a more rigorous funding model would provide 
the regulators with more certainty, while enhancing transparency and efficiency. As 
part of this model: 
• Regulator funding should be set by Government based on the recommendation of 
three-yearly funding reviews. These reviews should include consultation with 
industry and consumer stakeholders. 
• Once determined, funding would remain stable between reviews, subject to 
appropriate indexation and efficiency arrangements.22 Changes would only be 
made if there were a significant change in the scope of a regulator’s mandate, or an 
emergency event such as a financial crisis. 
Regulators should be funded at a level that enables them to offer remuneration that is 
competitive with the private sector. Effective regulation depends on effective human 
capital, and more effective regulators are likely to require higher salaries. Regulators 
currently target average remuneration at the 25th percentile of the market rate for like 
work in the financial sector; however, the Inquiry is concerned they currently find it 
difficult to meet this target. 
The Inquiry is also concerned this target may be too low, preventing regulators from 
offering market-median or higher remuneration to attract more specialised and senior 
staff with strong market experience without median pay for other staff falling well 
below the 25th percentile.
                                                          
22  The efficiency measure may be a fixed efficiency dividend, or some other tailored efficiency 
measure. It should be applied upfront as part of the funding review process to ensure 
regulator funding remains stable over the estimates period. 
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ASIC staff should be removed from coverage by the Public Service Act 1999 (Public 
Service Act) to bring it into line with APRA and the RBA. APRA and ASIC should be 
able to opt out of public sector–wide employment, staffing, and other 
whole-of-Government policies and procedures that unnecessarily constrain their 
flexibility to deliver their regulatory mandate. 
APRA, ASIC and the payments system regulation function of the RBA should each 
conduct six-yearly forward-looking capability reviews to ensure they remain fit for 
purpose and have the capabilities to address future regulatory challenges.  
Objective 
• Ensure Australia’s regulators are fit for purpose and have the funding, staff and 
regulatory tools to deliver effectively on their mandates. 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Funding for APRA and ASIC 
The Interim Report set out the following principles for funding the regulators:23 
• Funding should have a high degree of stability and certainty. 
• Total funding should be proportionate to the task. 
• Regulatory costs should be borne by those contributing to the need for regulation. 
• Funding should promote the independence and accountability of the regulators. 
The funding arrangements currently applying to APRA and ASIC do not reflect these 
principles. Regulators lack stable funding. They are subject to unpredictable budget 
reductions and unexpected efficiency dividends that limit their capacity to plan how 
they will dedicate resources beyond the short term. ASIC funding was reduced in the 
2014–15 Budget. At the same time, APRA and ASIC were subject to additional 
whole-of-Government efficiency dividends in the 2014–15 Budget, the 2013–14 
Economic Statement and the 2011–12 Budget. Submissions support the view that 
financial regulator funding should have a high degree of stability and certainty. 
The Inquiry has not carried out its own assessment of the adequacy of regulator 
funding. However, submissions from both industry and consumer stakeholders argue 
that ASIC is not adequately funded to carry out its current consumer protection 
mandate in relation to the financial services industry, let alone the more proactive role 
                                                          
23  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
pages 3-110 to 3-111.  
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the Inquiry recommends ASIC should adopt in the future.24 ASIC has also relied 
heavily on specific-purpose funding. Periodic funding reviews would allow 
Government to determine whether the regulators have sufficient funding to execute 
their mandates. The Inquiry recognises that funding reviews are not simple tasks. 
However, it believes there should be more consideration of the resources that 
regulators require to deliver effectively on their mandates. 
APRA’s industry funding arrangements mean its costs are generally borne by 
prudentially regulated entities. This is not currently the case with ASIC. The next 
recommendation in this chapter—that industry funding should also be adopted for 
ASIC—will address this issue. 
Current funding arrangements do not promote regulator independence and 
accountability. These would improve if funding levels were based on periodic funding 
reviews rather than annual Government decisions, and if regulators had more 
discretion in determining how funding is used. Funding reviews would ensure 
sufficient resources to support other recommendations in this report, such as ensuring 
regulators can offer remuneration that allows them to compete effectively with the 
private sector for talent. 
Operational flexibility 
APRA and ASIC are both subject to policies that limit their capacity to attract and 
retain staff from the private sector. In particular, public sector–wide industrial 
relations policies are a poor fit for APRA and ASIC, whose employees are typically 
recruited from the private sector.25 Second round submissions agree with the 
proposition that APRA and ASIC should have more flexibility over staffing and be 
able to offer competitive remuneration. Indeed, industry participants recognise the 
value of competent and experienced regulators.26 
Unlike APRA and the RBA, ASIC is subject to the Public Service Act. Yet there is no 
clear rationale for which agencies are included in the Act and which are not. ASIC 
notes in its submission that the application of the Public Service Act has unnecessarily 
limited ASIC’s ability to recruit and utilise external staff.27 Although the Inquiry 
recognises the need for regulators to maintain a culture of ‘public service’, this does 
not depend on coverage by the Public Service Act and can be achieved through 
tailored codes of conduct and statements of values. Removing ASIC from coverage by 
                                                          
24  See also: Senate Economics References Committee 2014, , Report on the Performance of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
pages 407–415; International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability 
Assessment, IMF Country Report No.12/308, IMF, Washington, DC, page 26. 
25  Over the last five years, less than 5 per cent of APRA staff members were recruited from the 
public service. APRA, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 78. 
26  Australian Financial Markets Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 52.  
27  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, pages 75–77.  
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the Public Service Act would allow it to tailor management and staffing arrangements 
to suit its needs. 
Capability 
There is no formal process for keeping regulators fit for purpose by ensuring they have 
the skills, resources and powers to meet future challenges. At present, regulators are 
subject to regular review through the five-yearly International Monetary Fund 
Financial Sector Assessment Program. However, this has a strong focus on compliance 
with international standards and codes. Capability reviews are only undertaken on an 
ad hoc basis; for example, the Palmer Review into the role of APRA in the collapse of 
HIH. This is in contrast to the recent requirement for major Government agencies, 
including the ATO and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, to undertake periodic 
capability reviews. For APRA and ASIC, a six-yearly cycle would allow capability 
reviews to be aligned with every second funding review, allowing the two to take 
place concurrently. 
Conclusion 
Moving ASIC and APRA to a three-year budget model, giving them more operational 
autonomy and introducing six-yearly capability reviews would enhance the operation 
of the current regulatory framework. This is a particularly important issue for ASIC 
given the breadth of its responsibilities.  
Given the extent of the changes the Inquiry has proposed for ASIC in this report, ASIC 
should be the first to undergo a capability review in 2015. This would help to ensure it 
has the skills and culture to carry out its enhanced role effectively.  
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Strengthening Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s funding and powers 
Recommendation 29 
Introduce an industry funding model for Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and provide ASIC with stronger regulatory tools. 
Description 
Government should recover the cost of ASIC’s regulatory activities directly from 
industry participants through fees and levies calibrated to reflect the cost of regulating 
different industry sectors. Government would continue to set ASIC’s overall funding 
needs. However, this would be done through three-yearly funding reviews. 
Government should strengthen the Australian Credit Licence and Australian Financial 
Services Licence (AFSL) regimes so ASIC can deal more effectively with poor 
behaviour and misconduct. ASIC should be able to consider all relevant factors in 
determining whether or not a licence should be granted. ASIC approval should be 
required for material changes in the ownership or control of a licensee. Finally, ASIC 
should have more capacity to impose conditions requiring licensees to address 
concerns about serious or systemic non-compliance with licence obligations (including 
expert reviews). 
The maximum civil and criminal penalties for contravening ASIC legislation should be 
substantially increased to act as a credible deterrent for large firms. ASIC should also 
be able to seek disgorgement of profits earned as a result of contravening conduct. 
Objective 
• Ensure ASIC has adequate funding and regulatory tools to deliver effectively on its 
mandate. 
Discussion 
Problems the recommendation seeks to address 
Industry funding 
At present, Government only recovers a small proportion of ASIC’s costs directly from 
industry participants, through the Financial Institutions Supervisory Levies, 
application fees and fees for market supervision. The absence of industry funding 
means ASIC costs are not transparent to regulated industry participants. It also 
exposes ASIC to an increased risk of funding cuts that are unrelated to changes in the 
cost of delivering on its mandate. The Senate Economics References Committee report 
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on ASIC’s performance highlighted that resource constraints affect ASIC’s capacity to 
conduct surveillance across regulated entities.28 
Most of the revenue collected by ASIC on behalf of Government comes from annual 
fees paid by small proprietary companies as part of ASIC’s registry business. These 
entities pay more than the cost of supervision. By contrast, the fees collected from large 
corporations, auditors, liquidators and financial institutions amount to less than the 
cost of regulating them, although some of this shortfall is offset by the money 
Government collects through the Financial Institutions Supervisory Levies 
administered by APRA. 
The Wallis Inquiry recommended that both APRA and ASIC should be industry 
funded.29 However, this recommendation was only adopted in relation to APRA. At 
that time, the revenue collected by ASIC on behalf of the Australian Government was 
required to be shared with the states. 
Enforcement tools 
Although ASIC’s AFSL licensing powers were significantly strengthened in 2012, as 
part of the Future of Financial Advice law reforms, ASIC’s submission notes that some 
gaps remain in its capacity to exclude persons who are not fit and proper from the 
industry:30 
• Ownership or control of licensees can change without the need to obtain approval 
from ASIC — or APRA, in the case of prudentially regulated entities. This problem 
was identified in relation to the collapse of Trio Capital. While the previous 
Government agreed to a recommendation by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services to address this issue, the law has not been 
changed.31 
• The extent to which ASIC can consider previous conduct in other businesses in 
determining whether an applicant will satisfy the ‘fit and proper’ test is uncertain. 
This can limit its capacity to refuse a licence to applicants who have played a 
material role in businesses previously subject to enforcement action. This issue was 
                                                          
28  Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Report on the Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 23–24.  
29  Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, 
Recommendation 107, Canberra, page 535. 
30  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 46. This issue is also covered in Chapter 4: Consumer outcomes.  
31  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2012, Inquiry into the 
Collapse of Trio Capital, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 127–128; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Government Response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Collapse of Trio Capital, Canberra, page 2. 
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identified in the Senate Economics References Committee’s report on ASIC’s 
performance.32 
• ASIC is limited in its capacity to use the licensing regime to impose conditions on 
firms to address concerns about internal systems relating to serious or systemic 
misconduct. At present, these can often only be imposed through enforceable 
undertakings with the agreement of the licensee. 
As the Inquiry noted in its Interim Report, the maximum penalties in Australia for 
contravening laws governing financial sector conduct are low by international 
standards. For example, ASIC cannot seek disgorgement of profits in relation to civil 
contraventions.33 As such, current penalties are unlikely to act as a credible deterrent 
against misconduct by large firms. While the Inquiry recommends substantially higher 
penalties, it does not believe that Australia should introduce the extremely high 
penalties for financial firms recently seen in some overseas jurisdictions. This practice 
risks creating inappropriate incentives for government and regulators unless revenue 
is separated and used for social or public purposes. 
Conclusion 
Few submissions comment on ASIC enforcement powers or the adequacy of the 
current penalty regime. Most discussion of ASIC enforcement powers focused on 
whether or not ASIC should regulate product manufacture and distribution, although 
there was some discussion of the balance between administrative remedies on the one 
hand, and enforceable undertakings and judicial remedies, such as civil and criminal 
penalties, on the other.34 Some submissions specifically support substantially 
increasing maximum penalties.35 
Stronger enforcement of the current framework can reduce demands for new rules and 
regulations. This is a particularly important issue for ASIC given the breadth of its 
responsibilities. The main risk of the new arrangements is that they may impinge 
unfairly on the rights of industry participants. However, ASIC decisions in this area 
would continue to be subject to merits review. 
Second round submissions are divided on the issue of whether Government should 
charge fees and levies that reflect the cost of ASIC’s regulatory functions. Several 
                                                          
32  Senate Economics References Committee 2014, Report on the Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pages 387–388. 
33  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, pages 3-124 to 
3-125.  
34  Minter Ellison 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 9. 
35  Law Council of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Business Law Section, pages 7–8 and 10–12; Australian Shareholders’ Association 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 1. 
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submissions support industry funding, while others were opposed to this option.36 
Remaining submissions that dealt with the issue support the concept of industry 
funding provided it is accompanied by stronger transparency and accountability 
mechanisms.37 Others emphasise that Government, rather than regulators, should 
determine the overall quantum of funding.38 One issue is whether ASIC’s regulatory 
functions are ‘public goods’ that should be funded through general taxation. Although 
ASIC’s regulatory functions reflect public policy objectives, the Inquiry does not 
believe this should prevent the introduction of industry funding. However, it may be 
inappropriate for particular functions, such as financial literacy. Industry funding is 
already used by APRA as well as many similar regulators overseas.39 
The main benefit of industry funding is its potential to give ASIC more predictable 
funding as well as strengthen engagement between ASIC and industry on the costs of 
conduct and market regulation. It would also have some potential costs. Depending on 
how they are designed, fees and levies have the potential to increase barriers to entry 
and potentially limit competition. One submission raises this concern in relation to 
existing cost recovery arrangements for market supervision.40 
To maximise its benefit, the funding model should be structured to create a close 
relationship between the incidence of fees and levies and the cost of regulating the 
relevant activity. Costs must also be attributed fairly across different firms and 
industry segments. The way in which industry funding is implemented may need to 
be tailored to different industry sectors. 
The Inquiry expects the benefits of industry funding to exceed the costs, subject to 
careful implementation and inclusion of an appropriate transparency and 
accountability framework.41 It has sought to address stakeholder concerns about 
industry funding by ensuring Government would continue to set ASIC’s budget. 
Recommended three-yearly reviews would bring additional rigour to the budget 
process, and improve the efficiency of the regulators. 
                                                          
36  Choice 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 25; EY 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 16; Stockbrokers Association 
of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 13–15; 
SMSF Professionals Association of Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 73. 
37  For example, Australian Financial Markets Association 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 46; Insurance Council of Australia 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 15; Westpac Group 2014, Second round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 109. 
38  Herbert Smith Freehills 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
ASIC Funding, supplementary submission; National Insurance Brokers Association 2014, 
Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 27. 
39  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 3-112. 
40  Chi-X Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 2-6. 
41  Basic requirements are set out in Department of Finance 2014, Australian Government Cost 
Recovery Guidelines, Resource Management Guide No. 304, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra. 
Financial System Inquiry — Final report 
254 
Strengthening the focus on competition in the financial 
system 
Recommendation 30 
Review the state of competition in the sector every three years, improve reporting of how 
regulators balance competition against their core objectives, identify barriers to cross-border 
provision of financial services and include consideration of competition in the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission’s mandate. 
Description 
Through their annual reports, regulators should demonstrate that they have given 
explicit consideration to trade-offs between competition and other regulatory 
objectives when designing regulations. The effect of regulatory proposals on 
competition should be explained explicitly in consultation documents and annual 
reports, which would then feed into Assessment Board examination of overall 
regulator performance. 
Government should commission periodic external reviews of the state of competition 
in the financial system every three years, including regulatory barriers to foreign and 
domestic entrants. 
As an immediate first step, regulators should examine their rules and procedures to 
assess whether those that create inappropriate barriers to competition can be modified 
or removed, or whether alternative and more pro-competitive approaches can be 
identified.42 Each regulator should report back to Government prior to the first 
external review of the state of competition. 
Government should update ASIC’s mandate to include a specific requirement to take 
competition issues into account as part of its core regulatory role.43 
These proposals are in addition to the recommendations in this report addressing 
sectoral issues in banking, payments and financial markets. 
                                                          
42  Some of this is underway. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) stated in its 
second round submission that it is considering whether a more graduated approach to 
authorisation may be warranted for established foreign institutions. APRA 2014, Second 
round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 87. 
43  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) requires ASIC to 
promote commercial certainty and economic development and efficiency while reducing 
business costs. However, there is no explicit reference to competition in the ASIC Act (or the 
objects clause for Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001). 
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Objectives 
• Increase the focus on competition in the financial sector. 
• Deliver more explicit reporting about the competition implications of regulatory 
decisions. 
• Highlight areas where there may be opportunities to strengthen competition. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
The benefits of competition are central to the Inquiry’s philosophy. While competition 
is generally adequate in the financial system at present, the high concentration and 
steadily increasing vertical integration in some sectors has the potential to limit the 
benefits of competition in the future. Licensing provisions and regulatory frameworks 
can impose significant barriers to the entry and growth of new players, especially 
those with business models that do not fit well within existing regulatory frameworks. 
Financial services businesses competing across national borders can find themselves 
subject to duplicated and sometimes conflicting obligations. In some cases, these rules 
reflect different local circumstances. However, they can limit competition in Australia 
as well as impede Australian-domiciled firms’ ability to participate in global financial 
markets. 
Australian Competition Law provides an economy-wide framework for promoting 
competition and addressing anti-competitive behaviour. However, the effectiveness of 
the framework depends on the ACCC’s capacity to enforce its provisions — and the 
ACCC must prioritise its work across the entire economy. Also, Australian 
Competition Law does not provide a framework for removing regulatory barriers to 
competition through improved regulatory practices and rules. 
At present, regulator mandates adopt an inconsistent approach to competition. The 
PSB has a clear competition objective. APRA is required to consider competition and 
contestability in its decisions, although the industry frameworks do not adopt a 
consistent approach to this issue. ASIC lacks an explicit competition mandate. 
Furthermore, there is no current requirement for regulators to explain how they 
balance competition considerations with other regulatory objectives in reaching 
decisions.44 
Finally, there is currently no process for regularly assessing the state of competition in 
the financial system, as there is for assessing stability in the form of the Financial 
Stability Review. This creates the risk that broader competition issues will ‘fall between 
the cracks’ as regulators focus on their specific mandates for stability or consumer 
                                                          
44  The Interim Report noted this is currently done on an ad hoc basis: Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, page 3-122.  
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protection. For example, no regulator has direct responsibility for removing barriers to 
consumers switching products. 
Conclusion 
The recommendation would deliver a stronger focus on competition in the financial 
system. In the absence of change, there is a risk that regulators and policy makers will 
not place sufficient emphasis on competition when making decisions. This is a 
significant issue given the: 
• Extent of market concentration in some parts of the system, and its potential to limit 
competition in the future. 
• Disproportionate effect that regulation can have on smaller firms. 
• Potential benefits to the Australian economy of disruptive innovation from new 
market entrants in the financial system, and improved depth and international 
connectivity of financial markets from cross-border competition. 
The Inquiry considered two alternative options for strengthening the focus on 
competition: appoint an additional APRA member to focus on competition, or give the 
ACCC exclusive responsibility for competition matters (that is, remove it from the 
mandates of APRA and ASIC). In relation to the first option, the Inquiry concluded 
that strengthening consideration of competition issues as part of ordinary regulatory 
processes was likely to have more effect than appointing a separate competition 
member. 
In relation to the second, the Inquiry considered it would be counterproductive to 
remove competition and efficiency considerations from the mandates of APRA and 
ASIC because this would reduce pressure on them to consider these issues. The ACCC 
also lacks the power to intervene in regulation making by APRA or ASIC. Its focus is 
on enforcing the prohibitions against anti-competitive conduct by businesses in 
Australian Competition Law.  
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Compliance costs and policy processes 
Recommendation 31 
Increase the time available for industry to implement complex regulatory change.  
Conduct post-implementation reviews of major regulatory changes more frequently. 
Description 
Except in exceptional circumstances, Government and regulators should give industry 
participants at least six months to begin implementing regulatory changes once they 
are finalised. Additional transitional periods of 12–24 months will also generally be 
appropriate. Grouping commencements at fixed dates during the year — for example, 
1 July and 1 January — would help industry participants to accommodate overlaps 
between related changes, rather than having to make multiple system changes. 
Government and regulators should also carry out more post-implementation reviews 
of major changes to analyse their cost effectiveness and help develop better processes 
for future interventions. 
This proposal is consistent with Government’s recently announced Regulator 
Performance Framework, which requires post-implementation reviews for regulatory 
changes that have a major economic effect. The Inquiry’s recommendations on 
accountability and competition are also expected to improve policy processes and 
focus policy makers and regulators on considering compliance costs and efficiency 
implications. 
Objective 
• Reduce costs, complexity and unanticipated negative implications associated with 
implementing regulatory change. 
Discussion 
Problem the recommendation seeks to address 
Most industry submissions identified the scope and pace of domestic regulatory 
change in the post-GFC environment as a major issue. This is partly due to factors 
beyond Australia’s direct control, including the proliferation of global standard-setting 
under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board in the wake of the crisis. Another 
factor is the wave of domestic regulatory change in countries that were at the epicentre 
of the crisis, substantially affecting Australian firms with an international presence. 
However, these developments have occurred at the same time as major domestically 
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driven changes to the regulation of credit, financial advice, general and life insurance, 
and superannuation. 
The Inquiry has not sought to examine all regulation with a view to identifying 
deregulation opportunities. However, the Inquiry commissioned Ernst & Young (EY) 
to assess the cost effectiveness of regulatory processes for three initiatives: changes to 
the presentation of credit card terms and conditions; the ‘know your customer’ (KYC) 
requirements of Australia’s anti-money laundering (AML) framework; and the 
three-day balance transfer requirement for superannuation funds included in the 
SuperStream reforms. 
EY’s conclusion was that Government can, “… improve medium-term outcomes of 
regulatory intervention through incremental changes in how it designs and 
implements additional measures and how it monitors the impact (including 
unintended effects) of regulation that has been implemented”.45 Although overall 
policy settings may be appropriate, the report identified some shortcomings in how 
policies are operationalised, including: 
• In some cases, it is not clear that detailed costs and benefits of changes have been 
considered. 
• There are gaps in industry consultation processes; for example, they may occur too 
late to allow for efficient planning. 
• Implementation deadlines can be optimistic. 
The EY report highlighted the difficulties associated with undertaking cost-benefit 
analysis of regulatory interventions. In particular, it noted that governments undertake 
interventions for a mix of short- and long-term objectives and that assessing benefits is 
more difficult than assessing direct costs. Timing issues are also relevant in that costs 
may be readily apparent in the short-term, yet benefits may only emerge over a longer 
period. For this reason, EY suggested that better upfront cost effectiveness analysis 
would be an appropriate alternative to a full cost-benefit analysis, particularly where 
timeframes are short. 
Improved cost effectiveness analysis could include up-front projections of the expected 
effects, early consultation on costs, and then post-implementation monitoring of actual 
effect and costs, with review points triggered where changes have materially lower 
effects or materially higher costs. Specific findings related to the three initiatives 
studied by EY are set out in Box 13: EY cost effectiveness analysis of regulatory 
interventions. 
                                                          
45  EY 2014, Financial System Regulation, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
October 2014, page 2. 
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Box 13: EY cost effectiveness analysis of regulatory interventions 
Reforms to the presentation of credit card terms and conditions are estimated to 
have involved total implementation costs of between $40 million and $120 million 
across the industry. EY found some changes to consumer behaviour and associated 
savings did follow the reforms; however, it could not conclude with certainty that 
the changed behaviour was the result of the reforms. EY noted it was not clear 
whether the Commonwealth had undertaken detailed consideration “… of how to 
best target different consumer segments through the overall dispersion of additional 
information on credit card terms”.46 This example highlights the importance of a 
transparent cost-benefit or cost effectiveness process. 
KYC requirements are estimated to have cost between $647 million and $1 billion to 
implement, with ongoing annual costs of between $299 million and $435 million. The 
changes are driven by the need to comply with international regulatory standards. 
Although participants agreed AML legislation is essential, consultations 
highlighted, “… earlier consultation on coverage and structure would have 
produced more efficient regulation”.47  
The three-day balance transfer requirement introduced as part of SuperStream was 
estimated to have cost industry between $560 million and $1.2 billion. EY noted that 
regulation in this area was a response to industry’s failure to adopt effective 
electronic payment protocols. However, the industry view was that Government’s 
approach generated some additional costs. In particular, consultation did not start 
early enough and implementation deadlines were optimistic. Tight deadlines meant 
that solutions were implemented in a less than optimal way to ensure timelines were 
met. A more risk-based approach from the Commonwealth, with more time for 
industry to develop data requirements and format standards, would have produced 
a more efficient outcome.  
The EY work reinforced some of the main points in industry submissions, where 
industry participants asked for better regulatory design and more realistic 
implementation time frames.48 In general, better processes for the future are a higher 
priority in the short term than efforts to reduce the current stock of regulation. 
Despite concerns related to processes arising from this work, the Inquiry has found 
limited evidence to suggest the compliance burden is higher in Australia than in 
comparable peer countries. The Australian Bankers’ Association submission 
highlighted that, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report 2013–14, Australia ranks 128th out of 148 countries for “Burden of government 
                                                          
46  EY 2014, Financial System Regulation, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
October 2014, page 26. 
47  EY 2014, Financial System Regulation, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
October 2014, page 33. 
48  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, pages 63–68, ANZ 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 28.  
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regulation”.49 However, in addition to the evidence set out in the Interim Report, cost 
of compliance survey data provided by Thomson Reuters Accelus suggests that, 
although compliance costs for the financial sector have risen in Australia recently, 
Australia is not out of step with other jurisdictions. 
Chart 7: Financial services firm compliance teams spending more than 










































Source: Thomson Reuters Accelus.50 
Conclusion 
Regardless of Australia’s relative position, unnecessary compliance costs and poor 
policy processes are a concern. The Inquiry notes that Government has already 
implemented a range of initiatives in this area, including more stringent requirements 
relating to RISs, sunsetting provisions for existing regulations, portfolio targets for 
reducing compliance costs and the Regulator Performance Framework. 
Combined with Government’s existing initiatives to reduce ‘red tape’ and a slowing in 
the pace of international regulation, the Inquiry’s recommendations should address 
many of the concerns raised in industry submissions.  
                                                          
49  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 63. 
50  Thomson Reuters Accelus 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 
7 October 2014. 
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Appendix 1: Significant matters 




Explore ways to facilitate development of the impact investment market and encourage 
innovation in funding social service delivery. 
Provide guidance to superannuation trustees on the appropriateness of impact investment. 
Support law reform to classify a private ancillary fund as a ‘sophisticated’ or ‘professional’ 
investor, where the founder of the fund meets those definitions. 
Impact investing allows investors to pursue opportunities that provide both social and 
financial returns. This innovative form of funding is growing globally as a valuable 
mechanism to support social service delivery. Changing community expectations 
about the role of government and the financial sector in funding social service delivery 
highlight a need for this funding mechanism in Australia. 
Impact investment can occur through direct investment in not-for-profit or social 
enterprises. Alternatively, it can be intermediated by community development 
financial institutions, social banks and impact investment fund managers. These 
intermediaries play a valuable role in channelling impact investment funds as well as 
building capacity in not-for-profit and social enterprises to attract impact investment 
funds. 
Importantly, impact investing has the potential to benefit government and taxpayers 
by reducing costs and improving social policy outcomes. It can change the role of 
Government from paying for inputs to paying for outcomes. It can also benefit 
not-for-profits by diversifying their funding sources and helping them to develop 
technical expertise in benchmarking and measuring outcomes, as well as improving 
governance and accountability. 
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Given the potential benefits of social impact investment and its current limited use in 
Australia, the Interim Report sought feedback on market impediments. The Inquiry 
agrees with stakeholders who suggest that clarifying some aspects of regulation would 
facilitate market development, including: 
• Clearer guidance from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) on 
the appropriateness of impact investment for superannuation trustees. Currently, 
guidance is limited. 
• Government should amend the law to facilitate private ancillary funds established 
and controlled by ‘sophisticated’ or ‘professional’ investors accessing wholesale 
offerings for social impact bonds.1 
Many stakeholders argue that Government should play a more active role to facilitate 
the social impact investment market in Australia, although views vary on the nature of 
this role.2 The Inquiry agrees “Government intervention can play a catalytic role both 
in facilitating the functioning of the ecosystem and targeting actions to trigger its 
further development. However, these actions should provide incentives for the 
engagement, not the replacement of the private sector and should be conducted in a 
manner conducive of the market”.3 
The Inquiry sees merit in Government facilitating the impact investment market. 
Government’s involvement should include coordinating interested private sector 
parties, providing expertise on social service delivery and performance measurement, 
and offering explicit public endorsement for the significant private sector interest in 
this emerging market. 
                                                          
1  Impact Investment Group 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
pages 6–7. 
2  Westpac 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 50; Impact 
Investing Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 5; 
Impact Investment Group 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 9. 
3  Impact Investing Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 10 citing: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2011, 
Financing high-growth firms: the role of angel investors, OECD, Paris, page 124. 
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Retail corporate bond market 
Recommendation 33 
Reduce disclosure requirements for large listed corporates issuing ‘simple’ bonds and 
encourage industry to develop standard terms for ‘simple’ bonds. 
Australia has an established domestic bond market. However, a range of constraints, 
including tax and regulatory settings, have limited the market’s development — in 
particular, the retail corporate bond market. The Interim Report discusses these issues 
further.4 
For corporates, the disclosure requirements for a retail corporate bond issue are more 
onerous and costly than for domestic wholesale issuance. Although the new ‘simple’ 
corporate bonds legislation reduces the cost of disclosure documentation, it is still 
greater than for a domestic wholesale issue.5 Less onerous disclosure requirements for 
listed securities would make retail issuance simpler and more cost effective. 
The Inquiry considers that Government should amend the law to reduce disclosure 
requirements for large listed corporate issuers of ‘simple’ bonds. The disclosure regime 
should comprise a term sheet for a standardised product and a cleansing notice. In 
addition, industry — assisted by the Australian Financial Markets Association — 
should develop standard terms and conditions for ‘simple’ bonds, which would also 
help reduce disclosure costs. The Inquiry believes that the proposed regime would 
strike the right balance between reducing issuance costs and providing potential 
investors with sufficient information to make a considered investment decision. 
Stakeholders generally agree, and suggest that the documentation costs would be 
broadly aligned with those for domestic wholesale issuance.6 Given the proposed 
disclosure regime is similar to current requirements for a domestic wholesale issue, it 
would also reduce the administrative burden of a retail offer associated with a 
wholesale issue. 
Broadly, submissions and stakeholders agree that, at least initially, the new disclosure 
regime should not be available to smaller corporates on the listed equity market. In 
                                                          
4  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
pages 2-86 to 2-87. 
5  The Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2014 became law 
on 11 September 2014. The regime is not fully implemented, as much of the structure and 
content of disclosure requirements are to be set by regulation and have only recently been 
released for public consultation. 
6  Based on an industry survey conducted by the Australian Financial Markets Association 
(AFMA). AFMA 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 1 October 2014. 
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general, investors have the benefit of more market research and publicly available 
information for larger corporates. Larger corporates are also more likely to be repeat 
issuers and thus be subject to market discipline regarding the quality of their 
disclosures. 
The Inquiry considers that the new regime should only be available to the top 150 
companies by market capitalisation on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). This 
is broadly consistent with the views of stakeholders. Government should review this 
limit after two years to determine whether the regime should be extended to smaller 
corporates. 
Unfair contract term provisions 
Recommendation 34 
Support Government’s process to extend unfair contract term protections to small 
businesses. 
Encourage industry to develop standards on the use of non-monetary default covenants. 
Protections from unfair contract term (UCT) provisions under the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act 2001 currently do not apply to small business loans or 
business-to-business lending. The UCT provisions are limited to consumer contracts: 
those in which at least one party is an individual acquiring goods or services wholly or 
predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
Several submissions suggest that some non-monetary loan covenants are unfair and 
lenders could be more transparent when exercising them. 
The Inquiry supports Government’s public consultation and policy development 
process for extending the coverage of UCT protections under standard form contracts 
to small businesses. Although such protections would not prevent unfair terms in 
non-standard contracts, the Inquiry believes this approach may improve broader 
contracting practices and the fair exercise of rights pursuant to non-monetary default 
covenants. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) could also 
make protections more effective by clarifying its intent to enforce UCT provisions. 
More broadly, the Inquiry encourages the banking industry to adjust its code of 
practice to address non-monetary default covenants. The Code of Banking Practice and 
the Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice could require banks to give borrowers 
sufficient notice of changes to covenants and of an intention to enforce —which could 
give a borrower reasonable time to obtain alternative financing. Such adjustments to 
industry practice would also provide greater scope and guidance for the Code 
Compliance Monitoring Committee and the Financial Ombudsman Service to deal 
with relevant complaints. 




Clearly differentiate the investment products that finance companies and similar entities 
offer retail consumers from authorised deposit-taking institution deposits. 
Finance companies operate under an exemption from the Banking Act 1959. They differ 
from authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) because they raise funds by issuing 
debt securities rather than by accepting deposits. Although most Australian finance 
companies source their funding from wholesale investors, some smaller entities target 
consumers. The period since the global financial crisis has seen numerous failures of 
finance companies, resulting in significant losses. In the wake of these failures, it has 
become apparent that some consumers did not appreciate the difference between 
finance companies and ADIs.7 This problem was exacerbated by finance companies 
using bank account–like terminology and allowing consumers to access funds at call. 
The Inquiry considered whether to ban finance companies from accepting retail funds 
from consumers. However, it recognises that well-run finance companies can play a 
useful role in the market. It also considered whether they should be prudentially 
regulated by ASIC — an approach considered by the former Government following 
the collapse of Banksia Securities. However, the Inquiry does not recommend that 
ASIC’s mandate be extended in this way. The Inquiry considers that the best approach 
would be to differentiate the products of finance companies from accounts offered by 
ADIs. The Inquiry therefore recommends APRA ban finance companies from offering 
at-call products to retail consumers and from using bank account–like terminology. 
Corporate administration and bankruptcy 
Recommendation 36 
Consult on possible amendments to the external administration regime to provide additional 
flexibility for businesses in financial difficulty. 
The Interim Report asked stakeholders about the efficiency of Australia’s external 
administration regime.8 Submissions indicate that Australia’s external administration 
provisions are generally working well and do not require wholesale revision. 
                                                          
7  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 83. 
8  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, 
Canberra, page 2-69. 
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Stakeholders present little evidence to suggest the Australian regime causes otherwise 
viable businesses to fail. However, submissions highlight that a few elements of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11 insolvency framework merit 
consideration.9 
Submissions argue that directors should be protected by ‘safe harbour’ provisions that 
permit restructuring efforts for firms in financial difficulty without invoking external 
administration processes. These protections would only apply where directors seek 
expert assistance. Stakeholders also suggest extending the safe harbour protection to 
the expert restructuring advisers to prevent them from being considered de facto 
directors. Further, stakeholders suggest that ipso facto clauses be suspended from 
operating during the restructuring efforts.10 
The Inquiry recognises more work needs to be done to assess the potential value of 
these proposals and recommends Government conducts stakeholder consultation on 
these matters. 
The current Australian external administration regime has other complexities: 
• In some cases, external administration and bankruptcy processes overlap, causing 
disproportionate complexity and cost. This particularly affects small and 
medium-sized enterprises, where the owner faces personal bankruptcy if their 
incorporated business fails. 
• Complaints and dispute resolution processes relating to the external administration 
regime could be improved. ASIC is currently implementing measures to enhance 
existing processes. 
• Elements of external administration and bankruptcy regulation are not technology 
neutral and efficiencies available from digital processes are not being used. 
Government consultation has commenced on measures to address elements of the first 
two of these issues. Recommendation 39: Technology neutrality in this appendix addresses 
the third. 
                                                          
9  Chapter 11 refers to “… the chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code providing (generally) for 
reorganisation, usually involving a corporation or partnership”. United States Courts, 
Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code, United States Courts, Washington, DC, viewed 
23 October 2014, 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx>. 
10  Ipso facto clauses deem a company to be in default in circumstances approaching insolvency; 
for instance, where there has been a ‘material adverse change’ in a company’s financial 
circumstances. Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2003, 
Rehabilitating large and complex enterprises in financial difficulties, CAMAC, Sydney, 
paragraph 1.44, page 9. 
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Superannuation and retirement incomes 
Superannuation member engagement 
Recommendation 37 
Publish retirement income projections on member statements from defined contribution 
superannuation schemes using Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
regulatory guidance. 
Facilitate access to consolidated superannuation information from the Australian Taxation 
Office to use with ASIC’s and superannuation funds’ retirement income projection 
calculators. 
Research indicates that giving consumers retirement income projections improves their 
engagement with saving for retirement.11 However, many superannuation funds do 
not provide retirement income projections on member statements. All members need 
to understand their projected retirement income to make informed decisions about 
their retirement savings. Where possible, all funds should provide meaningful 
retirement income projections on member statements, including scenarios to alert 
members to sequencing risk, based on the standard assumptions described in ASIC’s 
requirements for superannuation forecasts.12 This would benefit members at a 
relatively small cost to superannuation funds. 
Superannuation funds can only provide a partial perspective of retirement incomes for 
members who have multiple accounts and wealth accumulated outside of 
superannuation. Online calculators enable individuals to enter all their information — 
superannuation fund and asset balances—to obtain a more accurate retirement income 
projection, including any income from the Age Pension. The Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO), which holds consolidated superannuation information across multiple 
accounts, could provide that information for use in calculators, which could initially be 
accessed from the ATO’s myGov superannuation portal. This would assist funds to 
design calculators that provide retirement income projections based on the 
comprehensive income product for retirement they offer members 
(see Recommendation 11: The retirement phase of superannuation in Chapter 2). 
                                                          
11  Goda, G, Manchester, C, Sojourner, A 2012, What’s my account really worth? The effect of 
lifetime income disclosure on retirement savings, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 17927. 
12  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Regulatory Guide 229: 
Superannuation forecasts, ASIC, Sydney. 
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There would be small implementation costs for the ATO to link its existing myGov 




Update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the threat environment, 
improve cohesion in policy implementation, and progress public–private sector and 
cross-industry collaboration.  
Establish a formal framework for cyber security information sharing and response to cyber 
threats. 
As observed in the Interim Report, cyber attacks are increasing in frequency and 
sophistication.13 The financial industry is a major target of cyber crime and is under 
increasing threat as the number of high-value targets in the sector grows. Major 
industry participants raise cyber security as a significant risk to their viability and to 
the financial system. A financial sector cyber crisis could result in system-wide impacts 
and significant consumer detriment. 
The growth in interconnectivity, increasing network speeds and broad distribution of 
technology mean that responses to cyber threats by individual institutions are 
necessary but, in some cases, insufficient. Many industry participants suggest the 
cyber security of the financial system is only as strong as its ‘weakest link’, requiring 
efforts by both Government and industry to strengthen capacity to respond in an 
effective and coordinated way. 
Australia has a Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) in place, released in 2009, that outlines a 
whole-of-Government cyber security policy. Submissions indicate the CSS is out of 
date and not suited to today’s threat environment. Given the rapidly changing nature 
of cyber space and the threat environment, Government should act to ensure Australia 
has an updated and cohesive CSS. 
Industry participants indicate that, although they already actively monitor the threat 
environment and are well placed to identify vulnerabilities, the most effective 
responses come from combining the intelligence they hold with timely threat 
                                                          
13  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, 
page 4-55. 
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information held by Government. Consequently, policy and regulatory frameworks 
need to support effective and timely public–private sector information sharing. 
Given the constant and rapid evolution of cyber threats, public–private sector 
coordination of cyber crisis planning — including across sectors (for example, with the 
telecommunications sector) — is becoming increasingly important. Industry 
participants in particular highlight a need to clarify the roles of the public and private 
sectors in a cyber crisis event to ensure a rapid, coordinated and effective response. 
Updating the CSS, developing formal mechanisms for public–private sector 
information sharing and clarifying public and private sector roles in a cyber crisis 
would help to improve the resilience of the financial system. It would better prepare 
the financial sector, Government and other industry sectors to respond in a timely and 
coordinated manner to evolving cyber threats. 
Technology neutrality 
Recommendation 39 
Identify, in consultation with the financial sector, and amend priority areas of regulation to 
be technology neutral. 
Embed consideration of the principle of technology neutrality into development processes for 
future regulation. 
Ensure regulation allows individuals to select alternative methods to access services to 
maintain fair treatment for all consumer segments. 
Some regulation assumes or requires the use of certain forms of technology. For 
example, regulation may specify certain delivery mechanisms for products, or use 
terminology that assumes a paper-based environment. In other cases, new 
technologies put the operation of certain provisions in doubt. These circumstances can 
impede innovation and efficiency by preventing the uptake of new technologies that 
could provide better outcomes for users, businesses and government. They can also 
prevent government and regulators from managing risks appropriately. 
Stakeholders have identified a range of priority areas for amendment, including 
regulation relating to financial products and services disclosure, customer consent and 
authorisation, payments and cheques, external administration processes, conveyancing 
and identity verification.14 
                                                          
14  Including: Mercer 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
pages 57-58; King & Wood Mallesons 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System 
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Government should establish an industry working group to identify the priority areas 
of regulation to be amended for technology neutrality. A number of stakeholders have 
indicated their support for and willingness to be involved in such an initiative.15 
Technology-neutral regulation enables any mode of technology to be used and tends to 
be competitively neutral. Generally, regulation should be principles-based and 
functional in design, focusing on outcomes rather than prescribing the method by 
which it should be achieved. However, the Inquiry recognises that technology specific 
regulation may continue to be required and be beneficial in cases where adopting a 
common technology standard would improve overall system efficiency. In these cases, 
future review mechanisms should be established to ensure technology-specific 
regulation does not impede innovation. 
The principle of technology neutrality should be incorporated into government 
policy-making guides, and processes for developing future regulation. The guidance 
should allow for technology-specific regulation on an exceptions basis.  
A technology-neutral approach to regulation enables regulators and government to 
adapt to innovative developments and manage risks. It can also reduce compliance 
costs by removing unnecessary regulatory impediments and improving the stability 
and longevity of regulation. It can also give financial product providers greater 
flexibility to innovate to meet changing consumer expectations. 
Stakeholders note a potential consequence of technology-neutral regulation is that it 
risks excluding some community segments from the financial system.16 For example, 
by enabling businesses to shift to electronic service delivery as a default, older 
Australians or others with limited internet access may become excluded. As a result, it 
is important that regulation accommodates the ability of consumers to select 
alternative methods to access services, such as paper-based delivery. 
In implementation, a phased approach may be required to manage transitional costs to 
industry. However, the Inquiry believes these costs would be outweighed by the 
longer-term efficiency benefits to industry and improved consumer outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Inquiry, pages 33–34; PEXA (Property Exchange Australia) 2014, Second round submission 
to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 7–9; Australian Restructuring Insolvency and 
Turnaround Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry 
(main document), page 3. 
15  Commonwealth Bank 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 60. 
16  Refer, for example, to National Seniors Australia 2014, Second round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 29. 
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Consumer outcomes 
Provision of financial advice and mortgage broking 
Recommendation 40 
Rename ‘general advice’ and require advisers and mortgage brokers to disclose ownership 
structures. 
The current regulatory framework addresses advice on financial products. The 
framework makes an important distinction between personal and general advice: 
• Personal advice takes account of a person’s needs, objectives or personal 
circumstances, whereas general advice does not. 
• General advice includes guidance, advertising, and promotional and sales material 
highlighting the potential benefits of financial products. It comes with a disclaimer 
stating that it does not take a consumer’s personal circumstances into account. 
However, consumers may misinterpret or excessively rely on guidance, advertising, 
and promotional and sales material when it is described as ‘general advice’. The use of 
the word ‘advice’ may cause consumers to believe the information is tailored to their 
needs. Behavioural economics literature and ASIC’s financial literacy and consumer 
research suggests that terminology affects consumer understanding and perceptions.17 
Often consumers do not understand their financial adviser’s or mortgage broker’s 
association with product issuers. This association might limit the product range an 
adviser or broker can recommend from.18 Of recently surveyed consumers, 55 per cent 
of those receiving financial advice from an entity owned by a large financial institution 
(but operating under a different brand name) thought the entity was independent.19 
                                                          
17  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 378: Consumer testing 
of the MySuper product dashboard, ASIC, Sydney, page 22; ASIC 2013, Report 341: Retail investor 
research into structured capital protected and capital guaranteed investments, ASIC, Sydney; 
Susan Bell Research 2008, The provision of consumer research regarding financial product 
disclosure documents, Financial Services Working Group, Sydney. 
18  ASIC’s review of Future of Financial Advice reform implementation observed that 
approximately 63 per cent of licensees in the sample tested were affiliated with financial 
product issuers. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 407: 
Review of the financial advice industry’s implementation of the FOFA reforms, ASIC, Sydney, 
page 19. 
19  In contrast, only 14 per cent of consumers considered financial planners working under the 
brand of the same financial institution to be independent. Roy Morgan Research 2014, data 
provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 7 November 2014. 
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The Inquiry believes greater transparency regarding the nature of advice and the 
ownership of advisers would help to build confidence and trust in the financial advice 
sector. In particular, ‘general advice’ should be replaced with a more appropriate, 
consumer-tested term to help reduce consumer misinterpretation and excessive 
reliance on this type of information. Consumer testing will generate some costs for 
Government, and relabelling will generate transitional costs for industry — although 
these are expected to be small. The Inquiry believes the benefits to consumers from 
clearer distinction and the reduced need for warnings outweigh these costs. 
Although stakeholders have provided little evidence of differences in the quality of 
advice from independent or aligned and vertically integrated firms, the Inquiry sees 
the value to consumers in making ownership and alignment more transparent. In 
particular, these disclosures should be broader than Financial Services Guide and 
Credit Guide rules currently require, and could include branded documents or 
materials. The Inquiry believes the benefits to consumers would outweigh the 
transitional costs to industry of effecting branding changes. 
Unclaimed monies 
Recommendation 41 
Define bank accounts and life insurance policies as unclaimed monies only if they are 
inactive for seven years.  
At present, bank accounts and life insurance policies are deemed to be unclaimed 
monies and transferred to Government if they are inactive for three years. The present 
position was changed in 2012, from a longstanding arrangement that required an 
inactive period of seven years. 
The Australian Bankers’ Association estimates that reverting to seven years would 
halve the number of claims.20 The Inquiry believes Government should act to ensure 
bank accounts and life insurance policies are deemed unclaimed after seven years of 
inactivity and that these monies should be held in a separate trust account. 
                                                          
20  Australian Banker’s Association 2014, Submission in response to the Treasury discussion 
paper: Options for Improving the Unclaimed Bank Account and Life Insurance Money Provisions, 
page 2.  
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Regulatory system 
Managed investment scheme regulation 
Recommendation 42 
Support Government’s review of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s 
recommendations on managed investment schemes, giving priority to matters relating to: 
• Consumer detriment, including illiquid schemes and freezing of funds 
• Regulatory architecture impeding cross-border transactions and mutual recognition 
arrangements 
The Inquiry received relatively few submissions on managed investment scheme (MIS) 
matters, possibly due to other related and concurrent Government consultations. 
In 2012, following a series of high-profile scheme collapses, the Corporations and 
Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) released a report into MISs that identified 
problems in a range of areas, including arrangements for restructuring or winding up 
failed schemes.21,22 The report also highlighted more fundamental concerns about 
schemes being used as vehicles for entrepreneurial activities rather than as passive 
investment vehicles. It found that most problems with the sector had arisen due to 
stress in ‘common enterprise’ schemes, where the MIS structure is favoured over the 
corporate structure for tax reasons. This in turn led to a number of difficulties in 
managing the financial distress of those schemes and consequent consumer detriment. 
In 2014, CAMAC released a broad-ranging discussion paper that, among other issues, 
identified MIS regulatory architecture characteristics that impede other jurisdictions 
from recognising the equivalence of the Australian regulatory regime. Without 
equivalence, companies find it harder to conduct cross-border business.23 
Submissions received were largely about these issues. Accordingly, the Inquiry 
believes these should be priority areas for Government action arising from CAMAC’s 
work. 
                                                          
21  Collapses were experienced primarily in the agribusiness sector. 
22  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2012, Managed investment schemes, 
CAMAC, Sydney. 
23  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2014, The establishment of managed 
investment schemes, CAMAC, Sydney. 
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In addition to this recommendation, the Inquiry is making several other 
recommendations affecting the MIS sector, including: 
• Strengthening regulators’ focus on competition in the financial system, including 
identifying barriers to cross-border provision of financial services. 
• Prioritising the rationalisation of MIS legacy products (see below). 
• Removing regulatory impediments to innovative product disclosure and 
communication with consumers. 
The Inquiry also identifies a number of taxes for consideration as part of the Tax White 
Paper process, such as the tax treatment of funds management vehicles (for further 
detail, see Appendix 2: Tax summary). 
Legacy products 
Recommendation 43 
Introduce a mechanism to facilitate the rationalisation of legacy products in the life insurance 
and managed investments sectors. 
Industry estimates suggest that approximately 25 per cent of all funds under 
management are in legacy products.24 These are products that are closed to new 
investors and have become uneconomic or rendered out of date by changes to market 
structure, Government policy or legislation. Legacy products increase costs to fund 
managers and life insurers. They can also prevent consumers from accessing better 
features in newer products.  
Between 2007 and 2010, Government worked with industry to develop a mechanism to 
facilitate product rationalisation, focusing on the managed investments and life 
insurance sectors — superannuation was considered less problematic as there was 
already a successor fund transfer mechanism in relevant legislation. However, 
Government did not finalise or implement the mechanism.  
The mechanism would have facilitated rationalisation of genuine legacy products — 
that is, not simply those that are performing poorly — subject to a ‘no disadvantage 
test’ for relevant consumers. It would also have provided tax relief to ensure 
consumers were not disadvantaged as a result of triggering an early capital gains tax 
event. 
                                                          
24  Financial Services Council (formerly Investment and Financial Services 
Association Ltd) 2009, Second round submission to Australia’s Future Tax System Review, 
page 5. 
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The Inquiry sees benefit in such a mechanism for product rationalisation that treats 
consumers fairly. Given the cost of implementing the mechanism, the Inquiry 
considers it should initially be limited to managed investments and life insurance, and 
that it should be subject to a cost recovery mechanism, such as an application fee. The 
application fee could be designed to offset process administration costs and 
incorporate economic incentives to ensure rationalisation targets the most problematic 
areas. 
Corporations Act 2001 ownership restrictions 
Recommendation 44 
Remove market ownership restrictions from the Corporations Act 2001 once the current 
reforms to cross-border regulation of financial market infrastructure are complete. 
An additional restriction on the ASX’s ownership, over and above the Foreign 
Investment Review Board national interest test, was introduced on the exchange’s 
demutualisation in 1998. The rationale for this restriction was concern about a possible 
conflict of interest in the ASX’s role as a market co-regulator. However, responsibility 
for market supervision has now been transferred to ASIC, and proposals are underway 
to allow for stronger cross-border regulation.25 
Government should act to remove market ownership restrictions for the ASX to make 
it subject to the same ownership restrictions as other entities in the financial sector.
                                                          
25  Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) 2014, Application of the Regulatory Influence Framework 
for Cross-border Central Counterparties, CFR, Sydney; Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012, Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO 
Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia, RBA, Sydney; Stevens, G 2012, Review 
of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation, letter to the Hon. Wayne Swan, MP (Deputy 




Appendix 2: Tax summary 
The Inquiry has identified a number of taxes that distort the allocation of funding and 
risk in the economy. The Inquiry also identified other tax issues that may adversely 
affect outcomes in the financial system. Unless they are already under active 
Government consideration, the tax issues listed below should be considered as part of 










treatment of savings 
The tax system treats returns from some forms of saving more favourably than others. For example, interest income from bank deposits 
and fixed-income securities are taxed relatively heavily. This distorts the asset composition of household balance sheets and the broader 
flow of funds in the economy. 
To the extent that tax distortions direct savings to less productive investment opportunities, a more neutral tax treatment would likely 
increase productivity. 
The relatively unfavourable tax treatment of deposits and fixed-income securities makes them less attractive as forms of saving and 
increases the cost of this type of funding. 
Negative gearing and 
capital gains tax 
Capital gains tax concessions for assets held longer than a year provide incentives to invest in assets for which anticipated capital gains 
are a larger component of returns. Reducing these concessions would lead to a more efficient allocation of funding in the economy. 
For leveraged investments, the asymmetric tax treatment of borrowing costs incurred in purchasing assets (and other expenses) and 
capital gains, can result in a tax subsidy by raising the after-tax return above the pre-tax return. Investors can deduct expenses against 
total income at the individual’s full marginal tax rate. However, for assets held longer than a year, nominal capital gains, when realised, 
are effectively taxed at half the marginal rate. All else being equal, the increase in the after-tax return is larger for individuals on higher 
marginal tax rates. 
The tax treatment of investor housing, in particular, tends to encourage leveraged and speculative investment. Since the Wallis Inquiry, 
higher housing debt has been accompanied by lenders having a greater exposure to mortgages. Housing is a potential source of 
systemic risk for the financial system and the economy. 
Dividend imputation The case for retaining dividend imputation is less clear than in the past. To the extent that dividend imputation distorts the allocation of 
funding, a lower company tax rate would likely reduce such distortions. 
By removing the double taxation of corporate earnings, the introduction of dividend imputation (in 1987) reduced the cost of equity and 
the bias towards debt funding. This contributed to the general decline in leverage among non-financial corporates. 
However, the benefits of dividend imputation, particularly in lowering the cost of capital, may have declined as Australia’s economy has 
become more open and connected to global capital markets. If global capital markets set the (risk-adjusted) cost of funding, then 
dividend imputation acts as a subsidy to domestic equity holders. That would create a bias for domestic investors, including 
superannuation funds, to invest in domestic equities. Imputation provides little benefit to non-residents that invest in Australian 
corporates. 
For investors (including superannuation funds) subject to low tax rates, the value of imputation credits received may exceed tax payable. 
Unused credits are fully refundable to these investors, with negative consequences for Government revenue. 
Mutuals cannot distribute franking credits, unlike institutions with more traditional company structures. This may adversely affect mutuals’ 








Interest withholding tax 
(IWT) 
For non-residents, repatriated income from Australian investments is, in some cases, subject to withholding tax. The unequal tax 
treatment of repatriated income may affect the funding decisions of Australian entities and place Australia at a competitive disadvantage 
internationally.  
Lower, more uniform withholding tax rates would unwind these distortions; however, since withholding taxes help protect the integrity of 
the tax system, reforms should consider the potential implications for tax avoidance. 
Withholding tax varies depending on a range of factors, including the type of funding, the country of the non-resident and the relationship 
between the non-resident and the domestic recipient of the funding.  
Withholding taxes generally increase the required rate of return for foreign investors, which reduces the relative attractiveness of 
Australia as an investment destination. Where foreign investors can pass on the cost to domestic recipients of funds, this raises the cost 
of capital in Australia. 
For financial institutions, different funding mechanisms are subject to different rates of IWT. Reducing IWT (for the relevant funding 
mechanisms) would reduce funding distortions, provide a more diversified funding base and, more broadly, reduce impediments to 
cross-border capital flows. 
For foreign bank branches in Australia, interest paid on funds borrowed from the offshore parent is deductable, limited to the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) cap. This can prevent the branch from claiming the full interest cost of borrowing. 
Australia’s IWT regime also applies to derivative transactions. Under G20 commitments, certain standardised over-the-counter 
derivatives need to be collateralised and cleared through a regulated central counterparty (CCP). In Australia, outbound interest 
payments on collateralised positions may be subject to IWT (flows from Australian participants to offshore CCPs, or flows from Australian 
CCPs to offshore participants). This may increase costs for Australian participants and adversely affect liquidity in Australian derivatives 
markets. 
Development of new financial markets that trade non–AUD denominated financial products (for example, RMB-denominated products) 
requires making markets across borders. Greater certainty regarding how withholding taxes are applied in these markets, and better 
alignment of the regime with regional trading partners, would aid market development. 
The Research and 
Development (R&D) Tax 
Incentive 
The R&D Tax Incentive provides businesses with annual tax offsets for eligible R&D costs.  
Submissions broadly support the regime, although some argue that more frequent access to tax offsets would help alleviate firms’ cash 
flow constraints, particularly for new ventures. 
Tax treatment of 
Venture Capital Limited 
Partnerships (VCLPs) 
Simplifying the tax rules for VCLPs and streamlining Government administration of the regime would reduce barriers to fundraising. A 
2011 Board of Taxation review (Review of taxation arrangements under the Venture Capital Limited Partnership regime) made 








Tax treatment of funds 
management vehicles 
In 2009, the Johnson Review (Australia as a financial centre: Building on our strengths) recommended changes to the tax treatment of 
funds management. Government has implemented some of the proposed changes but is still considering others, including expanding the 
range of collective investment vehicles (CIVs). 
Typically, offshore investors require an investment vehicle that allows flow-through of any tax liabilities from the vehicle to the end 
investor. However, Australian tax law does not allow for the types of vehicles that both provide for flow-through and are familiar to 
offshore clients (particularly in Asia). A broader set of appropriate vehicles would better facilitate the management of foreign funds. 
The Board of Taxation reviewed tax arrangements applying to CIVs in 2011. Government is yet to release the report. 
Tax treatment of 
superannuation: Tax 
concessions 
Tax concessions in the superannuation system are not well targeted to achieve provision of retirement incomes. This increases the cost 
of the superannuation system to taxpayers and increases inefficiencies arising from higher taxation elsewhere in the economy, and the 
distortions arising from the differences in the tax treatment of savings. It also contributes to the broader problem of policy instability, 
which imposes unnecessary costs on superannuation funds and their members and undermines long-term confidence in the system (see 
Chapter 2: Superannuation and retirement incomes). 
Tax treatment of 
superannuation: 
Differentiated tax rates 
on earnings 
Earnings are taxed at 15 per cent in the accumulation phase, but are untaxed in the retirement phase. This can act as a barrier to funds 
offering ‘whole-of-life’ superannuation products and increases costs in the superannuation system. 
Aligning the earnings tax rate between accumulation and retirement would reduce costs for funds, help to foster innovation in whole-of-
life superannuation products, facilitate a seamless transition to retirement and reduce opportunities for tax arbitrage (see Chapter 2: 
Superannuation and retirement incomes). 
Tax treatment of legacy 
products 
Legacy products are financial products that are outdated and closed. These include some life insurance policies and interests in 
managed investment schemes. 
Legacy products are a drag on the efficiency of product providers, which ultimately may lead to higher costs for consumers. In 2009, 
Government proposed a framework for rationalising legacy products; however, this has not yet led to an implemented solution. One 
significant issue is the tax treatment of underlying assets when legacy products are converted or consolidated into products with 
equivalent features or benefits (see Recommendation 43: Legacy products in Appendix 1: Significant matters). 
Duties on insurance Insurance taxes are levied by the states and territories. All states impose stamp duties on general insurance premiums, while some 
states impose additional levies—for example, fire service levies. 
Insurance taxes mean that individuals and businesses must pay more to achieve the same risk reduction. Reducing duties on insurance 
would assist in dealing with underinsurance. 
Tax treatment of 
non-operating holding 
companies (NOHCs) 
With regard to corporate groups that include regulated entities, a group headed by a NOHC may give legal and operational separation to 
the group’s regulated and non-regulated activities. In Australia, few financial groups are headed by NOHCs, and none of the four major 
banks operate under this structure. 
A NOHC structure may provide financial institutions with greater flexibility in their activities. For regulators, a NOHC structure may 
facilitate supervision and resolution. However, restructuring carries significant costs for corporate groups, including tax implications. 








Goods and services tax 
(GST) 
GST is not levied on most financial services. This may contribute to the financial system being larger than it otherwise would be.  
Financial service providers that do not charge GST still must pay GST on inputs, but cannot claim input tax credits. Providers pass this 
cost on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
As a result, households could be over-consuming financial services compared to what they would consume if GST was applied to these 
services. Because the GST is embedded in prices charged to businesses, but not charged explicitly, businesses cannot claim input tax 




Appendix 3: Small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
A number of the Inquiry’s recommendations are designed to reduce structural 
impediments to SMEs’ access to finance. Such impediments include information 
imbalances between lenders and borrowers, and barriers to market-based funding. 
Other recommendations would help reduce costs for SMEs and support innovation. 
The Inquiry encourages industry to expand data sharing under the new voluntary 
comprehensive credit reporting (CCR) regime (see Recommendation 20: Comprehensive 
credit reporting in the Chapter 3: Innovation). More comprehensive credit reporting 
would reduce information imbalances between lenders and borrowers, facilitate 
competition between lenders, and improve credit conditions for SMEs. Although CCR 
relates to individuals’ data, personal credit history is a major factor in credit providers’ 
decisions to lend to new business ventures and small firms. 
The Inquiry supports a facilitative regulatory regime for crowdfunding, while 
recognising the risks involved (see Recommendation 18: Crowdfunding in Chapter 3). A 
well-developed crowdfunding sector would give SMEs more funding options and 
increase competition in SME financing. The Inquiry supports Government’s current 
process to graduate fundraising regulation to facilitate securities-based crowdfunding. 
Government should use these policy settings as a basis to assess whether broader 
fundraising and lending regulation could be graduated to facilitate other forms of 
crowdfunding, including peer-to-peer lending. 
Information imbalances, among other factors, have led to numerous and onerous 
non-monetary terms in some lending contracts. The Inquiry supports Government’s 
current process for extending consumer protections for unfair terms in standard 
contracts to small businesses (see Recommendation 34: Unfair contract term provisions in 
Appendix 1: Significant matters). Although such protections would not prevent unfair 
terms in non-standard contracts, the Inquiry believes this approach may improve 
broader contracting practices. The Inquiry also encourages the banking industry to 
adjust its codes of practice, to require banks to give borrowers sufficient notice of an 
intention to enforce contract terms and give borrowers time to source alternative 
financing. 
Recommendations to reform the payments system would benefit SMEs (see 
Recommendation 17: Interchange fees and customer surcharging and Recommendation 16: 
Clearer graduated payments regulation in Chapter 3). The Inquiry’s proposals to lower 
interchange fee caps would reduce the fees paid by all businesses and reduce the 
difference in fees paid by small and large businesses. 
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As technology evolves, greater access to data and innovations in data use are likely 
to benefit all businesses, particularly SMEs. For example, more extensive access to 
quality datasets would improve business decision making. Globally, payment 
providers are developing new ways to assess SMEs’ creditworthiness and extend 
credit to SMEs. The Inquiry recommends that the Productivity Commission review 
how data could be used more effectively, taking into account privacy considerations 
(see Recommendation 19: Data access and use in Chapter 3). 
The Inquiry considers that financial system innovators which challenge the existing 
regulatory structure should have better access to Government, and that Government 
and regulators should have greater awareness and understanding of financial system 
innovation. This would enable timely and coordinated policy and regulatory responses 
to innovation. The Inquiry recommends that Government establish a permanent 
public–private sector collaborative committee, the ‘Innovation Collaboration’, 
consisting of senior industry, Government, regulatory, academic and consumer 
representatives (see Recommendation 14: Collaboration to enable innovation in Chapter 3). 
Better targeted tax settings for start-ups and innovative firms would facilitate 
innovation. Simplifying the tax rules for Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, and 
streamlining Government administration of the regime, would reduce barriers to 
fundraising. More flexible access to research and development tax offsets could help 
reduce firms’ cash flow constraints, particularly for new ventures. These issues should 





Appendix 4: Consultation 
Approach to the Inquiry 
The Inquiry has taken a consultative approach to its task. 
The Committee invited public submissions by 31 March, based on the terms of 
reference. The Inquiry received more than 280 submissions as part of this process. 
The Inquiry invited a second round of submissions in response to the Interim Report, 
released on 15 July 2014, which made 28 observations and posed a series of questions 
seeking further information from stakeholders. The Inquiry received more than 6,500 
submissions as part of this process. 
In addition to formal submissions, Committee members have held bilateral meetings, 
roundtables and public forums in Australia over the course of the Inquiry. The 
Committee also met with the International Panel and undertook two international trips 
to meet with international regulators and financial intermediaries. 
Consultation 
Committee and Panel meetings 
No. Event City 
31 Financial System Inquiry Committee meetings Sydney (1 meeting held in Canberra) 
1 International Advisory Panel meeting (with Committee) Sydney 
2 International Advisory Panel meeting (with Committee) Teleconference 
1 International Advisory Panel meeting (with Committee) Hong Kong 
Public Forums 
Location Date Committee Members attending 
Perth 13 August 2014 David Murray, Craig Dunn 
Melbourne 14 August 2014 David Murray, Kevin Davis, Brian McNamee 
Brisbane 19 August 2014 David Murray, Carolyn Hewson, Brian McNamee 
Sydney 20 August 2014 David Murray, Carolyn Hewson, Craig Dunn 









Location Date Event 
Melbourne 9 May 2014 Industry Roundtable – Small Business 
Sydney 16 July 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief — Payments sector 
Sydney 16 July 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief — Financial Markets sector 
Sydney 16 July 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief — Banking sector 
Sydney 17 July 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief — General Insurance sector 
Sydney 17 July 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief — Superannuation and Life 
Insurance sector 
Sydney 7 May 2014 Academic roundtable — Centre for International Financial 
Regulation 
Melbourne 6 August 2014 Academic roundtable — Australian Centre for Financial Studies 
Sydney 15 August 2014 Industry roundtable – Consumer outcomes 
Sydney 18 August 2014 Post-Interim Report sector de-brief – Consumer organisations 
Sydney 18 August 2014 Industry Roundtable – Small Business 
Sydney 19 August 2014 Industry roundtable — Banking 
Sydney 19 August 2014 Industry roundtable — Superannuation 
Sydney 19 August 2014 Industry roundtable — Retirement Incomes 
Sydney 21 August 2014 Academic roundtable — Centre for International Financial 
Regulation 
Speeches 
14 February 2014 
Conduct of the Financial System Inquiry 
Address to the Economic and Political Overview Conference, Sydney, Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia 
David Murray AO, Chair, Financial System Inquiry 
1 May 2014 
Financial System Inquiry: An Update on Progress 
Address to the Australian Business Economists, Sydney 
David Murray AO, Chair, Financial System Inquiry 
15 July 2014 
Sustaining Confidence in the Australian Financial System — Launch of the Interim Report 
Address to the National Press Club, Canberra 
David Murray AO, Chair, Financial System Inquiry 
Note: These speeches are available on the Financial System Inquiry website (see http://fsi.gov.au). 
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Stakeholder meetings 
The Inquiry also participated in several hundred meetings with stakeholders. The table 
below summarises the stakeholder meetings attended by Committee members. It does 
not include the numerous stakeholder meetings conducted by the Secretariat. 
Meetings in Australia 
Pre-Interim Report Post-Interim Report 
No. Stakeholder category No. Stakeholder category 
11 Government 13 Government 
20 Financial Institutions 34 Financial Institutions 
6 Consultants 1 Consultant 
5 International 5 International 
1 Service provider 2 Service providers 
21 Peak bodies 16 Peak bodies 
 - - 1 Individual (small business owner) 
64 Total 72 Total 
International Trips 
Date  No. of meetings Location 
26 March 2014 5 meetings Hong Kong 
20–24 July 2014 17 meetings Europe — Frankfurt ,Basel, London 
24–30 July 2014 14 meetings United States — New York, Washington DC 
7–11 September 2014 10 meetings Asia — Singapore, Beijing, Hong Kong 
Submissions to the Inquiry 
First round submissions (lodged up until 2 May 2014) are available on the Financial 
System Inquiry website (www.fsi.gov.au), except where authors requested 
confidentiality. A list of people and organisations that made non- confidential 
submissions is available at Appendix 3 of the Financial System Inquiry Interim Report. 
The second round of submissions closed on 26 August 2014. Of the more than 6,500 
submissions the Inquiry received in response to the issues set out in the Interim 
Report, more than 5,000 campaign submissions were received on the issue of ‘credit 
card surcharges’ — these are not listed below. Second round submissions are also 
available on the Inquiry’s website. 








Analysis of submissions 
Chart 8: Second round submitters to the Inquiry shows the composition of parties that 
made second round submissions to the Inquiry. 
















35 Per centPer cent
 
Source: Centre for International Financial Regulation. Excludes campaigns such as credit card surcharges 
and too-big-to-fail. Also excludes appendices, attachments, supplementary materials and confidential 
submissions. 
Chart 9 (page 289) shows the frequency that Interim Report observations were raised 
in second round submissions. 
Chart 10 (page 290) shows the three observations that each category of stakeholder 
raised most frequently in the second round of submissions. The darker shade 







Chart 9: Frequency that Interim Report observations were raised in second round submissions 
 
Source: Centre for International Financial Regulation and Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation. Excludes campaigns such as credit card surcharges and too-big-to-







Chart 10: Top 3 observations in second round submissions from each category of stakeholder 
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List of submitters 
The following people and organisations made non-confidential second round 
submissions. The Interim Report lists the people and organisations that made 

























ANZ and the 































Australian Centre for 
Financial Studies 
(ACFS) 
Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS) 
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Bank Doctor, The 
Bank Reform Now 
Banki Haddock Fiora 













































































Bruce Mulvaney & Co 
Buckland, Dianne & 
Ray 





































Centre for Commercial 
and Property Law — 
Queensland University 
of Technology 
Centre for Digital 
Business 
Centre for International 
Finance and Regulation 
(CIFR) 
Centre of Excellence in 
Population Ageing 
Research (CEPAR) 
CFA Societies Australia 
Challenger 
Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Queensland 
Chan & Naylor 
Chant West 
Chapman, Graeme 















































Committee for Sydney 
Commonwealth Bank 



























Council of Small 
Business Australia 
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Council of Social 











































de la Motte, Rolfe 
Dean, Geoffrey 













































































Financial Rights Legal 
Centre 
Financial Services 
Council (FSC)  
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Financial Services 




















Fraser, the Right 
Honourable Malcolm 
Freedman, Ben 
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Jacobs, Richard and 
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Stephanie 

































Law Council of 
Australia (Business 
Law Section) 








Lazarenko, M & 
Marcussen, D 
LCH.Clearnet 
Legal Aid NSW 
LeGarde-Glasko, Inez 
Leikov, Joreje 
Lekakis, G, Rogers, I 
and Manning, P 
Lele, Stephen 
Lemon, Robert 






LM Investor Victim 
Centre (LMIVC) 
Lock, Diane & Max 



















Malfiore, S & G & L 
Manadavadi, Pravin 
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Real Estate Institute of 
Australia 
Real, Roger 
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Reed, Andrew 
Regional Banks (on 
behalf of BoQ, Bendigo 
and Adelaide Bank, 





Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) 













































































































































Supported Residents & 
Carers Action Group 
Swan, Graham 
Swiggs, David 





TAL Dai-chi Life 




















































































































Wood, Don & Anita 
Wood, Ian 
Wrae, Louisa 















Appendix 5: Glossary, acronyms and 
abbreviations 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
ABA — Australian Bankers’ Association  
ABN — Australian Business Number 
ABP — account-based pension 
ACCC — Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACSC — Australian Cyber Security Centre 
ACTU — Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ADI — authorised deposit-taking institution 
AFA — Association of Financial Advisers 
AFMA — Australian Financial Markets Association 
AFSA — Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
AFSL — Australian Financial Services Licence 
AFTS — Australia’s Future Taxation System 
AGD — Attorney-General’s Department 
AGIMO — Australian Government Information Management Office 
AIST — Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
AML — anti-money laundering 
ANAO — Australian National Audit Office 
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APCA — Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited 
APRA — Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  
ARCA — Australian Retail Credit Association 
ASC — Australian Securities Commission 
ASIC — Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASFA — Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia  
ASSOB — Australian Small Scale Offerings Board 
ASX — ASX Limited or the exchange operated by ASX Limited  
AT1 — Additional Tier 1  
ATM — automated teller machine 
ATO — Australian Taxation Office 
AUSTRAC — Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
AVCAL — Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited  
BCBS — Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS — Bank for International Settlements 
bps — basis points 
CAMAC — Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 
CCP — central counterparty 
CCR — comprehensive credit reporting 
CEO — Chief Executive Officer 
CET1 — Common Equity Tier 1 
CDFI — community development financial institution 
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CDI — CHESS depositary interest 
CFR — Council of Financial Regulators 
CIPR — comprehensive income product for retirement 
CSEF — crowd-sourced equity funding 
CSS — Cyber Security Strategy  
CTF — counter-terrorism financing 
D-SIB — domestic systemically important banks 
DC — defined contribution 
DHS — Department of Human Services 
DLA — deferred lifetime annuity 
DVS — document verification service 
EFT — electronic funds transfer 
ESMA — European Securities and Markets Authority 
FATCA — Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (US based legislation) 
FCA — UK Financial Conduct Authority 
FCA Act — Financial Corporations Act 1974 
FCS — Financial Claims Scheme  
FIDO — Fast Identity Online alliance  
FINRA — Financial Industry Regulatory Authority  
FIRB — Foreign Investment Review Board 
FMI — financial market infrastructure 
FOFA — Future of Financial Advice law reform 
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FSAC — Financial Sector Advisory Council  
FSAP — Financial Sector Assessment Program 
FSB — Financial Stability Board, formerly the Financial Stability Forum.  
FSG — Financial Services Guide 
FWC — Fair Work Commission 
G-SIB — global systemically important bank 
G20 — Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from 20 major 
economies 
GDP — gross domestic product 
GFC — global financial crisis 
GSA — group self-annuitisation  
GST — goods and services tax  
HQLA — high-quality liquid assets 
IADI — International Association of Deposit Insurers 
IC — Innovation Collaboration 
IMF — International Monetary Fund 
IOSCO — International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
IRB — internal ratings-based 
IWT — interest withholding tax  
KYC — know your client/customer 
LEI — legal entity identifier 
LEIROC — Legal Entity Identifier Regulatory Oversight Committee  
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LIBOR — London Interbank Offered Rate 
LRBA — limited recourse borrowing arrangement 
MIS — managed investment scheme  
NGO — non-government organisation 
NOHC — non-operating holding company 
NPV — net present value 
OBPR — Office of Best Practice Regulation 
OECD — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OIX — Open Identity Exchange 
OSC — Ontario Securities Commission 
OTC — over-the-counter trading 
P2P — peer to peer  
PAYE — Pay As You Earn  
PAYG — Pay As You Go  
PC — Productivity Commission 
PDS — product disclosure statement 
PJCCFS — Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services  
PPF — purchased payment facility 
PSB — Payments System Board  
R&D — research and development 
RBA — Reserve Bank of Australia  
RCAP — Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
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RIS — Regulation Impact Statement 
RMB — Reminbi, the official currency of the People’s Republic of China 
RMBS — residential mortgage-backed securities 
ROE — return on equity 
SG — superannuation guarantee 
SIS Act — Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
SIS Regulations — Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 
SME — small and medium-sized enterprises 
SMSF — self-managed superannuation fund 
SOA — Statement of Advice 
SOE — Statement of Expectations 
SOI — Statement of Intent 
UCT — unfair contract term  
UFI — Unauthorised Financial Insurer 
VCLP — Venture Capital Limited Partnerships 
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Glossary 
accumulation phase — the period of time over which an individual builds the value of 
their superannuation benefits before retirement. 
account-based pension — an individual investment account set up with superannuation 
benefits from which a retiree draws a regular income. 
annuity — an investment that pays a guaranteed regular income stream. 
Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited (APCA) — a public company owned 
by banks, building societies and credit unions with specific accountability for key parts of 
the Australian payments system, particularly payments clearing operations. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) — the prudential regulator of the 
Australian financial services industry that oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, 
general insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance companies, friendly societies, 
and most members of the superannuation industry. 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) — the national regulator of 
corporate entities, with responsibility for market protection and consumer integrity issues 
across the financial system. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) — a national statutory 
authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(formerly the Trade Practices Act 1974) and the provisions of the Conduct Code. ACCC’s 
consumer protection work complements that of State and Territory consumer affairs 
agencies. 
Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) — an industry body representing 
about 200 organisations that participate in Australian over-the-counter wholesale financial 
markets such as those for foreign exchange, interest rate products, financial derivatives, 
repurchase agreements, commodities, equity and electricity derivatives. 
Australia’s Future Tax System (AFTS) — Australia’s future tax system, Report to the 
Treasurer, December 2009, Australian Government, Canberra. 
authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI) — an institution authorised by APRA to carry 
on banking business such as a bank, credit union or building society. 
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Basel I, II, III standards — the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision standards 
governing internationally active banks. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) — provides a forum for regular 
cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of 
key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. 
Bitcoin — a type of digital currency. 
BPAY — a payments clearing organisation owned by a group of retail banks. Individuals 
who hold accounts with a BPAY participating financial institution can pay billing 
organisations that participate in BPAY, using account transfers initiated by phone or 
internet. The transfers may be from savings, cheque or credit card accounts. 
basis points (bps) — a basis point is 1/100th of 1 per cent or 0.01 per cent. The term is 
used in money and securities markets to define differences in interest or yield. 
borrower — a person or entity that incurs a debt to a lender on agreed terms. 
capital market — a market for medium to long-term financial instruments. Financial 
instruments traded in the capital market include shares, and bonds issued by the 
Australian Government, State governments, corporate borrowers and financial 
institutions. 
CHESS depositary interest (CDI) — a financial product that is a unit of beneficial 
ownership in an underlying financial product quoted on the ASX.  
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital — comprises ‘tangible’ equity such as 
shareholders’ common equity.  
Comprehensive Credit Reporting (CCR) — a change in credit reporting legislation 
introduced in March 2014. The change will mean lenders must report positive information 
about how well consumers meet their repayments, not just negative events, such as 
defaults. 
Comprehensive product for retirement (CIPR) — a combination of products that is 
designed for retirement that, at a minimum, provides individuals with income, flexibility 
and risk management (particularly for longevity risk). 
Consumers — ‘retail clients’ as defined in the Corporations Act 2001. 
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Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) — the coordinating body for Australia’s main 
financial regulatory agencies — RBA, APRA, ASIC and Treasury. CFR’s role is to contribute 
to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation and to promote stability of the 
Australian financial system. 
Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) — Australian Government’s 2009 Cyber Security Strategy. 
deferred lifetime annuity (DLA) — a form of lifetime annuity for which income payments 
are delayed for a set amount of time. 
defined benefit (DB) superannuation — a superannuation scheme where contributions are 
pooled. Benefits are calculated using a predetermined formula, and depend on an 
individual’s salary or wage and length of service. 
defined contribution (DC) superannuation — a superannuation scheme where 
contributions are made, and investment earnings accrue, in an individual’s account over 
their working life. Benefits in retirement are the balance of the account. 
derivative — a financial contract whose value is based on, or derived from, another 
financial instrument (such as a bond or share) or a market index (such as the Share Price 
Index). Examples of derivatives include futures, forwards, swaps and options. 
ePayments code — an update and replacement of the Electronic Funds Transfer Code of 
Conduct. 
Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) — a guarantee on retail deposits of up to $250,000 per 
depositor per ADI. 
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) — a non-statutory body established in 1976 to 
advise the Treasurer and the Government on Australia’s foreign investment policy and its 
administration. 
financial markets — a generic term for markets in which financial instruments are traded. 
The four main financial markets trade in foreign exchange, fixed interest or bonds, shares or 
equities, and derivatives. 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) — a joint International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank program, seeking to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of 
countries’ financial systems, and to determine how key sources of risks are being managed. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) — formerly the Financial Stability Forum. The FSB was 
formed in April 2009 as the re-establishment of the Financial Stability Forum, which had 
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existed since 1999. The FSB has a mandate to assess the vulnerabilities affecting the financial 
system, identify and oversee action to address them, and promote cooperation and 
information sharing among authorities responsible for financial stability. Its membership 
comprises the G20 countries such as Australia. 
financial market infrastructure (FMI) — the channels through which financial transactions 
are cleared, settled and recorded, including payments systems and trading platforms. 
fiscal policy — Government spending and taxation policies that influence macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) — regulatory reforms relating to financial advice that 
commenced in mid-2013. These reforms included the introduction of the ‘best interests’ 
duty and a ban on conflicted remuneration. 
gross domestic product (GDP) — a measure of the value of economic production in the 
economy. 
Group self-annuitisation (GSA) — in a GSA, participants contribute funds to a pool that 
is invested in financial assets. Regular payments from the pool are made to surviving 
members. GSAs allow pool members to share, but not completely eliminate, longevity risk 
and do not require capital to back guarantees. 
Innovation Collaboration (IC) — a recommended public-private sector collaborative 
committee, to be chaired by Treasury to facilitate financial system innovation and enable 
timely and coordinated policy and regulatory responses. 
insolvency — a situation where an entity has insufficient assets to cover the value of its 
liabilities, resulting in an inability to meet its financial obligations as they fall due. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — an international organisation of 188 member 
countries that was established to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange 
stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; foster economic growth and high levels of 
employment; and provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance 
of payments adjustments. 
internal ratings-based (IRB) — an approach allowed under the Basel II guidelines, where 
major banks use their own risk models to calculate risk weights for the purposes of 
regulatory capital requirements. 
Know Your Client (KYC) — customer identity verification requirements applied under 
anti-money laundering legislation. 
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lender — a person or institution that provides loans on agreed terms to borrowers. 
leverage — the amount of debt used to finance an asset. A firm with significantly more 
debt than equity is considered to be highly leveraged. 
liquidity — the capacity to sell an asset quickly without significantly affecting the price of 
that asset. Liquidity is also sometimes used to refer to assets that are highly liquid. 
liquidity management — activities within a financial institution to ensure that holdings of 
liquid assets (for example cash, bank deposits and other financial assets) are sufficient to 
meet its obligations as they fall. 
longevity risk — the uncertainty about how long a particular person (or group of people) 
will live. For an individual, it is the risk of outliving their savings. For providers of 
guaranteed retirement income products, it is the risk recipients will live longer, and draw 
more benefits, than the provider has allowed for. 
lump sum — an amount of a superannuation benefit paid to a fund member as a 
stand‐alone cash amount. Benefits can be paid as one or more lump sums. 
monetary policy — the setting of an appropriate level of the cash rate target by the Reserve 
Bank of Australia to maintain the rate of inflation in Australia between 2 and 3 per cent 
per annum on average over the business cycle. 
myGov — a secure single sign-on site that allows users to access a range of Australian 
Government services. 
MySuper — low-cost, simple default superannuation products, established as part of the 
Stronger Super reforms announced in 2011. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) — a forum of 
industrial market countries that seeks to encourage economic growth, high employment 
and financial stability among its members and contribute to the economic development of 
less-advanced members and non-member countries. 
Payments System Board (PSB) — created in 1998, within the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA). The PSB is responsible for determining the RBA’s payments system policy so as to 
best contribute to: controlling risk in the financial system; promoting the efficiency of the 
payments system; and promoting competition in the market for payment services, 
consistent with the overall stability of the financial system. Powers to carry out the PSB’s 
policies are vested with the RBA. 
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platforms — administrative services made available by intermediaries for the holding, 
dealing and viewing of investments selected by individual investors. They provide the 
capability for investors to choose investment products and generally offer a range of tools 
to analyse investment portfolios. 
Productivity Commission (PC) — The Productivity Commission is the Australian 
Government's independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and 
environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. Its role is to help governments 
make better policies in the long term interest of the Australian community. 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) — Australia’s central bank. 
retirement phase — the period after an individual has retired from the workforce and 
qualifies for, and may be in receipt of, superannuation benefits. 
Self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) — a superannuation fund with fewer than 
five members, all of whom are trustees or directors of a corporate trustee. 
simple bonds — bonds with certain features including a face value of less than $1,000, a 
maturity of less than 15 years, and being issued by a listed entity or wholly-owned 
subsidiary of one. 
small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) — there are a range of definitions for SMEs 
based on number of employees, turnover and other factors, but in essence the term relates 
to businesses that are not large businesses. 
Stronger Super — the Stronger Super reforms were implemented in response to the Super 
System Review. Reforms include MySuper, SuperStream, strengthening governance and a 
number of measures relating to SMSFs. 
SuperStream — a Stronger Super reform implemented on a transitional basis starting in 
2013. The reform is aimed at improving the efficiency of the superannuation system. Under 
SuperStream, employers must make superannuation contributions on behalf of their 
employees by submitting data and payments electronically in accordance with the 
SuperStream standard. All superannuation funds, including SMSFs, must receive 
contributions electronically in accordance with this standard. 
